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Part I Introduction and Research Methodology 
 
1    Introduction 
 
1.1 Water for Life  
Under the United Nations ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’, the 
principle of life and the dignity of the human person must be the ultimate guiding 
norm for all development policy, including environmental policy. On this basis, 
powerful international interests, public and private, one expected to adapt their 
agendas to serve human needs rather than dominate them. 
The availability and quality of freshwater resources around the world is a 
growing concern to the international community. Despite the academic debate 
regarding the relationship between water and conflict, it is certain that control of the 
world’s limited freshwater resources will continue to be subject to dispute.  
Water is an essential element for life. Water is a primary building block of life. 
Without water there is no life, yet water, despite its creative role, can destroy. The 
Bible opens precisely with the image of the divine spirit hovering over the water at 
the creation of the universe.  
In the Judeo-Christian Holy Book, the Bible, God is presented as the source 
of living water beside which the good man can find life. Because the Bible was 
written in a part of the world where water is scarce, it is not surprising that water 
features significantly in its account of the lives of the people. Due to the scarcity of 
water in the lands of the Scripture, rainfall and an abundance of water was seen as a 
sign of God’s favour and goodness. 
In the accounts of creation contained in the first two chapters of the Bible, it is 
from the midst of the waters that dry land is made to appear, while living reptiles and 
rich life forms are made to swarm the waters. It is also water that moistens the earth 
for other forms of life to appear. 
The principles of sustainability and of the universal destination of the goods of 
creation confirms that people and countries, including future generations, underpins 
the right to fundamental access to those goods which are necessary for their 
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development. As well as the centrality of the human person, this must be foremost in 
any consideration of the issues of water. (Walker-Leigh V. 2003) 
Worldwide, water demands are increasing, groundwater levels are dropping, 
water bodies are increasingly contaminated, and delivery and treatment 
infrastructure is aging. Although wars over water alone have not yet occurred, there 
is ample evidence showing that the lack of clean freshwater has led to intense 
political instability and that violence has occasionally been the result. As water 
quality degrades and quantity diminishes over time, the effect on the stability of a 
region can be unsettling. 
Population growth, a change in consumption habits and a deterioration of 
water quality in some areas are considered the main reasons leading to water 
scarcity. Furthermore, the duality between national and environmental system 
boundaries can cause conflicts. National politics often ignore the fact that people are 
bound together by shared environmental resources. The water resources for 
irrigation are finite, upstream actions effect downstream reservoirs and water 
courses, and droughts have no political boundaries.  
Many consider that water has often been used as a strategic target in war, 
even when water facilities are not targeted; they are often among the first casualties 
of the violence. International efforts to protect and sustain fresh water have focused 
primarily on management practices and policies, rather than prevention of the 
violence and conflict that impacts water supply. Little attention is given to the 
international legal regimes that are designed to protect fresh water, or the 
effectiveness of those regimes. 
The link between natural resources and national security is becoming 
increasingly apparent, and in the case of water, discussions have largely focussed 
on the question of water scarcity and water-stress. These concepts raise visions of a 
world in which conflicts arise over inadequate water supplies. 
Water shortage and the threat of desertification are the major regional 
challenges facing the countries of the Middle-East in the foreseeable future. The 
region’s water supply depends on fluctuations in rainfall, which is in short supply. 
The countries in the region also suffer from lack of storage capacity, to regulate the 
water supply and to bridge over drought and dry cycles.  
Lebanon has a wealth of water resources in its numerous rivers, its 
underground aquifers, and with plentiful rainfall in the winter. The fundamental 
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problem is that more than half of the rainwater flows unexploited into the sea, 
accompanied by poor water management. Finding proper solutions should enable 
Lebanon to meet all its own needs, and be an exporter of hundreds of millions of 
cubic meters of water to its parched neighbours. Despite the lack of development 
plans, South Lebanese water resources are of particular political and strategic 
interest, given they are focussed on the Jordan River Basin and the area around the 
Golan Heights. 
 
1.2 Region Water Sensitivity 
Why does the Middle East dominate the headlines so often? The obvious 
answer is: Oil. Without oil, the economies of many nations would grind to a halt. The 
crucial importance of oil alone ensures that the Middle East will remain in the 
headlines for years.  
This dependence on oil has fundamentally altered the Western nations’ 
relationship with the region, transforming it into a strategically vital part of the world. 
Nations around the world are all affected by what is happening in this volatile region. 
As the amount of available freshwater in the world decreases in quantity and 
quality, protection of this critical resource becomes a matter of international security. 
In the Middle East fresh water may become as important as oil.  
More than anywhere else, the Middle East exemplifies the perils and 
possibilities created by the water crisis. There is scarcely enough freshwater for the 
present population of the Jordan Valley as this study will document.  
Water is a sensitive issue in the parched Middle East and Arab world. Almost 
all the five Arab-Israeli wars fought since Israel’s establishment in 1948 have 
touched on water-related issues. For example, Arab attempts to divert the sources of 
the Jordan River were one of the main factors leading to the 1967 War (LaMotte, 
2002).  
Gleick (1993) describes water resources as military and political goals, using 
the Jordan and Nile as examples, and uses case studies from the Middle East, 
South Asia, and South America as well-known examples of water as a cause of 
armed conflict. Many list the Jordan River as a principal cause of the 1967 war and 
describe water as a causal factor in both the 1967 war and the 1982 Israeli invasion 
of Lebanon (Barrett, 1994).  
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In fact, in the years since Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982, a hydraulic 
imperative theory, which describes the quest for water resources as the motivator for 
Israeli military conquests, both in Lebanon in 1979 and 1982 and earlier, in the 
Golan Heights and West Bank in 1967, was developed in the academic literature and 
the popular press. 
Water-related incidents include the first Arab summit, with the subsequent 
establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964, armed 
escalation between Syria and Israel leading up to the Six-Day War in 1967 and, 
according to some, the war itself, as well as the current impasse over the final status 
of the West Bank. Israel’s incursions into Lebanon and its continued presence 
(Chebaa farms and Kfarchuba hills) there have also been linked to a hydraulic 
imperative. 
1.2.1 Historical Snapshot 
From the beginning of civilization in the Middle East, the limits and fluctuations 
of water resources have played a role in shaping political forces and national 
boundaries. Water availability helped to determine both where and how people lived 
and influenced the way in which they related to each other. Issues of water conflict 
and cooperation have become especially intense with the growth of nationalist 
feelings and populations of the twentieth century.  
These issues are also relevant to current conflict, particularly between Israel, 
Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but they 
may offer new opportunities for dialogue as well. 
Before World War I the Middle East was dominated by the Ottoman Empire, 
the Ottomans who ruled over all the lands, which form the countries whose names 
are now so familiar to everyone. Turkey, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Israel, Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia were ruled by this empire. Within this empire different groups lived in 
relative harmony. About 40% were Turks and 40% Arabs, with the remainder a 
different ethnic groups; Armenians, Jews, Christians and other. 
Things might have continued this way, but at an early stage in World War I, it 
was not clear which side the Ottomans would support. Both the British and the 
Germans approached the Turks. Finally the sultan opted to support the German 
Kaiser, an unwise decision that ultimately led to the birth of many new nations cited 
previously. One of these nations that eventually came into being was the Jewish 
state of Israel, complicating the geopolitical situation in the region.  
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1.2.2 The Jewish state of Israel and water  
Relations between the Arabs and the Israelis concerning water in the years 
after the establishment of Israel were marked by a “proposal-disagreement” scheme. 
As an example, Eric Johnston’s efforts to settle the water issue in the mid-50s failed, 
mostly because as long as the Arabs accepted a plan, Israel would reject it because 
it wasn’t granted access to the Litani waters. And the other way round, the Arabs 
couldn’t say yes to a proposal and decide for example on the Litani due to political 
reasons. This situation did not bring about agreements, but rather increased the 
pressure on both parties. 
At the end of the 19th century Jewish strategic planners already realized the 
importance of water while making the first plans for a new state of Israel. Jewish 
leaders after World War I considered it necessary to extend the plans for Israel to 
important sources in order to keep Israel economically viable (Sabbagh 1994, p. 
505). The Sea of Galilee, the Yarmouk River, the Golan Heights and the Litani River 
were, among other landmarks, supposed to mark the natural border in the north.  
After the San-Remo accord in 1920, which decided on the former territories of 
the Ottoman Empire, Chaim Weizman (Chairman of the World Zionist Organization), 
who later became Israel’s first president, wrote to the British Foreign Secretary, Lord 
Curzon (George Nathaniel Curzon, first Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, 11 January 
1859 – 20 March 1925, was a British Conservative statesman who served as Viceroy 
of India between 1899 and 1905, and Foreign Secretary between 1919 and 1924): 
... The accord draft France proposed not only separates Palestine from the 
Litani River, but also deprives Palestine from the Jordan River sources, the east 
coast of the Sea of Galilee and the entire Yarmouk valley north of the Sykes-Picot 
line. I am quite sure you are aware of the expected bad future the Jewish national 
home would face when that proposal is carried out. You also know the great 
importance of the Litani River, the Jordan River with its tributaries, and the Yarmouk 
River for Palestine. (Eickelpasch, T. 2007) 
He wrote also to the British Minister David George (David Lloyd George, first 
Earl Lloyd-George of Dwyfor, 17 January 1863 – 26 March 1945, was a British 
statesman and the only Welsh Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. He was Prime 
Minister throughout the latter half of World War I and the first four years of the 
subsequent peace, between 1916 and 1922), describing the minimum requirements 
of a Jewish State, stating that: 
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The whole economic future of Palestine is dependent upon its water supply 
for irrigation and for electric power, and the water supply must mainly be derived 
from the slopes of Mount Hermon, from the headwaters of the Jordan and from the 
Litani River in Lebanon ... We consider it essential that the Northern Frontier of 
Palestine should include the Valley of the Litani, for a distance of about 25 miles 
above the bend, and the Western and Southern slopes of Mount Hermon. (Isaac, J. 
and Hosh, L. 1992) 
The Zionist movement, however, faced opposition by the French and was not 
able to extend the borders and reach the Litani River. (Eickelpasch, T. 2007)  
During World War II and its aftermath, investigations and assessments of the 
regions’ resources continued. For example in 1939 Ionide and Hayes published their 
plans, followed by Lowdermilk in 1944, Klab in 1949 and McDonald in 1950. Of these 
plans the Lowdermilk plan caught great attention and was considered the ‘water 
constitution’ by the Jewish. Lowdermilk proposed to use the Dan, Zarqa, Banias, 
Yarmouk and the Hasbani River in Lebanon as contributors to irrigate the Jordan 
Valley. Furthermore, it was suggested that the Litani River should make up an 
artificial lake in northern Palestine from where water could be pumped to the Negev 
Desert in South Palestine. Lowdermilk’s plan failed in the end because Eric Johnston 
in the 1950s, then a special envoy to the Middle East of President Eisenhower’s US 
administration, denied the use of half the flow or more of the Litani River. 
Nonetheless, the Lebanese waters in the South were of interest to the Israelis for 
their purity and surplus (Kolars/Naff, 1993).  
At the end of World War II the situation became even more complicated. The 
new state of Israel was about to come into being and the water needs of the native 
Palestinians and the increasing numbers of immigrating Jews had to be satisfied. 
Besides, the latter were (and to a certain extent are still) not necessarily used to 
water scarcity.    
David Ben Gurion proclaimed Israel as a new sovereign state on May 14, 
1948. The Zionist movement, led by their ideology and motto “to make the desert 
(Negev) bloom”, abandoned further plans of regional development. After a period of 
bargaining for water from 1918 until 1948, Israel began to develop national and 
shared water resources.  
After 1948 Israel was, due to its growing military power, able to annex more 
and more territories. Despite the already mentioned ideological background, Israel 
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thought strategically and practically that obtaining a greater territory promised more 
access to water, which again allowed Jewish farmers to produce better and larger 
crops. Increased agricultural production resulted in a higher capacity for absorption 
of Jewish immigrants to Palestine. And Palestinian farmers, who could not keep up 
with the more advanced Israeli production, ended up in bankruptcy and “had no 
other choice than sell their land to always-ready-to-buy Zionists”. (Sabbagh 1994, p. 
507)  
The foundation of this strategy is not only the acquisition of land, which was 
solvable through military dominance, but also the availability of water. Without it, the 
developmental circle was at stake. This explains why since 1948 and particularly 
after 1967 Israel had confiscated and controlled most of the Arab lands and water 
resources under the title of security reasons or security needs.  
Mr. Y. Shamir, Prime Minister of Israel in 1990, summarized this policy in the 
sentence: “Great Aliya (immigration) needs great Israel”. This means that great 
immigration needs all water resources in the occupied territories to still are under the 
control of Israel. On the same principle “Aliya in the future needs new water 
resources and new lands, otherwise Israel will be in a water crisis!” (ibid. p. 513) 
Earlier Moshe Sharett, Israeli Foreign Minister at the time, said: 
“All those wishing to win our cooperation in this sphere must realize one thing. 
For Israel, water is no luxury, not even merely a highly desirable and useful addition 
to our system of natural resources. Water for us is life itself. It is food for the people 
and not food alone.” (Sharett, 1953) 
The diaries of Moshe Sharett, Prime Minister of Israel in the mid-1959s, reveal 
that David Ben-Gurion (the first Prime Minister of Israel), and Moshe Dayan (Israel’s 
chief of Staff and later Defence Minister) were strong advocates of an Israeli 
occupation of southern Lebanon up to the Litani River. Sharett quotes Dayan as 
having said in 1954: 
“... The only thing that’s necessary is to find an (Lebanese) officer, even just a 
Major. We should either win his heart or buy him with money, to make him agree to 
declare himself the saviour of the (Christian) Maronite population. Then the Israeli 
army will enter Lebanon, will occupy the necessary territory, and will create a 
Christian regime which will ally itself with Israel. The territory from the Litani 
southward will be totally annexed to Israel and everything will be all right”. (See 
appendix 2, annex 2) 
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Both Chain Weizman (Head of the World Zionist Organization) and David Ben 
Gurion claimed the Litani Basin as part of Israel’s ancestral rights. Additionally, 
Moshe Dayan was a long-time advocate of Israeli sovereignty over the Litani. 
Since the water has continued to play a key role in Israeli history. For example in the 
1960s Israeli warplanes bombed a Jordanian dam project on the nearby Yarmuk 
River, a tributary of the Jordan. The hydraulic imperative theory noted earlier, was 
seen to explain the quest for water resources as the motivator for Israeli military 
conquests, both in Lebanon in 1979 and 1982 and earlier, on the Golan Heights and 
West Bank in 1967.  
The May 1991 issue of Geographical magazine ran a series of articles related 
to “water wars” and hydro-politics, including a piece on the Middle East, “where 
conditions for water-related tension are perfect”. Authors writing in this vein cite the 
importance of aridity, internationally shared rivers, rapid population growth, and 
unfriendly political relations among the riparian states. Aridity and population growth 
appear often as key contributors to potential water wars, in a modified form of 
environmental determinism, which conceptualizes that environmental factors strongly 
influence human actions. In a similar fashion, other articles such as “Where Dams 
Cause Wars” link water development projects in the region with the potential for 
violent conflict. In 2002 Israel threatened Lebanon with war if it completed a project 
on the Wazzani, a tributary of the Hasbani River that flows into the Sea of Galilee, 
Israel’s main water supply. Lebanon claimed that it could not use the Litani River as 
a water supply because it is too polluted. (Yoffe and Wolf. 2002) 
 
1.3 An alternative to conflict  
On April 1998 a workshop on Middle Eastern water problems was held in 
Nicosia, Cyprus, organized by an institute affiliated with the University of California at 
San Diego. The mission of the institute and the workshop was to search for solutions 
to regional conflicts, based on scientific research and meetings between scientists 
from both sides of the national divide. Researchers, engineers, politicians and 
managers, from the U.S.A., Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and Jordan, participated 
in the workshop. (Prof Issar. 1998) 
          After preliminary statements, the Palestinian representative said that, in 
accord with the Oslo agreements, in which Israel recognizes the rights of the 
Palestinians to domestic water supplies, and on the basis of predicted population 
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increase and rising standards of living, the Authority requests permission to draw on 
water from the Uplands Aquifer for the next decade at a rate of 200 Million Cubic 
Meters per year (Mm3/yr), and within 20 years, 400 Mm3/yr. The Palestinians request 
was strongly opposed, on the grounds that this water is about one third of the overall 
water usage of the State of Israel.  
To replace this source, Israel would have to desalinate sea water-meaning an 
annual loss of $200 million, even rising to $400 million later on. The American 
intermediary proposed an economic compromise. He noted that Israel’s GNP 
reaches some $100 billion, so that $200-400 million represents only 0.2 to 0.4% of 
GNP. He noted that the sum lost by Israel through the theft of motor vehicles and 
their smuggling over the border, reached some $400 million per year, and proposed 
that the Palestinian Authority takes steps to stop the theft; the U.S.A. offered Israel 
low cost credit to start construction of a desalination plant to produce 200 Mm3/yr. 
When the plant commenced production, Israel would allow the Palestinians to draw 
this amount of water from the Uplands Aquifer. In the first stage, Israel would gain 
$200 million/year, and in the future, when the Palestinians would want to pump the 
full amount, the two sides would enter fresh negotiations. The Palestinian agreed, 
but claimed that since the border between Israel and the Autonomy was highly 
convoluted, the Palestinian police would be unable to close it off to the smuggling of 
vehicles. The only way would be to shorten the border by the dismantling of isolated 
Jewish settlements stuck in the middle of the Arab population. The Israeli stated that 
the settlements were important for security and defense of the water sources. The 
Palestinian replied that their removal and the resultant shortening of the border 
would also improve Israel’s security. Thus, the debate slid into a well known weary 
pattern. (Ibid. 1998)  
When the Centre for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University completed a 
major research project on the implications of a complete withdrawal from the 
Occupied Territories for Israel in early 1992, publication of the report was censored 
by the director of the Israeli Water authority and the then Minister of Agriculture, 
Rafael Eitan. Eitan reportedly said that it was not the business of an academic study 
to define a territorial settlement in the region. The study demonstrated that even with 
complete withdrawal from the Occupied Territories, Israel would still be able to 
prosper with adequate water supplies. The former director of the Israeli Water 
Authority, Kentor Cohen, believed it was “strange” that the military censors would 
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have a problem with the report, noting that “... people who say that Israel cannot 
return the occupied territories because of water are politicians not experts in water 
issues ... The experts don’t say that.” (Ibid. 1998) 
The Jordan River basin includes portions of Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon 
and the Palestinian Territories (the West Bank and Gaza Strip). Through military 
action in the Arab-Israel wars of 1967 and 1973, Israel has come to control a 
significant part of the basin, leaving water-short Jordan in a vulnerable position. In 
October 1994 the political situation in the region changed and Israel and Jordan 
signed a Peace Accord. As part of this treaty, Israel promised to provide an 
additional 50 million cubic meters (Mm3) water a year to its Arab neighbour. Israel’s 
commitment to supply Jordan with extra water is now considered fixed, since any 
deviation from the agreement will aggravate the already acute water shortage in the 
Hashemite Kingdom. 
The water-related part of the 1994 treaty is especially significant because it 
opens the door to increased cooperation in water matters between two traditionally 
hostile countries. However, Israel and Jordan continue to disagree over the 
implementation of the treaty.  
Under the Oslo agreement of 1995, Israel allowed Palestinians in the West 
Bank to abstract up to 80 million cubic meters a year (Mm3/yr). From the western 
aquifer, recognizing for the first time that the Palestinians have legitimate water 
rights in the West Bank.  
 
1.4 Research Goals 
After examining the availability of water resources, limited co-operation and 
water use and management in Israel and Lebanon, the aim of this research is to 
identify issues in the disputes that have arisen, to explore some alternative scenarios 
that could lead to the solution of the complex problems related to water supply, and 
to recommend processes through which the countries concerned are likely to agree 
to mutually satisfactory solutions to the problems.  
This thesis explores how the effective management of water resources in 
Israel and Lebanon can provide domestic and regional benefits, and examines 
whether an economic framework can assist such effective management. Instead of 
considering water as a cause of political tension and even of armed conflict, is it 
possible to be promoted as a ‘vital element’ toward peace? 
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This thesis considers whether there is some possibility for ‘mutually 
advantageous bargaining and exchange’ between Lebanon and its neighbours, 
especially Israel, over water resources, that might prevent future conflicts over this 
contentious issue. The intersection between cultural-values (religions background), 
science and development, is discussed.  
This Thesis explores the following questions:  
a. Is there a water “problem” between Israel and Lebanon?  
b. Given that most conventions and treaties were designed to cover conflicts of 
an international character, and that the concept of war is changing, and the 
term is used more often today in the international war against terrorism, does 
the existing body of laws provide an adequate degree of protection, and is 
there any weakness in the existing ones?  
c. Can economic considerations alone provide an acceptable solution to water 
allocation problems? 
d. Could mutually advantageous bargaining over water have wider implications 
for peace between the relevant countries? 
e. Can religion contribute to a satisfactory solution to water allocation problems?  
 
1.5 Thesis outline and structure 
This thesis is structured as follows:  
First Part: This part includes Chapter two, which is divided in two sections: the 
introductory section explores the thesis goals and objectives. The second section 
highlights the methodology, methods that are chosen, and the reasons for these 
choices.  
  Second Part: Freshwater resources status and availability, water allocation 
and water management, main freshwater problems as well as present and future 
policy plan towards conservation, use efficiency and water quality, are discussed in 
depth in this part, which comprises chapters three (Israel) and four (Lebanon).  
Third Part: This part includes the fifth chapter (Political, Legal, Economic and 
Religious issues in water allocation), which considers the present state of water 
under international law, current problems and weaknesses in existing law, and 
outlines principles of customary law and the existing international conventions and 
protocols in this area. This section focuses on the relationship between water and 
conflicts, and tries to answer the question of adequacy of protection and weakness in 
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the existing law. Furthermore, it examines the relationship between water scarcity, 
availability and conflicts. 
After explaining the relationship between Externalities, Property Rights and 
Economic Efficiency models (Efficiency in Exchange, and Efficient Allocations), this 
section explores the role of strategic behaviour and bargaining strategy, and 
discusses the potential gains to cooperation and international agreements. It finally 
highlights the role of some key religions in this matter; the Islamic point of view 
(based on Shari’a), the Vatican’s position, and the Jewish perspective. 
This part also contains Chapter 6, which includes a case study showing that 
despite an existing conflict between two parties, there is a high probability of 
reaching an understanding and/or an agreement. This is achievable, in particular, 
when the limits and fluctuations of water resources play a role in shaping political 
forces and national boundaries, and when the issue of water availability determines 
both where and how people live and influences the way in which they relate to each 
other.  
Furthermore, this part contains chapter 7 which highlights the different 
perspectives that can be of high value in the contribution to the solution model (road 
map) that being developed in chapter 8.  
Fourth Part: After highlighting in brief the lessons learned from previous 
chapter 6, and taking into consideration the discussions and the different points of 
view mentioned in chapter 7, chapter 8 (Managing Water Resources, Co-operation 
or Conflict) discusses the importance of co-operation by working towards finding 
common grounds between the concerned parties, starting with:  
- Firstly, by recognizing the religious-cultural, and values system background 
of each group;   
- Secondly, by examining whether the paradigms used for negotiations are 
“rights-based” or “needs-based”;  
- Thirdly, by showing that economic consideration alone may not provide an 
acceptable solution to water allocation problems, especially to solve water 
allocation disputes between concerned nations;  
- Finally, by acknowledging the raised issues, this study concludes by the 
identification of common denominators, which should be considered as a 
stepping stone to another level of in-depth discussions and negotiations 
between the relevant countries. 
13 
 
2 Methodological Aspects 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
From case studies to econometric analysis, policy research has a long 
tradition of employing both qualitative and quantitative methods, but the usual 
apposition of qualitative research against quantitative research makes it easy to miss 
the fact that qualitative research itself covers a multitude of different approaches. 
Qualitative work can be positivist: It can attempt to document practices that 
lead consistently to one set of outcomes rather than another, to identify 
characteristics that commonly are related to some policy problem, or to find strategic 
patterns that hold across different venues and with different actors. Qualitative work 
also can be interpretive: It can seek to understand what general concepts like 
poverty or race mean in their specific operation, to uncover the conscious and 
unconscious explanations people have for what they do or believe, or to capture and 
reproduce a particular time, culture, or place so that actions people take become 
understandable. 
Understanding the fundamental assumptions behind a research is essential in 
order to justify the methodologies and methods to be employed in the research 
design. Justification of the methodological choice should relate to the theoretical 
perspective that underpins the research (Crotty, 1998). This study is therefore 
structured into three main measures:  
- Analyses of the assessment of freshwater resources in Israel, Lebanon and 
the Palestinians’ territories (West Bank and the Gaza Strip);  
- Assessing the international law position, the socio-economic perspective and 
the culture-religions consideration;  
- An analysis of the state of conflict or co-operation between parties.  
 
2.2 Research Paradigm 
 There are two main research paradigms or philosophies which can be labelled 
positivist and phenomenological. The first give greater priority to the external reality, 
facts and linear causality; the latter gives greater priority to meanings, inter-linkages 
and understand reality as something that is constructed by the observer and involved 
actors. 
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When the research’s goal is to develop a conceptual model for the purpose of 
building theory around a particular phenomenon or process, an interpretive approach 
(phenomenological) utilising a qualitative methodology is more appropriate. 
However, if the primary goal of the research problem is to test the validity of a model 
where all the variables which influence a phenomenon or process are already 
known, then a quantitative methodology (positivist) may be more appropriate.  
In fact, different kind of terminology are used in describing these two terms, 
table 2.2.a shows alternative terms for the main research paradigms. 
 
Table 2.2.a  
Positivist Paradigm   Phenomenological Paradigm 
Quantitative    Qualitative 
Objectivist    Subjectivist 
Scientific    Humanistic 
Experimentalist   Interpretivist 
Traditionalist          
Source: Adapted from Collis J. and Hussey R. (2003) p. 47.  
 
Qualitative research methodology is not suited for all research problems, and 
one must take into account the research goals as well as the research philosophy 
and epistemology driving the research. In situations where a review of the extant 
literature does not reveal significant attempts at constructing a theoretical model of a 
phenomenon, the researcher may wish to take an alternative research approach to 
the more traditional quantitative techniques in order to uncover concepts and 
construct a conceptual model and build theory within a specific context. 
Positivists believe that science and the process of research is value-free. 
Therefore, positivists consider that they are detached from what they are researching 
and regard the phenomena which are the focus of their research as objects. 
Positivists are interested in the interrelationship of the objects they are studying and 
believe that these objects were present before they took an interest in them. 
Furthermore, positivists believe that the objects they are studying are unaffected by 
their research activities and will still be present after the study has been completed. 
These assumptions are commonly found in research studies in the natural sciences, 
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but they are less convincing in the social sciences which are concerned with the 
activities and behaviour of people. (Collis, J. and Hussey, R. 2003) 
At the other extreme, phenomenologists consider that researchers have 
values, even if they don’t show them. These values help to determine what are 
recognised as facts and the interpretations which are drawn from them. They believe 
that the researcher is involved with that which is being researched. Furthermore the 
main criticisms of the positivistic paradigm are (ibid. 2003):  
a. It is impossible to treat people as being separate from their social contexts 
and they cannot be understood without examining the perceptions they 
have of their own activities. 
b. A highly structured research imposes certain constraints on the results and 
may ignore more relevant and interesting findings. 
c. Researchers are not objective, but part of what they observe. They bring 
their own interests and values to the research. 
d. Capturing complex phenomena in a single measure is, at best, misleading. 
For example, is it possible to assign a numerical value to a person’s 
intelligence?  
 
Table 2.2.b Features of the two paradigms 
Positivistic paradigm        Phenomenological paradigm 
Tends to produce quantitative data     Tends to produce qualitative data 
Uses large samples        Uses small samples 
Concerned with hypothesis testing     Concerned with generating theories 
Data is highly specific and precise     Data is rich and subjective 
The location is artificial       The location is natural 
Reliability is high        Reliability is low 
Validity is low        Validity is high 
Generalises from sample to population     Generalises from one setting to another 
Source: Adapted from Collis, J. and Hussey, R. 2003, pp.55.  
 
Table 2.2.b shows the main features of the two paradigms. It is important to 
mention in this context that the type of methodology should reflect the assumptions 
of the research paradigm. For example, an experiment conducted in a laboratory to 
measure the productivity of workers where the temperature of the room is 
16 
 
deliberately varied would be positivistic. However, some methodologies can be used 
under either a positivistic or a phenomenological paradigm, depending on the 
assumptions used by the researcher.   
 
2.4 Research Approach 
  Approach, strategy and method are hierarchically dependent on each other. 
There are two basic research approaches (positivist and phenomenological) within 
which different research strategies are used, each strategy makes use of different or 
all research techniques.  
Two types of case studies were conducted in this research; the Johnston 
Negotiations, and the Yarmouk River negotiations. Using existing literature, the 
development and effectiveness were analysed in chapter 5, which considers the 
present state of water under international law, current problems and weaknesses in 
existing law, and outlines principles of customary law and the existing international 
conventions and the relevant protocols in this area.  
This research then shows in chapter 5 the role of strategic behaviour and 
bargaining strategy, and discusses the potential gains to cooperation and to 
international agreements ending by explaining the role of religion in this matter; the 
Islamic point of view, which is based on Shari’a, the Vatican’s position, and the 
Jewish perspective. 
The main purpose was to test the working hypotheses and reach the third 
objective of the research: the identification of general lessons on conflict 
prevention/resolution and cooperation. Each new case study gave rise to some 
modifications or additions to the set of hypotheses. This new set then formed the 
starting point for the next case study. The end results are the lessons learned in 
section 8.4 and the key messages presented in section 8.5 in chapter 8 of this study. 
Diagram 2.4.1 summarizes the different levels of the research approach, 
strategy and research technique or method. In order to position this study in the 
context of social and natural science approach, the approaches, strategies and 
techniques used in this study are marked in bold. As the study progressed, the 
phenomenological approach became increasingly significant. 
This research uses a case study strategy as a start and for the next stage 
uses elements of action research in the form of Dialogue Workshop. 
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Diagram 2.4.1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Mason, 2004 
 
Case Study Method:  
The case study is an extensive examination of a single instance of a 
phenomenon of interest and is an example of a phenomenological methodology.  
The case study method investigates a phenomenon within its real-life context, 
where multiple sources of evidence are used to construct or inform the phenomenon. 
One of the decisions that the researcher must make using this method should take 
into consideration whether to conduct a single case or multiple cases.  
Although a case study approach is a very satisfying methodology, there are some 
weaknesses. Access to suitable information is sometimes difficult and the process 
can be very time consuming, as confronted in this study when collecting information 
particularly about Lebanon in chapter four. 
The strategy used in this research belongs to the category of in-depth case 
studies which is discussed in chapter six.  
Ethnography 
Ethnography is an approach in which the researcher uses socially acquired and 
shared knowledge to understand the observed patterns of human activity. The 
researcher can obtain firsthand experience of the context being studied, and better 
Research Approach 
Phenomenological  Positivist Paradigm 
Research Strategy 
Case Studies Ethnography Surveys Experiment 
Research Methods 
Grounded theory* Action Research  Sampling Observations 
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understand and interpret the phenomena being examined. This is exactly what 
happened during the making of chapter five especially section 5.6. 
On the other hand when conducting ethnographical studies a number of 
problems the researcher faces; the issue of whether the particular setting or group 
reflects the research interest and whether it will be possible to generalise from the 
findings. 
Action Research 
Action research is the approach which assumes that the social world is constantly 
changing. It is a type of applied research designed to find an effective way of 
bringing about a conscious change in a partly controlled environment (Collis J. and 
Hussey R., 2003).  
Accordingly, this thesis tries to highlight two of the characteristics that cope with 
this type of research: 
- The investigation of the whole complex problem; 
- Taking into consideration the fact that the action research is primarily applicable 
to the understanding and planning of change in social systems. 
 In addition, the methodology used in this research should not be judged solely by 
the criteria used for the positivistic paradigm, but by a criterion more appropriate. 
Grounded Theory and Observations 
Grounded theory is an approach for looking systematically at qualitative data 
aiming at the generation of theory. Sometimes, grounded theory is seen as a 
qualitative method, but grounded theory reaches further: it combines a specific style 
of research (or a paradigm) with pragmatic theory of action and with some 
methodological guidelines (wikipedia.org, 2008). 
The grounded theory approach is the only part which could not be in-depth 
tackled during this research, actually in chapter 7 this thesis showed different 
perspectives, which can be considered as observations. These points of views 
consist of personal comments, opinions and discussions based on meetings and 
discussions with key figures in Lebanon during different visits to Lebanon between 
2006 and 2008, especially after the armed conflict that took place in July 2006 
between Israel and Lebanon. 
This research opens the way for another level of discussions, by taking into 
account the elements cited in this chapter and in this thesis as a whole, particularly 
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in chapter eight, in order to be used basically during a brain storming approach in the 
proposed future Workshops’ Dialogue.  
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Part II Freshwater Resources in Israel and 
Lebanon; Facts and Availability 
 
3 Israel 
 
“For Israel, water is no luxury, not even merely a highly desirable and useful 
addition to our system of natural resources. Water for us is life itself. It is food for the 
people and not food alone…” (Sharett M., 1953, see appendix 2, annex 2) 
 
3.1 Introduction  
The State of Israel is a country in the Western Asian Levant, on the south-
eastern edge of the Mediterranean Sea. It borders Lebanon on the north, Syria and 
Jordan on the east, and Egypt on the south-west (see appendix 2, Annex 1, Fig. 1).  
Israel is one of the most densely populated countries in the world, and yet 
only 20% of the land is arable, and half of that has to be irrigated. More than half of 
Israel is arid or semi-arid, and steep hillsides and forests dominate the rest of the 
country. Israel also has striking rainfall inequalities, while the north of the country 
enjoys a relatively generous rainfall between 700 and 1000 millimetres each year, 
the central region receives around 500 millimetres and the south only 25-30 
millimetres annually. 
Israel is an arid country, with the desert occupying more than 50% of its land 
area. Similar conditions exist in other countries in the region. Israel has a surface 
area of about 20,770 km2 and a population of about 6.3 million. Annual rainfall 
ranges from nearly 1,000 mm in the north to 30 mm in the south, and nearly all of it 
falls within the four-month period from November through February, with quantities 
fluctuating from year to year. 
Due to global warming and frequent droughts, the regime of the natural flows 
is decreasing despite the limits on water withdrawal. At the same time, the inflow of 
pollutants from human activity and negligence above the aquifers is increasing, 
resulting in the increase of mineral and other pollutants in the groundwater. Due to 
unbalanced exploitation and return flow from irrigation, an increase in the salinity of 
the groundwater has occurred in many wells. 
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Today, all obvious feasible resources are exploited, including springs, 
groundwater reservoirs, aquifers and the Jordan River system. At the same time, as 
a result of accelerated population, industrial and agricultural growth, the coastal 
aquifer has been increasingly threatened by contamination from chemical and 
microbial pollutants, salinity, nitrates, heavy metals, fuels and toxic organic 
compounds. 
 
3.2 Israel Freshwater  
  Annual water availability is estimated at approximately 2,000 million cubic 
meters per year (Mm3/yr), of which about 1,600 Mm3 is potable water and the rest is 
brackish and other marginal water sources. Both water resource development and 
consumption have grown rapidly since the establishment of the State of Israel in 
1948. (IMFA 2002) 
The depletion of the country’s main water sources is worsened by the 
deteriorating quality of water resources due to demographic, industrial and 
agricultural pressures and to overexploitation of the country’s water reservoirs 
beyond the natural replenishment rate. 
Israel’s total water consumption today stands at around 1,850 Mm3 of water 
per year. Water demand and consumption are increasing, exceeding the capacity of 
the natural sources, which are being depleted. Water quality in the sources is 
deteriorating, due to over-exploitation and intensive human activity. In 1997, the 
quantity stored in reservoirs was 1,000 Mm3 compared to the average supply of 
1,800 Mm3 within the “green line” boundaries (1967 borders) and 2,100 Mm3 
between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean. (Keren Kayemeth LeYisrael-
Jewish National Fund (KKL-JNF), 2008) 
According to the UN water index, Israel suffers from a severe water shortage. 
UN criteria define the minimum quantity of water necessary as 500 cubic meters per 
person per year. Israel’s water sources can supply only 200 cubic meters per year, 
only 40% of what the UN considers minimal. By the year 2020 the population of 
Israel is expected to have grown by another three million. This means that the 
country will require another 300 Mm3 of drinking water in order to cope with this 
population growth and the ever-rising standard of living. (ibid, 2008) 
The total average annual potential of renewable water amounts to some 1,800 
Mm3, of which about 95% is already exploited and used for domestic consumption 
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and irrigation. About 80% of the water potential is in the north of the country and only 
20% in the south. The amount of water consumed is greater than the amount of 
water collected from rainfall. In a drought year, the situation worsens, because the 
amount of water in reservoirs and the amount of water flowing in rivers and streams 
is significantly decreased. (ibid, 2008) 
3.2.1 Freshwater resources (See Appendix 2, Annex 1, Map 4) 
Israel gets most of its fresh water from three sources: Lake Kinneret (see 
Appendices 2, annex 3, parts a and b) otherwise known as the Sea of Galilee (figure 
3.2.a): the Coastal Aquifer along the coastal plain of the Mediterranean Sea; and the 
Mountain Aquifer, under the central north-south (Carmel) mountain range. Additional 
smaller regional resources are located in the Upper Galilee, Western Galilee, Beit 
Shean Valley, Jordan Valley, the Dead Sea Rift, the Negev and the Arava. In 
addition, it has made increasing use of recycled sewage water, amounting to 453 
Mm3/year. (IMFA 2002) 
 
Fig. 3.2.a: the Golan Heights water surface and the Sea of Galilee 
 
Source: http://www.d-n-i.net, 2007  
 
 
The Hasbani is a Lebanese river that 
merges with the Dan and the Banias River 
to make the Jordan River. This river flows 
from the Wazzani source at the foot of 
Mount Hermon. 
Golan Heights, Water Surface. 
Lake Kinneret or the Sea of Galilee is 
Israel’s largest freshwater lake. It is 
approximately 53 km (33 miles) in 
circumference, about 21 km (13 miles) 
long, and 13 km (8 miles) wide; it has a 
total area of 166 km², and a maximum 
depth of approximately 43 m. 
In Northern Israel near kibbutz Sede 
Nehemya, the Upper Jordan River drops 
rapidly in a 75 km run to swampy Lake 
Hula, which is slightly below sea level in the 
Galilee sea area. 
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One third of the sewage water is treated and used for irrigation, mainly in the 
arid Negev region, where agricultural land in the centre of the country gives way to 
urban sprawl (International Development Research Centre (IDRC), 2008). 
About one-third of the State of Israel’s national water consumption, some 600 
Mm3/year, of water is generated from the Upper Cretaceous aquifers (often referred 
to as the Mountain Aquifer) that are recharged along the axial part of the Samarian-
Judean Anticlinorium running along the north-south direction through most of the 
West Bank territory. 
 
Table 3.2.a: Groundwater balance for the seven major basins (2000/2001) 
    Description 
 
Basin 
Total water 
extraction(1) 
Artificial 
recharge 
Total 
spring 
flow(2) 
Yield(3)  Long term 
average 
replenishment 
Coastal 
Aquifer 
476 122 0 476 283 
Yarqon-
Taninim 
374 0 20 394 350 
Western 
Galilee 
96 0 12 108 153 
Mount 
Carmel 
35 0 3 38 47 
Kinneret 62 0 276 338 580 
Eastern 
Mountain 
149 0 190 339 367 
Negev and 
Arava 
85 0 0 85 55 
Total 1277 122 501 1778 1835 
Source: SEMIDE/EMWIS Water context, 2002  
Notes: (1) Include Saline water extraction.  
(2) Include Saline spring flow.  
(3) Total water extraction + Total spring flow.  
 
Table 3.2.a shows the seven major groundwater basins in Israel (noting, no 
current figures) Groundwater recharged along the high ridges of the “Anticlinorium 
axis” diverges into three directions along the structural slopes.  
To the west the Turonian-Cenomanian aquifer (also called Western Basin or 
Yarqon-Tannimin Aquifer) towards the Coastal Plain, to the east (Eastern Basin) 
towards the Jordan-Dead Sea through, and to the north (North-eastern Basin) 
draining towards Valley of Jezreel (Esdraelon) and Beit Shean Valley (see Appendix 
2, annex 3, part c, d and e). 
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3.2.1 Water distribution  
A Government-owned company called Mekorot Water Company (Ltd) is 
considered as Israel’s national water company. 
 
Table 3.2.b Facts and Figures 
Annual water supply  1,500 Mm3 (70% of national consumption and 80% of drinking water) 
Wastewater reuse: 60% of treated wastewater 
Sewage treatment: 40% of overall sewage  
Customers 4,800 municipalities, local councils, agriculture settlements, kibbutzim and 
regional associations, who in turn supply water to Israel’s citizens, farmers and 
industries 
Employees 2,150 
Founded 1937 
Ownership Fully owned by the State of Israel 
Financial information Sales: more than US$ 700 million per year 
Shareholders’ equity: US$ 500 million 
Balance sheet total: more than US$ 3 billion 
Physical plant Production and supply facilities: 3,000 
Control centres: 8 
Water pipes: 10,500 Kilometres (Km) 
Desalination plants: 31. A 100 Mm3/yr seawater desalination plants is under 
construction in Ashdod that will be operational in 2011. 
Sewage treatment plants: 6 
Reused wastewater projects: 10 
Filtration plants: 8. Including a 500 Mm3/yr filtration plant company’s Eshkol 
facility 
Pumping units: 1,822 
Pumping stations: 659 
Reservoirs: 91 
Wells: 1,042 
Tanks: 637 (500 m3and above) 
Reclamation projects: 10 
Water quality laboratories: 6 
Water testing Water samples taken: 40,000 annually 
Laboratory analysis: 190,000 annually 
Source: Adopted from Mekorot, 2008  
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Table 3.2.b shows the company figures and facts as of 31/12/2006. Founded 
in 1937, its objective is to develop the country’s water supply systems. Mekorot is the 
national water authority under the Water Law, 1959, and operates the nationwide 
water system, which includes the National Water Carrier. It is responsible for 
managing the country’s water resources, developing new sources and ensuring 
regular delivery of water to all localities for all purposes. Mekorot is in charge of the 
wholesale supply of water to urban communities, industries and agricultural users. 
Mekorot produces and supplies about two-thirds of the total amount of water used in 
Israel. The remainder is provided through privately owned facilities. (Mekorot, 2008) 
3.2.2 The National Water Carrier  
Commissioned in 1964, the National Water Carrier (Figure 3.2.b) represents 
most of the country’s fresh water resources. The shortage of water in the southern, 
semi-arid region of Israel required the construction of an extensive water-delivery 
system that supplies water to this region from resources in the north.  
The National Water Carrier supplies a blend of surface and groundwater. 
Water not required by consumers is recharged into the aquifer through spreading 
basins and dual-purpose wells. Recharging of aquifers helps to prevent evaporation 
losses, in the coastal area, and intrusion of seawater. 
The main function of the Carrier is to convey water to the southern region of 
the country from the Sea of Galilee (Hebrew, Yam Kinneret, and Lake Kinneret) in 
the north. The original plan was to draw water from the Jordan River before it 
entered the lake. 
The first stages of the groundwork began in 1953. However, because of 
strong opposition by Syria and a United Nations resolution, Israel was forced to 
suspend work and modify the initial design. The final plans were approved in 1956, 
and the National Water Carrier was completed and functioning by 1964.  
The Carrier is a combination of underground pipelines, open canals, interim 
reservoirs and tunnels. Water from the lake is lifted by the Sapir Pumping Station (4 
x 6.75 m3/sec) from -213 to +44 meters, discharging via an open canal (Jordan 
Canal), along 17 km into the Tsalmon Reservoir (1 Mm3). From there, the Tsalmon 
Pumping Station lifts the water from +37 to 152 meters through Yaakov Tunnel (850 
m long), into Bet Natufa Canal (17 km long), and discharges it into the Eshkol 
Reservoirs. (Dr. Sitton D. 2002) 
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Fig. 3.2.b: Israel’s National Water Carrier 
  
Source: Sitton D. 2003 
 
At the Eshkol site, the canal widens to form a settling basin with a volume of 
1.2 Mm3 (600x500x4.5 m) and a reservoir with a storage volume of 3.8 Mm3. From 
the reservoir, water flows into the National Carrier made of a closed 108" pipeline 
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laid over a distance of 86 km, branching near Rosh Haayin into two Yarkon branches 
(66" and 70") until it reaches Mitzpe Ramon, 280 kilometers south of Lake Kinneret. 
In addition to the Sea of Galilee, two large aquifers, the Mountain Aquifer and 
the Coastal Aquifer, contribute some 350 Mm3 and 250 Mm3 respectively, to the 
National Water Carrier each year. The National Water Carrier supplies a total of 
1,000 major consumers, including 18 municipalities and 80 local authorities. In 1996, 
a total of 730 Mm3 of water was supplied to consumers, of which 450 Mm3 was 
supplied for domestic and industrial purposes. (ibid. 2002) 
The National Water Carrier functions not only as the main supplier of water, 
but also as an outlet for surplus water from the north in winter and early spring, as 
well as a source of recharge to the underground aquifers in the coastal region. Most 
of the regional water systems are incorporated into the National Water Carrier to 
form a well-balanced network in which water can be shifted from one line to another 
according to conditions and needs. 
3.2.3 Water supply and demand  
Israel water sources are primarily dependent on annual replenishment 
through rainfall. This is problematic because of various factors, the most important 
being short-term climatic variability and the possibility of longer term periods of 
significant declines resulting from prolonged drought. For example the Sea of Galilee 
has had annual inflows ranging from a low of 100 Mm3 in drought years (in 1991) to 
a high of 1 500 Mm3. (IMFA 2002) 
In recent years, the water supply in Israel has reached a stage of critically 
fragile balance between supply and demand as a result of several factors (KKL-JNF. 
2008):  
- A sequence of drought years, resulting in inadequate replenishment of water 
reservoirs (both surface and underground aquifers) in combination with over-
pumping of the already dwindling water reserves; 
- Rapid increase in population due to immigration (from 4.8 million in 1990 to 
6.3 million in 2000, 31% increase in 10 years), leading to increased water 
consumption for domestic use; 
- Delays in the commissioning of large-scale projects of reclamation and 
purification of urban sewage water and construction of plants for desalination 
of seawater. 
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Annual water demand amounts to about 2100 Mm3/year, of which about one 
half is used for agriculture and the remainder is used by the urban and industrial 
sectors (Table 3.2.c). 
 
Table 3.2.c: Water Supply (1998, 2010 and 2020) 
         E. P. /Year* 
               (Million)          
Water 
Supply (Mm3) 
 
6.0 / 1998 
 
 
7.4 / 2010 
 
8.6 / 2020 
Surface Water 640 645 660 
Ground Water 1050 1050 1075 
Brackish 140 165 180 
Treated Effluents 260 470 565 
Desalination 10 100 200 
Total 2100 2430 2680 
Source: IMFA, 2002 
* Estimated Population for the years 1998, 2010 and 2020.  
 
 
Table 3.2.d: Water Demand (1998, 2005, 2010 and 2020) 
             Year 
Water 
Sources (Mm3) 
 
1998 
 
2005 
 
2010 
 
2020 
Urban 800 980 1060 1330 
Sector 920 750 680 600 
Natural Effluents 120 95 75 60 
Brackish 260 380 490 640 
Wastewater 1300 1225 1245 1300 
Total 2100 2430 2680 2680 
Source: IMFA, 2002 
 
Regarding domestic consumption, public waterworks, supplying an average of 
about 250 litres per capita per day, serves all Israeli settlements. Similarly, about 
95% of the return flow is collected, about 80% is adequately treated, and in many 
cases, reused for irrigation (42%). Drinking water quality conforms to World Health 
Organization (WHO) standards and further improvements to meet prevailing 
European Union and United States standards are planned. (KKL-JNF. 2008) 
Currently, the urban sector consumes about 980 Mm3. The trend of 
consumption in the domestic sector is on the rise, reflecting the continuing increase 
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in population and improved living standards of the Israeli population. The annual 
increase is about 20- 30 Mm3 per year, about 4%; it is assumed that consumption 
will reach 1,300 Mm3, by the year 2020. (Table 3.2.d) 
Without forgetting the agricultural consumption, and due to population growth 
and the associated water demand, the supply of fresh water resources to the 
agricultural sector has decreased from about 77% in the sixties, to about 60% at 
present. The reduced allocation is substituted with non-potable resources, including 
brackish and reclaimed sewage effluents. Although agriculture is still the largest 
consumer, consumption in this sector is strongly influenced by annual rainfall 
quantities, and during drought period’s consumption is reduced. (KKL-JNF. 2008) 
The Israeli Ministry of National Infrastructure is very concerned about an 
upcoming water deficit. It is evident that 50 years from now the total regional 
population may be in the order of 25-30 Million in comparison to the current 12 
Million. On the other hand, the long-term deficit may reach 3000 Mm3/year, 
exceeding the natural rate of replenishment. Furthermore, improper control of waste 
in the region could cause irreversible contamination of the water resources. In 
particular, the already heavily polluted Karstic Mountain aquifer, left unmanaged, 
could have serious implications on the quality of water in the region (IMFA. 2002). 
3.2.4 Water Allocations  
In 1959, a comprehensive water law was passed, making water resources 
public property and regulating water resources exploitation and allocation, as well as 
pollution prevention and water conservation. Most regions in the country were 
declared “rationing regions”, meaning regions where water consumption was to be 
limited to fix rations.  
Therefore, norms were established for agricultural consumption and crops for 
per capita domestic consumption and for industrial consumption. Saying that, this 
legislation was based on the following principles (ibid. 2002): 
- Water resources are the property of the public and that there is no private 
ownership of water resources; 
- Every person has the right to a water allocation for recognized purposes; 
- The overall quantity of available water is scarce and that a prioritisation 
process has to take place in order to provide sufficient water, in quantity as 
well as in quality, to all users; 
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- Only a centralized allocation of water resources can ensure an optimal use 
of the limited water resources; 
- The consumers, through their representatives, need to have a major input in 
the formation of the rules relating to the allocation of water quotas; 
- Attempts must be made to increase the water quantities available for 
utilization by the consumers; 
- The government has the right to take appropriate action to prevent the 
pollution of water resources. 
While the water source itself cannot be the subject to private ownership, water 
production, pumping and supply equipment may, and is in many cases, privately 
owned. Thus, once water is allocated the water is brought to the end user through 
the private sector. 
Under the water law, all available water resources are for use by consumers, 
as directed by the Water Commissioner. The Water Commissioner is responsible for 
implementing the Government’s policy, ensuring sufficient water supply of the 
required quality and reliability, while conserving and preserving water resources, 
including (ibid. 2002): 
- Allocating water for the domestic, agricultural and industrial sectors, at the 
appropriate levels of quality, reliability and service, in accordance with 
national development plans; 
- Planning, constructing and operating the water supply systems and delivery 
facilities necessary for meeting national demand; 
- Advising the Government about water tariffs based on water quality and 
sector of consumption; 
- Monitoring and evaluating water resources; 
- Creating public awareness about water conservation needs.  
Furthermore, and since the introduction of the Water Law, an annual water 
production and supply license is issued to each and every producer and supplier. 
The production license is a fundamental document reflecting the Water 
Commissioner’s provisions regarding the amounts of water allowed for production, 
supply or consumption, conditions of production, and the restrictions to which it is 
subject. The first priority is given however to municipal and domestic supply. 
Accordingly the water allocations for all the sectors are (ibid. 2002): 
31 
 
Agriculture: The water allocation for agriculture makes a distinction between 
private agriculture and planned agriculture (Kibbutzim or Kibbutz: A collective farm or 
settlement owned by its members in modern Israel; children are reared collectively. 
And Moshavim Or Moshav: A cooperative Israeli village or settlement comprised of 
small farms). The initial stage was the recognition of water usage rights (not water 
rights) already existing at the time of the law’s announcement, which was done by 
photographing the farmers’ areas, their designation and the quantity of water 
consumed in those days. Subsequently, usage norms were established for the 
different crops, and the multiplication of the norms by the scale of crop cultivation 
determined the water quota for the farmer. 
Water allocation for planned settlements was determined according to the 
types of soil and water production means as well as the number of units establishing 
the maximum size of the settlement. The maximum water allocation for the 
settlement was obtained by multiplying the number of planned farm units by the 
water quota per unit. 
Industry: Establishing quotas for industrial plants whose production 
processes use more than 5,000 cubic meters of water a year is done based on the 
quantities of water consumption, according to the type of product and scope of 
production. 
           The multiplication of the norms by production scope constitutes the basis for 
water allocations in the plant. A plant whose wastewater disposal system does not 
meet the required criteria, does not receive a water consumption license. 
Domestic consumption: The amount of water allocated to the local authority 
for domestic consumption includes the use of water for domestic needs, gardening, 
auxiliary farms, services and public utilities, trades, commerce, etc. within the 
domain of the local authority. In other words, the overall shared consumption of the 
local authority, excluding separate allocations for industrial and agricultural needs 
within its domain. 
In recent years the amount of water allocated to local authorities, for various 
uses, has not been fixed. Every local authority is entitled to usage as per its 
requirements for various purposes; subject to the consumption difference between 
the quantities of water that it sells to consumers within its boundaries was not more 
than 12%. If the consumption difference is higher, the local authority is given a 
monetary fine. (KKL-JNF. 2008) 
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3.2.5 Extraction levies 
In 1999 all those extracting water from water sources were charged with an 
extraction levy payment. The extraction levies reflect the regional and countrywide 
shortage and are intended to internalise the water shortage considerations. The 
rates of the levy are fixed in regulations and updated from time to time, in 
accordance with the updating set-up of the water tariffs. The obligation for payment 
of the extraction levy falls on the extractor, but he is entitled to collect it from his 
consumers their share of the extraction levy as well, together with the cost of the 
water, according to the quantity of water supplied to them. (IFMA. 1999) 
If the water extractor does not pay the extraction levy, the Water 
Commissioner has the right to cancel, to suspend or to change the extraction license 
of that extractor from that water source. In parallel, in order to advance various goals 
for the benefit of the water economy, the law sets a framework for granting 
allowances from the State budget, for the production and development of inferior 
water sources, which will serve for the conversion of good water. (ibid. 1999) 
3.2.6 Water prices 
Mekorot provides more than two thirds of the water supply (see section 3.2.1). 
The prices the company is entitled to charge are the rates set by the Ministers of 
National Infrastructures and Finance, approved by the Knesset’s Finance 
Committee, and updated from time to time according to the changes in the 
Consumer Price Index, electricity rates and the average wage index. (Mekorot. 2008) 
The rates are categorized by the different uses: domestic, consumption and 
services, industry and agriculture. 
The rates for industrial and agriculture uses are lower than those for domestic 
consumption and services for two major reasons: 
- Water for agriculture and industry is designated for production; 
- Water for agriculture is supplied on a less reliable basis and is of poorer 
quality. (ibid. 2008) 
Rates within the local authority are set by the Ministers of Interior and 
Finance, based on the rate the local authority pays when buying water from Mekorot. 
The rates for agriculture and industrial uses within the local authority are identical, in 
principle, to Mekorot’s sale price. However, the local authority collects distribution 
expenses to cover the costs of distributing and supplying this water within the 
authority’s domain. Domestic consumption and service rates are set based on the 
33 
 
buying rate paid to Mekorot and the amount needed to cover the expenditures 
entailed in supplying this water with the required quality and reliability. 
Domestic consumption rates are progressive and rise with an increase in the 
amount of water consumed. The first price is for the initial 8 cubic meters per month 
for each housing unit. The second price is for the next 7 cubic meters. For each 
additional cubic meter, the price increases gradually. Large families are allow to 
have water price benefits, each additional family member over 4 persons is entitled 
to 3 additional cubic meters a month charged according to the first rate. (Ibid. 2008) 
For gardening and landscaping a relatively low water rate has been set, 
identical to the first rate for domestic consumption. But this is only for a limited 
amount of water, 0.6m3 per m2 of garden, and for no more than 300m3 a year per 
garden, for the period between April-November. 
In condominiums, the limitation is up to 500m2 of garden for each house. This 
is not a question of allocating water, but of providing water for gardening at a 
relatively low rate, such that the consumer can use a greater amount of water for the 
garden, but in such case the amount exceeding the 300m3 or 500m3, as the case 
may be, is added onto the domestic consumption. (Ibid. 2008) 
Shared consumption in condominiums is defined as the difference between 
the amount of water recorded by the general water meter for the condominium and 
the amounts of water recorded by the tenants’ individual water meters. The shared 
consumption is divided equally among the housing units. If the shared consumption 
is higher than usual or has increased suddenly, this is usually a sign of a hidden leak 
in the property’s internal system. In such a case, the local authority obliges the 
immediate repair of the hidden leakage and payment for the water lost. 
If the local authority is convinced that repair of the hidden leakage has been 
carried out quickly and efficiently, it is entitled to charge for the water lost due to the 
leak according to the first rate of domestic consumption. A consumer, who uses a 
small amount of water, pays only a fixed usage fee, intended to cover the local 
authority’s expenses for reading the meters and dispatching the bill, which must be 
done even if water consumption is very low. (Ibid. 2008) 
Payment is based on the reading of water meters. Local authorities are 
required to supply water only under a measurement framework, using properly 
functioning water meters, and must notify consumers of a water meter reading at 
34 
 
least once every two months, charging them accordingly. The bill sent to the 
consumer must be based solely on the water meter reading.  
If there is any change in the water rates during the consumption period 
covered by the bill, the assumption is that consumption was evenly divided over that 
same period. Therefore, the consumers will be charged according to the previous 
rate up to the day of change, and according to the new rate from that day onward. 
Where a water meter has not been installed, the charge for domestic consumption is 
for 15m3 a month, or 8m3 a month for small apartments, where no more than two 
persons reside, or 5m3 a month if only one person lives in such an apartment. (Ibid. 
2008) 
If found that the water meter has been malfunctioning during a certain period, 
and it is impossible to determine the water consumption of the consumer, the local 
authority is entitled to charge the consumer for an amount of water determined 
according to the average water consumption during the two months preceding the 
malfunction and the two months following it, or based on the consumption during the 
corresponding period of the previous year. 
 
3.3 Management of Water Resources 
The issue of water resources availability and the potential for further 
development of advanced systems to provide adequate supply was not merely an 
academic or technological question. It also had political implications. Indeed, national 
rights to the land lay at the heart of the conflict between the Jewish and the Arab 
communities.  
British government policy was to place restrictions on the purchase of land by 
Jews, establishment of new settlements and also on immigration to Palestine, based 
on the argument that physical conditions prohibited further growth of the existing 
population. One of the measures taken by the leadership of the Jewish community to 
counter British policy was to demonstrate that, with proper development, the land 
could sustain a much larger population. Hence, considerable effort was invested in 
conceiving and designing water projects. (MNI, 2006) 
There are a number of long-term solutions, such as building water 
desalination facilities. Short-term solutions include conserving water and building 
sewage water reclamation plants. (IMFA 2002) 
Treatment of sewage water accomplishes two purposes:  
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- First, supplying purified water to the major water consumers, agriculture and 
industry; 
- Second, preserving the environment and the quality of the aquifers. (Ibid. 
2002) 
 
Table 3.3.a: Government decisions to increase water resources 
Seawater desalination plants  400 Mm3 
Brackish water desalination plants  50 Mm3 
Rehabilitation of saline polluted and depleted wells  50 Mm3 
Treatment and reuse of sewage effluents for 
irrigation 
500 Mm3 
Water import 50 Mm3 
Total 1050 Mm3 
Source: MNI, 2002 
 
 
Table 3.3.b: Supply development plan: Required investments 2002-2010 
Desalination (Millions US$) 1,600 
Sewage treatment and reuse system (Millions US$) 1,000 
Water supply (Millions US$) 600 
Renovation and improvements (Millions US$) 800 
Total (Millions US$) 4,000 
Source: MNI, 2002 
 
In addition and after several consecutive years of drought and growing water 
scarcity, the government has begun to implement a comprehensive water 
management plan, based on such components as wastewater treatment and 
recovery, water conservation, seawater and brackish water desalination and 
remediation of contaminated wells. Plans for desalinating hundreds of millions of 
cubic meters of seawater are implemented (see Tables 3.3.a, and 3.3.b).  
Based on previously mentioned the government of Israel decided on an 
integrated policy and action (MNI. 2006): 
- To preserve and protect the existing reserves, in quality and quantity; 
- To intensify water saving in all sectors by economic measures, raising the 
price, as well as by legal means, enforcement, improved management and 
organization; 
- To increase considerably the supply of potable water, mainly through 
seawater desalination and purification of water sources; 
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- To advance the treatment of sewage, its collection and purification, turning it 
into the main source of water for agriculture (replacing potable water); 
- To invest in Agro-technology, to convert agriculture to using mainly low 
quality water; recycled waste water, brackish and flood water. 
3.3.1 Desalination  
Three types of desalination projects were initiated and supported, on a large 
scale in the past few years, by the Israel Water Commission, in order to generate 
new water supply sources and/or to upgrade the quality of existing water sources 
and supply systems: 
Well Water Desalination: To rehabilitate and reintroduce into the local and 
national water supply systems 50 Mm3 per year of non-potable water, by the year 
2010, the Israel Water Commission supported and supervised the installation of two 
desalination plants (around 1.55 Mm3 per year of potable water) plus the 
rehabilitation of another 27 wells (between 2003 and 2006), and an extra 19 projects 
are in the process of technical and economical evaluation in order to attain the set up 
target. (Ibid, 2006) 
Most projects are executed through BOOT (Build, Own, Operate and 
Transfer) agreements between the well owners, water suppliers and private 
entrepreneurs with the State providing projects that meet threshold preconditions 
and requirements grants of up to 40% of their normalized investments. Typical well 
outputs are in the range of 80-200 m3/hour, and treated costs are in the range of 1.2-
1.4 Israeli-Shekel /m3. (Ibid, 2006) 
Brackish Water Desalination: More than 166 Mm3 per year of brackish 
water are pumped today from various boreholes throughout the State and used 
directly as a source of supply. Around 35 Mm3 per year are used by industry, the rest 
for agriculture. In Eilat and the Arava settlements, another 10 Mm3 per year of 
brackish water are desalinated, generating 7 Mm3 per year of potable water (the cost 
is between 1.4 and 1.8 IS/m3). (Ibid, 2006) 
It is the intention of the Water Commission to increase the production of 
potable water through brackish water desalination:  
- First, by replacing the brackish water currently used by industry and 
agriculture with suitably treated municipal effluents, and using the brackish 
water made available as raw feed for additional desalination plants; 
37 
 
- Second, by desalinating additional, unutilised brackish water sources. A total 
potential of about 200 Mm3 per year has been identified so far, and these 
could be used to generate about 50 Mm3 per year of potable water. (Ibid, 
2006) 
Seawater Desalination: The Government approved, in early 2002, the 
installation of seawater desalination plants with a total output of 400 Mm3 per year of 
potable water. All projects were to be executed by the private sector, through 
international tenders. 
An agreement was signed at the Water Commissioners’ Office in Tel Aviv on 
February 24, 2005, for the establishment of a second seawater desalination plant. 
The accord was signed by National Infrastructure Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer in 
the presence of Water Commissioner Shimon Tal and senior Finance Ministry 
officials. (Jerusalem Post. 2005) 
A private company, Derech Hayam, will build the $85 million plant in the 
Palmahim area, which will produce 30 Mm3 of purified water a year. The project is 
fully operational in 2007. This follows a plant that has been built at Ashkelon, which 
started to produce some 50 Mm3 of pure water summer 2005 and reached full 
capacity of 100 Mm3 by the end of 2005. (Ibid. 2005) 
Plans and facilities  
The water shortage obliged the National Infrastructures Ministry headed by 
Minister Benyamin (Fuad) Ben – Eliezer to initiate an emergency plan to deal with.  
 
Table 3.3.c Seawater Desalination Facilities 
Location Name of the 
concessionaire 
Execution phase Annual volume 
(Mm3) 
Ashkelon VID Operational 108 
Palmachin Via Maris Operational 30 
Hadera H2ID Operational 100 
Ashdod Mekorot Expected to be at 
the end of 2012 
100 
Sorek In bid Expected to be in 
2012 for the first 
150 Mm3 
300 
Source: Adapted from MNI, 2008 
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The objective of the plan is to increase the volume of water desalinated up to 
at least 750 Mm3/y, of which 600 Mm3 will be completed by the year 2013, and the 
rest until 2020. Recent figures show that 138 Mm3 of water are desalinated in the 
Ashkelon and Ashdod plants, plus 100 Mm3 capacity of a new facility that has being 
constructed in Hadera. (MNI. 2008) 
Table 3.3.c shows the desalination facilities which are operational, and the 
ones in the processes to be. These plants and facilities should provide to the Israelis 
the water they need to face this crisis.  
It is important to mention in this regard that the cost of desalinated water from 
the Ashkelon plant is about 50 US cents/ m3, lower than from any other seawater 
desalination plant in the world. Desalinated water costs for the other, smaller projects 
are expected to be within 50 to 60 US cents/ m3. 
Furthermore, a construction of a desalination plant (50 Mm3) in Gaza: drinking 
water and domestic consumption. Another 50 Mm3 one (brackish water): the Jordan 
Rift Valley (JRV), plus a 50-100 Mm3 desalination plant in the Mediterranean coast. 
In addition, a construction of a large-scale desalination plant of 800 Mm3 of water, 
utilizing the hydrostatic pressure obtained from the difference of the level between 
the Mediterranean and the JRV for production of electric power and desalination of 
huge quantities of water for the use of Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians. All 
together the completed project will provide 1 billion/m3 of desalinated water.  
The proposed Regional Seawater Desalination project will be able (over a 
period of 10-15 years) to provide around 1 Bm3 of desalinated seawater, and provide 
a solution to the current water crises as well as meet the future needs of Israel, 
Jordan and the Palestinian Authority. It is important to mention that the time needed 
for planning and construction of a desalination project is not less than 5 years.  
The calculated investment required for the desalination of 1 m3 of water is 4-5 
dollars. The cost of desalination of 1 m3, including investment recovery, is 0.70-1.00 
dollar. The cost is beyond the purchase capability, of both the Palestinians and 
Jordan, who also suffer from severe water scarcity. (Ibid. 2008) 
3.3.2 Water importation 
Turkey and Israel have signed a deal to allow Israel to purchase 50 Mm3 of 
Turkish water annually over the next ten years. The water will come from the 
Manavgat River and will be transported to Israel’s Askhelon port by ships. This deal 
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will also help Israel supply water to Jordan, as it has pledged to do under its peace 
treaty. Israel usually needs around two billion cubic meters of water annually and the 
Turkish water should supply five percent of its needs. (Jerusalem Post. 2000) 
On August 2002, a groundbreaking agreement was signed, that will have 
Turkey export 1.75 billion cubic feet of water from its Manavgat River to Israel each 
year for the next 20 years. While the Turkish water is expected to fulfil only about 
three percent of Israel’s needs, during the 20-year period. (Near East Report. 2002) 
The deal, which will be worth $800 million to $1 billion, “will create a new 
reality in the region,” Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres (at that time) said. “I 
hope that Turkey will be the major supplier of water to the region.” Still at issue is the 
actual transporting of the water to Israel, which is expected to entail a high cost. Oil 
tankers will likely be used, but must first be refurbished to make them safe for 
hauling water.  
The water-purchasing deal was signed August 6 during a meeting between 
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and visiting Turkish Energy and Natural 
Resources Minister Zeki Cakan (then). The penning of the agreement was the end 
result of years of negotiations between the two nations to finalize the terms of the 
deal. (Ibid. 2002) 
 
3.4 Role of Irrigation in Agriculture  
Until the beginning of the 20th century, agriculture in the Land was almost 
entirely rain-fed, and therefore was limited to the northern part of the country and the 
coastal area. In some northern localities, where spring-water was available, fields 
were irrigated. The water was conveyed by gravitation from the source to the fields in 
open dirt canals. Each farmer was supposed to get his share of water for several 
hours once every few days or weeks. However, due to heavy loss of water along the 
transportation route, resulting from fast percolation into the ground, the water was 
distributed unevenly.  
Along the coast, underground water was raised from shallow wells with the 
help of “norias” (a water wheel with buckets attached to the rim) driven by donkey or 
ox. The water was collected in a pool and from there conveyed by gravitation to 
adjacent plantations (mainly orange groves). (IMFA. 1999) 
Such wells were dug manually and the output was low; the notion that 
agriculture requires a reliable water supply began to take hold only at the end of the 
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19th century and the beginning of the 20th century. This revolutionary change in 
attitude was introduced to the area mainly by the Jewish settlers, who were ready to 
adopt advanced technologies and know-how. Such technologies were introduced by 
immigrants with specialized skills and professional training. Among them were 
people experienced in advanced methods of drilling through hard layers of rock and 
pumping large quantities of water from deep wells. (IMFA. 2002) 
Eighty percent of farms are owned and run by kibbutzim (collective villages) 
and moshavim (cooperative villages). The remaining 20% are mainly citrus groves in 
the centre of the country owned by large private companies. Kibbutzim often 
develop, design, manufacture and market their own agro-technology inputs. Drip 
irrigation was developed in a kibbutz and all major manufacturers of the equipment 
are kibbutz-based. (Ibid. 2002) 
These farmers work closely with the country’s ten agricultural research 
institutes, including the Agricultural Research Organization (ARO) and the Hebrew 
University’s Faculty of Agriculture in Rehovot. Twenty-five professional and 
marketing associations also fund R&D, as do various government bodies and 
hundreds of private firms in the biotechnology and computer software sectors. 
Because Israeli farmers and scientists have had to contend with a difficult 
environment and limited water resources, their experience is especially relevant to 
the developing world. Development of greenhouse equipment, seed and livestock 
propagation, fertilizers and pesticides has enabled Israeli agriculture to prosper in 
adversity. In addition, farmers have learned to develop high value-added and 
innovative farm products that enable them to compete in markets with lower-cost 
producers. Water management, recycling, desalination and transportation in the 
National Water Carrier have enabled the country to overcome drastic shortages. 
(Ibid. 2002) 
3.4.1 Advanced methods of irrigation 
  One of the most important agro-technological innovations is probably the 
invention in Israel of drip irrigation by Simcha Blass and his son (the father 
conceived the idea some 35 years ago, the son developed the dripper).  
Today, networks of plastic pipes with small openings for each plant or tree are 
strategically placed across fields. Via the drippers, controlled amounts of fertilizer 
can be pumped through the irrigation pipes to the plants, a system known as 
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“fertigation” (the application of fertilizers, soil amendments, or other water soluble 
products through an irrigation system). 
Traditionally, drip irrigation has been used in regions where water is scarce, 
but it has also been effective where rainfall is high because of its precision. For 
example, experiments in Northern California in “precision” irrigation caused some 
types of tree to grow three times faster. Fast-growing trees can increase profits for 
timber growers and at the same time minimize environmental damage by reducing 
the number of trees that need to be felled. 
Half a dozen Israeli companies sell plastic piping and a full range of 
accessories for drip irrigation. Many also specialize in designing customized 
irrigation systems for gardens, parks, farms and entire regions, installing them and 
then providing consultation and maintenance. Exports of irrigation equipment totalled 
almost $300 million in 1998. (IMFA. 1999) 
Drip irrigation has many advantages over other irrigation methods. Studies 
show that drip irrigation has a Water Use Efficiency (WUE is defined as the ratio 
between the amount of water taken up by the plant and the total amount of water 
applied) of about 95%, versus 45% for surface irrigation and 75% for sprinkler 
irrigation. Accordingly, drip irrigation has many advantages over other methods of 
irrigation, and that it is also superior to surface and sprinkler irrigation in regard to 
water saving, especially under conditions of limited water supply (IMFA. 2002): 
- Water is discharged uniformly from every dripper fitted onto the lateral pipe. 
This is true even on moderately sloping terrain. Furthermore, the development 
of compensated drippers enables uniform irrigation on steeper slopes and the 
ability to extend laterals with drippers over greater distances; 
- Via the drippers, fertilizers can be supplied to the plant together with the 
water; 
- Water and fertilizers are delivered directly to the root system rather than to 
the total area of the field, thereby economizing on both water and fertilizers; 
- The quantity of water delivered can be optimised to fit different soil types, 
avoiding percolation of water beyond the root zone. Furthermore, sandy soils, 
which cannot be watered by furrows or by flooding, can be efficiently irrigated 
with drippers; 
- The emergence of weeds is minimized; 
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- Between the planted rows the dry ground facilitates comfortable access in 
the field for workers and machines throughout the season; 
- Exploitation of poor quality water (saline water or effluents) is made possible 
because: 
• Drip irrigation, unlike sprinkler irrigation, makes it possible to utilize 
saline water. This is because direct contact between water and leaves 
is avoided, thus avoiding burns. 
• Drip irrigation causes salts to be continuously washed away from the 
root system, averting salt accumulation in the immediate vicinity of the 
roots. This is important when irrigating saline soils or irrigating with 
saline water. 
• Drip irrigation allows the use of minimally treated sewage water 
because the water is delivered directly to the ground, minimizing health 
risks. 
- Drippers with a given discharge of water (of the order of several litres per 
hour) can be installed at any spacing to accommodate the needs of any crop; 
- Drip irrigation is the most efficient method of irrigation when it comes to 
water saving. Since the drippers emit the water directly to the soil adjacent to 
the root system, which absorbs the water immediately, evaporation is minimal. 
This characteristic is especially important under the conditions prevailing in 
arid zones. In irrigation by sprinklers or by surface methods, evaporation is 
enhanced by winds, while in drip irrigation the impact of winds is minimal. 
Other types of irrigation include: pressure irrigation methods; buried irrigation, 
which prevents infiltration by tiny roots; spray irrigation, which is suitable for 
orchards; and sprinklers used for entire fields. These systems can be very 
simple or high-tech. (ibid. 2002) 
Options range from the basic turn on/off variety with volume clocks, to more 
sophisticated computerized systems, which include sensors to monitor the moisture 
level of the soil and check changes in the diameter of the stem or fruit.  
Other accessories include filter traps to sweep dirt away and low flow drip 
emitters for soil-less media in greenhouses. Minute or ultra-low-rate (ULR) irrigation 
methods have been developed to apply water at rates of less than one millimetre per 
hour. (ibid. 2002) 
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3.4.2 Conservation, use efficiency and water quality 
In Israel, there is a growing awareness of the importance of conserving and 
purifying water. In public gardens and parks, the municipalities are requested to give 
preference to plants that do not require much water, and to reduce grassy areas. 
Parks have been placed under a conservation regime, including planting of drought-
resistant plants and watering at night. Car-wash facilities receive an operating 
license on condition that they purify and recycle the water.  
Local authorities are required to build facilities for treating sewage water, and 
Israeli farmers were asked to stop raising crops with high water consumption, and to 
go over to sophisticated cultivation methods that conserve water (such as hothouses 
and improved irrigation systems).  
The wide scale adoption of low volume irrigation systems (e.g. drip, micro-
sprinklers) and automation has increased the average efficiency to 90% as 
compared to 64% for furrow irrigation. As a result, the average requirement of water 
per unit of land area has decreased from 8,700 m3/ha in 1975 to the current 
application rate of 5,500 m3/ha. At the same time agricultural output has increased 
twelve fold, while total water consumption by the sector has remained almost 
constant. (ibid. 2002) 
In the domestic and urban sectors conservation efforts focus on 
improvements in efficiency, resource management, repair, control and monitoring of 
municipal water systems. Citizens are urged to save water. The slogan “Don't waste 
a drop” is known in every home in Israel.  
Beyond transportation, Israel has developed effective solutions for the 
shortage of water in some areas. Efficient water management has increased 
agricultural output 12-fold (as mentioned previously) during the past 50 years, while 
water consumption has remained constant through rigorous maintenance of 
infrastructure, replenishing of aquifers and the allocation of appropriate quotas and 
pricing to discourage wasteful consumption. 
The use of recycled water has provided another solution. Out of 1.1 Bm3 of 
water used for agriculture in 1998, approximately 250 Mm3 were recycled effluents. 
The Water Commission forecasts, that by 2010 one third of all crops will be irrigated 
with “cleaned” water. Twenty-four desalination plants in Eilat, the Dead Sea region 
and the Arava Desert supply another 161 Mm3 of irrigation water each year. (ibid. 
2002) 
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During a visit to Melbourne, March 2007, Professor Uri Shani (the director and 
chairman of the Israeli Government water and sewage authority) said: “We limited 
household use and started building a desalination plant in 2002”, Israel could no 
longer gamble on the long-term use of aquifers. There were sustainability issues with 
the aquifers, which were saline. “So we decided to go into water production”, he said 
(Hopkins, P. 2007). 
The first plant, which produces 110 mega-liters of water at a cost of $US250 
million, is now up and running. A 40-megalitre plant is due to start this month. He 
said two 110-megalitre plants would be built in the next six years. This would help 
push up Israel’s total amount of water available from desalination to about 400 
mega-litres a year, “about half the demand of Israel’s proven requirements”. He said 
the desalination plants were part of a broader water strategy, which must cope with a 
growing population. 
Another element is the huge use of recycled water. He said about 75 per cent 
of sewage was recycled and used on half of Israel’s agriculture. “It is good water, the 
supply is secure and it is cheap”, he said. “It means (farmers) are no longer 
dependent on the weather”. Government water company Mekorot, which organises 
waste water treatment, has also invested more than $100 million in a filtration plant 
for water pumped from the Sea of Galilee to ensure the water meets health 
standards. (ibid. 2007)  
Another 70 Mm3 of water are generated annually from underground sources; 
geothermal waters found beneath the surface of the Negev desert are also used. 
Farmers have found that salt water produces “sweeter” crops than regular water. 
“Desert sweet” tomatoes and melons, for instance, fetch premium prices on 
European markets. 
Cloud seeding (injecting clouds with iodine to increase the percentage of 
water that each cloud yields) has proven effective. Exploration (using sophisticated 
seismological techniques), prevention of pollution, soil conservation and drainage 
have all maximized water use. Landscaping to redirect floodwaters, computerized 
calculations to chart routes of runoff water and the strategic placement of trees and 
crops have also prevented desertification. 
Invented by the Dutch for cooler climes in Northern Europe, the greenhouse 
has been adapted by Israel for use in arid regions. Some 3,000 hectares of 
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greenhouse cultivation enable farmers to overcome restrictions imposed by soil 
quality, arid climate and limited water supply.  
Greenhouses can be erected in places where the soil is unsuitable. Irrigation 
systems overcome the problem of water scarcity, and curtains and skylights can be 
regulated to filter out or admit sunlight and provide temperature control. Plastic 
covering provides for thermal disinfecting of the soil prior to planting, covers the soil 
for heat collection, prevents growth of weeds and pests, and minimizes evaporation 
and the escape of fertilizers.  
Netting above the plants can keep out scales, mites and other pests while 
more sophisticated netting can act as a thermal screen, cooling plants during the day 
and keeping them warm at night. Fogging systems can be used for climate control.  
Operated by computer programs all these systems can be designed to 
generate a micro-environment on the cutting edge of 21st-century farming. Several 
Israeli companies manufacture and export woven high-tech plastic sheeting and 
specialize in custom greenhouse projects, including consultation, installation and 
maintenance.  
Because of the high initial investment, greenhouses are best suited for high 
value-added crops such as vegetables, flowers, ornamental plants and spices, and 
for intensive farming. Israeli greenhouses, for instance, average three million roses 
per hectare and yield an average of 300 tons of tomatoes per hectare each season.  
 
3.5 Main Freshwater Problems  
A report of the State of Israel was presented on October 2000, to the 
Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change on impacts, adaptation and vulnerability to climate change in Israel, 
indicates that water supply may severely decrease, falling to around 60% of current 
levels by 2100, due to sedimentation in reservoirs, salinity and the lack of reservoir 
recharge (Pe’er and Safriel. 2000).  
Increased rain intensity combined with a reduction in overall precipitation will 
diminish vegetation cover and increase surface runoff, leading to desertification, 
especially in the Negev. The resulting soil erosion, salinity, and loss of vegetation will 
further increase surface runoff. Agricultural fields (mainly rain fed ones) will become 
more saline from increased evapotranspiration.  
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Increased surface runoff will reduce aquifer recharge, and sea level rise and 
the intrusion of seawater into the coastal aquifer will further damage groundwater. 
The quality of stored water will degrade due to salinity, and the increased surface 
runoff will transport dissolved pollutants to waters reservoirs, often causing algal 
blooms. 
The most advanced technology and practices are being applied to protect and 
minimize the pollution of water resources. Water conservation maps, restricting land 
use activities above groundwater resources, were produced to protect the underlying 
resources.  
Regular monitoring of water resources, including: water recharge, water table 
levels, abstraction, salinity (chlorides) and pollution (nitrates) data are regularly 
monitored and reported. The data provides an effective tool for influencing the 
planning, the development process, and permissible emission of pollutants to the 
environment. 
3.5.1 Water Quality 
Water resources from the Kinneret are diminishing, although it supplies 
Israelis with 22 - 33 percent of their water usage, and a larger percentage of drinking 
water. Recently certain algae have grown in the Kinneret, and treatment is 
necessary for any water taken directly from the reservoir. The source of the algae is 
unknown, but two nearby sewage plants are suspected culprits. 
In the 1950’s, an attempt at preventing the spread of malaria in the region 
forced much of the land surrounding the sea to be used for agriculture, and the 
draining of many swamps near the sea. As a result, water funnelled into the Kinneret 
no longer naturally filters out unneeded materials, the peat at the bottom of the old 
swamps combined with combustion, contributes to the enlargement of useless 
square feet of arid land.  
The solution to this problem is by returning some of the water back to the old 
swampland. But another one will be created when new water is added. Israel must 
introduce aquatic life into the new bodies of water that have no natural predators. 
The unchecked growth of such aquatic life will compromise water quality.  
Lake Winnipesaukee has also had its share of ills, including E-coli bacteria (a 
species of bacterium normally present in intestinal tract of humans and other 
animals; sometimes pathogenic, can be a threat to food safety), oil and gas. Boat 
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traffic accounts for the oil and gas increases, and an increase in boat rental fees 
helps to pay for this cleanup. (Weiss, B. 2003) 
The quality of supplied water in Israel varies from very low salinity water (10 
mg/l of chlorides) from the Upper Jordan River, 200 mg/l from the Kinneret, and 
more than 1500 mg/l from groundwater sources in the south. Groundwater 
exploitation is controlled to prevent seawater intrusion to the Coastal Aquifer and 
movement of saline water bodies within the Karstic Limestone Aquifer. 
3.5.2 Water pollution 
In recent years, efforts have focused on restoring the country’s ailing rivers, 
which have either dried up or become sewage conduits as a result of industrial 
discharge, municipal sewage, over-pumping or just general abuse. The National 
River Administration was created (in1993) to oversee the restoration of the country’s 
rivers. 
The Central Bureau of Statistics has released a report on “River Water Quality 
-- 1996-98”, based on data compiled by the Water and Rivers Department of the 
Ministry of Environmental Affairs, the National Parks Authority and Yarkon River 
Authority. Pollutant measures include Biochemical Oxygen Demand (BOD), 
untreated sewage and industrial and agricultural waste.  
Water quality tests are carried out each year. In 1998, it was found that very 
high quantities of pollutants were found in 11 rivers flowing near population centres. 
In five of the 11 rivers checked, pollution levels were very high, or else they were 
directly receiving raw sewage. 
 In the other six rivers, pollution levels were moderate to high. The rivers with 
the most significant improvement were the Dalia River, Hadera River and Habsor 
River (in the northern Negev). The improvements were mainly the result of sewage 
treatment plants beginning operations. 
 Israel’s most polluted river is the Sorek River in the Judean Hills, and the 
least polluted is the lower Jordan River. (IMFA, 2002) 
3.5.3 Government Concerns 
Recently the Israeli government devoted part of its weekly cabinet meetings to 
the water crisis, with Minister of Infrastructure Benjamin Ben-Eliezer announcing that 
as a result of five consecutive drought years, of which the last was the most severe, 
it is only too likely that by 2009 there will be a real shortage of drinking water.  It is 
48 
 
probable that the level of drinking water in wells and in Lake Kinneret will drop to the 
‘black line’ during 2009. (KKL-JNF. 2008)   
This means that it will not be possible to operate the pumps in Lake Kinneret, 
on the one hand, and it will be necessary to totally stop drawing water from the wells 
of the coastal aquifer, otherwise they will be irreversibly damaged, on the other hand.  
In any event, an additional sharp reduction in the usage of fresh water for agriculture 
will be required. This sort of reduction entails millions of shekels in damages and in 
compensation that will have to be paid to farmers, and, of course, the drying-up of 
extensive farming areas. 
Minister of Agriculture Shalom Simchon wants municipal desalination plants to 
be built as speedily as possible in towns along the Mediterranean, in order to supply, 
by artificial means, a portion of the drinking water these localities require.  This 
solution would save pumping from the coastal aquifer which is already in danger of 
severe over-salinity, and it would also avoid worsening the damage caused to 
agriculture by the expected reduction in the amounts of purified water used for 
irrigation. 
At the same cabinet meeting, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert instructed that an 
emergency plan be drawn up to deal with the water shortage.  Without such a plan, it 
will be impossible to deal with the present crisis.  While several of the ministers 
supported the accelerated building of desalination plants in each town along the 
Mediterranean coast, others spoke of the need for massive enforcement and 
information campaigns on saving water in households. Whatever the outcome, the 
bottom line is real damage to the quality of Israeli life, which has progressed together 
with the general rise in the standard of living. (ibid. 2008) 
 
3.6 Wastewater Treatments and Reuse  
The combination of severe water shortage, contamination of water resources, 
densely populated urban areas and highly intensive irrigated agriculture, has made it 
essential to increase development of treated wastewater.  
Wastewater treatment and disposal is generally dealt with by the health 
authorities that dictate the degree and criteria of treatment and discharge of effluents 
to water bodies according to public health standards. Advanced treatment is required 
for appropriate disposal of effluents, in a manner not harmful to recipient water 
bodies. Treating wastewater to such a high standard is very costly and the 
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Government has to assist the local governments, providing grants and soft loans 
amounting to more than US $100 million per year.  
The Administration for Wastewater Infrastructure within the Water 
Commission is responsible for coordinating activities between the Government 
ministries, local municipalities and operational bodies. These activities relate to all 
aspects of construction of waste treatment facilities and their disposal and reuse in 
accordance with criteria determined by the Ministry of the Environment and the 
Ministry of Health. 
Israel has emerged as a world leader in recycling wastewater, with over 65% 
of the wastewater treated and reused for agricultural purposes in accordance with 
stringent permits issued by the Ministry of Health. National policy calls for the 
gradual replacement of freshwater allocations to agriculture by reclaimed effluents. 
Major efforts are currently being focused on upgrading effluent quality standards for 
different purposes. The objective is to treat 100% of the country’s wastewater to a 
level enabling unrestricted irrigation in accordance with soil sensitivity and without 
risk to soil and water sources.  
3.6.1 Policies and Ongoing Plan 
The Government’s objective is to increase the treatment and reclamation of 
wastewater. The aim is to produce safe effluents which correspond to the following 
principles: 
- Accelerating the treatment and reuse of urban and industrial wastewater; 
- Producing additional non-potable water at a competitive cost; 
- Preventing the pollution of water bodies by adopting a zero discharge policy; 
- Maintaining the current agricultural production. 
These principles are supplemented by additional assumptions including: 
- Cost sharing by the various beneficiaries; 
- Economic justification and users’ commitment to continuous reuse and 
compliance with regulations. 
With the growth in population, great need for expansion and new construction 
of modern wastewater treatment plants. Currently the urban centres generate about 
450 Mm3 of wastewater, of which around 360 Mm3 are drained to wastewater 
treatment plants. Of the treated effluents, about 265 Mm3 are reused for irrigation. 
Future development plans for the year 2020 signal an increase in raw wastewater to 
about 700 Mm3, of which about 570 Mm3 should be used. (KKL-JNF. 2008)   
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It is estimated that effluents constituted around 40% of the water supplied to 
agriculture in 2005, it is now more than 50% according to the Minister of Agriculture 
and Rural Development, Shalom Simhon:  
“Over 50% of water used for agriculture is recycled water, which is the highest 
percentage in the world. Agriculture, as the main customer of recycled water, serves 
the environment, and lessens the pollution of streams and water sources. Using 
recycled effluents instead of fresh water is part of our water policy.” (Ibid. 2008)  
Effluent reservoirs enable sewage water to be reclaimed and purified to a high 
standard for agricultural use. This reduces potable water consumption and prevents 
river pollution. Irrigation with freshwater can cost up to New Israeli Sheqel (NIS) 1.87 
per cubic meter, irrigation with recycled effluents costs no more than NIS1.00 per 
cubic meter, which means savings of hundreds of thousands of shekels annually, 
depending on the size of the irrigated fields. (Ibid. 2008) 
 
Fig 3.6.a Percentage of Treated sewage effluent 
 
Source: KKL – JNF, 2008 
 
3.6.2 Treatment processes 
Effluents are treated in biological treatment plants, either in extensive 
oxidation ponds, aerated lagoons, or in advanced modified activated sludge 
systems, incorporating phosphorus and nitrogen removal.  
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Further treatment for reclamation and reuse is based on one of the following 
courses: 
a) Advanced treatment followed by soil aquifer treatment, producing high-
quality effluent (tertiary effluents) for unrestricted, non-potable usage. This treatment 
includes the percolation of denitrified effluents into a confined aquifer from which the 
effluents are pumped for unrestricted irrigation after a detention period of about 400 
days. Such schemes are confined to areas with a large population concentration, 
such as the Dan Region Scheme, which caters to a population of about 2 million. 
Furthermore, a system combining treatment and distribution to irrigated land 
has been established for medium and small towns. The key element is a large 
surface reservoir which receives secondary effluents all year-round, and releases 
them for the irrigation of non edible crops during the summer months. 
 This major element in the treatment process regulates between the relatively 
constant flow of wastewater and the seasonal demand for irrigation, six to eight 
months a year. There are around 200 surface reservoirs, 7 to 10 meters deep with a 
capacity ranging between 0.1 Mm3 and 12 Mm3, producing more than 150 Mm3 of 
sewage effluents and drainage water. These deep reservoirs have proven to 
significantly improve the effluent quality, thus providing high quality effluents without 
environmental nuisances. (Ibid. 2008) 
b) Biological treatment followed by a long detention period in surface 
reservoirs producing effluents (secondary effluents), for restricted irrigation of non 
edible crops. It is important to say that reclaimed effluents, after tertiary treatment 
followed by Soil Aquifer Treatment, are used for the irrigation of all crops without any 
restriction. Tertiary effluents (activated sludge and seasonal detention, or activated 
sludge with sand filtration) are used on a restricted basis for the irrigation of canned 
fruits, vegetables for cooking and for fruits with non edible peels. Secondary effluents 
(activated sludge, trickling filters and oxidation ponds with seasonal detention), 
stored in surface reservoirs, are used, with restrictions, for the irrigation of industrial 
field crops (mainly cotton), fodder crops, forests and pastures. Water quality in 
surface reservoirs is inferior to aquifer storage. 
One of the leading organizations in this domain is Keren Kayemeth LeYisrael-
Jewish National Fund. Professor Uri Shani, Director of the Israel Water Authority 
emphasized the great importance of KKL-JNF’s reservoirs. Speaking at the 
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international journalists’ ecological conference held by KKL-JNF at the end of 
January 2008 he said:  
“KKL-JNF reservoirs today provide an excellent alternative to fresh water for 
agricultural use, to the extent of 40% and more of the overall agricultural water 
consumption, and they help to relieve the present crisis in Israel’s water economy. 
Additional help is provided by other large KKL-JNF projects for the rehabilitation of 
Israel’s rivers and the restoration of water-based nature reserves such as the Hula 
Valley. Nonetheless, in both the coming summer and the summer of 2009, Israel will 
have to impose restrictions on the use of fresh water by limiting the irrigation of 
gardens.” (ibid. 2008) 
Also Mr. Avri Kadmon, Director of KKL-JNF Land Development Information 
Department, said in this regards: 
“The State of Israel is on the brink of a profound water crisis, for which 
agriculture will be the first to pay the price. The gravity of the situation demands that 
action be taken now to reduce allocations of potable water for agriculture. This 
means that water used for agricultural production in Israel will come from the effluent 
reservoirs that KKL-JNF has established throughout the country. The combined total 
usage of the 200 reservoirs built by KKL-JNF so far reaches over 250 Mm3 of water 
per year. In other words, the water stored in KKL-JNF’s effluent reservoirs permits 
the irrigation of over 450 thousand dunam - about 112.5 acres - of orchard and field 
crops throughout Israel!  
“Israel’s total water consumption today stands at around one billion 850 
million cubic meters of water per year. KKL-JNF reservoirs supply some 16% of the 
country’s overall water consumption and some 40% of its water for agricultural 
purposes. As consumption rises with population growth and improvement in the 
standard of living, so, too, will the amount of effluent produced increase 
proportionately. This means that it is vitally important to establish additional 
reservoirs for the storage of treated effluent, both in order to increase the amount 
available for agricultural purposes and to prevent pollution of the environment as a 
result of insufficiently treated effluent’s reaching our rivers.” (ibid. 2008) 
3.6.3 Existing projects 
Reuse of effluents is generally relevant to the agricultural sector, which 
consumes between 1200 and 1300 Mm3 of water per year (around 60% of total 
water consumption). Wastewater effluents are already used for irrigation in all parts 
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of the country. In some regions (Haifa and the Northern Valleys) the practice is well 
established and virtually the entire quantity of effluent available is utilized. In other 
regions (Western Galilee and the Northern Coastal Plain) the practice is only partial. 
Existing projects addressing the treatment and utilization of wastewater from major 
urban centres are: 
1) Dan Region Project: This project, which serves the Tel Aviv Metropolitan 
Region, treats about 110 Mm3 of wastewater annually. The wastewater is treated 
and recharged into the local aquifer. Percolation through, and absorption by the 
sandy soils, provide additional treatment. The effluents are filtered through ground 
basins employing an intermittent flooding and drying regime. A network of 
observation wells surrounding the recharge area monitors the quality and ensures 
that the treated water does not flow towards fresh water wells beyond the confined 
recharge area.  
Results obtained so far indicate that the spreading basin-unsaturated zone-
aquifer system is effective in purifying secondary effluents and upgrading them to a 
level suitable for unrestricted irrigation and for a variety of industrial and non-potable 
municipal uses. 
2) The Kishon Scheme: Produce effluents restricted for the irrigation of non 
edible crops. The most significant of this type of scheme renovates the wastewater 
of the Haifa Metropolitan Area, which amounts to 30 Mm3 per year. After 
conventional activated sludge treatment, the effluents are conveyed to the Yizreel 
Valley, some 30 kilometres to the east, where they are impounded in a 12 Mm3 
reservoir for summer irrigation of cotton and other non edible crops. A total of 60 
Mm3 per year is being used by the irrigation scheme, including about 15 Mm3 of 
fresh water from the National Carrier.  
In addition, other schemes employing different treatment processes have 
been developed for the treatment and utilization of sewage from medium-sized 
towns. In these schemes, the level of treatment ranges from advanced treatment of 
the activated sludge type to aerate and oxidation ponds, as well as less thorough 
means.  
The effluents are subsequently diverted directly or from open channels to a 
series of surface reservoirs, from which they are later used for irrigation.  
3) National Projects: The ongoing and planned wastewater reuse projects 
fall within three categories: National, Regional and Local projects. The national 
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projects are owned and operated by Mekorot - the National Water Company. The 
regional and local projects are owned and operated by Regional Water Users 
Associations. In some cases, the regional and local projects are jointly owned or 
operated by Mekorot and the regional/local water users.  
For national and regional projects financed by public funds, the charge paid 
by the user is fixed by the Government. Most of the regional and local projects are 
self-financed and the charges are determined by the users, without any Government 
intervention. 
The development plan covers new projects and expansion of existing ones as 
follows: 
- The Dan Region Sewage Reclamation Plant: The expansion of the Dan 
Region Project from the current volume of 110 Mm3/year to a capacity of 160 
Mm3/year has been approved by the Government;  
- Haifa Kishon Complex: The Haifa Kishon Complex Scheme is being 
expanded, increasing the capacity of the pumping units and extending the 
main conveyance system, to allow the connection of new consumers; 
- West Bank Collectors for the Prevention of Pollution of Groundwater 
Aquifers: Currently, wastewater generated from the cities and villages of the 
West Bank are discharged into the dry rivers. The direct health hazard and 
the environmental nuisance are coupled with the inevitable deterioration of 
water quality of underground aquifers;  
- Regional Projects: Major regional works were initiated in the seventies to 
receive, treat and reuse the wastewater from most of the urban centres in the 
various regions, including: Western Galilee, Kinneret Watershed, Inner 
Valleys, Hadera-Netanya, Yarkon South, Jerusalem, Ayalon South and Beer-
Sheva West. The plan for the coming years is to expand the existing projects 
and to initiate new projects, in the Western Galilee. 
3.6.4 Investment requirements  
The cost of treatment and reuse depends on the size of the plants (whether 
new, renovated or expanded), as well as the various treatment stages and disposal 
options. Assuming the treatment of a total quantity of 200 Mm3, using a combination 
of secondary and advanced treatment followed by reuse for irrigation, the total cost 
will amount to about US $650 million, as compared to US $760 million for treatment 
and sea disposal. (KKL-JNF. 2008) 
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The investment costs are to be accepted by the farmer, who utilizes the 
effluents for irrigation; the local authority, which would otherwise have to pay for 
more advanced treatment and disposal by conventional methods; and the State, 
which is concerned with alleviating the water scarcity and protecting environmental 
quality.  
 
3.7 West Bank and Gaza Strip  
The Occupied Territories and Israel are dependent on the same water 
resources and the current use and control of this water is based on Israel’s territorial 
control and political objectives. 
Jews and Palestinians have both used the region’s groundwater for 
generations. Both sides base their claims to this limited resource on historical use, 
territorial possession and basic human needs. 
The Israelis claim that during the late 1980s and early 1900s, Jewish farmers 
began developing the region’s groundwater resources more effectively to support 
their expanding farming practices. Following the establishment of the State of Israel 
in 1948, water resource development further expanded to support the growing Israeli 
economy.  
By 1967, and prior to Israel’s occupation of the West Bank, Israel was already 
utilizing a major portion of the available water resources of the Western and Northern 
Basins through the full development of springs, rivers and wells in Israel. 
Hence, Israelis claim the right to the water naturally emerging or pumped in 
Israel and which historically has been extracted since before even the creation of 
Israel. They base their claim on the significant damage that would result from the 
loss of the Israel’s current level of use, necessary to meet the country’s vital 
economic and human needs. 
On the other hand, Palestinian development of the region’s groundwater 
resources has been relatively limited. Prior to the establishment of Israel, 
Palestinians lacked the financial and organizational resources necessary to develop 
the region’s aquifers. While they did maintain and use various wells and springs in 
the region, new wells were rarely dug, many natural springs remained unused, and 
there was little industry or economic growth to justify investment in water resources.  
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Before 1948, few Palestinian villages developed central water supply 
systems. Later, under the Jordanian administration of the West Bank between 1948 
and 1967, little if any improvement happened. 
Also based on historical use, territorial possession and human necessity, 
Palestinians claim right to the region’s groundwater. Furthermore, the Palestinians 
debate that since most of the region’s aquifer recharge (Fig. 3.7.a) falls (as rain) over 
the West Bank, by virtue of sovereignty over the territory, they should have first 
opportunity to use and exploit the resources. Adding that Palestinians suffered, and 
still, from severe shortages and point to the huge disparity between the average 
amounts of water available to each Palestinian.  
It is important to mention that Palestinians and some legal scholars assert that 
Israel’s extraction of water inside the West Bank since 1967 is a direct violation of 
the Geneva Convention, which applies to international armed conflict and addresses 
the obligations of a “belligerent occupier” (under the Convention, a belligerent 
occupier may use the natural resources of an occupied land to support its military 
forces of occupation.  
However, it may not use those resources to support its own civilian’s 
activities). This argument is highly contested by Israel and other legal scholars, 
especially the characterization of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as being international 
and, hence, the applicability of the Geneva Convention to the situation. 
3.7.1 West Bank and Gaza Strip Water Resources  
The groundwater sources consist of underground aquifers and sub aquifers 
that are recharged by rainwater and underground flows between the basins.  
The surface water sources consist of perennial and seasonal rivers and lakes, 
the Jordan River and its tributaries, and Lake Tiberias (Sea of Galilee) being the 
major ones. 
The West Bank and Gaza Strip constitute two quite different areas in terms of 
topography, geology, and rainfall patterns. 
About one third of the State of Israel’s national water consumption, some 600 
Mm3/year, of water is produced from the Upper Cretaceous aquifer, often referred to 
as the Mountain Aquifer (Fig. 3.7.a), that are recharged along the axial part of the 
Samarian-Judean Anticlinorium running along the north-south direction through most 
of the West Bank territory. 
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Fig. 3.7.a: Mountain and Coastal Aquifers 
 
Source: IMFA, 2002 
  
Hydro-geologically, the pre-1967 Israeli territories are downstream of the 
Western and the Northern Aquifers. In other words, groundwater flows from the 
recharge areas along the high ridges populated by the Palestinians across the 1967 
“green line” boundaries into Israel.  
The 6,000-km2 Western Mountain Basin extends from the Judean Desert 
northward to the Carmel Mountain foothills, and from near the centre of the Mountain 
Belt westward to the Coastal Plain.  
The annual rainfall varies between 500 - 709 mm on the western slopes and 
100-500 mm on the eastern sides. Rainfall is the West Bank’s main source of water, 
mainly during the short rainy season (November-May); 68 percent evaporates and 
the rest filters down to replenish the aquifer. 
 A small amount drains off as surface runoff. The only perennial surface 
source is the River Jordan, which runs along the West Bank’s eastern border. Thus, 
Groundwater constitutes the major source of water. 
 
Mountain Aquifer: 
- ~ 600 Mcm3/yr (38 
%). 
- 90% of 
replenishment 
area is under the 
West Bank. 
- Israel pre-empts 
80% of total 
annual recharge 
as downstream 
riparian. 
 
Coastal Aquifer: 
- ~ 250 Mcm3 
(16%). 
- Annual Recharge: 
~ 55 Mm3. 
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Table 3.7.a: Groundwater Resources and Overall Water Consumption 
Water 
Resources 
(Mm3/year) 
Annual 
Recharge 
Israeli 
Consumption 
Settlements 
Consumption 
Palestinian 
Consumption 
Total Water 
Consumption 
Mountain 
Western Basin 
 
362 
 
344 
 
10 
 
22 
 
376 
Mountain 
North-Eastern 
Basin 
 
145 
 
103 
 
5 
 
30 
 
138 
Mountain 
Eastern Basin 
 
172 
 
40 
 
35-50 
 
69 
 
144-159 
Israeli Coastal 
Aquifer 
 
250 
 
260 
 
0 
 
0 
 
260 
Gaza Coastal 
Aquifer 
 
55 
 
0 
 
5-10 
 
110 
 
115-120 
Treated 
Wastewater 
 
 
450 
 
450 
 
0 
 
0 
 
450 
Source: International Water Resources Association  
  
Precipitation recharges the groundwater system at an average volume of 366 
Mm3/year (Table 3.7.a). The groundwater flows from the recharge zones in a general 
westward and northward direction across the 1967 border. 
3.7.2 Gaza-Strip’s Water  
Situated along the southwest coastal plain of historic Palestine and bordering 
the Mediterranean Sea, the Gaza Strip has an arid climate. There are no permanent 
surface water sources. Although in some years there is a little temporary surface 
runoff, almost none of this water is collected. Annual rainfall is far lower than in the 
West Bank, falling from 350 mm in the north to 150 mm in the south, and rates of 
evaporation are extremely high. 
The only significant source of water in Gaza Strip is groundwater (Table 
3.7.a). This is replenished directly by rain water infiltration and by underground flows 
from the Negev in the east in areas inside of the “Green Line”. At present, 
groundwater sources are replenished by rainfall, irrigation runoff, and cesspool 
sources, the latter two of which result in severe contamination of the groundwater 
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reserves. In addition, Israel’s over pumping inside the “Green Line” is preventing 
replenishment of the Gaza Strip aquifer by fresh water.  
A new study by the European Union’s FP5 project (the Fifth European 
Community Framework Program) found that the Palestinians pump about 140 Mm3 
of water from more than 1,000 wells annually from the southern coastal aquifer. 
Many of these wells are privately owned, and most of them are not under any sort of 
supervision.  
In addition the population of the Gaza Strip, which numbers more than one 
million, is increasing by 70,000 people a year. The coastal aquifer will not be able to 
meet rising demand. The quality of the water used by the Gaza Strip residents has 
already deteriorated and does not meet any international standard.  
The concentration of chlorides (a gauge of salinity) is above 1,000 milligrams 
per litre, whereas in Israel the maximum permitted amount in drinking water is 
600mg/l. The nitrate concentration (a measure of pollution originating in sewerage 
and fertilizers) has been found to be more than 500 milligrams per litre in some 
places the Israeli standard is 70mg/l. 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
The Jordan River basin (Jordan, Israel, Syria, Lebanon, and the Occupied 
Territories) will sustain 12 to 14 million people, and the population of the region will 
exceed that number by 3 to 4 million over the next two decades. As a result, 
forecasts heightened external and internal competition in these countries over 
decreasing amounts of water. This competition will most likely take the form of 
internal civil disorder rather than ‘water wars’ between states.  
The 2008 rainy season is ending with a deficit of 500 million cubic meters of 
water. Until 2014, it is not expected that the level of drinking water in the aquifers 
and in Lake Kinneret will rise above the lower ‘red line’ which marks the minimal 
quantity of water reserves needed for an ongoing regular supply.   
The water shortage will affect not only the supply of sweet water to private 
consumers and to farmers, but also the usage of recycled water in agriculture. There 
is a danger that, as a result of the demand to save fresh water, there will also be a 
reduction in the quantity of domestic sewage water that is purified and transferred for 
re-use in agriculture. This will also affect the diverse network of water reservoirs for 
the recycling of water. The 200 reservoirs built so far now provide about 45% of all 
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the water used in agriculture, mainly for different kinds of orchards. For public health 
reasons, this water is not used for field crops, and only for orchards, as the trees’ 
branches do not come into direct contact with the water. 
One of the solutions suggested by the head of the Water Authority, Professor 
Uri Shani, is improved utilization of temporary water sources, such as flood waters.  
Professor Shani advised augmenting the infrastructure for flood-water collection in 
channels where the floods are usually relatively higher. This recommendation 
actually entails expanding the system of water storage. (KKL-JNF, 2008) 
Israel’s hydrological concerns in the Occupied Territories outweigh its 
ideological and security fears since 40% of Israel’s water originates in the occupied 
West Bank. Therefore, Israel suggested several solutions to ameliorate water 
shortages including:  
- The creation of a basin-wide water authority and;  
- Restructuring basin economies away from heavily irrigated agriculture 
toward other sectors like electronics, services, and light industry. 
After several consecutive years of drought and growing water scarcity, the 
government has begun to implement a comprehensive water management plan, 
based on such components as wastewater treatment and recovery, water 
conservation, seawater and brackish water desalination and remediation of 
contaminated wells. Plans for desalinating hundreds of millions of cubic meters of 
seawater are currently being implemented.  
The proposal for reallocation of the insufficient current resources of water, 
coupled with the continued threat of desert encroachment, will not solve the problem 
of water scarcity, neither for Israel nor for its neighbours. It will only perpetuate the 
water shortage or place the entire burden of desalination on the shoulders of Israel.  
The solution, besides the general economic development of Israel’s 
neighbours, is to assist the neighbours of Israel to meet the cost of seawater 
desalination (specifically for the Palestinian and for Jordan) for a period of few years.  
It is important to say that the Groundwater in the three basins (the Weastern 
Basin or Yarqon-Tanninim Aquifer to the west towards the Coastal Plain, the so-
called Eastern Basin to the east towards the Jordan-Dead Sea trough and the so-
called Northern Basin to the north draining towards Valley of Jezreel or Esdraelon 
and Beit Shean Valley) will, most probably, be considered a transboundary water 
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resource between Israel and the future Palestinian State, and in the light of general 
scarcity of water resources in the region, will be subject to contentious negotiations.  
The controversy over water resources will be a difficult problem to overcome. 
Although there were a number of cooperative efforts made at addressing issues of 
quality and allocation of water resources shared between the Israeli and Palestinian 
societies, neither party has ever agreed to waive its claims to what it considers its 
fair share. 
The region’s water resources are insufficient to provide the needs for both 
parties; accordingly new sources of freshwater must be identified. With growing 
populations and the need for economic development, especially by the Palestinians, 
there is a desperate need for the Israelis and the Palestinians to shift their focus from 
accusation and condemnation toward efforts pitched at finding new sources of 
freshwater. 
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 4 Lebanon 
 
Lebanon is more than just a land, it is a message! John Paul II 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Lebanon is situated on the eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea, bounded 
on the north and east by Syria (375 km) and on the south by Israel (79 km). From 
east to west it averages around 50 km, meanwhile the coastline stretches over 225 
km from north to south; its greatest width from west to east is 85 km. Total area of 
Lebanon is 10,450 square kilometers (of which 10,280 km2 are land area and 170 
km2 are water area).  
 The terrain is a narrow coastal plain followed by Lebanon Mountains (western 
mountains), the Bekaa valley, and the eastern mountains that extend to the Syrian 
border. The highest altitude in the country, Quornet Al-Sawda rises to over 3,080 
meters and is covered by snow for most of the year.  
 The last population census in Lebanon is dated back to 1932. Since then, 
population estimate is based on partial surveys. In 1997, the Lebanese population 
was estimated at 4 million inhabitants; more than 10 percent are non-Lebanese 
(Wikipedia. 2008). Palestinians constitute the vast majority of foreigners, estimated 
at around 400,000 inhabitants, of who around 50 percent are living in refugee 
camps. Other nationalities include Syrian, Egyptian, Sri Lanka, Philippine and others 
that mainly represent the foreign labor, mostly doing blue-collar work.  
The region known as greater Beirut is heavily populated with around 1.5 
million inhabitants, of which 400 thousand are residing in the administrative region of 
Beirut, capital of Lebanon. Other major cities are Tripoli 91 km north of Beirut, with 
about 250,000 people; Saida 41 km south of Beirut, with about 80,000 people; Tyre 
(Sour) 79 km south of Beirut with about 30,000 inhabitants, and Zahle 47 km east of 
Beirut with about 80,000 people.  
Lebanon has a Mediterranean climate along the coast and alpine in the 
mountains, with long sultry summers and short mild winters. Average humidity along 
the Coast Ranges from the high 60’s to the high 70’s. During the summer months 
from May through September, the average daily temperature in Beirut ranges from 
22° C (72° F) to 30° C (86° F), it feels hotter due to humidity levels. The thermometer 
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hovers around 23° even at night. January and February are the coldest months of 
the year when the average temperature in Beirut is 14° C (55° F), rarely falling below 
8° C (46° F).  
In the hottest months the mountains provide a welcome relief from the 
endless heat of the coast, though the daytime temperatures are about the same as 
in Beirut, the humidity is much less and the nights are cooler. The Bekaa Valley is 
very hot and dry in summer with temperatures reaching the high 30’s though the 
nights are cool. Bekaa Valley winters are cold, wet and windy. The Spring and 
Autumn seasons are short but pleasant. Average annual rainfall is 893 mm, of which 
about 85 per cent are in the winter months. Unlike some other Arab states, Lebanon 
does not have oil. The most abundant resources the country is rich of are water and 
fertile land. However these sources are still under-utilized. Lebanon has two major 
rivers: the Assi and the Litani. 
  
4.2 Freshwater in Lebanon  
Lebanon has a wealth of water resources in its numerous rivers (appendix 2, 
annex 1, map 2), underground aquifers, and plentiful rainfall in the winter. The 
fundamental problem is that more than half of the rainwater flows unexploited into 
the sea, accompanied by poor water management. Human activities put pressures 
on both the quantity (water abstraction) and quality (water pollution) of water 
resources.  
Many activities affect, mainly negatively, the water cycle (deforestation, dams, 
irrigation, drainage canals) thereby altering the conditions for water replenishment. 
For example, soil erosion and the loss of plant cover (rainfall intercept) diminish 
groundwater recharge.  
Continued soil erosion and loss of plant cover, forests include, will lead to 
scarcer water resources and poorer water quality in the future. Water quality will not 
improve until the practice of disposing untreated wastewaters on land and into 
streams and rivers ends. Finding proper solutions should enable Lebanon to meet all 
its own needs and be an exporter of hundreds of millions of cubic meters of water to 
its parched neighbours. 
4.2.1 Fortunate hydrological position 
Lebanon is in a relatively fortunate hydrological position. It is estimated that 
the yearly precipitation results in an average yearly flow of 8,600 Mm3, giving rise to 
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40 major streams and rivers (including 17 perennial rivers) and more than 2000 
springs. Despite this, many inexpert predict that Lebanon will experience a water 
deficit within 10 to 15 years, mainly because there is general and widespread 
concern in Lebanon about water, reflecting the country’s insecurity about perceived 
and real threats to its sovereignty over water resources. This attitude affects the 
quality of water data collected, analysed, and published.  
This makes it difficult to manage water resources adequately at present and 
to make meaningful projections into the future about potential use and availability of 
water. Water stress in neighbouring countries including Syria, Israel, West bank 
Gaza and Jordan is a harsh reminder that Lebanon must rethink its water strategy 
and protect its water resources by imposing radical water management policies that 
should be developed and implemented. 
  According to the UN’s Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia 
(ESCWA), Lebanon has an annual supply of 2,850 Mm3 of water, of which 400 to 
1,000 Mm3 is in underground reserves. A U.S. Company, Parsons, which undertook 
a preliminary study of Lebanon’s water situation in 2001, believes that Lebanon has 
the potential to develop its water resources so that around 4,500 Mm3 of water 
annually would be available, much of which could be sold to the region. (ESCWA. 
2000) 
Lebanon, however, has yet to exploit these water resources and even suffers 
from water shortages because of supply and management problems. Estimates of 
Lebanon’s annual water demand vary from 1,100 to 1,400 Mm3. A US aid-funded 
study by Development Alternatives in 2001 estimated that Lebanon uses 75 percent 
of its annual water supply for irrigation (ibid. 2000). 
Domestic use accounts for 165 Mm3 and industrial use 130 Mm3. However, 
the Parsons study concluded that real domestic demand for water is over 300 Mm3 
and that the Government of Lebanon cannot meet almost half that amount. Demand 
for water is expected to rise to 2,500 Mm3 by 2015, and perhaps as much as 4,000 
Mm3 by 2025, according to ESCWA (Tayyar N. 2002). 
1) Water balance, and precipitation distribution: Multiple studies estimated 
the annual water balance in Lebanon at approximately 8,600 Mm3 (the average 
yearly precipitation) with nearly 50 percent lost through evapotranspiration, while 
additional losses include surface water flows to neighbouring countries (estimated by 
the Litani River Authority to represent about 8 percent) and groundwater seepage 
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(almost 12 percent). This leaves 2,600 Mm3 of surface and groundwater that is 
potentially available, and of which 2,000 Mm3 is deemed exploitable (Table 4.2.1.a). 
 
Table 4.2.a: Yearly Water Balance 
Precipitation 
 
 
 
(Mm3/Y) 
Evapotranspiration 
 
 
 
(Mm3/Y) 
Groundwater 
seepage 
 
 
 
(Mm3/Y) 
Surface water flows to 
neighbouring countries 
 
Net 
potential 
surface and 
groundwater 
available 
(Mm3/Y) 
Net 
exploitable 
surface and 
groundwater 
 
(Mm3/Y) 
Syria Israel 
(1) 
Mm3/Y 
(2) 
Mm3/Y 
(3) 
Mm3/Y 
8,600  (4,300) (1,030) (415) (95) (160) 2,600 2,000 
Source: Ministry of Environment (MoE)/Lebanese Environment and Development Observatory (LEDO), 2001. 
Notes:  - Precipitation estimated from isohyet’s map, and flows to Syria from National Litani Organization. 
- All figures between brackets represent losses. 
- (1) Al Assi River flows to Syria. 
- (2) Al Kabir River flows to Syria (represents the border between Lebanon and Syria). 
- (3) Hasbany River flows to Israel. 
 
Precipitation in Lebanon is unevenly distributed, up to 90 percent of falls 
between November and April. Several parts of the country experience zero rainfall 
during the remaining six months, which implies the need for water storage. River 
runoffs peak during the wettest months with only small base-flows at all other times, 
when water is usually most needed.  
 
Table 4.2.b: Recorded rainfall 
 
Station 
Year Average 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 1996-2000 1961-1990 
Beirut 827 733 658 487 834 708 825 
Zahle 798 686 533 311 614 588 - 
Tripoli 844 639 694 378 872 685 - 
Source: MoE/LEDO, 2001 
 
Annual precipitation can reach up to 2,000 mm in some areas and barely 
makes the 200 mm mark in others. Coastal areas experience 600 to 1,000 mm 
annual rainfall, neighbouring mountain areas between 1,000 to 1,400 mm and 
between 200 and 600 in the North and Central regions, and around 600 to 1,000 mm 
in the South. (LEDO. 2001)  
Table 4.2.b shows recorded rainfall in Beirut, Tripoli and Zahle Meteorological 
stations. Prior to the “civil war” (1975), Lebanon had more than eight stations spread 
across the country. Many were damaged during the war and meteorological records 
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were interrupted for several years. Several stations were rehabilitated in the 1990s. 
In addition, several research centres and universities operate as auxiliary weather 
stations. 
2) Surface water resources: In Lebanon there are 17 perennial streams and 
23 seasonal ones. Thirteen Rivers flow west from their source in the Mount Lebanon 
range to the sea: Ostuene, Aaraqa, Al Bared, Abou Ali, Al Jaouz, Ibrahim, Al kelb, 
Beirut, Awali, Litani, Al Zahrani and Abou Assouad. Al Kebir River also flows west 
and traces the northern border of Lebanon with Syria.  
  The Litani River Drains the southern Bekaa plain crosses the southern 
periphery of the Mount Lebanon range and discharges into the sea north of Tyre. Al 
Assi or Orontes River flows north in Syria draining the northern Bekaa plain. The 
Hasbani River crosses the southern border and forms one of the tributaries of Jordan 
River (appendix 2, annex 1, map 2). 
 
Table 4.2.c: the 17 Perennial streams in Lebanon 
River name 
 
Length 
(Km) 
Flow in Mm3 
Annual Max. Min. 
Al Kabir 58 190 13.9 1.8 
Ostuene 44 65 4.01 0.8 
Aaraqua 27 59 6.27 0.8 
Al Bared 24 282 15.2 2.7 
Abou Ali 45 262 37.3 1.6 
Al Jaouz 38 76 6.18 0.4 
Ibrahim 30 508 27.6 1.9 
Al Kalb 38 254 18.1 2.4 
Beirut 42 10 10 0.1 
Damour 38 307 32.7 0.6 
Al Awali 48 299 26.2 3.9 
Saitani 22 14 1.3 0 
Al Zahrani 25 38 3.4 0.3 
Abou Assouad 15 11 -* -* 
Litani 170 793 30.8 4.3 
Al Aassi 46 480 20.9 11.5 
Hasbani 21 151 11.3 1.6 
Source: Ministry of Environment/LEDO, 2001.  
* No data available.  
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Table 4.2.c presents the length and the annual flow rates, plus the minimum 
and the maximum flow rates recorded for each river. Most of these rivers flow peak 
during March and April, some reach maximum flow, as the Aassi River, in July. 
Minimum flows are typically recorded in September and October. 
3) Underground aquifers: The country’s limestone formation has many 
fissures and fractures, which allow rainwater to infiltrate deep into the ground. The 
estimates for the groundwater quantity available for exploitation range from 400 to 
1,000 Mm3/yr according to different sources of information. (Amery. 2000, 
MoE/LEDO. 2001)        
The water in these aquifers, either:  
- Remains stored in aquiclude (impermeable ground: a layer of rock, 
sediment, or soil through which ground water cannot flow), some may be 
exploited through wells while other remains untapped in deep layers; 
- Reappears as surface waters, at lower elevations, in the form of springs; 
- Forms submarine springs discharging near the coastline or the sea, are lost 
to deep layers and many reappear in the groundwater of neighbouring 
countries. 
In this context, it is important to mention that the most comprehensive study is 
the one of the 1970s, which has been conducted by the UN (1970 UNDP report of 
underground aquifers in Lebanon). 
The country has been divided into two distinct hydro-geological provinces:  
- The Interior Province comprising the eastern flanks of Lebanon’s range, the 
Bekaa Valley and the western flanks of Anti-Lebanon; 
- The Mediterranean Province comprising the western flanks down to the sea. 
The line that divide between these two basins is been considered as a 
fictitious line passing through the tops of Mount Lebanon, Mount Barouk (Jabal Al 
Barouk), Jabal Niha and the Lebanese Galilee. In both Provinces several basins 
were identified.  
The physical characteristics of these aquifers/basins are expected to remain 
the same since the initial studies (1970s) were conducted, much of the hydrological 
and hydraulic properties have changed due to uncontrolled groundwater tapping 
especially during the civil war (1975-1990). 
The country’s geological structure have further complicated the issue, as 
faults may act as barriers, flow paths for water divide the same basin into sub-basins 
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with different groundwater table levels. Furthermore, in karsts terrain (widespread in 
the country) the hydrology is different from other types of terrain where diffuse flow of 
water dominates. In karsts, water tends to concentrate along specific paths flowing in 
underground rivers and conduits until and through the phreatic (of or relating to 
ground water) zone, a phenomenon whereby the traditional concept of water table 
does not clearly apply resulting in the difficult task of delineating a general 
groundwater surface map, as well as the problem of a lack of data. 
4.2.2 Water distribution and water consumption 
Obviously agriculture is the largest consumer of water in Lebanon (as well as 
worldwide), followed by domestic and industrial uses. Many attempts made to 
estimate current water consumption in Lebanon in the past. It is very difficult to 
determine the actual breakdown of water consumption as large shares of water in 
public distribution systems are lost through leakages and private wells, most of which 
are unlicensed therefore not monitored. In general, agriculture represents between 
60 to 70 percent of total water consumption. This consumption is likely to decrease 
in the future as more is diverted for domestic and industrial use (see table 4.2.d).  
 
Table 4.2.d: Total water demand by sector  
Usage type 1990 1994 2015 
Mm3/Y Percent Mm3/Y Percent Mm3/Y Percent 
Agriculture 875 72 950 74 1,700 60 
Domestic 271 22 205 16 900 32 
Industry 65 6 130 10 240 8 
Total 1,211 100 1,285 100 2,840 100 
Source: LEDO, 2001 
 
It is widely reported that current water consumption is around 1,400 Mm3. 
Demand forecasts are conflicting, ranging from 1,897 Mm3 to 3,300 Mm3 for the year 
2010 (MoE/LEDO. 2001).  
1) Domestic consumption: 79 percent of buildings were connected to water 
supply networks (Census of Buildings and Establishment for 1996-7). The highest 
rate of connection was recorded in Beirut and Kesrouan (93 and 94 percent 
respectively). It is important to note that some improvements have been made since, 
but there is no up-to-date information regarding this matter.  
Water supply to households originates from surface or underground water 
resources. Most of the country’s 15 potable water treatment plants existed before the 
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civil war and they were rehabilitated and some expanded. Between 1995 and 2001, 
average water treatment capacity increased by more than 50 percent (see Table 
4.2.e). Even though it is difficult to estimate the current level of domestic water 
consumption, several sources indicate that the target capacity is 160 litres per day 
per person. Actual delivery is presumably much lower (around 64 litres per day in 
some areas), due to high system and distribution losses. Therefore, in addition to 
investing in production and treatment measures, the Government is increasingly 
focusing on reducing losses and improving distribution. 
 
Table 4.2.e Distribution and capacity of Water Treatment Plants 
Region 
 
Water Board Plant Location 
(Name) 
Capacity (m3/day) 
1995 2001 
 
Greater Beirut 
 
Beirut Dbaye 230,000 430,000 
Ain Al-Delbe Dayshounieh 50,000 50,000 
Hazmieh 50,000 50,000 
 
North 
Lebanon 
 
Tripoli Haab 40,000 40,000 
Nabaa al-
Ghar 
Kousba 5,000 16,000 
Batroun Nabaa Delleh 3,500 12,000 
 
Mount 
Lebanon 
 
Metn Al-Marj Lake 3,500 3,500 
Jeita 16,000 17,000 
Jbeil Nahr Ibrahim 4,000 16,000 
 
 
South 
Lebanon 
 
 
Saisa Nabaa Kfarwa 8,500 8,500 
Nabaa Al-
Tasse 
Nabaa 
Azzibeh 
4,000 4,000 
Sour (Tyre) Al-Bass 6,000 12,000 
Ras Al-Ain 13,500 15,000 
Jabal Amel Taybeh 8,000 8,000 
Bekaa Valley Zahle Berdawni 10,000 10,000 
Total (12 
Authorities) 
(15 Plants) 452,000 692,000 
 Source: MoE/LEDO, 2001. 
 
2) Agriculture consumption: Lebanon has significant water resources that 
could be used to more than double irrigated agricultural land and that it could export 
to its neighbours. Unlike its neighbours, it does not have to cope with areas of 
extreme aridity. 
Agriculture in Lebanon is increasingly shifting to irrigated production, which 
adds pressure on water resources. Increased irrigation implies more groundwater 
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pumping, leading to salinity build-up in the soil. The agriculture sector is the largest 
consumer of available water resources. During the recent decades, irrigated lands 
have more than doubled, from 40,775 hectares in 1961 to 104,009 hectares in 1999 
(FAO, 2000). The gradual substitution of traditional and wild cultivar (A variety of a 
plant developed from a natural species and maintained under cultivation) with new 
crop varieties constitutes an added pressure on water resources. 
Water for irrigation is provided from both surface and groundwater (48 and 52 
percent, respectively). The number of farms that have private water wells is believed 
to be increasing rapidly (many farms have more than one well), taking into 
consideration that there are no data on water wells to support this.  
Furthermore, another concern with the expansion of irrigated agriculture is the 
high dependence on gravity irrigation. Gravity irrigation accounts for around 64 
percent of the total irrigated land and is the predominant method of irrigation with 
surface water. Compared to sprinkler and drip irrigation, gravity irrigation inherently 
carries high water losses, due to low system efficiencies and high evaporation 
losses. While efficiency of gravity irrigation could be significantly improved using 
optimal water and crop management schemes, the majority of farmers in Lebanon 
lack of training in basic agriculture. 
Government spending is moderate concerning this sector. Under the Irrigation 
Rehabilitation and Modernization Project (IRMP), partially funded by a World Bank 
loan, distribution schemes have been completed in Qassmieh/Ras al Ain (3,800 ha.), 
Yammouneh (5,600 ha.), Akkar al Bared (800 ha.), Dennieh (5,000 ha.) and the 
south Bekaa (2,000 ha.). These projects will cost an estimated US$71 million and 
potentially will irrigate 17,200 hectares, which may be further expanded to 20,000 
hectares. The most ambitious irrigation schemes to date is Canal 800 (ibid. 2001). 
Canal 800 is a series of surface water distribution networks that will irrigate 
15,550 hectares of arable land in South Lebanon, stretching from the Qaraoun Lake 
to the southern border with Israel. The main distributor (about 56 km.) originates at 
the Taybeh pumping station (from a derivation of the Litani River). An additional 56 
km of secondary distribution lines bring the total length to 112 km. The target area is 
divided into 12 irrigation zones distributed across the “Cazas” of Mareayoun (two 
zones covering 2,569 hectares), Nabatiyeh (one zone covering 1,750 hectares), and 
South Qassmieh (nine zones covering 10,916 hectares).  
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Canal 800 is designed to supply irrigation water at the rate of 6,600-7,000 m3 
per hectare per season. The project is expected to cost an estimated US$100 
million, to be funded partly by the Arab Fund for Social Development (AFSD). 
Originally an old project design, the feasibility study for Canal 800 is currently being 
updated and detailed designs are under preparation. Execution of Canal 800 (main 
distributor, irrigation networks, land levelling) will require at least 10 years. 
Canal 800 and the IRMP will add 32,255 hectares to irrigate agriculture. 
These irrigation schemes are designed to tap surface water resources and may 
alleviate current demand pressure on groundwater. However, excessive diversion of 
surface water could reduce base flows further thereby affecting freshwater habitats. 
This may alter floral association and faunal populations in freshwater bodies.  
Moreover, improvement to the irrigation infrastructure in Lebanon must be 
accompanied by improved water management, as agriculture accounts between 60 
and 70 percent of total water consumption. (FAO. 2000) 
4.2.3 Other uses of water 
Mainly two types of water uses: 
- Hydropower plants: Several rivers have been dammed to generate 
electricity, starting as early as the 1960s. Due to the reliance on water 
gradients (and many other reasons; political, religious, etc.) there are little 
interest in expanding existing hydroelectric plants or even building new ones. 
Recently the government has invested significant resources to capture snow 
water at high altitudes to sustain agriculture production during the dry season 
(summer period). This is further discussed in sub-section 4.3.3, part 1 Dams 
and reservoirs; 
- Recreational use: Swimming pools that mainly are for private use (villas, 
hotels and country clubs) and are presumably tapped from underground water 
resources at liberty. Water parks also are considered as heavy water 
consumers and not monitored as well private swimming pools. 
 
4.3 Freshwater Management 
Lebanon’s water supply and irrigation networks are in less than average 
shape, and a considerable amount of precious water is lost every year. Although 
donors, in particularly from Arab States, have given over $600 million since the end 
of the civil war in loans and grants to rebuild the water network, much of which dates 
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back to the French mandate, the 2001 US AID study estimated that 50 to 70 percent 
of the distribution systems still need to be rehabilitated. Water losses exceed 50 
percent in many areas. Overuse of wells in coastal areas has lowered water tables 
and caused saltwater to intrude into the coastal aquifers (LEDO. 2001)  
Much of the country’s irrigation system dates from before the civil war (before 
1975), and cracks in canals, evaporation, and illegal use of canal water account for 
irrigation efficiency of 30 to 40 percent, according to the AID study. About 80,000 to 
90,000 hectares are irrigated every year, out of a potential 180,000 hectares. Donors 
have pumped about $60 million into irrigation systems since the early 1990s. USAID 
has given $1.9 million in grants for 89 potable water projects and $3.9 million for 189 
irrigation projects over the past decade. 
In addition, the management of Lebanon’s water resources is poor. ESCWA 
estimates that only 40 percent of Lebanese pay for their water. Except for Sidon 
(Saida), water systems are not metered and customers are charged a flat fee. In 
Beirut, water users, both domestic and commercial, pay about $153 per year, which 
provides no incentive to save water. Although water tariffs in Beirut have increased 
more than 40 percent since 1994, revenues cover less than 70 percent of operating 
costs, according to the 2001 AID study.  
Water shortages should not be commonplace in Lebanon given that the 
country is blessed with plentiful rainfall in the winter. There are many reasons for this 
shortage that are related to poor water management, however, the fundamental 
problem is that more than half of the rainwater flows unexploited into the sea. The 
government is trying to do something about it.  
According to the ministry’s 10-year plan, one of the objectives is to transfer 
the full cost of providing water supply and sewage disposal services from the state to 
consumers through an equitable tariff and collection system. This, however, may 
prove problematic. None of the water authorities, with the exception of the Sidon 
Water Authority, have domestic water meters installed and charge on a volumetric 
basis. In addition, since municipal supplies are irregular, there are a huge number of 
private wells in the country that are not monitored. As a result, people feel water is 
something that is practically free. 
4.3.1 Water quality 
Industrial activities releases a wide range of chemical effluents into water 
courses, especially surface and coastal waters, not to mention leaching of pesticides 
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and fertilizers from agriculture. It is difficult to estimate the pollution loads into water 
bodies from various sectors. Not only data on effluent generation from industry are 
scant and poorly monitored, there is also insufficient data on effluent disposal routes; 
i.e. direct discharge on land or into nearby water courses and the Mediterranean 
Sea, indirect discharge into sewer networks with or without pre-treatment. 
1) Surface and underground water quality: In general water quality data 
are available from indirect sampling activities conducted by various institutions 
(National Centre for Marine Sciences, Ministry of Public Health/Directorate of Central 
Laboratory, American University of Beirut Water Resources Centre, Ministry of 
Energy and Water). Such data highlight spatial variations but do not account for 
temporal variations, which require continuous sampling and monitoring events 
(something Lebanon does not have). 
 
Figure 4.3.a: Level of BOD5 in nine Rivers 
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 Mean recorded values for BOD5 (mg/1) 
Source: ECODIT, 2001, p. 118. 
 
Water bodies are affected by effluents and solid waste from about 22,000 
industrial establishments, not to mention the domestic effluent from the whole 
population (around four millions). It is estimated that domestic effluent reaches 
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around 249 Mm3 per year while previous reports estimated industrial effluents at 
about 22.3 Mm3 per year (ECODIT. 2001). 
A study conducted by American University of Beirut Water Resources Centre, 
November 1999, assessed the impact of waste disposal on water quality in nine 
major rivers. The results of water and sediment samples from 65 separate sampling 
sites showed generally high concentrations of BOD5 (The biochemical oxygen 
demand of wastewater during decomposition occurring over a five day period; a 
measure of the organic content of wastewater, up to 154 mg/1 at certain sites), as 
well as fecal and total coliforms [a group of bacteria which live within the bowels of 
larger organisms and ferment a sugar called lactose, producing gas within 48 hours 
of growth. They are generally small, gram-negative, bacilliform (shaped like rods) 
facultative anaerobes and they include strains such as Kelbsiella, Enterobacter, and 
Citrobacter. They are useful for measuring the amount of water pollution by feces 
(Figure 4.3.a)]. High BOD5 levels and coliform counts indicate that untreated 
domestic sewage is directly discharged into water bodies. 
Another study prepared for the Ministry of Environment and the Litani River 
Authority by MVM (Swedish based company) between November 1998 and May 
2000, reveals that currently up to seven sewer networks of varying sizes discharge 
their effluents into the River. Baalbek, Houch Al-Rafqa, Qaa er Rim, Zahle, Chtoura, 
Qabb Elias, Bar Elias, Joub Jannine and Qaraoun discharge untreated sewage into 
the Litani or its tributaries.  
The River also receives industrial effluents from sugar-beet factories, paper 
factories, lead recovery plants, limestone crushers, agro-industries and poultry 
farms, tanneries and slaughterhouses.   
  The study also found that the dump releases significant amounts of 
hydrocarbons and chlorinated organic substances including alkyl naphthalene and 
non-polar carbons. The impact of open dumping at Zahle open dump (along the 
Berdawni River) was assessed, the results showed that heavy metal concentrations, 
including zinc, copper and nickel, were significantly higher downstream of the open 
dump (ibid. 2001).  
This River is also affected by leachate [the liquid produced when water 
percolates through any permeable material. It can contain either dissolved or 
suspended material, or usually both. This liquid is most commonly found in 
association with landfills where result of rain percolating through the waste and 
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reacting with the products of decomposition, chemicals and other materials in the 
waste to produce the leachate. If the landfill has no leachate collection system, the 
leachate can enter groundwater, and this can pose environmental or health problems 
as a result. Typically, landfill leachate is anoxic, acidic, and rich in organic acid 
groups, sulfate ions and with high concentrations of common metal ions especially 
iron. Leachate has a very distinctive smell which is not easily forgotten. 
 
Figure 4.3.b: Level of NO3 in nine Rivers 
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 Mean recorded values for NO3 (mg/1) 
Source: ECODIT, 2001, p.118. 
 
The risks from waste leachate are due to its high organic contaminant 
concentrations and high ammoniacal nitrogen. Pathogenic micro-organisms and 
toxic substances that might be present in it are often cited as the most important, but 
pathogenic organism counts reduce rapidly with time in the landfill, so this only 
applies to the freshest leachate. These risks are greatly mitigated by properly 
designed and engineered landfill sites. For example, sites that are constructed on 
geologically impermeable materials or sites that use impermeable liners made of 
geotextiles or clay.  
The use of linings is now mandatory within both the United States and the 
European Union except where the waste is genuinely impermeable. In addition, toxic 
materials such as cadmium and toluene cannot be disposed of in landfills] released 
from five open dumps (Baalbek, Sifri, Barr Elias, Zahle and Joub Jannine). Unlike 
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controlled landfills, which are equipped with basal lining systems to intercept 
leachate, open dumps release leachate directly into the environment. Leachate will 
seep into groundwater or runoff into nearby watercourse. These pollutants indicate 
the presence of pesticide residues in the dump, presumably caused by the disposal 
of agro-chemical wastes. 
Figure 4.3.b presents mean recorded values for NO3 [Nitrates such as 
potassium nitrate (saltpeter) and ammonium nitrate are important nitrogen carriers in 
fertilizers; lesser amounts of calcium nitrate, magnesium nitrate and sodium nitrate 
are applied. These nitrates must be used quickly by plants because they are easily 
lost through leaching or denitrification by bacteria. Nitrate pollution has become an 
environmental issue in rivers and oceans. In freshwater or estuarine systems close 
to land, nitrate can reach high levels that can potentially cause the death of fish. 
While nitrate is much less toxic than ammonia or nitrite, levels over 30 ppm (parts 
per million) of nitrate can inhibit growth, impair the immune system and cause stress 
in some aquatic species. In most cases of excess nitrate concentrations, the 
principal pathway of entering aquatic systems is through surface runoff from 
agricultural or landscaped areas which have received excess nitrate fertilizer. These 
levels of nitrate can also lead to algae blooms, and when nutrients become limiting 
(such as potassium, phosphate or nitrate) then eutrophication can occur. As well as 
leading to water anoxia, these blooms may cause other changes to ecosystem 
function, favouring some groups of organisms over others. Consequently, as nitrates 
form a component of total dissolved solids, they are widely used as an indicator of 
water quality] levels.  
High Nitrates (NO3) levels reflect the additional presence of diffuse sources of 
pollution, such as fertilizers from riverbank agriculture. Concentrations of total 
dissolved solids, chlorides, orthophosphates and sulphates varied from 17-464 mg/1, 
8-85 mg/1, <0.1-1.72 mg/1, and 0.23-68 mg/1, respectively. 
Lebanon does not have standards for surface water quality. Decision 52/1 
(1996) does however provide minimum water quality standards for aquatic life, 
including several heavy metals such as Zinc and Copper. The corresponding limit 
value for both is 1 mg/1.  
Limestone formation facilitates the seepage of liquid wastes to water 
underground. Point sources of pollution include the discharge of domestic and 
industrial solid and liquid wastes, as well as routine or occidental spills (leaking 
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underground storage tanks per example). Diffuse sources of pollution include mainly 
agrochemicals (pesticide residues and fertilizers) and seawater intrusion (water 
salinity). 
The American University of Beirut conducted a preliminary assessment of 
underground water quality in Lebanon in 1999. A total of thirty one samples from 
thirteen different regions were analysed for the presence of sixteen pesticide 
compounds, including transformation products. The results showed that NO3 
concentrations were moderately high in the sampled wells, especially along the 
coast, ranging from 0.3 mg/1 in Niha to 51.9 mg/1 in Choueifat (ibid. 2001).  
The Lebanese and the World Health Organization (WHO) standards in 
drinking water are 45 mg/1 and 50 mg/1 respectively. Generally, nitrate levels above 
20 mg/1 indicate human-based pollution (not naturally occurring). Phosphate levels 
were within acceptable ranges (ibid. 2001). Pesticide residues were detected in trace 
concentrations:  
- Aldrin (30 percent of the sampled wells): An organochlorine insecticide 
which is oxidized in the insect to form dieldrin, a neurotoxin. Aldrin was 
formerly used to kill soil insects such as termites and grasshoppers to protect 
crops such as corn and potatoes. It has been classified as a persistent 
organic pollutant. Due to health concerns regarding dieldrin, it is no longer 
manufactured or used in the United States. In addition, aldrin is itself a 
carcinogen and mutagen. The last American farm to use the pesticide was 
Emily Farms, in Covina, CA. It can be formed from the synthesis of 
hexachloro-1, 3-cyclopentadiene with norbornadiene in a Diels-Alder reaction; 
- Dieldrin (12 percent): A chlorinated hydrocarbon originally produced by 
Bayer AG as an insecticide. The molecule has a ring structure based on 
naphthalene. Dieldrin is closely related to aldrin which itself breaks down to 
form dieldrin. Aldrin is not toxic to insects, it is oxidised in the insect to form 
dieldrin which is the active compound. Both dieldrin and aldrin are named 
after the Diels-Alder reaction which is used to form aldrin from a mixture of 
norbornadiene and hexachlorocyclopentadiene. Originally developed in the 
1940s as an alternative to DDT, dieldrin proved to be a highly effective 
insecticide and was very widely used during the 1950s to early 1970s. Endrin 
is a stereoisomer of dieldrin. However, it is an extremely persistent organic 
pollutant; it does not easily break down. Furthermore it tends to accumulate 
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as it is passed along the food chain. Acute (short-term) exposure is 
considered to be harmless, but long-term exposure has proven toxic to a very 
wide range of animals including humans, far greater than to the original insect 
targets. For this reason it is now banned in most of the world; 
- Heptachlor (12 percent): An insecticide that usually comes in the form of a 
white or tan powder, the tan powder being of lower purity. It is similar to 
insecticide chlordane. Heptachlor was widely used in the past to kill insects. In 
1962, Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring questioned the safety of heptachlor. The 
Environmental Protection Agency has banned the sale of heptachlor products 
in the United States and virtually eliminated its use for any purpose. Due to its 
highly stable structure, heptachlor can persist in the environment for decades. 
The amount that can be present in different foods is regulated; 
- Heptachlor epoxide (9 percent): An oxidation product of heptachlor formed 
by many plants and animals, including humans, after exposure to heptachlor. 
It has been shown to remain in soil treated with heptachlor for over fifteen 
years and is toxic to animals and humans. 
2) Seawater contamination, wastewater discharge and coastal water 
quality: Seawater contamination of underground water near the coast has been 
reported in Lebanon as early as the 1960s. This problem has reached a new scale of 
severity over the last two decades due to the rural-urban migration and also 
population growth. This increases demand for water all along the coast, and most 
particularly in and around the capital. Many new urban developments (housing and 
recreational resorts in mountain areas) rely on underground water supplies. In the 
absence of strict enforcement of borehole specifications and permissible abstraction 
rates, the salt-freshwater interface shifts inland. 
Over-pumping leads to higher chloride concentrations in underground water. 
In 1997, almost 42,000 buildings (nine percent of all buildings in Lebanon) were 
equipped with private wells. Farmers across the country are suspected of having 
drilled countless number of more wells. A high sodium and chloride concentration in 
coastal underground water is attributed to seawater intrusion (ibid. 2001).  
High chloride levels in mountain regions and in Bekaa Valley are potentially 
attributed to fertilizer applications and where demand for irrigation is increasing 
rapidly. Farmers are digging wells at liberty, defying the most basic well digging 
standards (permissible depth and minimum distance between wells).   
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Chloride concentrations were generally above the World Health Organization 
(WHO) and Lebanese permissible limit of 250 mg/1 and 200 mg/1 respectively. 
Sodium concentrations were well above the 200 mg/1 WHO standard and 150 mg/1 
Lebanese standards for drinking water (sodium levels exceeded 5,000 mg/1 in some 
wells). 
Another study conducted by the AUB Water Resources Centre in 2000 
shows, in addition to trace levels of several pesticides, high concentrations of nickel, 
copper, chromium, lead and arsenic at several locations along the coast. Currently, 
there are about 53 wastewater outfalls along the coast (ibid. 2001). Coastal waters 
are also affected by countless beachfront resorts, numerous reclamation and sea 
embankment projects (new sea runway at Beirut International Airport and Dbaye 
Marina). 
Some 2.3 million people live in the coastal zone. They release approximately 
950,000 m3 of wastewater a day, most of it ending up in the sea (CDR/ECODIT (a 
worldwide, water and environmental management and international development 
consulting firm) - IAURIF (French Institut d'Aménagement Urbain de la Région d'Ile 
de France), 1997). Of the 10 coastal areas monitored by the National Centre for 
Marine Sciences, only one station (Batroun) was deemed fit for swimming based on 
the concentration of fecal coliform. All other nine areas exceeded the WHO fecal 
coliform standard for recreation waters. 
Furthermore, solid waste disposal in beachfront dumps continues in Tripoli 
and Saida, but has stopped in Normandy and Bourj Hammoud. Disposal of solid 
waste in uncontrolled landfills and waterfront dumps exacerbate the current pattern 
of seawater contamination.  
In the absence of clay or plastic liners, leachate seeps into underground water 
and seawater resulting in both organic and inorganic contamination. In addition to 
the release of leachate, coastal open dumps are also the source of drifting debris 
and floating waste, which may sink to the bottom and cover the sea floor.  
The Professional Divers’ Association (PDA) frequently reports that the waste 
covers the sea floor at many locations off the coast, reducing photosynthesis and 
suffocating marine flora and fauna. Fishers report the gradual decline of the coralline 
reefs. Frequently observed, waste includes cans, tires, plastic materials, etc. (ibid. 
2001) 
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3) Drinkable water quality: Water is either chlorinated directly at the source 
or treated at a centralized water treatment plant. Regional water authorities are 
responsible for procuring, treating and distributing potable water to households. 
Potable water quality may deteriorate during distribution (rusting water conduits, 
cross contamination by wastewater network, etc.). Therefore, it may not be safe for 
consumption to end-users, potentially leading to incidences of gastro-intestinal 
diseases (e.g., diarrhea, dysentery) and other infectious diseases (e.g., typhoid, 
hepatitis). 
The Directorate of Preventive Medicine reveals (published at the MOPH 
between 1995 and 2000) that the annual number of cases of dysentery, hepatitis A 
and typhoid (leading types of water-borne diseases in Lebanon) has declined (see 
Table 4.3.a) in some areas (Beirut, South and Nabatiyeh). Bekaa and North Lebanon 
have experienced a sharp increase in the incidence of all three water-borne 
diseases.    
 
Table 4.3.a: Case of Reported Water-Bourne Diseases in Mohafaza (1995-2000) 
Reported 
diseases 
Mohafaza 
Beirut Mount 
Lebanon 
North 
Lebanon 
South & 
Nabatiyeh 
Bekaa Unspecified Total 
Year 2000 
Dysentery 5 17 69 5 245 13 354 
Hepatitis A 20 12 135 19 36 17 239 
Typhoid 32 110 371 45 140 31 729 
Average for years 1995-2000 
Dysentery 9 47 24 314 68 18 471 
Hepatitis A 35 39 84 86 22 20 286 
Typhoid 47 86 294 230 99 42 795 
Source: MoE/LEDO, 2001. 
 
4.3.2 Water pollution; Economic impact, policies and actions 
A major problem for those managing Lebanese water availability and demand 
is the lack of accurate and reliable data. This condition has two sides: 
- During the civil war hardly any research was carried out or data collected; 
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- Because of the regions’ geopolitical situation, official reports are often false 
and subject to manipulation. 
Under Lebanese law, water is considered as a public good. Water is subject 
to a set of regulations that have their roots in the civil law as well as in administrative 
law. In favour of the administration, the Lebanese legislator mentioned that all waters 
in Lebanon belong to the public domain.  
Hydrological metering and information collection in Lebanon goes back to the 
mid-1960s. However, the application of such information for scientific use was then 
very limited. Such metering required a heavy investment to be made in a public 
sector domain. In the early 1970s the “Direction Générale des Statistiques” began 
collecting hydrological data but its work was interrupted by the political events 
following the crisis in 1975.  
In the early 1980s some isolated action took place such as the report 
published by the Water Authority in Beirut. Towards the end of 1980s the Council for 
Development and Reconstruction launched a series of local studies.  
Lebanon has not developed a countrywide database of water quality, though 
the UNICEF reported that 60 to 70 percent of water resources are contaminated 
(ibid. 2001). High level of nitrates and phosphorus from agrochemicals contaminate 
surface water. Major pollutants of surface water and groundwater are untreated 
municipal wastewater. Most sewer systems are damaged or operating over capacity.  
Potable water networks are frequently polluted by wastewater infiltration. The 
only operating wastewater treatment plant is the Ghadir plant designed to serve 
300,000 people. Some 35 Mm3 of untreated industrial effluent is discharged each 
year into the Mediterranean, Qaraoun Lake, and the Litani and the Berdawni Rivers.  
Waterborne diseases are one of the leading causes of mortality among 
children less than five years old. Health problems resulting from exposure to water 
pollutants often result in health care expenditure as well as absence from work. In 
addition to this health impact (a major concern in Lebanon), poor water quality 
increases the costs of water treatment and encourages people to spend more on 
bottled water.  
A report presented to the Ministry of Energy and Water (MEW) by ECODIT in 
2001 shows that the costs of the health impacts of water pollution is at US$ 7.3 
million per year and the costs of excess bottled water consumption at about US$ 7.5 
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million per year. The methodology used to estimate these costs always relies on very 
conservative estimates. 
 
Table 4.3.b: Estimated Annual Costs of Excess Mortality due to Water Pollution 
in Lebanon 
 
Cost 
Category 
 
Premature 
mortality 
Hospital admissions due to 
diarrhea diseases 
 
Emergency 
room visits 
Restricted 
activity days 
 
Dysentery Hepatitis 
A 
Typhoid 
No. of 
persons 
or cases 
 
69 
 
132 
 
72 
 
202 
 
378 
 
13,133 
 
Cost per 
person 
(US$) 
 
88,573 
 
900 
 
1,750 
 
2,800 
 
76.04 
 
29.4 
 
Total 
cost 
(US$) 
 
6,111,537 
 
118,800 
 
126,000 
 
565,600 
 
28,743 
 
386,110 
 
7,336,790 
Source: ECODIT, 2001. 
 
Table 4.3.b shows the estimated costs on public health, including excess 
mortality due to unsafe water supply. As previously mentioned, poor water quality 
also encourages people to buy more bottled water than they would normally buy if 
they had access to clean and good quality drinking water. 
According to a survey on household budgets, bottled water represents 0.6 
percent of average annual expenses. By comparing local consumption with typical 
per capita consumption rates in select Mediterranean countries, it was estimated that 
Lebanon’s excess consumption due to water pollution is 7.6 litres per capita per 
year. 
In addition, water pollution results in many other hidden costs that are more 
difficult to quantify. Therefore, the costs presented in this report tend to 
underestimate the actual and real costs of water pollution and should be used as a 
starting point for more thorough economic evaluation based on new information that 
may become available in the future. 
The following three sections will highlight key policies and actions to 
reorganize the water sector in Lebanon. 
1) Institutional developments: The MEW that supervises autonomous water 
authorities and is responsible for water management developed a 2000-2009 water 
strategy. The strategy addresses: Dams and aquifer recharge, potable water 
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projects, irrigation projects, wastewater treatment plant construction, and prevention 
of river flooding.  
The Water Organization Law No. 221 of May 2000 created five water 
agencies for Beirut, northern Lebanon, southern Lebanon, southern Beqaa, and 
northern Beqaa. Also provided, a two-year transitional period, for reorganizing the 
existing water boards into regional water authorities. 
Law No. 241 (29/05/2000) reorganized the existing 22 water boards into four 
Regional Water Authorities. The Litani River Department (LRD) is the only water 
authority to retain special responsibilities and functions that extend beyond its 
administrative region (natural boundaries of the Litani River watershed). The LRD 
continues to be responsible for developing and manage irrigation water associated 
works in the southern Bekaa Valley and South Lebanon.  
Ministry of Environment protects the environment, conducts studies on 
wastewater treatment, permits the establishment of classified organizations, and 
enforces legislation. 
Ministry of Public Health established a Department of Sanitary Engineering to 
monitor water quality, and also sets standards for drinking water, proposes 
specifications for wastewater and drinking water networks, recommends action for 
pollution prevention, and operates water quality equipment such as chlorinators. 
Other organizations include: 
- Ministry of Interior and Municipal Affairs supervises municipal works 
including sewage and drainage infrastructure. 
- Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR): responsible for water, 
wastewater and solid waste facilities. 
- National Council for Scientific Research conducts and coordinates scientific 
research and contain an environmental division responsible for pollution, 
marine biology, and waste, wildlife, and nature reserves. 
2) Overview and spending: CDR awarded 192 contracts worth a total of 
US$ 409.2 million in the water supply sector (ECODIT. 2001), between January 01, 
1992 and December 31, 2000. By March 2001, 60 percent of these projects were 
completed. More than 95 percent of the total contract values are capital costs, 
almost four percent are technical assistance contracts and less than one percent is 
operation and maintenance contracts.  
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Under the National Emergency and Rehabilitation Program I (NERP), the 
water supply networks of 19 water boards were rehabilitated and/or upgraded, 
including at least eight treatment plants, about 280 pumping stations, reservoirs and 
distribution systems. NERP I was financed by the World Bank.  
NERP II, financed by the Kuwaiti Fund for Arab and Economic Development 
(KFAED), will rehabilitate and expand the water supply networks in the GBA. Under 
NERP II, the capacity of the Dbaye water treatment plant was extended to 430,000 
m3 per day at a cost of US$ 5.7 million, it will further expanded by 70,000 m3 per day. 
16 water supply projects were under execution by March 2001 and 13 others were 
under preparation. 
3) Water pricing: Subscription fees for domestic water supply vary among 
water boards; the law gives regional water authorities the power to set and collect 
water tariffs for domestic and agriculture use. During year 2001, tariffs ranged from 
LBP 65,000 per year to LBP 231,000 per year for a 1m3/day gauge subscription (this 
tariffs include 10 percent municipal surcharge). The existence of differences due to 
water availability and distribution costs as gravity distribution is the cheapest, while 
distribution by pumping is far more expensive.  
 
Table 4.3.c: Water Tariffs for selected regions between 1996 and 2001  
Region In thousand LBP for annual subscription of 1m3/day % 
Increase* 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Akkar 100,000 100,000 134,100 134,100 160,100 60 
Baalbeck-
Hermel 
110,000 132,000 132,000 132,000 132,000 20 
Barouk 110,000 110,000 121,000 152,000 152,000 38 
Beirut 158,400 158,400 182,160 200,500 230,500 46 
Bsharre 65,000 65,000 65,000 65,000 65,000 0 
Dinniyeh 75,000 75,000 75,000 75,000 75,000 0 
Metn 127,100 152,800 180,600 210,100 231,100 82 
Saida 99,000 115,000 147,000 148,000 148,000 49 
Tripoli 132,000 132,000 132,000 132,000 165,000 25 
Source: ECODIT, 2001, p.127. 
* Percent increase 2000 - 1996. 
 
Table 4.3.c presents the increase in water tariffs between 1996 and 2000. 
Based on these tariffs, households are paying the equivalent of US$ 0.12/m3 to US$ 
0.42/m3 of water (according to World Bank report in 1995, the average tariff in Israel 
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for urban drinking water is US$ 1/m3). In fact, most households end up paying much 
more on a per cubic meter basis, two reasons: 
- Frequent and periodic water shortages (some areas report receiving water 
only a few hours per day), which oblige households to buy water from private 
water distributors (between US$ 5 and US$ 10/m3). 
- Secondary residences (many have another house in their villages, used only 
during summer season as a get away from the hot and humid weather in the 
coastal areas) pay the full annual water subscription tariffs even though they 
use the residence only for a few weeks or months during the year. 
As long as water meters are not installed, the price of water will remain 
unaffected by actual water consumption and people will pay the same yearly amount 
regardless of the quantity of water actually delivered and consumed. This leads to 
the conclusion that people have no incentives to conserve water and waste is more 
common. 
4.3.3 Potable water projects 
In July 2002, the French Development Agency (Agence Francaise du 
Developpement, AFD) and the GoL signed a 10-year $12 million loan agreement to 
rehabilitate water networks and build water reservoirs in the southern Nabatieh and 
Hasbaya districts. As part of the agreement AFD will also provide an assessment of 
the water sector in South Lebanon and prepare tender documents for a private 
company to manage the new South Lebanon water authority.  
Work is about to start on a US$2 million AFD project to renovate water 
networks and build seven water reservoirs in Jezzine district. In the north, AFD has 
offered a US$20 million loan to repair water distribution systems in Tripoli and to 
improve the management of the local water authorities that will be merged into the 
North Lebanon water authority.  
President Lahoud, on August 2002, laid the cornerstone for a US$3.5 million 
drinking water project in Metn funded by the Kuwait Fund for Arabic Economic 
Development (KFAED). Meanwhile, a US$35 million Japanese-funded project is 
replacing pipes and building reservoirs in Kesrwan district. 
1) Dams and reservoirs: The irrigation potential in Lebanon is linked to the 
physical mobilization of water and to the rehabilitation and modernization of irrigation 
infrastructures. An increase in the irrigated area can be achieved from surface water 
resources through the construction of storage dams and interregional transfers, for 
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example the Khardalé dam over the middle Litani river (now postponed) and the 
“Canal 800” (see 2.2.2 Agriculture consumption) conveyor for the irrigation of more 
than 15 000 ha in South Lebanon. More than 83 sites for possible dam construction, 
with a total capacity of 873 Mm³, have already been prospected and are 
recommended for further investigation. (FAO. 1997) 
Lebanon has only one major dam, on the Litani River at Lake Qaroun, with 
storage of 220 Mm³ and an effective storage of 160 Mm³ from year to year. It 
regulates the downstream flow of the Litani River for power generation and irrigation 
The Bisri dam on the Awali River is currently at the final design stage for a storage 
capacity of 128 Mm³ and is intended mainly for supplying water to Greater Beirut. 
The Kardalé dam on the middle reach of the Litani River, also to give a storage 
capacity of 128 Mm³, has been postponed at the preliminary design stage, due to the 
situation in the southern border region. (ibid. 1997) 
The Green Plan, which is a public authority established in 1963, responsible 
for the development of water reservoirs, and the private sector have already 
developed hundreds of small earth and concrete storage ponds, with a maximum per 
unit capacity of 0.2 Mm³. During the period 1964-1992 the Green Plan produced a 
total of 3.5 Mm³ of earth ponds and 0.35 Mm³ of concrete ponds. The Litani River 
Authority implemented three hillside stock ponds in the early 1970s for a total 
storage capacity of about 1.8 Mm³. (ibid. 1997)  
In a ceremony, August 2002, President Lahoud inaugurated construction of a 
US$42 million Shabrouh Dam in Faraya that will serve Kesrwan and Metn Districts. 
The districts currently have only a daily water supply of 24,000 cubic meters, 
according to press (Naaman. 2002). The dam, which is built by a French-Lebanese 
consortium, takes two to three years to build and have a capacity of about eight 
Mm3. It more than doubles the region’s water supplies.  
Energy and Water Minister Beydoun said, at the same ceremony, that 
Shabrouh dam was the first of 30 dams and artificial lakes the GOL envisions 
building in order to store 800 Mm3 of water a year. Work also started on a US$5 
million 500,000 m3 dam at Qaisamani to provide drinking water to the Metn district 
and a US$7 million 1.5 Mm3 dam at Yammouneh, near Baalbek, to provide irrigation.  
Funding for both these projects is from the MEW’s budget, according to MEW 
Director General Mr. Fady Comair. The Kuwaiti Fund has offered a US$30 million 
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loan to finance two additional dams in the Metn at Habbache and Boqatta, according 
to the Council for Development and Reconstruction. 
Also an agreement signed with Syria in April 2002 for the joint construction of 
a US$100 million dam on the El-Kabir River, which marks Lebanon’s northern border 
with Syria. The dam is expected to store 70 Mm3 of water, of which Syria will use 60 
percent and Lebanon the remainder.  
2) Projects for the Orontes River: The 610-km long Orontes starts near 
Hermel and runs northeast about 16 kms before crossing into Syria, which has built 
four dams on the river, and then Turkey before emptying into the Mediterranean. A 
1994 Syria-Lebanon agreement on use of the Orontes’ waters allots Lebanon 80 m3 
from the river’s average annual flow of 400 m3. Lebanon currently uses only a 
quarter of this, however, to irrigate about 500 hectares along the banks of the river, 
according to the MEW.  
According to NGO Cooperative Housing Fund (CHF) working in the region, 
there are virtually no other irrigation activities between Baalbek and Hermel. With 
help from a US$90,000 US AID grant, however, CHF completed a US$200,000 small 
(17,000 cubic meter) lake near Qamouha that is providing irrigation for 150 hectares. 
Syrian President Hafez Assad agreed to a dam on the Orontes during his visit 
to Lebanon (March 2002), and the MEW followed up by enlisting a British company 
(finished a study for the GOL of a potential dam and irrigation project on the Orontes 
River in the northern Bekaa) to begin work on the one-year study. According to the 
MEW, the proposed US$120 million project would build a 30-40 Mm3 capacity dam 
that would be used primarily for irrigating 6-7,000 hectares (of a potential 30,000 
hectares) near Qaa and Hermel.  
The dam also would likely generate 15 to 20 megawatts of electricity. MEW 
DG Comair mentioned in May 2002 that the dam also could supply 10,000 cm of 
potable water to Hermel. The dam is likely to be built about four kilometers from the 
river’s source and two kilometers southeast of Hermel. (Naaman, T. 2002) 
4.3.4 Litani River Plans 
The Litani rises in the central Bekaa, runs southwest through the valley, turns 
west near Marjeyoun and makes a run for the coast north of Tyre. The GOL in the 
1950s built a dam on the river in the southern Bekaa creating Lake Qaroun. The 51-
km lake has a capacity of 220 Mm3 (less than half during the dry summer season) 
and provides limited irrigation and power to villages near the lake. With a US$7 
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million loan from the World Bank, the Litani Water Authority completed the first 
phase of the Bekaa Irrigation Project, which will provide, when finish, water for 2,000 
hectares nearby.  
A US$40 million second phase aims to irrigate 6,700 hectares, and a World 
Bank team finalized loan details with the GOL in the Spring of 2002. The head of the 
Litani Water Authority Mr. Nasser Nasrallah mentioned on March 2002 that unlike 
prices for potable water across the country, the Litani Authority has an irrigation 
water-pricing scheme that rewards conservation by charging farmers lower fees for 
adopting more efficient drip irrigation. 
Even more ambitious than the Bekaa Irrigation Project is the US$460 million 
Litani Water Project, which will bring water to 99 villages and thousands of hectares 
of agricultural land in the south. Kuwait and the GOL signed in January 2002 a 
US$65 million loan agreement to help finance the US$220 million first phase of the 
project.  
The Arab Development Fund is to provide a $100 million loan, and the GOL is 
committed to coming up with US$55 million. When completed, the Litani River 
Project is expected to provide 90 Mm3 of water annually to southern farms and 30 
Mm3 of potable water to the region. Seventy percent of the project will be in areas 
that were under Israeli occupation, and the project will employ 7,300 persons said 
Mr. Nasrallah. (ibid. 2002) 
4.3.5 towards sustainable water management 
On 2001, an environment report explained that despite seemingly abundant 
water resources, “Lebanon is poised to experience a water deficit within the next 10-
15 years, unless sound and radical water management policies are developed and 
implemented. Water stress in neighbouring countries including Syria, Jordan, Israel, 
West Bank and Gaza Strip is a harsh reminder that Lebanon must rethink its water 
strategy in the shortest delay possible, protect water resources and use them more 
judiciously”. (LEDO, 2001)  
Lebanon’s water supply problems are worsening, Lebanon’s population was 
about 4 million in 2001 with annual increase of approximately 1.65 percent (ibid. 
2001). Lebanon possessed 766-1,287 m3 renewable water resources per capita (as 
of 1997). Those numbers are projected to decrease to 336-979 m3/capita by 2015 
and 262-809 m3/capita by 2025. This means that it will be unable to meet its local 
demand by 2025. In 1994, total water demand in Lebanon was 1,285 Mm3 per year, 
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of which 74 percent was used by agriculture, 16 percent for domestic consumption, 
and 10 percent by industry. (ibid. 2001)  
Furthermore, water resources in Lebanon are believed to be particularly 
vulnerable to climate change due to Global Warming (flooding and desertification), 
since it is located at the border of desert regions and more than 60 percent of its 
economic activities lie in a narrow coastal plain along the Mediterranean Sea. (Bou-
Zeid and El-Fadel, 2002) 
A 10-year plan for the years 2000 till 2009 was introduced by the MEW, which 
has initiated several programs to better manage Lebanon’s water resources. This 
plan is being divided into two 5-year plan.  
Table 4.3.d presents the five main components of this plan. It is considered as 
the first step towards proper, sustainable and comprehensive water management. 
This plan has five main components, four of which tackle water issues the fifth 
relates to electric infrastructure, the largest share that represents nearly two-thirds of 
the budget was allocated to procure additional water resources.  
Such infrastructure investments intend to alleviate water shortages by 
increasing water supplies also is potentially an economic as well as an ecologic 
burden on society. Efforts should be committed to improve water efficiency (water 
metering, lifting illegal connections, introducing on-farm practices for the efficient use 
of irrigation), and securing alternative water resources, such as treated wastewater. 
 
Table 4.3.d: Budget Appropriation for 10-Year Plan 
Component of 10-Year Plan Percentage of Budget 
allocation 
Procurement of additional exploitable water 
resources 
66.7 
Potable water supply projects 15.7 
Irrigation schemes and wastewater plans 9.8 
Assessment of river basins & their protection 
from pollution and flooding 
5.1 
Electric infrastructure 2.7 
Source: MoEW, 10-Year Plan. 
Note: The total budget allocated is US$ 850 Million, equals to US$ 212.5 per capita (assuming a population of 4 
million). 
 
In the absence of an overall strategy, the government is pursuing a piecemeal 
approach: 
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- Taking into consideration the fact that Lebanon is in a fortunate hydrological 
position, also has perfect geological formations, and despite plans to 
construct up to 30 new small dam systems only four proposed dams are being 
explored; 
 - While the government has been advocating private sector participation in 
many sectors including water, many factors prevent this participation such as 
lack of written policies and action plans, an inadequate legal framework, 
unclear procedures for creating and sustaining public-private partnerships. 
Actually, isolated efforts have been made; management contract with a 
private operator in the city of Tripoli and considering other arrangements 
supported by the World Bank in Baalbeck. 
In addition to the less than expected achievements made, strategy for 
improvement should be taken into consideration. The following is a list of some of 
the actions needed to bring Lebanon’s water management capabilities into the 21st 
century: 
- Develop a water quality management strategy to accompany the water 
strategy and integrated action plan for water quality management that 
includes the private sector; 
- Review the existing legal and regulatory framework and develop additional 
legal texts. Review existing standards of enforceability. Pass the pending 
environmental law and environmental impact assessment laws. Upgrade and 
update the skills and other capacities of staff; 
- Improve water quality monitoring including reconnaissance surveys of the 
status of water quality and the sources of pollution, identify the country’s 
laboratory requirements, and develop a sustainable cost-effective monitoring 
program (this should be done with the aim of improving water delivery and 
reducing water loss, which will also protect groundwater from wastewater 
contamination); 
- Establish a self-monitoring and compliance program for industries. Plans 
should be overseen and enforced by the Ministry of Environment; 
- Develop and implement a program for strengthening national capacities in 
water quality management including water resources management, 
wastewater management, operation and maintenance of treatment plants, 
wastewater reuse, database creation and updating, information dissemination, 
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community participation, monitoring and enforcement, and new economic 
measures such as “Polluter Pays”. Strengthen management in order to 
develop more efficient use of limited financial resources. (Stronger 
management is likely to be an efficient way to collect water subscription fees); 
- Update hydrological maps at a scale of 1:2500000, showing major 
catchment’s areas, drainage lines, and patterns, rivers, lakes, and other major 
and minor water bodies, as well as rainfall distribution patterns; 
- Produce hydro geological maps at a scale of 1:2500000, showing 
groundwater flow patterns, water-quality levels, aquifer boundaries, existing 
development, and areas for potential future development. (Drawing these 
maps can be done with the help of very useful relevant data obtained from 
meteorological satellites, Landsat Multispectral Scanners [The human eye has 
three colour receptors for red, green and blue. Multi-spectral images are 
images that are taken with additional receptors sensitive to other frequencies 
of the visible light, or to frequencies beyond visible light, like the infrared 
region of electromagnetic continuum. This can allow extracting additional 
information that the human eye fails to capture Multi-spectral images are the 
main type of images acquired by Remote sensing (RS) radiometers. Multi-
spectral is the opposite of panchromatic. Usually satellites have 3 to 7 or more 
radiometers (France's SPOT has 3, Landsat has 7). Each one acquires one 
digital image (in remote sensing, called a scene) in a small band of visible 
spectra, ranging 0.7 µm to 0.4 µm, called red-green-blue (RGB) region, and 
going to infra-red wavelengths of 0.7 µm to 10 or more µm, classified as NIR-
Near Infrared, MIR-Middle Infrared and FIR-Far Infrared or Thermal. In the 
Landsat case there are 7 scenes comprising a 7 band multi spectral image], 
and other such devices. There is, however, no substitute for land surveys, 
which provide, among other things, human field confirmation of 
technologically gathered data). 
 
4.4 Wastewater Management 
An unfortunate and seemingly inevitable outcome of modernization and 
industrialization is pollution. The contamination of water resources is being a major 
concern to the Lebanese environmentalists. While wastewater could potentially 
increase supplies for irrigation, indeed it could also add plant nutrients such as 
92 
 
nitrogen and phosphate. The majority of wastewater outlets are in rivers, intermittent 
streams, etc., and they are contaminating the ground water quality; a big portion is 
discharged into the sea. 
Lebanon generates approximately 249 Mm3 (65,800 MGY) of domestic 
wastewater, up from 165 Mm3 per year (43,000 MGY) in 1991. In addition, industry 
generates an estimated 43 Mm3 of wastewater per year. In the absence of waste 
surveys and industrial production statistics, it is difficult to estimate the composition 
of industrial wastewater. In 1991, the quantity of treated wastewater was roughly 
estimated at 4 Mm3 per year (1,000 MGY) and the quantity reused at 2 Mm3 per year 
(530 MGY), less than 2 percent generated. (LEDO, 2001)  
4.4.1 Collections, Treatment and Disposal 
Wastewater management requires adequate collection and treatment of 
wastewater, and disposal of treated effluent and sludge. The untreated wastewater 
infiltrates from cesspools to groundwater or flows directly from sewer pipes to the 
natural watercourses. Significant improvements are being made to the sewer 
network, though little has been achieved in terms of wastewater treatment. Clearly, 
wastewater in Lebanon represents both an immediate public health concern and vast 
untapped resource. 
UNICEF estimated in a 1996-97 report that some 10 percent of wastewater is 
used untreated in agriculture irrigation. About 37 percent of nearly half-million 
buildings in Lebanon were connected to sewers in 1997. The remaining buildings 
(around 63 percent) either use cesspools and septic tanks or simply release raw 
sewage directly into the environment, including rivers and streams, dry river beds, 
and underground (through dry wells). (ibid. 2001) 
Since 1997, extensive wastewater works have been achieved, which has 
presumably improved the wastewater collection capacity. The current extent of 
buildings connected to sewer networks is not known, but presumably higher than 
1996-97 levels. 
Wastewater from Beirut as well as parts of the Cazas of Metn, Baabda and 
Aley is collected and transported to two main coastal collectors: 
- The northern collectors comprise two lines and extend over 17 Km, and are 
designed for a future population of 891,000 people (CDR, 2001). Works on 
these collectors were completed in 2001, but they are out of operation until 
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the proposed Dora wastewater treatment plant is constructed. To date, no 
funding has been secured for the construction of this plant;  
- The southern collectors comprise also two lines converging on Ghadir, 
where a preliminary wastewater treatment plant already exists. These two 
collectors are about nine kilometres long and will serve an estimated 
population of 784,000 people. 
Wastewater collection systems are under preparation for major coastal cities 
including Tripoli, Jounieh, Saida and Tyre. Wastewater collectors are under 
execution in Akkar, Beddawi, Laboue and Baalbeck. (ibid. 2001) 
Thirty-five wastewater treatment plants are currently planned or under 
construction (seven under construction, 18 under preparation and funded, 10 with no 
funding secured to date). The GOL initiated the construction of seven wastewater 
treatment plants in 2001: Saida, Chekka, Batroun, Jbeil, Chouf coastal area, 
Baalbeck and Nabatiyeh. The only large-scale treatment plant that is currently 
operational is the Ghadir plant, south of Beirut.  
The Ghadir plant provides only preliminary treatment (i.e. grit and scum 
removal). A current study is exploring the economic feasibility of upgrading the 
Ghadir plant to provide secondary treatment before discharge into the sea.  
Lack of funds represents a big problem that leads to the absence of 
operational wastewater treatment plants. Effluents from coastal agglomerations are 
discharged into the sea while effluents from inland communities are disposed in 
rivers and streams on open land or underground. While the number of sea outfalls 
has been surveyed, there is no information on the state of these outfalls (i.e. length, 
dimensions, loading volume, etc.).  
Most outfalls extend only a couple of meters into the sea or terminate at the 
surface (no submersed outfall and therefore no effective dilution of wastewater). To 
note that the Ghadir outfall is a 1,200 mm diameter submersed pipeline which 
extends 2.6 Km into the Mediterranean Sea, the outlet point is approximately 60 
meters deep thereby achieving some dilution of the disposed wastewater. (ibid. 
2001) 
Delays in wastewater works in several regions in the country have prompted 
several municipalities and local communities to make their own arrangements to 
improve wastewater collection and treatment. 
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In the next few years, Lebanon is going to face a new waste management 
problem: Sludge generated from wastewater treatment plants. The character and the 
amount of the solids depend on the number and type of industries within the 
community, the degree to which their wastes are pre-treated before discharge to the 
public sewers, and the primary and secondary processes employed within the 
treatment plant. A master plan for sludge management is being drafted. (ibid. 2001)  
The preliminary report indicated that treatment plants will either generate 
digested sludge at the rate of 35-49 g/person/day, or undigested sludge at the rate of 
63 g/person/day. The study examines available ways for reuse the sludge as a soil 
conditioner.  
For example, digested sludge could be used in agriculture, provided the 
sludge meets minimum quality standards such as permissible heavy metal content, 
for the reason that sewage sludge contains micro-organisms that may contribute to 
the transmission of disease, as well as organic contaminants that may be hazardous 
or toxic to humans or have detrimental effects on the environment in general.   
Table 4.4.a shows the estimated sewage sludge production for 2001 and 2010. 
 
Table 4.4.a: Estimated Sewage Sludge Production for 2001 and 2010 (wet-
weight basis) 
Mohafaza 2001 2010 
Mass 
(Tones/day) 
Volume 
(m3/day) 
Mass 
(Tones/day) 
Volume 
(m3/day) 
Beirut (Dora & Ghadir) 113 283,182 136 339,607 
Rest of Mount 
Lebnanon 
21 162,981 26 198,150 
North Lebanon 50 141,892 61 173,389 
South Lebanon 14 66,811 18 83,329 
Bekaa 53 297,472 69 465,552 
Total 251 952,338 310 1,260,027 
Source: ECODIT, 2001, p. 239. 
 
4.4.2 Government Policies and Actions 
A Damage Assessment Report was prepared to formulate a policy framework 
for the wastewater sector (in 1995). Implemented over three phases, the resulting 
National Emergency Response Program (NERP) launched two major programs: 
a. Coastal Pollution Control Program (CPCP): CPCP represents Lebanon’s 
commitment to fulfil the requirements of the Barcelona Convention and its 
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protocols. Despite the cancellation in the late nineties of the World Bank loan 
to fund wastewater management works in Saida, Sour (Tyre) and Kesrouane, 
CPCP is proceeding with alternative funding from various sources. 
b. Water Resources Protection Program (WRPP): Works under the WRPP 
include the rehabilitation of water treatment plants and water sources (springs 
and wells), as well as the rehabilitation and construction of transmission and 
distribution networks. 
In 2001, the MoE took the lead in setting up a national follow up committee to 
look into and facilitate wastewater management works across the country. Hosted by 
the MoE, this committee is composed of representatives from CDR, the MoEW and 
the MoIM, and holds regular meetings to check on progress and bottlenecks. 
1) National Emergency Rehabilitation Program (NERP): The NERP mainly 
concentrates on the rehabilitation of two wastewater-pumping stations in Al-Mina 
(Tripoli) and Jounieh, and the rehabilitation and construction of 820 Km of sewer 
networks in different areas of Lebanon (CDR, 2001). The construction and 
equipment of the first large-scale wastewater pre-treatment plant in Lebanon was 
completed in Ghadir, south of Beirut, as well as the rehabilitation of the associated 
sea outfall. This plant was brought into service in November 1997. NERP also 
implemented the installation and rehabilitation of sewer networks to serve the North 
Beirut area as well as the northern suburbs of the capital, up to the coastal 
agglomeration of Dbaye. 
2) Government Contributions: CDR has awarded 122 contracts worth a 
total of US$ 226.2 million in the wastewater sector, between January 1992 and 
December 2000: 
- US$ 120.5 million for construction of new networks and treatment plants in 
coastal areas; 
- US$ 62.5 million for operation and maintenance of sewer and drainage 
networks; 
- US$ 31.7 million for rehabilitation of existing sewerage networks; 
- US$ 11.5 million for water resource protection works. 
  As well as constructing an additional 26 solid waste and wastewater 
management facilities, using effective, affordable, and low-maintenance technologies 
well-adapted to rural areas, and which will enable 14,000 families to live in cleaner, 
healthier, safer surroundings. (ibid. 2001) 
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4.5 Conclusion 
There are increasing problems facing the water sector in Lebanon, making it 
more difficult to handle them with the classical management approaches being 
followed. Both natural causes and human interferences are adding, cumulatively, to 
the extent of deterioration, quantitatively and qualitatively. There is a definite need to 
upgrade the water sector, and to secure its sustainability. 
Lebanon is considered as “un Château d’Eau” compared to its neighbours but 
current water delivery systems do not meet the national demand for water. During 
fifteen years of civil war the water sector was barely operational and, as a result, the 
whole sector needs rehabilitation. These necessary innovations do require major 
institutional and administrative reforms as well as a new approach to water rights, 
water use efficiency and sustainability.  
Imperfect knowledge prevails at all levels in the water sector and deeply 
entrenched beliefs, based upon past experience, hold and often block or even stop 
the process of policy innovation in national water sector. Furthermore, economically 
and environmentally sound water policies, often identified by foreign actors do not 
prove to be politically feasible. To most users water is considered a resource of 
which there is plenty, people therefore expect it to be free and not wish to pay for it. 
These conducts determine the political feasibility of introducing water policy reform 
that contains principles of allocation efficiency and production efficiency. Information 
gaps have to be filled and notions held by those working in the current order, must 
be identified in order to formulate an implementation strategy for Lebanon. Only then 
can reform be introduced effectively and without the delay that normally faces the 
reform in many countries in the region. 
Lebanon’s water resources are partially developed, its water sector is in less 
than average shape, plus the lack of a sustainable management policy endangers 
the remaining freshwater resources. Political turmoil and chronic warfare are the 
reasons for the country slow water development until the early 1990s. Warfare 
rendered many reservoirs and pipeline non-functional, caused shortages of water in 
Beirut and led to the marginalisation of the country’s water sector and its associated 
local water authorities. 
However, not all problems faced by the Lebanese water sector are related to 
civil war. If future projects are not carefully planned, and supervised, Lebanon will 
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face shortages (!!!). The hydrological metering network does not function properly, 
and other obstacles such as the poor distribution of precipitation in terms of time and 
place are challenging circumstances. The high proportion of Lebanon’s water that 
flows into the Mediterranean Sea and the anarchic use of underground water (over 
exploitation and degradation) are considered as examples. The consequence of 
these problems is that information on water availability and demand in Lebanon is 
difficult to obtain and often less than reliable. 
The shortage of up-to-date and reliable hydrological data makes it very 
difficult to plan adequate and sustainable management of the country’s water 
resources into the 21st century. This data deficiency is critical, because economic 
development planning must consider the current hydrological picture to make 
sensible projections about growth and water needs. Reliance on 1930s data and 
1950s infrastructure and instruments for gathering water data is an obstacle to the 
sustainable management of Lebanon’s water resources.  
The UN ESCWA predicts problems to come up in 2025, in case Lebanon 
continues its present rate of increase in consumption. This supposition made in 1998 
is derived from the comparison of figures from 1997 and the projections for 2000 and 
2025. Should irrigation for agricultural purposes be expanded, it will be most likely 
that within or after the next 24 years Lebanon will have to cope with a major water 
shortage problem (ECODIT. 2001). 
It seems that the current efforts to avoid shortage have focused more on 
short-term strategies, as for example the improvement of water services through 
rehabilitation of the distribution system. For the coming years Lebanon’s objectives 
are the increased utilization of surface water resources and development of 
groundwater recharge schemes.  
Wastewater management in Lebanon is still in its very early phases. Plans are 
underway to expand the current wastewater treatment plant (Ghadir) and 
implementation started 2002. Many other treatments plants are under construction, 
some of which became operational in 2002. While sewage pollution load into the sea 
and rivers will decrease in the coming years, the operation of these plants will 
generate large quantities of sludge that will require adequate management to 
prevent environmental degradation.  
As for the Arab world in general, Lebanon will have to face the following 
challenges:  
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- The lack of public awareness of rational use and management of water; 
- The lack of institutional coordination, relevant legislation and 
implementation, and inadequate financial resources; 
- The lack of up-to-date knowledge of sources in quantity and quality; 
- The absence of cooperation at the regional or sub-regional level in shared 
rivers. 
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Part III Freshwater Resources from the 
Perspective of International Law, 
Economics and Religious-Culture  
 
5 International Law, Economic and Religious-
Culture Perspectives 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The ability for nations to resolve conflicts peacefully over internationally 
distributed water resources will increasingly be a factor in stable and secure 
international relations. As water resources become relatively scarcer, their use within 
nations can no longer be insulated from impacting on one’s neighbours. 
Section 5.2 tackles the gains to cooperation by using economic models, and 
which the relationship between externalities, property rights and economic efficiency 
models (efficiency in exchange, and efficient allocations). This chapter then shows 
the role of strategic behaviour and bargaining strategy, and talks about the potential 
gains to cooperation and international agreements, as well as discussing the Coase 
Theorem and its presence in an international context. 
This chapter considers, in section 5.3, the present state of water under 
international law, current problems and weaknesses in existing law, and outlines 
principles of customary law and the existing international conventions and the 
relevant protocols in this area. It focuses on the relationship between water and 
conflicts, and tries to answer the question of adequacy of protection and weakness in 
existing law.  
The concept of war is changing, and the term is used more often today in the 
international war against terrorism. This chapter discusses the relationship between 
water and conflicts, terrorism and the threat against water facilities. 
Finally, this chapter ends by explaining the role of religion in this matter; the 
Islamic point of view, which is based on Shari’a, the Vatican’s position, and the 
Jewish perspective. 
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5.2 Gains to Co-operation using Economic Models  
The allocation of water resources according to its economic value is 
considered as one of the most important principles involved in water conflict 
resolution theory. Here we distinguish between:  
- The allocation of water to its highest value use; “efficiency”; 
- And the distribution of gains from allocation; “equity”.  
Negotiated outcomes need not maximize net benefits for all countries. 
Inefficiencies can be traced to the desire to nationalize resources rather than to gain 
from cooperative development. 
Both efficiency and equity could be considered in agreement for managing 
international water resources. For example the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement 
between Egypt and Sudan did not reserve water for upstream riparian (Ethiopians). 
A basin wide agreement could make use of the Nile water more efficiently for the 
benefit of all three riparian: Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia. Construction of dams in 
Ethiopia would give that country irrigation, eliminate the annual Nile flood, and 
increase the total water available to Ethiopia and Sudan.  
In negotiations over use of the Nile, the net benefits of basin wide 
management, and the ways these three riparians could share equitable gains, 
should be demonstrated.      
Different users and uses of given water supplies, may place different values 
on the resource. Therefore, water sharing should take into consideration the 
possibility of increasing the overall efficiency of water utilization by re-allocating the 
water according to these values.  
This principle alone may not be accepted as equitable or fair by the parties 
involved. However, inclusion of economic aspects in water resource allocation may 
enhance better cooperation and future collaboration in joint projects in the region of 
concern.   
The basic economic problem that underlies all economic issues is the 
combined existence of scarce resources and unlimited wants. Given that, the first 
question is how to use scarce resources and organise production so as to satisfy, to 
the greatest extent possible, society’s unlimited wants.  
In other words, the available resources must be used as efficiently as 
possible, meaning that the maximum output must be obtained from the resources at 
hand (see appendix 1, annex 7 for more details). 
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5.2.1 Role of Strategic Behaviour, and Bargaining Strategy 
Usually the focus is on political issues when negotiations take place between 
two countries. Underlying the political issues (national sovereignty, creative 
diplomacy … etc) lie many economic factors (observed benefits and costs), that 
affect positively all the different participants and give the incentives for entering into 
environmental agreements. 
The negotiations between polluters and those damaged can result in efficient 
emission level, given that property rights are clearly defined and the transactions 
costs are minimal (see appendix 1, annex 7 for more details). On the international 
level, the globally efficient level of emissions should be attained through direct 
negotiations. 
Because International agreements are voluntary, it may be supposed that 
individual countries will never sign any agreement that makes them worse off. 
Accordingly, both parties seek an agreement that leaves them at least as well off as 
they would be without it. Furthermore, in the absence of any cooperation, each 
country will maximize its own net benefits of abatement and in doing so will choose a 
level of abatement at which its own marginal abatement cost equals its own marginal 
abatement benefit (see appendix 1, annex 7 for more details). 
Bargaining depends critically on the perceptions by each country of its own 
marginal damages and marginal abatement costs, as well as on how convincing it 
can be in expressing these views to other countries. Countries engaged in 
negotiations of this type will usually be involved at the same time in negotiations on 
other problems, as well as with negotiations with other countries. Thus, they will be 
concerned with the net outcome of all these negotiations, and this could dictate a 
position on this one issue quite different from what one would expect solely on the 
basis of the merits of this particular case. 
5.2.2 The Potential Gains to Cooperation and International Agreements 
The economic game theory suggests they can either be cooperative or non-
cooperative. A game is cooperative if the players can negotiate binding contracts 
that allow them to plan joint strategies. A game is non-cooperative if negotiation and 
enforcement of a binding contract are not possible.  
To solve cooperatively the problem of water allocations within a basin, the 
parties involved should realize some mutual benefits that can be achieved only 
through cooperation and be allocated to the parties. In cases of cooperation, each 
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party needs to participate voluntarily, and to accept the joint outcome from the 
cooperative project. Once a cooperative interest exists, the only problem, which 
remains to be solved, is the allocation of the associated joint costs or benefits.  
For a cooperative solution to be accepted by the parties involved, it is 
required: (see appendix 1, annex 7 for more details) 
- The joint cost or benefit is partitioned such that each participant is better off 
compared to a non-cooperative outcome; 
- The partitioned cost or benefit to participants is preferred in the cooperative 
solution compared to sub-coalitions that include part of the potential 
participants; 
- The costs or benefits are allocated. 
In the absence of a negotiated settlement, the country causing the externality 
will ignore the damages its activities impose on other countries. The full cooperative 
outcome is achievable by internalising the externality. In this case the country 
inflicting the externality chooses its actions so as to maximise the net profits of all 
countries, including it-self.  
Global net benefits will be higher in this case. The difference between the 
global net benefits to the cooperative and non-cooperative outcomes defines the 
potential gains to cooperation.    
In any economic game (or any game in general) the most important aspect of 
strategy design is understanding your opponent’s point of view, and deducing how 
your opponent is likely to respond to your actions. Yet even in simple gaming 
situations, people often ignore or misjudge their opponents’ positions and the rational 
responses those positions imply. 
Table 5.2.a shows two countries, A and B. Both share a common aquifer, and 
both face two choices: extract the water at a High or Low rate. This can be 
considered as an example of the Prisoners’ dilemma game; the assumption here is 
that the numbers on the left are A’s payoff and the numbers on the right are B’s 
payoff (Table 5.2.a).  
Each country prefers higher payoff to a lower payoff, but does not care what 
payoff the other country receives. Despite that, the two countries are interdependent 
insofar as each country’s realized payoff depends not only on its own choice for a 
rate of extraction but also on the choice made by the other country. 
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Table 5.2.a Prisoners’ Dilemma Game     
                   B 
         A 
Low High 
       Low 5 - 5 2 - 6 
       High 6 - 2 3 - 3 
 
Due to the existence of interdependency, what strategy should the players 
pursue? - In deciding whether to choose “High” or “Low”, country A will wish to 
consider how the payoffs it receives depend on player’s B strategy. Suppose B 
chooses “Low” then A receives a payoff of 5 if it chooses “Low” and 6 if it chooses 
“High”. So given B’s choice (Low), A’s best response is to choose “High”. Suppose 
now that B chooses “High”, then A receives 2 if it chooses “Low” and 3 if it chooses 
“High”. 
Again, given that B chooses “High”, A’s best choice is “High”. This means that 
A should choose “High” whatever B chooses. Choosing “High” is therefore a 
dominant strategy. Since the game is symmetric, choosing “High” is also a dominant 
strategy for B. Thus, the equilibrium (Nash) to this game for both players is to choose 
“High” and to receive a payoff of 3 each. The equilibrium to the game is inefficient 
(as choosing Low leads to a higher payoff for both parties). 
Note that in this game both players have strictly dominant strategies. This 
need not be true for other payoffs. A player has a strictly dominant strategy if this 
strategy outperforms other strategies regardless of what opposing players do. When 
a player has a strictly dominant strategy this is the player’s Nash equilibrium 
strategy.  
In many games players do not possess strictly dominant strategies. It is 
advisable however to check whether such dominant strategies do exist since then 
Nash equilibrium is immediately determined. Searching for strictly dominant 
strategies is a basic practical ‘first-shot’ attempt at trying to solve a game. 
It is interesting to note that the Nash equilibrium does not maximize the 
aggregate payoff to both players. Total profits are maximized when both parties 
choose Low.  It would thus be better for them to get together and reach a 
cooperative agreement.  That pursuing individual self-interest yields a Nash 
equilibrium outcome yielding lower payoffs to both players than the cooperative 
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outcome is an instance of the Prisoners’ dilemma. Note that this Prisoners’ dilemma 
has three characteristics: 
- Each player has an option to cooperate or defect; 
- Each player has a dominant strategy (to defect); 
- The dominant strategy equilibrium is inferior for each party to the non-
equilibrium solution to cooperate. 
These features characterise all Prisoners’ dilemma situations. 
If both parties negotiate an agreement, which specifies (by assumption) that if 
either party chooses “High”, it would have to pay a fine to the other party equal to 2.   
Table 5.2.b shows that if B chooses “Low” and A does not, A receives payoff 
of 4 (6 in the original game but now must pay a fine equal to 2). Hence, B receives 
payoff of 4 (originally 2 plus the fine). The payoffs are the same if A chooses “Low” 
and B chooses “High”. Accordingly, the best strategy for each player is to choose 
“Low”, whatever the other player chooses. Thus, the agreement makes choosing 
“Low” a dominant strategy and the equilibrium to the altered game is efficient. 
 
Table 5.2.b Prisoners’ Dilemma Game include Penalties for “Cheating” 
                   B 
         A 
Low High 
       Low 5 - 5 4 - 4 
       High 4 - 4 3 - 3 
 
 
There is no guaranty that the allocation of water resources is efficient when 
there is international interdependence. The nature of interdependence that exists 
among countries can be complex. Many shared water problems are unidirectional, 
as in the case of upstream countries causing harm to downstream countries. The 
fact that countries are interdependent means that they can potentially be made 
better off if they can cooperate in managing international water resources and in 
practice such cooperation is typically codified in international agreements. 
Attempts to correct unidirectional externalities encounter difficulties. Consider 
the problem where certain activities by one country harm all others. If the rights to 
generate externalities are vested in one country, the others will have to pay this 
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nation to cease its destructive activities. If the externality affected only one other 
country, then bargaining might be possible; the externalities might be internalised 
without outside intervention.  
But in the case of global or regional externalities, all countries except the 
generator suffer. All sufferers might be willing to bribe the generator to cease its 
harmful activities. But a contribution by any one country would confer benefits on all 
others and not just the one making the compensation payments. The others could 
therefore do better by free riding. Accordingly cooperation would be foiled.  
Mechanisms exist that can lead countries to reveal their preferences for global 
public goods truthfully, and hence for correcting global externalities. But in the 
absence of a World Government these mechanisms cannot be employed without the 
consent of the sovereign nations themselves. The problem of correcting global 
externalities, such as of managing global common property, is that global optimality 
demands global cooperation, and yet the incentives facing individual countries work 
in the opposite direction. Based on that, assumption that cooperation will not develop 
is compelling, but they can hardly be complete. Cooperation does take place and is 
often codified in international agreements.      
In an international dispute, agreements between countries cannot be enforced 
by a third party. International agreements must be self-imposed; this may mean that 
international water resources potentially cannot be managed as efficiently as 
international resources.  
The difficulty of implementing an efficient international agreement is that there 
is no supernational organization to enforce such agreement, thus the agreement 
must appeal to each nation individually. In fact there are three desirable 
characteristic of a global agreement: 
- The agreement should be self-enforcing; 
- Each country should be better-off participating in the agreement; 
- Environmental conditions provided by the agreement should be Pareto-
preferred to the status quo and, ideally, Pareto efficient. 
It is easy to meet two of these three conditions leaving the other condition 
unfulfilled. 
The fact that these agreements exist does not mean that they achieve the full 
cooperation outcome, where the actions (water extraction rates, pollution emission 
levels …etc) of parties are chosen to maximise the net benefits of all affected 
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countries taken together. Many agreements are incomplete in the sense that the 
number of parties is less than the number of countries affected. International 
negotiations on environmental treaties are only one dimension of the full set of 
international interactions among countries. How an individual country behaves in 
bargaining over, for example, a treaty reducing environmental damages depends not 
only on the merits of that particular problem but on the whole gamut of international 
relationships in which it is involved. If it is involved simultaneously in negotiations on 
other matters, it may be more concerned with the total outcome and be willing to 
compromise in some areas in return for concessions in others.  
In addition, when countries are involved in negotiations they may be 
concerned particularly with supporting up their reputations as hard bargainers, which 
may lead them to behave, in certain cases, in ways that look to be inconsistent with 
their self-interest.  
Developing a reputation can give one a strategic advantage, and developing 
the right kind of reputation can be viewed as a strategic move.   
In many cases, the disagreement point of negotiations will not be decided by 
legal doctrines alone but by the threats that countries can make regarding the 
actions they would choose in the event that negotiations break down. In some cases, 
this disagreement point will be given by the non-cooperative outcome. In general, a 
country will do better in negotiations if it can commit itself to a particular action in the 
event of a breakdown in negotiations.  
Such strategic behaviour can enhance the country’s strength at the 
negotiating table. 
5.2.3 The Coase Theorem and its application in an International Context 
According to the Coase Theorem, the bargaining solution will be efficient 
when property rights are clearly specified, when transactions costs are close even 
equal to zero, and when there is no strategic behaviour (noting that bargaining is 
unlikely to generate an efficient outcome because parties frequently behave 
strategically). 
The Coase Theorem suggests that war should be unlikely, rather than fighting 
the two sides could achieve some mutually advantageous bargain. They could live at 
peace with a higher standard of living or in case of conflict one side (the weaker) 
should surrender rather than fight.  
107 
 
On the international level, the globally efficient level of emissions should be 
attained through direct negotiations, given that property rights are clearly defined and 
the transactions costs are minimal. 
Furthermore, the law of international water resources offers two extreme rules 
relating to property rights; the doctrine of “unlimited territorial sovereignty”, which 
states that a country has exclusive rights to use of water within its territory (this view 
sometimes called the “Harmon Doctrine”). And the doctrine of “unlimited territorial 
integrity”, which states that the quantity and quality of water available to a country, 
cannot be altered by another country. 
If the doctrine of “unlimited territorial sovereignty,” is accepted by both parties 
and if each party seeks to maximise its own payoff, then the upstream country will 
abate its emissions up to the point where the marginal cost of abatement equals the 
marginal benefit of abatement to itself. (Barrett, S. 1994) 
In an extreme example, where the upstream country does not benefit at all 
from abatement, and no abatement will be undertaken in the absence of bargaining, 
even if the downstream country would benefit substantially from upstream 
abatement.  
Under the doctrine of “unlimited territorial integrity”, the pre-bargaining 
position is very different. The upstream country cannot emit any pollution into the 
river, even if the downstream country would not suffer any damage from pollution. 
Whichever doctrine is accepted the pre-bargaining outcome is likely to be inefficient. 
Both countries could potentially be made better off through bargaining. 
One might expect that two such different doctrines would result in two 
different post-bargaining outcomes. Coase Theorem shows that this is not the case 
if: 
- Parties doing bargaining know more about the relative values involved 
(abatement costs and damages); 
- There are no transaction costs; 
- The pollution issue of the river can be seen in isolation from other 
international relations; 
- Sometimes difficulties of achieving mutually beneficial bargaining outcomes 
can be resolved by giving a party, harmed by another party, the right to sue. 
Thus eliminating the need for bargaining because it specifies the 
consequences of the choices each of the parties must make. 
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    Bargaining can be time-consuming and costly, especially when property rights 
are not clearly specified. Neither party is sure how hard to bargain before the other 
party will agree to a settlement. Bargaining can also break down even when 
communication and monitoring are costless; if both parties believe they can and 
should obtain larger gains.  
One party when making a demand for larger share and refuse to bargain 
assumes incorrectly that the other party will eventually concede. This strategic 
behaviour can lead to an inefficient, non cooperative outcome. In this situation, an 
agreement may never be reached, especially if one or both parties want to earn a 
reputation for tough bargaining. 
In an international context there are a number of problems with the Coase 
theorem. A third party, which can impose either doctrine on the two countries does 
not exist. Agreements between parties must be self-enforcing. The doctrine, which is 
most attractive to one country, is least attractive to the other.  
If a country accepts a doctrine in one instance, then the precedent may be 
held against it in another. Hence, it may not be in the self-interest of either party to 
endorse unreservedly one of the doctrines. 
The problem is that neither of these two doctrines is likely to be acceptable to 
both parties. Suppose country (A) invokes the doctrine of “unlimited territorial 
sovereignty” in negotiations, then (B) might well threaten to reconsider its position on 
trade or defence agreements. If (B) invokes the doctrine of “unlimited territorial 
integrity” then (A), might well threaten to pollute the river anyway.  
Suppose two parties are moving toward some kind of peace agreement, each 
side offers some painful concessions to the other. At this specified moment some 
form of terrorism strikes. This kind of behaviour makes it harder for each side to 
accept other’s offer. Terrorists, knowing this, may choose to strike at precisely at 
these times and aim to reopen the appropriate “wounds”, all to prevent peace. 
 
5.3 Water under International Law 
International law constitutes the rule and norms by which states conduct their 
actions in relation to other states. In the context of international water resources, the 
law (international water law) endeavours to define riparian states’ rights and 
obligations to their shared waters.  
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Historically, the focus of international water law was on surface waters such 
as shared lakes and rivers. The use, management and conservation of shared 
groundwater resources received little attention in international legal discourse and 
political circles, and generally were absent from bilateral and multilateral 
agreements. 
International water law did not begin to be formulated until after World War I. 
Advisory bodies and private organizations have tried to provide a framework for 
increasingly intensive water use, focusing on general guidelines, which could be 
applied to the world’s watersheds. These general principles of customary law were 
not intended to be legally binding. 
The uniqueness of each basin and its riparian states suggest that any 
universal set of principles must be fairly general. The problems arise when attempts 
are made to apply this reasonable but vague language to specific water conflicts. For 
example, riparian positions and consequent legal rights shift with changing 
boundaries many of which the world community still does not recognize.  
Furthermore, international law only concerns itself with the rights and 
responsibilities of states. Some political entities that may claim water rights, would 
not be represented, such as the Palestinians along the Jordan River, even though, 
the Palestinians do have some degree of autonomy and even sovereignty within 
their territory.  
5.3.1 Inadequacy of international law 
International law has evolved in response to the changing character of 
international conflict. Most conventions and treaties were designed to cover conflicts 
of an international character. The concept of war is changing, and the term is used 
more often today in the international war against terrorism. 
As international water law is ambiguous and often contradictory, and no 
mechanism exists to enforce principles, which are agreed-upon, criteria for equity 
are particularly difficult to determine in water conflicts.  
1) General principles of international law 
The framework of international law derived and applied by the International 
Court is revealed in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ): 
“The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law 
such disputes are submitted to it, shall apply: 
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- International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognised by contesting states; 
- International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
- The general principles of law recognised by civilised nations; 
- Judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of 
the various nations, as subsidiary means for determination of rules of law.” 
(UNEP – ELI/PAC. 1998) 
It is important to mention that conventions (often referred to as treaties) 
represent the best grounds of the will of states, and are considered the primary 
source of international law. It is true that while conventions are binding only on the 
signatories, they may become customary international law, thereby becoming 
binding on non-signatories, in other words if those conventions receive consistent 
and widespread acceptance, customary law may assist in clarifying treaty provisions, 
when the terms of the treaty are subject to interpretation. 1907 Hague Convention on 
Land Warfare is well-known example. (Vinogradov, Wouters and Jones. 2004) 
International custom is the secondary source of international law and is 
applicable to all nations. When applicable conventions and customary international 
law do not exist, general principles of law recognised by civilized nations are 
traditionally used to fill the gaps. However, these principles may need interpretation 
and translation.  
For example in the 1997 discussions among the riparians of the Euphrates 
basin, Syrians objected strongly to the proposals for water pricing. This led to a 
temporary impasse until it was explained by an outside observer that some Islamic 
legal interpretation forbids charging money for water itself. When the term was 
modified to mean “tariff”, representing costs only for storage, treatment, and delivery, 
and discussions were able to proceed. (ibid. 2004) 
Similarly, Israelis and Jordanians invented legal terminology to suit particularly 
local requirements in their 1994 peace treaty. In negotiations leading up to the treaty, 
the Israelis, arguing that the entire region was running out of water, insisted on 
discussing only water allocations; that is, the future needs of each riparian. The 
Jordanians, in contrast, refused to discuss the future until past grievances had been 
addressed; they would not negotiate allocations until the historic question of water 
rights had been resolved. There is little room to bargain between the past and the 
future, between rights and allocations.  
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Negotiations reached an impasse until one of the mediators suggested the 
term ‘rightful allocations’ to describe simultaneously historic claims and future goals 
for cooperative projects, this new term is now imbibed in the water-related clauses of 
the Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace. (ibid. 2004) 
2) Customary International Law 
Martens Clause of the 1907 Hague Convention attained the status of 
customary international law through the international community’s widespread 
observance: “Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued … the 
inhabitants and belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles 
of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized 
peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience”. 
(Lorenz. 2003, p. 11) 
Customary international law has focused on providing general guidelines for 
the watersheds of the world. Many of the common claims for water rights are based 
either on hydrography i.e. from where a river or aquifer originates and how much of 
that territory falls within a certain state. Or on chronology i.e. who has been using the 
water the longest time.  
Most of the debate in the realm of customary law has been over trying to 
accommodate as many concerns as possible in an attempt to find generalized 
principles for all of the world’s international watersheds, in the meantime riparians of 
these basins have been negotiating agreements which focus on specifically local 
concerns and conditions. 
Even as the principles for sharing scarce water resources evolve and become 
more moderate over time, the essential argument still emphasizes the rights of each 
State (a riparian is entitled to a certain quantity or use of water depending on certain 
physical or historical constructs), generally resting on the fundamental dispute 
between hydrography and chronology.  
3) International Conventions: 
General and particular rules developed in The Hague and Geneva 
Conventions, which are under international humanitarian law, protect water facilities 
that supply water to human populations. 
The Hague Conventions are concerned with rules related to the methods and 
means of warfare, while the Geneva Conventions are concerned with the victims of 
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war. Given this, water facilities are not mentioned by name, and the conventions 
apply only during time of war or other conflict. 
The Hague Law: In 1868, the Declaration of St. Petersburg was announced 
at a meeting called Tsar Nicholas II of Russia. This was the first action to the 
continuing concern over the increasingly destructive warfare of the era. The 
declaration was short and simple:  
“The only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish 
during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy”. (ibid. 2003, p. 8) 
This declaration “established” the foundation for the modern international 
humanitarian law and its evolution.  
The 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions, initiated by Tsar Nicholas in an 
attempt to “humanize” war, furthered the cause of limiting armaments by providing 
that “the right to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited” (Lorenz. 2003). 
Additionally, Article 23(g) of the 1907 Convention states that it is forbidden to 
“destroy or seize the enemy’s property, unless … imperatively demanded by the 
necessities of war” (ibid. 2003). While this does not mention water or water facilities, 
they may be protected under this provision as well as other related to property.  
The Annex to the Hague Convention IV, Article 1, sets out the basic 
qualification of war-like behaviours, those individuals and groups that are subject to 
the “laws, rights and duties of war”. It applies to armies, militias and volunteer corps 
fulfilling the following conditions: 
- To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
- To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance; 
- To carry arms openly; 
- And to conduct their operations openly and in accordance with the laws and 
customs of war. 
This forms a basic principle of international humanitarian law today, although 
some expansion was attempted later with Protocol II to the Geneva Convention. 
Together with the requirement for an “armed conflict”, the scope and application of 
international humanitarian law has been developed. 
The “Geneva Law”: The first in a series of Geneva Conventions was in 1864; 
it addressed the treatment of the sick and wounded soldiers in time of war. Broader 
issues of humanitarian law were the focal points in 1868, 1906, 1925 and 1929 
Geneva Conventions. In response to the failure of the Hague agreements in the First 
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World War and the atrocities committed in the Second World War, four additional 
Protocols were signed in 1949 by sixty-four states to provide more specific 
provisions to protect victims of war.  
These four Protocols were accepted by the international community more 
than any other agreements, concerning international humanitarian law, and they also 
contained the beginnings of modern concepts of environmental protection during 
wartime. (ibid. 2003, p. 8-9) 
In addition to the prohibition against “wilfully causing great suffering or serious 
injury to body or health”, the conventions prohibit the “extensive destruction and 
appropriation of property not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully 
and wantonly”; water storage and water facilities can be considered as examples.  
4) The 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Conventions (ibid. 2003, p. 9, 10, 11) 
The prohibition of military or any other hostile use of Environmental 
Modification Techniques (ENMOD) and Protocol I and II to the Geneva Convention 
of 1949 were opened for signature in 1977.  
The purpose of Protocol I and ENMOD was to address the widespread 
awareness of the environmental destructiveness of the Vietnam War. Previously 
there was not much attention from the international community to the environment, 
especially in the four Geneva Conventions following the Second World War. Media 
coverage during the Vietnam’s war, plus an increasing worldwide awareness of the 
environment, led to the adoption of Protocol I, and ENMOD. Despite growing 
international concern about the effect of war on the environment, neither of these 
agreements has been universally adopted. 
Protocol I: The protection of the environment during periods of armed 
conflicts is specifically addressed in Articles 35 and 55 of Protocol I.  
Article 35 begins by restating two principles developed in St. Petersburg and 
The Hague; the right to choose means of warfare “is not unlimited” and it is 
prohibited to employ “methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or 
unnecessary suffering”. Article 35 (3) further strengthens the protection of the 
environment by stating that “it is prohibited to employ methods of warfare which are 
intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage 
to the natural environment”. Article 35 (1) mentions the protection of the environment 
as a basic rule. 
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Article 55 represents the “only truly environmental” provision in Protocol I. It 
states: 
1. Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against 
widespread, long-term and severe damage. This protection includes a 
prohibition of the use of methods or means of warfare, which are intended 
or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural environment and 
thereby prejudice the health or survival of the population. 
2. Attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals are prohibited. 
While neither of these provisions mentions water directly, it is nearly clear that 
protection of water storage and water facilities fall under these rules as well as all 
rules that have been established to protect the environment. 
ENMOD: In response to the “severe” environmental damage during the 
Vietnam’s war as a result of the United States use of chemicals and defoliants, the 
Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD) was established. The intention 
was to prohibit the military use of climate modification techniques, which can cause 
“widespread, long-lasting, or severe” damage to the enemy and obviously to the 
environment including water storage and water facilities: 
- Widespread: encompassing an area on the scale of several hundred square 
kilometres; 
- Long lasting: lasting for a period of months, or approximately a season; 
- Severe: involving serious or significant disruption or harm to human life, 
natural and economic resources, or other assets. 
Article 2 of the ENMOD attempts to explain and to define the phrase 
“environmental modification techniques”; it is any technique that modifies “the 
dynamics, composition or structure of the Earth, including its biota, lithosphere, 
hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of outer space” (Lorenz. 2003). By using the word 
hydrosphere ENMOD provides some degree of protection for water and the facilities 
that contain or transport it. To note also that the use of term “military or any other 
hostile use” instead of “armed conflict” or “war” was to further suggest the broadened 
application of the Convention. 
By providing an upper limit on the acceptable level of environmental damage, 
ENMOD refines the balancing of this damage with military necessity. Only recently 
the modern science is beginning to understand the relationship between water 
supply and climate change. In spite of the lack of universal adoption of ENMOD, 
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state recognition of the need to limit the level of environmental damage during times 
of military or other hostile activities, which could directly or indirectly affect the 
Earth’s water resources, could have significant importance for the protection of water 
facilities and water supply in general. 
Protocol II: Protocol II intends to provide basic protection for the victims of 
non-international armed conflicts. It calls for states to recognize that “in cases not 
covered by the law in force, human person remains under the protection of the 
principles of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience”. It does not apply to 
“internal disturbances and tensions”, which are “isolated and sporadic acts of 
violence”.  
It is important to note that both Protocols I and II have not been universally 
adopted. (ibid. 2003, p. 11) 
5) The 1997 UN International Watercourses Convention (Vinogradov, 
Wouters and Jones. 2004, p. 17-24) 
The initial attempt to draft a treaty of universal application to international 
freshwaters dates back to 1970, when the UN General Assembly asked its 
International Law Commission (ILC) to prepare a set of rules governing the non-
navigational uses of International Water Courses (IWC). The Commission, which 
consists of thirty-four international lawyers serving in their individual capacity and 
representing the major legal systems of the world, is a special UN organ entrusted 
with the codification and progressive development of international law.  
In 1994, the ILC adopted Draft Articles on the law of the non-navigational 
uses of international watercourses, following close to thirty years of work on the 
topic. This project went forward to the UN General Assembly and its Sixth (Legal) 
Committee, which provide the forum for negotiating and adopting the1997 IWC 
Convention. It is important to mention that given the multiple and the variety of 
international agreements dealing with water resources, there is only one universal 
treaty in this area; the 1997 UN Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses (1997 IWC Convention). 
It took the ILC 21 years to complete its “Draft Articles”, despite an additional 
call for codification at the UN Water Conference at Mar de Plata in 1977. For 
example, it took until 1984 for the term “International Watercourse” to be adequately 
defined. In 1994 the ILC adopted a set of 32 draft articles. The UN General 
Assembly adopted the articles, with some amendments, as the Convention on the 
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law of the Non-Navigation Uses of International Watercourses on May 21, 1997. The 
vote was 104 in favour, 3 against (Turkey, China and Burundi), and 27 abstentions. 
(ibid. 2004, p. 18) 
The concept of a “drainage basin”, for example, was accepted by the 
International Law Association (ILA) in the Helsinki Rules of 1966, which also 
provides guidelines for “reasonable and equitable” sharing of a common waterway. 
Article 5 (see appendix1, annex 1) lists no fewer than eleven factors which must be 
taken into account in defining what is “reasonable and equitable”. There is no 
hierarchy to these components of “reasonable use”, rather they are to be considered 
as a whole. Some states objected to the prominence of the “drainage basin” 
approach, which might be interpreted as an infringement on a nation’s sovereignty. 
Others argued that a watershed was the most “rational and scientific” unit to be 
managed. Given the complexities and uniqueness of each watershed, general 
codification should not even be attempted others indicated. (ibid. 2004) 
The 1997 Convention includes provisions for concepts, “reasonable and 
equitable use” and the obligation not to cause “significant harm” without setting a 
clear priority between the two. 
One important shift in legal thinking in the Helsinki Rules is that they address 
the right to “beneficial use” of water, rather than to water by itself. The Helsinki Rules 
have been used only once to help define water use, the Mekong Committee has 
used the Helsinki Rules definition of “reasonable and equitable use” in formulation of 
their Declaration of Principles in 1975, although no specific allocations were 
determined. 
The document about Groundwater includes eight factors for consideration in 
allocations, and suggests that “the weight to be given to each factor is to be 
determined by its importance in comparison with that of the other relevant factors”. 
(ibid. 2004)  
Much of the discussions leading to the Convention centred on how 
“reasonable and equitable use” within each watercourse state, “with a view to 
attaining optimal utilization thereof and benefits there from”, is balanced with an 
obligation not to cause significant harm. Reasonable and equitable use is defined 
similar to the Helsinki Rules, to be based on a non-exhaustive list of seven relevant 
factors.  
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The text of the ILC articles does not offer guidelines for prioritising these 
factors, suggesting in Article 6 (see appendix 1, annex 1) only that “the weight to be 
given to each factor is to be determined by its importance”, and that “all relevant 
factors are to be considered together”.  
Article 10 (see appendix 1, annex 1) says both that, “in the absence of 
agreement or custom to the contrary, no use...enjoys inherent priority over other 
uses”, and that, “in the event of a conflict between users (It shall be resolved) with 
special regard being given to the requirements of vital human needs”.  
The debate over which doctrine, “reasonable use” or “no harm” shall have 
priority has been intense, and was one of the focuses of discussion leading to the 
Convention. The World Bank, which must follow prevailing principles of international 
law in its funded projects, recognizes the importance of equitable use in theory but, 
for practical considerations, gives “no appreciable harm” precedent and will not 
finance a project which causes harm without the approval of all affected riparian. 
(ibid. 2004)  
Despite significant controversy over whether or not it was appropriate for a 
framework convention to contain dispute settlement provisions; Article 33 offers a 
range of dispute resolution mechanisms. States are free to select the means through 
which to settle their differences, including negotiation, mediation, conciliation, joint 
watercourse institutions, and so forth. If these attempts fail, any state to the dispute 
can unilaterally invoke the compulsory fact-finding procedure provided for under 
Article 33. (Appendix 1, annex 1)  
6) Other International Rules and Statements on International Water 
Resources   
The Berlin Rules 
On the 21st of August 2004 at Berlin Congress, the International Law 
Association produced a series of rules relating to the overall field of international 
water law. 
Berlin rules are the result of revision of the Helsinki and other International 
Law Association rules on international water resources. 
Professor Joseph W. Dellapenna (Rapporteur of the Water Resources 
Committee, drafted these rules with help of several members of Committee) noted 
that “First … these Rules both express rules of law as they presently stands and, to 
a small extent, rules not yet binding legal obligations but which, in the judgment of 
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the Association, are emerging as rules of customary international law. In other 
words, some of these Rules express the progressive development of the relevant 
international law. Following the recent practice of International Law Commission and 
reflecting the conclusion of the Committee that such progressively developed Rules 
will become settled customary international law in the near future, all Rules are 
expressed as present legal obligations (“shall”), leaving identification of Rules as 
progressive developments to the commentary. Second, most of the Rules contained 
herein are applicable to all waters—meaning all surface waters and groundwater 
other than marine waters—regardless of whether the waters in question are found in 
an international drainage basin». (Dellapenna. 2004) 
The major changes in the Berlin Rules relate to the rules of customary 
international law applicable to all waters—national as well as international. Chapter II 
sets forth the general principles applicable to all waters: the right of public 
participation, the obligation to use best efforts to achieve both conjunctive and 
integrated management of waters, and duties to achieve sustainability and the 
minimization of environmental harm.  
Many of the remaining chapters develop these basic principles in significant 
detail. Much or most of the materials in these chapters either is new or is significantly 
different from the content of either the Helsinki Rules or the UN Convention, both of 
which restricted their coverage only to international waters. Chapter III and some 
other chapters address the special rules of law applicable to transboundary waters. 
Chapter VIII provides the first comprehensive analysis of the customary international 
law applicable to groundwater. This chapter goes beyond the International Law 
Commission’s subsequently proposed Draft Articles on Transboundary Aquifers, 
both in addressing the customary international law applicable to national as well as 
international groundwater and in taking a more progressive stance on certain issues. 
Finally, the Berlin Rules address humanitarian law relating to water resources 
during armed conflict, navigation, and dispute resolution, all issues that the UN 
Convention and the Draft Articles either ignore or barely mention. (Ibid. 2004) 
The Dublin Statement 
On 26-31January 1992, five hundred participants, including government-
designated experts from a hundred countries and representatives of eighty 
international, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations attended the 
International Conference on Water and the Environment (ICWE) in Dublin, Ireland. 
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The experts saw the emerging global water resources picture as critical. At its 
closing session, the Conference adopted this Dublin Statement and the Conference 
Report. 
The Conference participants call for fundamental new approaches to the 
assessment, development and management of freshwater resources, which can only 
be brought about through political commitment and involvement from the highest 
levels of government to the smallest communities. Commitment will need to be 
backed by substantial and immediate investments, public awareness campaigns, 
legislative and institutional changes, technology development, and capacity building 
programs. Underlying all these must be a greater recognition of the interdependence 
of all peoples, and of their place in the natural world. 
In commending this Dublin Statement to the world leaders assembled at the 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de 
Janeiro in June 1992, the Conference participants urge all governments to study 
carefully the specific activities and means of implementation recommended in the 
Conference Report, and to translate those recommendations into urgent action 
programs for Water and Sustainable Development. (See appendix 1, annex 10) 
5.3.2 Relationship between water and conflicts  
Water resources become relatively scarcer and their use within nations can 
no longer be insulated from impacting on one’s neighbours. More conscious 
attention to the art and science of negotiation, mediation and arbitration can provide 
useful insights for resolving these conflicts without recourse to the limited solutions 
possible in international courts of law or, worse, the devastating possibility of armed 
conflict.  
Disputes over international waters are both common and current. The most 
recent example includes the increasing tension over shared water resources 
between Israel and Lebanon, the dispute over Chebaa Farms, Kfarshouba Hills. Also 
Israel opposes strongly Lebanon’s pumping of additional water from the Hasbani 
River, which is a tributary to the Jordan River, to its border villages, for drinking 
purpose.  
In this regards, it is important to mention the 2003 water allocation dispute 
between Lebanon and Israel over the distribution of the Wazzani River. The Wazzani 
springs rise in Lebanon close to the Blue Line, their waters feed the Hasbani River. 
In October 2002 as part of a concerted international response to rising tensions 
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between Israel and Lebanon over the construction of a pumping station at the 
Wazzani springs, the European Commission sent an expert team under the Rapid 
Reaction Mechanism to Lebanon and Israel. The team was sent in response to an 
appeal by the Lebanon and the UN for assistance in resolving the dispute. It was 
tasked with providing an objective assessment of the technical data upon which a 
mediated settlement of the dispute could be built. The study team delivered its report 
in July 2003, but in the absence of an agreed framework for mediation of the dispute 
the report has not yet been released, though Israel, Lebanon, the US and the UN 
have been briefed on its key findings. (For more details see Appendix 1, Annex 9) 
The question of transboundary water resources and water scarcity in river 
basins is an area of great and increasing concern to the international community. 
The past fifteen years have seen a renewed interest in the relationship between the 
environment, resource scarcity, and violent conflict. Some experts predict that by the 
year 2025, chronic water scarcity will affect as many as three billion people in fifty-
two countries (ibid. 2004).  
The relationship between water scarcity and conflict is complex, it represents 
by most scholars one of factors that can contribute to conflict, and there has not 
been a documented case of a “water war” in modern history. The changing nature of 
conflict and shortage of fresh water will certainly increase the potential for instability 
in the years ahead.  
The “Law of War”, or “Law of Armed Conflict”, is a branch of public 
international law that governs the conduct of nations during times of armed conflict. 
The purpose of the law of war is not to protect water or water facilities, but rather the 
human population dependent upon them for its survival. While the law of war is 
designed primarily to limit destructive action affecting the environment, recent 
amendments have been adopted that specifically address the protection of water 
facilities. 
During the Second World War the FBI recognized that: 
Water supply facilities offer a particularly vulnerable point of attack to the 
foreign agent, due to the strategic position they occupy in keeping the wheels 
of industry turning and in preserving the health and morale of the American 
populace. (Lorenz. 2003, p.29) 
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The rules for protection of water facilities in time of conflict, the changing 
character of conflict, increasing use of terrorism, and the lack of clarity in the law 
have all contributed to an unstable situation.  
The International Committee of the Red Cross (IRC) and other organizations 
have documented numerous cases where the destruction of a regional water supply, 
as a result of armed conflict, resulted in widespread suffering for the local population: 
- International-aid workers calculated the real costs of the Israeli invasion of 
the Palestinian areas in 2002. Estimating that a total of more than US$361 
million, worth of destruction, was inflicted on Palestinian infrastructure, public 
institutions and private property. Officials from the World Bank and the United 
Nations concluded that more than US$87.9 million (around 25% of the 
estimated real cost) damage was done to basic infrastructure, such as roads, 
power stations, sewers and water treatment facilities (Lorenz. 2003). This 
demonstrates that when public infrastructure is affected, water facilities are 
just one component of the problem; 
- “Surgical strikes” during the Gulf War against power supply system in Iraq 
resulted in a significant deterioration of drinking water supplies, and severe 
consequences for public health. The consequences of international sanctions 
on water supply present a related issue; 
- The interconnect nature of water facilities with infrastructure such as 
electrical systems and bridges makes them highly vulnerable to disruption 
during times of armed conflict. Recent conflict between Israel and Lebanon 
gives a clear sample; the total destruction of many villages in the south of 
Lebanon, the displacement of nearly quarter of the Lebanese population, the 
huge damages made to the infrastructure (bridges, airports, power plants, 
roads, etc.), resulted in a significant deterioration of water supply, and severe 
consequences for public health. (ibid. 2003) 
International Law has evolved as the nature of conflict has changed, but has 
yet to respond to the increasing phenomenon of intra- rather than interstate conflict, 
or to the rise of terrorism. Most conventions and treaties were designed to cover 
conflicts of an international character.  
Little attention has been given to the implications of possible terrorist attacks 
on water facilities, especially in view of development of chemical and biological 
threats. 
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1) Terrorism and the threat against water facilities  
The past decade has shown that internal conflicts are now more common and 
just as destructive in terms of human suffering, and terrorism is playing a much 
greater role. Protection of civilian population from a terrorist attack on a water facility 
is an issue that has been rarely discussed in the literature, as terrorist attacks can be 
expected to increase in the years ahead. 
The threat of international terrorism has dramatically increased over the past 
ten years, but a common international definition has been difficult to achieve. Attacks 
against civilians are viewed differently in many parts of the world, especially in the 
Middle East. Many Muslim leaders, for example, who condemned the attacks on the 
United States, have long refused to denounce terrorism directed at Israel. Some 
believe that the prohibition of killing non-combatants does not apply to Israel, where 
they claim settlers use force to take Palestinians land. 
A number of recent criminal or terrorist attacks have been directed at water 
facilities, including the dumping of chemicals into the Meuse River in France, the 
placing of a bomb in a water reservoir in South Africa, and the destruction of water 
pipes in the Israeli settlement of Yitzhar. (Lorenz. 2003, p. 26-28) 
There is little coordination of effort to protect critical water infrastructure on the 
international level. A successful attack would cause widespread panic and a loss of 
public confidence in water supply systems. There are many uncertainties in dealing 
with a potential attack on water facilities.  
Questions of detection, the nature of the response, and coordination are just a 
few of the issues. Nations can use their domestic law to prosecute a terrorist attack 
on a water facility, but the suspect is likely to flee the country soon after.  
The repatriation of the suspect to the state where the incident occurred often 
does not happen. If the incident occurs in international waters there is even less 
certainty that the terrorist would be brought to justice. 
The customary law of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions apply only 
in times of war or armed conflict. Terrorist activity is not limited to ongoing conflicts or 
near war zones. Small groups may operate with little or no centralized structure, and 
this can make apprehension and prosecution more difficult.  
Existing international legal obligations and state practice can be strengthened 
and clarified. Improve coordination between states, with appropriate funding, can 
reduce the threat to water facilities around the globe.  
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The United Nations can provide the necessary framework, based on a 
comprehensive legal regime. 
2) An adequate degree of protection or weakness in the existing law.  
The United Nations during its General Assembly in December 1999 
(International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of terrorism), adopted 
a draft, which states: 
Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general 
public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in 
any circumstances unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, 
philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious, or other nature that may be 
invoked to justify them. 
Large numbers of innocent people can be put at risk by relatively 
unsophisticated methods, recent world events shown. A number of international 
conventions condemn conduct that can be described as terrorism. Each jurisdiction 
or state proscribes certain conduct under its criminal code. (Lorenz. 2003, p. 28-31) 
 
5.4 Religions Standing 
Many consider water as a gift given to us by God; a gift is here to sustain, to 
purify and to enrich our life and the life of the creation.  
Taking into consideration all spiritual, practical and social aspects of this vital 
resource in history of humankind, the questions are: 
- What is happening in our relation to water? 
- Do we acknowledge the value of our water?  
Although it carries a deep meaning, water is mentioned in the Bible as the 
resource of the new life, symbol of the spiritual purification and transformation. In 
Judaism, in Islam and actually in all worlds and natural religions water also has the 
same level of spiritual meanings. Moreover, they are aware of water as a condition 
for life and acknowledge this fact in their particular way. 
Recognizing water as the central place in the practices and beliefs of all 
worlds and natural religions, this recognition is based on two main beliefs: 
- Water washes away impurities and wastes, it can make an object look as 
good as new and wipe away any signs of previous defilement. Furthermore, 
water can make a person clean, externally or spiritually, and ready when 
attending religious services; 
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- Without water there is no life, thus water has the power to destroy as well as 
to create. 
This significance of water manifests itself differently in various religions and 
beliefs, but it is these two qualities that underlie its central place in our cultures and 
faiths. 
5.4.1 Islam and Water issues  
Shari’a or Islamic law covers all aspects of the Islamic faith, including beliefs 
and practices. Shari’a is derived primarily from the Koran and the Sunnah (the way 
of life of the Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon him (pbuh): a phrase that Muslims 
often say after saying the name of the prophet of Islam), as known from Hadith, or 
documented narrations of what the Prophet said and did), and also through Ijtihad 
(inquiry, interpretation, and innovation by Muslim scholars). To be academically 
valid, the presentation of the Islamic perspective on any issue must be based upon 
these sources, particularly the first two. 
  Water is of profound importance in Islam. It is considered a blessing from God 
that gives and sustains life, and purifies humankind and the earth (Faruqui, Biswas 
and Bino. 2001). 
The Arabic word for water (ma’ ءام) is mentioned sixty-three times in the 
Koran. God’s throne is described as resting on water, and Paradise is described as 
“Gardens beneath which rivers flow.” 
“And Allah has sent down the water from the sky and therewith gives life to 
the earth after its death.” Not only does water give life, but also every life is itself 
made of water: “We made from water every living thing.” (ibid. 2001) 
All human beings rely on water for life and good health but, for Muslims, it 
enjoys special importance for its use in Wudu (ablution that is, washing before 
prayer) and Ghusl (bathing). 
In Islam, ritual purity (Tahara) is required before carrying out religious duties 
especially worship (Salat). Muslims must be ritually pure before approaching God in 
prayer. 
There are three kinds of ablutions in Islam:  
- Ghusl, the major ablution, is the washing of the whole body in pure water, 
after declaring the intention to do so. Muslims are obliged to perform ghusl 
after sex, which incurs a state of major ritual impurity. Ghusl is also 
125 
 
recommended before the Friday prayer, the two main feasts, and before 
touching the Koran. Ghusl must be done for the dead before they are buried; 
- Wudu, the minor ablution, which is performed to remove minor ritual impurity 
from everyday life. This must be done before each of the five daily prayers 
and involves using pure water to wash the face with pure water, rub the head 
with water and wash the hands and arms up to the elbows and the feet up to 
the ankles. This comes from the Koran 5: 7/8 “O you who believe, when you 
prepare for prayer, wash your faces and your hand to the elbows; rub your 
head and your feet to the ankles” and is elaborated on in great detail in the 
Sunna. Every mosque has running water for Wudu;   
- The third type of ablution is performed when no water is available. In this 
case clean sand may be used. 
The Islamic Shariah is one of the fundamental sources of water legislation in 
the Islamic world, as it embodies many principles, which are listed in part as follows: 
- Water is the common property of all. There should be no obstruction to its 
use and exploitation though its ownership is allowed, especially when it 
comes to groundwater; 
- The use of water by man and animals for drinking has priority over other 
uses even if it is meant to perform acts of worship. Therefore, nobody is 
allowed to prevent supplying man and animals with drinking water. 
The Prophet (pbuh) stated that among the three people Allah will ignore on 
the judgment day are “a man [who] possessed superfluous water on a way and he 
withheld it from the travellers.” 
The recognition of water as a vital resource, of which everyone has the right 
to a fair share of it, is emphasized by the following Hadith, which effectively makes 
water a community resource to which all, rich or poor, have a right: “Muslims have 
common share in three things: grass (pasture), water and fire (fuel).” (ibid. 2001) 
The Prophet (pbuh) said, “There is a reward for serving any animate (living) 
being,” and “He who digs a well in the desert . . . cannot prevent the animals from 
slaking their thirst at this well.” (ibid. 2001) 
The immense value of giving water to any creature is reflected by the 
following Hadith: “A prostitute was forgiven by Allah, because, passing by a panting 
dog near a well and seeing that the dog was about to die of thirst, she took off her 
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shoe, and tying it with her head-cover she drew out some water for it. So, Allah 
forgave her because of that.” (ibid. 2001) 
1) Water Conservation and Treated Wastewater  
The Koran makes two clear statements regarding water that support water 
demand management:  
- First, the supply of water is fixed, so demand must be managed because 
supplies cannot be infinitely increased: "And we send down water from the 
sky in fixed measure”; (ibid. 2001) 
- Second, it should not be wasted. As water supply is fixed, The Koran tells 
humans that they may use God’s gifts for their alimentation in moderation, 
provided that they commit no excess therein: “O Children of Adam!   . . . Eat 
and drink: But waste not by excess, for God loveth not the wasters.” (ibid. 
2001) 
Given the importance of cleanliness in Islam, and that many Muslim countries 
have minimal wastewater treatment, it is common to hear Muslims declare that 
wastewater reuse is undesirable, or even Haram (unlawful according to Islam). 
However, after a detailed study, in consultation with scientists and engineers, the 
Council of Leading Islamic Scholars (CLIS) in Saudi Arabia concluded in a special 
Fatwa in 1978 that treated wastewater can theoretically be used even for Wudu and 
drinking, provided that it presents no health risk. (ibid. 2001) 
2) Water Rights in Islam 
From an economic perspective, the Prophet (pbuh) said that, like fire and 
pasture, water is a common right to all Muslims (ibid. 2001). Moreover, according to 
modern legislation water is owned by society. 
Market approaches to water management, such as increasing tariffs and 
privatizing utilities, are controversial because water is such a vital social good. 
Economic measures may be even more controversial in predominantly Muslim 
nations because of the Islamic precept that water cannot be bought or sold. (ibid. 
2001) 
However, most Islamic scholars have concluded that individuals or groups 
have the clear right to use, sell, and recover value-added costs of most categories of 
water. These judgements are based primarily on a Hadith: “It is better . . . to go to 
the woods, [and] cut and sell lumber to feed himself . . . than to beg people for help,” 
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which implies that common property resources such as wood and water can be sold 
and traded. (Faruqui. 2001) 
As in Christianity and Judaism, in Islam humankind has the first right to the 
resources that God has provided for his creation. It is well accepted by Islamic 
scholars that the priority of water use rights is:  
- First, Haq al Shafa or Shirb, the law of thirst or the right of humans to drink 
or satisfy their thirst;  
- Second, Haq al Shafa, the right of cattle and household animals;  
- Third, the right of irrigation.  
However, the environment has clear and unmistakable rights in Islam. 
3) Islamic Water Principles 
A Workshop on Water Resources Management in the Islamic World 
(WRMIW) was held in Amman, Jordan, in December 1998, and was organized by 
the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) with support from the 
International Water Resources Association (IWRA), and the Inter-Islamic Network on 
Water Resources Demand and Management (INWRDAM). The workshop goals 
focused on developing better understanding of Islamic perspectives relating to 
selected water management practices, and outlining research necessary to educate 
water management policies that will improve the lives of the poor. 
Although the workshop participants were able to agree upon water 
management principles that could be considered Islamic, these principles are not 
unique. As one delves into Islam, one encounters values common to the other two 
Abrahamic monotheistic religions, Christianity and Judaism, whose holy books 
Muslims recognize (Abrahamic religion is a term of Islamic origin, commonly used to 
designate the three prevalent monotheistic religions – Judaism, Christianity, and 
Islam – which claim Abraham (Hebrew: Avraham םָהָרְבאַ ; Arabic: Ibrahim ميھاربا ) as a 
part of their sacred history. Other, smaller religions that identify with this tradition – 
such as the Baha’i Faith – are sometimes included. Abrahamic religions account for 
more than half of the world’s total population. Today, there are around 3.8 billion 
followers of various Abrahamic religions. Other comparable religious groupings 
include the Indian “religions” (way of life) and the Taoic religions of East Asia - both 
terms being parallels of the “Abrahamic” category). 
Thus, a water conservation project incorporating local values in, for example, 
Egypt, which has a large Christian minority, could include verses from the Bible, as 
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well as those from the Koran and Hadiths, which would complement each other. 
Because these values are universal, they are not common only to these closely 
related faiths, but are also inherent in many other belief systems. 
However, examining values is not easy. Most scientists and even 
development professionals avoid examining religion or values in the context of their 
work to avoid discord and to keep discussion “objective.” Nevertheless, where 
science, development, and values intersect, the issue cannot be avoided. 
Examining values can be particularly sensitive in the Middle East, where the 
prevailing religion is Islam, but which also has many adherents of other faiths, such 
as Christianity, Zoroastrianism [a religion based on concept of struggle between light 
(good) and dark (evil), and philosophy based on the teachings ascribed to the 
prophet Zoroaster (Zarathustra, Zartosht). Mazdaism is the religion that 
acknowledges the divine authority of Ahura Mazda, proclaimed by Zoroaster to be 
the one uncreated Creator of all God. As demonstrated by Zoroastrian creed and 
articles of faith, the two terms are effectively synonymous. In a declaration of the 
creed — the Fravarānē — the adherent states: “…I profess myself a devotee of 
Mazda, a follower of Zarathustra.” (Yasna 12.2, 12.8) While Zoroastrianism was 
once the dominant religion of much of Greater Iran, the number of adherents has 
dwindled to no more than 200,000 worldwide, with concentrations in India and Iran], 
and Judaism. However, in a spirit of tolerance and mutual respect, workshop 
participants reached consensus that followers of different belief systems have much 
to learn from each other. 
The workshop participants reached a consensus on Islamic water 
management principles, which can be outlined as follow: (Faruqui. 2001) 
- Water is first and foremost a social good in Islam, a gift from God and a part 
of, and necessary for, sustaining all life; 
- Water belongs to the community, as a whole, no individual literally owns 
water; 
- The first priority for water use is access to drinking water of acceptable 
quantity and quality to sustain human life and every human being has the right 
to this basic water requirement; 
- The second and third priorities for water are for domestic animals and for 
irrigation; 
- Humankind is the steward of water on earth; 
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- The environment (both flora and fauna) has a very strong and legitimate 
right to water and it is vital to protect the environment by minimizing pollution. 
Individuals, organizations, and states are liable for harm that they have 
caused to the environment or to the environmental rights of others, including 
water use rights; 
- Water resources must be managed and used in a sustainable way; 
- Sustainable and equitable water management ultimately depends upon the 
application of universal values such as fairness, equity, and concern for 
others; 
- Water conservation is central to Islam. Mosques, religious institutes, and 
religious schools should be used to disseminate this principle so as to 
complement other religious and secular efforts; 
- Wastewater reuse is permissible in Islam; however, the water must meet the 
required level of treatment to ensure purity and health for its intended 
purpose; 
- Full cost recovery is permissible: that is, the full cost of supplying, treating, 
storing, and distributing water, as well as the cost of waste-water collection, 
treatment, and disposal. However, water pricing must be equitable as well as 
efficient; 
- Privatization of water service delivery is permissible in Islam, but the 
government has a duty to ensure equity in pricing and service; 
- Water management requires Shura (consultation) with all stakeholders; 
- All community members, including both men and women, can play an 
effective role in water management and should be encouraged to do so; 
- Communities must be proactive to ensure equitable access to water 
resources; 
 - All nation-states have an obligation to share water fairly with other nation-
states; 
- Integrated water management is a necessary tool to balance equity across 
sectors and regions. 
On the other hand there were recommendations: (ibid. 2001) 
- Cooperation and sharing of knowledge of water resource management 
should be encouraged among Muslim scientists and countries by developing 
a network to promote equity; 
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- For the same purpose, cooperation and sharing of knowledge of water 
resource management should also be encouraged among scientists and 
countries regardless of religion; 
- Non-economic incentives for conserving water, as well as penalties for 
wasting it, should be identified; 
- Wastewater should be properly treated and reused. 
The most important findings are the following: 
- Water is a social good owned by the community. Provided that equity is 
maintained, as in Iran where all urban residents receive a lifeline volume of 
water free to meet their basic requirements, Islam allows for private sector 
involvement in service delivery, and up-to-full-cost recovery for water and 
wastewater treatment services; 
- In contrast to the current situation in the Middle East, the priority of water 
rights is first, domestic uses, second, livestock watering, and third, irrigation. 
The environment has very strong and specific water rights, and individuals, 
organizations, and states are liable for harm they caused to the environment, 
which allows for “polluter pays” legislation; 
- As indicated by the Fatwa and actual practice in Saudi Arabia, wastewater 
reuse is allowable, and encouraged where necessary, provided that the water 
is treated to the extent that makes it safe for its intended use. 
5.4.2 Judaism and Water  
In Judaism ritual washing is intended to restore or maintain a state of ritual 
purity and its origins can be found in the Torah. These ablutions can be washing the 
hands, the hands and the feet, or total immersion which must be done in “living 
water”, i.e. the sea, a river, a spring or in a Mikveh (it is a Jewish ritual bath used for 
cleansing after contact with a dead body or after menstruation. It can also be used 
for immersing vessels and as part of the initiation ceremony for converts. Only water 
that has not previously been drawn into a container can be used, and there must be 
no leakages. The mikveh has its origins in Ancient times when people had to be 
purified in a mikveh before they could enter the Temple area. Water in this case is 
important for its cleansing properties). (Juriga. 2003)  
In Temple times ablutions were practised by priests, converts to Judaism as 
part of the initiation rites and by women on the seventh day after their menstrual 
period. Priests had to wash their hands and feet before taking part in Temple 
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services. The ritual washing of hands is performed before and after meals and on 
many other occasions. 
Tow stories reflect the significance of water in Judaism:  
- The Great Flood in Genesis 6: 14-18. The significance of this is that the 
flood washed away all the sins of the world so that we could start afresh (God 
destroyed humanity by sending a great flood. Only Noah and his family and a 
two of each mammalian species were saved in the ark built by 
him. Afterwards God promised he would never attempt to destroy the earth 
again and sent the rainbow as a sign of this covenant. The story of a Great 
Flood is also found in other cultures such as the Australian Aborigines and 
some Pacific Islanders. The Israelites’ story is different from these because it 
emphasises the ethical demands of God. The flood is a divine punishment 
from which Noah survives because of his moral worth); (ibid, 2003) 
- The parting and crossing of the Red Sea in Jewish history. Water here is 
powerful, but an instrument of God for punishment “for the Egyptians” and a 
blessing “for the Israelites” (The Red Sea is significant in Jewish history 
because its parting by Moses was a miraculous event at the beginning of the 
Exodus which enabled the Israelites to escape from the Egyptian army that 
was chasing them. God allowed Moses to part the sea so that the Israelites 
could walk safely to the other side on dry land, while the Egyptians drowned 
as the sea came together again. This miracle was a reward for the faith of 
Moses and the Israelites, God's Chosen People. The parting and crossing of 
the Red Sea shows that God has power over nature, even the mighty 
oceans). 
“All those wishing to win our cooperation in this sphere must realize one thing. 
For Israel, water is no luxury, not even merely a highly desirable and useful addition 
to our system of natural resources. Water for us is life itself. It is food for the people 
and not food alone. Without large scale irrigation projects we shall not achieve high 
productivity, balancing the economy or economic independence. For without 
irrigation we shall not at all produce a worthy agriculture under our special 
circumstances, and without agriculture particularly highly developed and progressive 
agriculture shall not be a people rooted in the land, secure in its existence, stable in 
its character, in control of all the possibilities of material and spiritual creation 
inherent in it and which this country can open before it.” (See appendix 2, annex 2) 
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5.4.3 Water in Christianity 
Almost all Christian churches or sects have an initiation ritual involving the 
use of water. Baptism has its origins in the symbolism from the baptism of Jesus by 
John the Baptist in the Jordan River. After Jesus’ resurrection he commanded his 
disciples to baptise in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit (Matthew 
28:19-20). Baptism is regarded differently in different denominations within 
Christendom. Baptism is a symbol of liberation from the oppression of sin that 
separates us from God.  
It is believed that baptism does not in itself cleanse one from sin, but is rather 
a public declaration of a person’s belief and faith in Christ and it is a sign of welcome 
into the Church. The Catholic Church, however, believes that a real change occurs 
at baptism (it is more than just symbolism) it is at baptism that Catholics believe that 
the stain of original sin is actually removed from the individual.  
The use of water is important for its own symbolic value in three ways: 
- It cleanses and washes away dirt;  
- Fills everything it enters as God fills those who are immersed in Him; 
- And we need water to survive physically as we need God to survive 
spiritually.   
Baptism was usually performed with the person standing in water and with 
water being poured over the upper part of the body. This was called “immersion” but 
today the term refers to the method of dipping the whole body under water, which is 
used, for example, by the Baptist and Orthodox churches.  
In most Western churches today the rite is performed by pouring water over 
the head three times (affusion) and sometimes sprinkling water over the head 
(aspersion). 
Another important significance of water for Christianity is the “living water” that 
Jesus described himself as. John 4: 1-42 is the story of Jesus and a Samaritan 
woman (see appendix I, annex 5, part a, for more details) to whom he offers living 
water so that she will never thirst again, in other words eternal life through him.  
Holy water (See appendix I, annex 8, for more details) is water blessed for 
use in certain rite (s), especially that which is blessed at the Easter Vigil for baptism 
of catechumens. The use of water other than for baptism goes back to the 4th 
century in the East and the 5th century in the West. (Juriga. 2003) 
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The custom of sprinkling people with water at mass began in the 9th 
century. At this time “stoups”, basins for holy water from which people could sprinkle 
themselves on entering a church, were in common use. Holy water is also used at 
blessings, dedications, exorcisms and burials. 
Ablutions in Christianity are mainly baptism and the washing of fingers and 
communion vessels after the communion. This takes place in two parts: Firstly the 
chalice is rinsed with the wine, and then the chalice and priests’ fingers with wine 
and water. This ablution is important because after the bread and wine has been 
consecrated, Christ is believed to be present. 
The President of the Pontifical Council on Justice and Peace Archbishop 
Renato R. Martino set out the Vatican’s position in a note submitted to the World 
Water Forum on March 22, 2003. Entitled “Water, an Essential Element for Life,” 
Archbishop Martino’s Note says: (See appendix 5, annex 1)  
“Water is a common good of humankind. This is the basis for cooperation 
toward a water policy that gives priority to persons living in poverty and those living 
in areas endowed with fewer resources.” (ibid. 2003) 
“The principle of the universal destination of the goods of creation confirms 
that people and countries, including future generations, have the right to fundamental 
access to those goods which are necessary for their development,” the Note states.  
“The few, with the means to control, cannot destroy or exhaust this resource, 
which is destined for the use of all. Powerful international interests, public and 
private, must adapt their agendas to serve human needs rather than dominate 
them.” (ibid. 2003) 
The Note calls for country partnerships between developed and developing 
countries, as well as debt for water swaps.  
“The water services in many developing countries are, however, still plainly 
inadequate in providing safe water supplies. The situation is so dramatic that it will 
not be overcome without increased development assistance and focused private 
investment from abroad,” Archbishop Marino emphasizes in the Note. 
“Funds released through debt relief could well be utilized in improving water 
services,” he says. “Country partnerships can provide a method of institutional 
building and reform whereby a long term link can be formed between the water 
sector of a developed country and that of a developing country.”  
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Since the water supply of most developed countries is in the public sector, this 
appeal appears closely aligned to the civil society calls for public-public partnerships 
as opposed to the public-private partnerships advocated by in past years by the 
World Bank, the Global Water Partnership, the water multinationals and several 
Western donors. “Catholic social thought has always stressed that the defence and 
preservation of certain common goods, such as the natural and human 
environments, cannot be safeguarded simply by market forces, since they touch on 
fundamental human needs which escape market logic”. (ibid. 2003) 
In the Judeo-Christian Holy Book, God is presented as the source of living 
water beside which the just man can find life. Because the Bible was written in a part 
of the world where water is scarce, it is not surprising that water features significantly 
in the lives of the people. Due to the scarcity of water in the lands of the Scripture, 
rainfall and an abundance of water was seen as a sign of God’s favour and 
goodness. 
Water is a primary building block of life. Without water there is no life, yet 
water, despite its creative role, can destroy. The Bible opens precisely with the 
image of the divine spirit hovering over the water at the creation of the universe. In 
the accounts of creation contained in the first two chapters of the Bible, it is from the 
midst of the waters that dry land is made to appear, while living reptiles and rich life 
forms are made to swarm the waters. It is also water that moistens the earth for 
other forms of life to appear. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
Water has been a cause of political tensions between the Arabs and the 
Israelis. It is the only scarce resource for which there is no substitute, over which 
there is poorly developed international law, and the need for which is overwhelming, 
constant and immediate. International law may emphasize the doctrine of “equitable 
utilization” of water resources, but there is no clear definition of what this implies. 
(Barrett. 1994) 
International law is not based on treaties alone, and customary law can 
complement treaty law in many ways. Treaties or Conventions may attain the status 
of customary law over time. Customary law may assist in clarifying treaty provisions, 
when the terms of the treaty are subject to interpretation. 
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A general overview of the principal of international water law, which is part of 
international law, provides more specific rules, which have their origins in both 
international custom and treaty law. The most important international water-related 
treaty is the 1997 UN International Watercourses Convention. Its main elements 
were examined under the sub-headings of “scope”, “substantive rules”, “procedural 
rules”, “institutional mechanisms” and “dispute settlement”. 
Today’s conflicts result internal instability and ethno-political tension, rather 
than classic war between nations.  
Furthermore, when people are forced to accept agreements that give them 
less than they had expected, or less than what they feel they deserve, they 
sometimes behave unwisely. Evidence from experimental economics shows a strong 
tendency to punish others even when the behaviour is self-destructive. Not to 
mention that terrorism interacts with behavioural factors. 
Destruction and damage of water facilities, in conflict today, can be 
considered more likely. The consequences are more severe especially on the civilian 
population, which is becoming more vulnerable. Water facilities present an insecure 
target for terrorist attacks, particularly in developed countries that have not 
experienced conflict.  
The lack of a widely accepted measure for equitably dividing shared water 
resources represents the major barrier to water’s role as an agent of peaceful 
relations. 
Over the time nations began to realise that conduct during warfare should 
have limits, and the unwritten principles, which were generally followed by civilized 
nations to control warfare, and to protect the victims of war, rose to the status of 
customary international law. Despite the inherent difficulties, treaties are not only the 
best representation of local needs and settings, but they also carry the highest 
priority in international law. By encouraging local negotiations, global political issues 
could also be better avoided. Existing international legal obligations and state 
practices can be strengthened and clarified. Improve coordination between states, 
with appropriate funding, can reduce the threat to water facilities around the globe. 
The United Nations can provide the necessary framework, based on a 
comprehensive legal regime.  
Economic considerations alone may not provide an acceptable solution to 
water allocation problems, especially to solve water allocation disputes between 
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nations. Although economic criteria have never been explicitly used to determine 
water allocations in an international treaty and, while in some cases States have 
compensated co-riparian for water, no international water market has ever been 
established. 
Economic benefits have not been clearly used in allocating water, although 
economic principles have helped guide definitions of beneficial uses and have 
suggested baskets of benefits, including both water and non-water resources.  
These conclusions suggest a middle ground between the absolute uniqueness of 
each basin, and the feasibility of defining clear and authoritative guiding principles for 
allocations, which would work like a set of rules for all of the trans-boundary waters 
of the world.  
The generalized guidelines offered for allocations, whether based on legal or 
economic equity, have difficulty capturing the geographic uniqueness of each of the 
world’s international waterways, whether hydrological, political, or cultural aspects.   
Common property resources are not controlled by a single person and can be used 
without a price being paid. As a result of the free usage, an externality is created in 
which the current overuse of the resource harms those who might use it in the future. 
The standard economic model suggests that people are rational, and capture all 
available gains from trade. Many, for instance, would not give up their ideals, their 
values, their country, their family, or their religion for any amount of money.   
The Coase theorem is a useful approach for figuring out why efficient political 
bargains are so problematic, but it is not a good description of the real world. Even 
though, if the true problems are “game-theoretic” in nature, “wise leadership” can 
have a disproportionate impact on the world.    
   According to the Coase Theorem, the bargaining solution will be efficient 
when property rights are clearly specified, when transactions costs are at minimum 
and close to zero, and when there is no strategic behaviour. As transactions costs 
are low or non-existing, the efficient level of emissions should be attainable. The 
question that arises is:  
When transactions costs are high, can this seriously reduce the potential of 
the private property approach to identify the efficient level of emissions?    
The assumption of modest (even zero) transaction costs in negotiating an 
agreed level of the externality and price is very “optimistic”. There are financial and 
time costs involved in bargaining (not to mention “free rider” problems), if these costs 
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exceed benefits from agreement then bargaining will not occur. Also bargaining with 
small numbers often breaks down (wars do happen, terrorist attacks and…).  
Even if bargaining is costless, a pessimistic interpretation suggests that, 
rather than cooperation, surplus division problems can only be resolved by force or 
threat of using force. Furthermore, negotiations will not necessarily produce Pareto 
efficiency with asymmetric information since there may be cheating or blackmail.  
International agreements must be self-enforcing; this may mean that 
international water resources potentially cannot be managed as efficiently as 
international resources.  
Because International agreements are voluntary, it may be supposed that 
individual countries will never sign any agreement that makes them worse off. 
Agreements can be either cooperative or non-cooperative; they are cooperative if the 
players can negotiate binding contracts that allow them to plan joint strategies. A 
game is non-cooperative if negotiation and enforcement of a binding contract are not 
possible. 
Economic efficiency can be achieved without government intervention when 
the externality affects relatively few parties and when property rights are well 
specified.  
The efficient use of the river depends on negotiations and agreement between 
the two interested parties. Negotiation costs, together with the costs of the 
implementation of the agreement (transaction costs), could be expected to be fairly 
modest. Furthermore, when parties can bargain without cost and to their mutual 
advantage, the resulting outcome will be efficient, regardless of how the property 
rights are specified. Also, voluntary negotiations among those affected parties will 
generate efficient bargain, and the notion that externalities can be internalised once 
property rights are established suggests that government intervention to deal with 
externalities is unnecessary. 
However it is optimistic to suppose such things always occur. The game 
theory and the history of wars show that this is unrealistic. At best it can be seen that 
bargaining can alleviate some pollution issues provided property rights are well 
enforced.  
There is no contradiction between what Islam says about water management 
and the emerging international consensus on the issue. In fact, the Islamic water 
management principles are not unique. Some of the same principles could be 
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derived by studying other faiths, their holy books, and the lives of their Prophets. As 
one delves into Islam, one encounters values common not only to the other two 
Abrahamic religions, Christianity and Judaism, but also to many other world-views 
and religions.  
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6 Conflict or Cooperation – Case Studies 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Conflict over water appears in Chapter 26 of the book of Genesis, where the 
herdsmen of Gerar strove with the herdsmen of Isaac over control of water wells. 
Other ancient links between water and conflict may be found in the writings of 
Herodotus. Despite water’s links to conflict Jerome Delli Priscoli (1997) counters that 
the development of irrigation systems contributed to the development of communities 
and of civilization itself. (Yoffe and Wolf. 2002) 
After highlighting the Hydro-political position and the status of the Jordan 
River Basin, this chapter shows a case study, which demonstrates that despite an 
existing conflict between two parties reaching an understanding, and/or an 
agreement, is possible. This can be done when the limits and fluctuations of water 
resources play a role in shaping political forces and national boundaries. And when 
the issue of water availability determines both where and how people live and 
influence the way in which they related to each other.  
 
6.2 Background 
The Jordan River basin is shared by Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and the 
Palestinian Territories (the West Bank and Gaza Strip). Through military action in the 
Arab-Israel wars of 1967 and 1973, Israel has come to control a significant part of 
the basin, leaving water-short Jordan and the Palestinians in a vulnerable position. 
Because of its geopolitical position, the Jordan River basin had been 
described as having witnessed more severe international conflict over water than 
any other river system in the Middle East, and remains by far the most likely 
flashpoint for the future. (ibid. 2002) 
6.2.1 The Jordan River and its Hydro-political Position  
All of the countries and territories in and around the Jordan River watershed, 
except Lebanon, comprising Israel, Syria, Jordan, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip, 
are currently using between 95 per cent and more than 100 per cent of their annual 
renewable freshwater supply (ibid. 2002). In recent dry years, water consumption 
has routinely exceeded annual supply, the difference usually being made up through 
over-pumping of the fragile groundwater system. Water requirements for the year 
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2000 were around 2,000 Mm3 annually for Israel, approximately 130 % of renewable 
supplies, and 1,000 Mm3/yr, or 115 % of supplies for Jordan. Syrian water demand is 
expected to exceed available supply by 2010. (ibid. 2002) 
In addition to a natural increase in demand for water due to growing 
populations and economies, the region faced dramatic demographic changes from at 
least three sources: Israel accommodated a million Soviet Jewish immigrants 
between 1990 and 2000, a 25 % increase over its population (Bank of Israel). Jordan 
absorbed 300,000 Palestinians expelled from Kuwait in the wake of the Gulf War 
(early 1990’s). Finally, talks are being initiated over a greater level of autonomy of 
the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Presumably, an autonomous Palestine 
would strive to absorb and settle a number of the 2.2 million Palestinians registered 
worldwide as refugees. The absorption of any or all of these groups of immigrants 
would have profound impact on regional water demands. 
In October 1994 the political situation in the region changed and Israel and 
Jordan signed a Peace Accord. As part of this treaty, Israel promised to provide an 
additional 50 Mm3/yr of water to its Arab neighbour. (See appendix 3, annex 1) 
The water-related part of the 1994 treaty is significant because it opens the 
door to increased cooperation in water matters between two traditionally hostile 
countries. This is likely to prove important because, even with the division of water 
under the Peace Accord, there is still nowhere near enough water to meet the needs 
of the people living in the Jordan basin.  
Experts predict that Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian Territories will be 
running a water deficit of 1-2 billion cubic meters a year by 2020. However, Israel 
and Jordan continue to disagree over the implementation of the treaty. During a 
drought in the winter of 1998/99 Israel proposed to halve the amount of water it is 
obliged to give Jordan, World Water and Environmental Engineering magazine 
reported. 
Israel continues to move slowly on the dispute over water with the 
Palestinians. Under the Oslo agreement of 1995, Israel allowed Palestinians in the 
West Bank to abstract up to 80 Mm3/yr from the western aquifer, recognizing for the 
first time that the Palestinians have legitimate water rights in the West Bank.  
6.2.2 The Jordan River Basin (see appendix 2, annex 1: map 3) 
The Jordan River is a multinational river, flowing southwards for a total length 
of (approximately) 250 km through Lebanon, Syria, Israel, and Jordan. It is the third 
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largest perennial river in the Middle East. It receives most of its discharge from 
precipitation on the southern part of the Anti-Lebanon Range, and is joined by its 
largest tributary the Yarmouk River, which forms the present boundary between 
Syria and Jordan for 40 km before becoming the border between Israel and Jordan.  
The Jordan River watershed drains an area of 18,300 km2 in five political entities 
Lebanon, Syria, Israel, Jordan, and the West Bank. With only 1,400 Mm3 of usable 
flow (annually flow 1992), the Jordan River is the smallest major watershed in the 
region, compared with the Nile with 74,000 Mm3/yr or the Euphrates at 32,000 
Mm3/yr. (Naff and Matson 1984) 
It may be classified on the basis of hydrology, hydrogeology, and water use 
into three sections:  
1) The upper Jordan-headwaters, the Huleh valley, and Lake Tiberias (Figure 
6.2.a):  
 
Table 6.2.a: Annual discharge of the upper Jordan-headwaters 
River Riparian states Flow (Mm³) 
Mean Range 
Dan Israel 245 173-285 
Hasbani Lebanon 138 52-236 
Banias Syria/Israel 121 63-190 
TOTAL   504 298 - 711 
Source: Naff and Matson 1984  
 
Three springs make up the northern headwaters (or the upper Jordan-
headwaters) of the Jordan River (Table 6.2.a):  
- The Hasbani River derives most of its discharge from the Wazzani spring 
and group of springs on the uppermost Hasbani rising in Lebanon, with an 
average annual flow across the border of 138 Mm3/yr. It is important to note 
that over a recent twenty-year period, the flow of the Hasbani varied from 52 
million to 236 Mm3/yr. 
- The Banias in the Golan Heights is fed primarily from Hermon springs, 
averaging 121 Mm3/yr, during a recent twenty-year period it varied from 63 
million to 190 Mm3/yr; 
 -The Dan, the largest spring at 245 Mm3/yr, varying from 173 million to 285 
Mm3/yr and originating in Israel.  
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The streams from these springs converge 6 km into Israel and flow south to the Sea 
of Galilee (210 m below sea level). 
a. The Huleh Valley (Table 6.2.b) (appendix 2, annex 3, part b) 
The flow of the upper Jordan enters the Huleh valley (formerly Lake Huleh), 
where it is augmented by the flow of sub-lacustrine springs. Among the minor 
springs and seasonal watercourses, this contributes to the flow of the upper Jordan. 
 
Table 6.2.b: Water budget of the Huleh valley 
  Mm³ 
Inflow into valley 504 
Plus local run-off from Huleh to Jisr Banat Yaqub 140 
Minus irrigation in valley -100 
Outflow into Lake Tiberias 544 
Source: Naff and Matson 1984 
 
b. Lake Tiberias (Table 6.2.c) (appendix 2, annex 3, part a) 
The north fork of the Jordan falls 200 m to Lake Tiberias (the Sea of Galilee), 
which lies 210 m below sea level. The upper Jordan contributes an average of 610 
Mm3/yr to the lake, or 40% of Israel’s total identified renewable water resources. An 
additional 130 Mm3/yr enters the lake as winter run-off from various wadis and in the 
form of discharge from springs that contain high salinity. 
 
Table 6.2.c: Water budget of Lake Tiberias 
  Mm³ 
Inflow into lake 544 
Plus rainfall over lake 65 
Plus local run-off 70 
Plus springs in and around lake 65 
Minus evaporation from lake surface -270 
Outflow to lower Jordan 474 
Source: Naff and Matson 1984 
 
Lake Tiberias (figure 6.2.a) has a volume of 4 x 109 m³, which is 6.5 times the 
annual inflow from the upper Jordan River; the water depth is 26 m on average, with 
a maximum of 43 m. The surface area is 170 km², which loses about 270 Mm3/yr of 
water by direct evaporation. About 500 Mm3/yr leaves Lake Tiberias via its outlet and 
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flows south along the floor of the Dead Sea Rift for about 10 km to the confluence 
with the Yarmouk River. 
 
Figure 6.2.a the Upper Jordan-Headwaters, the Huleh Valley and Lake Tiberias  
Sourc
e: Adapted from the Johnston Plan (Passia.org 2006) 
 Borders line.     Jordan River Basin.  
 Syria-Israel ceases fire line (1967).   Israel’s National Water Carrier  
 
2) The Yarmouk River (Fig. 6.2.b):  
The Yarmouk River has sources both in Syria and Jordan and forms the 
border between those countries before it adds about 400 Mm3/yr to the Jordan River, 
10 km south of the Sea of Galilee. There is no flow contribution from the part of the 
valley where Israel is a riparian. Of the 7,242 km² of the Yarmouk basin, 1,424 km² 
lie within Jordan and 5,252 km² within Syria. The flow of the Yarmouk is derived from 
winter precipitation that averages 364 mm per year over the basin (Naff and Matson 
1984). 
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Figure 6.2.b the Yarmouk River 
 
Source: Adapted from the Johnston Plan (Passia.org 2006) 
 Borders line.     Jordan River Basin.  
 Syria-Israel ceases fire line (1967).   Israel’s National Water Carrier. 
 Groundwaters divide. 
  
3) The lower Jordan River and the Dead Sea (Fig. 6.2.c) 
For the first 40 km the river forms the international boundary between Israel 
and Jordan; south of that reach, it abuts the Israeli-occupied West Bank of the 
Jordan, where it forms the present cease-fire line. The Jordan here flows through the 
deepest portion of the Rift valley to enter the Dead Sea at 401 m below sea level, the 
lowest point on earth. 
Run-off from winter rainfall within the valley is carried to the Jordan River via 
steep, intermittent tributary wadis incised in the wall of the Jordan valley, primarily on 
the East Bank. This source represents an additional 523 Mm3/yr, of which only 20% 
originates in Israel; 286 Mm3 is derived from perennial spring flow, while 237 Mm3 is 
provided by winter rainfall (Naff and Matson 1984).  
The Jordan River picks up volume from springs and intermittent tributaries 
along its 320 km (include the Hasbani River) meander southward along the valley 
floor of the Syrio-African Rift. Because much of the Jordan’s flow is below sea level 
and the small springs that contribute to its flow pass first through the salty remains of 
ancient seas, the salinity of the water rises greatly even as its flow increases. 
Though the headwaters at the Hasbani, Banias and Dan have a salinity of 1520 
parts per million (ppm), levels at the south end of the Sea of Galilee are 340 ppm. 
This is diluted to some extent by the Yarmouk, which has a salinity of 100 ppm, but 
increases significantly downstream, reaching several thousand parts per million by 
the Allenby Bridge near Jericho. The Dead Sea, a terminal lake, has a salinity of 
250,000 ppm, seven times that of the ocean. (Naff and Matson 1984) 
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The river flows through the transition zone from the Mediterranean subtropical 
climate of Lebanon and the Galilee region in the north to the arid conditions of the 
Negev Desert and the Rift Valley to the south. Similarly, rainfall patterns vary 
spatially, with decreasing rainfall generally from north to south and from west to east. 
 
Figure 6.2.c the Lower Jordan River and the Dead Sea 
 
Source: Adapted from the Johnston Plan (Passia.org 2006) 
 Groundwaters divide.     Jordan River Basin. 
 Israel’s National Water Carrier 
 
The hills along both banks of the Jordan serve as recharge areas for 
extensive aquifer systems in the West Bank, Israel, and Jordan. There are three 
principal aquifer systems west of Jordan, which they have the following safe yields:  
- The north-east basin, which recharges in the northern West Bank and 
discharges in Israel’s Bet She’an and Jezreel valleys, has a safe yield of 140 
Mm3/yr; 
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- The western, or Yarkon-Tanninim basin, which also recharges in the hills of 
the West Bank but discharges westwards towards the Mediterranean coast in 
Israel, has a safe yield of 320 Mm3/yr; 
 - The eastern basin, which is made up of five separate catchment areas in 
the West Bank, all of which flow east toward the Jordan Valley, has a 
combined safe yield of 125 Mm3/yr.  
The coastal aquifer, another major groundwater source in Israel but without 
hydrologic connection to those listed above, provides a safe yield of about 280 
Mm3/yr. The Gaza aquifer, with connection to the coastal aquifer, provides an 
additional yield of 60 Mm3/yr, groundwater replenishment, within Jordan, totals about 
270 Mm3/yr in 12 different aquifers mostly in the Zarqa, Yarmouk, and Jordan 
catchments. 
These stream flow and groundwater recharge values represent the average 
annual values in the natural system. The actual amounts are highly variable and 
depend both on seasonal fluctuations (75 per cent of precipitation falls during the 
four winter months) and on annual variations in rainfall, which can be as high as 25-
40 per cent.  
Lebanon and Syria are respectively using about 35 Mm3/yr from the Hasbani 
River and about 250 Mm3/yr from the Yarmouk River, each for local irrigation 
projects. Their major sources are respectively the Litani River, with an average flow 
of 700 Mm3/yr and which lie entirely within Lebanon, and Euphrates River. Because 
the Litani River flows to within seven kilometers of the Hasbani River, it has been 
included in many planned diversion schemes in conjunction with the Jordan River.  
 
6.3 Historical background 
a- The Ionides Plan: 
In 1937, the government of Great Britain assigned M. Ionides, a hydrologist, 
to serve as the director of development for the East Jordan Government. His actual 
task was solely to conduct a study on the water resources and irrigation potentials of 
the Jordan Valley Basin. This study served as a main reference in the preparation of 
the proposed United Nations Partition Plan of Palestine. 
Published in 1939, the Ionides Plan made three recommendations: 
- Yarmouk flood waters were to be stored in Lake Tiberias; 
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- The stored waters plus a block quote quantity (1.76 m3/sec) of the Yarmouk 
River water, diverted through the East Ghor canal, were to be used to irrigate 
75,000 acres (300,000 dunums: A unit of area used in the Ottoman Empire 
and still used, in various standardized versions, in many countries formerly 
part of the Ottoman Empire. It was defined as “forty standard paces in length 
and breadth”, but varied considerably from place to place) of land east of the 
Jordan River; 
- The secured irrigation water of the Jordan River System, estimated at a 
potential of 742 Mm3, were to be used primarily within the Jordan Valley 
Basin. 
Since the Jordan and the Yarmouk Rivers were at that time still under the 
authority of the Palestine Electricity Corporation, the plan was difficult to implement. 
b- The Lowdermilk Plan: 
Zionist supporters worldwide were not satisfied with the findings and 
recommendations of Ionides. Their aspiration to utilize the Jordan River Basin for the 
irrigation of the Negev and the southern parts of Palestine was fulfilled by Walterclay 
Lowdermilk. Lowdermilk was commissioned by the United States Department of 
Agriculture to conduct such a study. 
Lowdermilk devised a plan calling for the irrigation of the Jordan Valley, the 
diversion of the Jordan and Yarmouk rivers to create hydroelectric power; the 
diversion of water from northern Palestine to the Negev desert in the south; and the 
usage of the Litani River in Lebanon. 
In striking contrast to the Ionides plan, Lowdermilk concluded that 1800 Mm3 
of water was available in the Jordan Basin for the purpose of irrigation. A canal was 
recommended to connect the Mediterranean Sea with the Dead Sea. Also, an 
authority similar to the Tennessee Valley Authority should be formed to assume full 
control over all activities concerning water resources. Such water management 
would ideally ensure adequate water resources and job opportunities for 4 million 
new Jewish immigrants in addition to the 1.8 million Arabs living in Palestine and 
East Jordan at that time. 
Control over the proposed project should be solely in the hands of Jews, with 
a limited amount of input allotted to the United Nations. Arabs unable or unwilling to 
live under such conditions were to be transferred to areas near the Euphrates and 
the Tigris Valley. 
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Lowdermilk’s plan and suggestions were enthusiastically embraced by 
influential Zionists. Technical experts subsequently contracted to implement and 
interpret this plan into feasible schemes. James B. Hays was selected for this 
assignment. 
c- The Hays Plan 
The Hays plan of 1948 called for half of the Yarmouk River water to be 
diverted into Lake Tiberias, replacing water diverted from the upper Jordan River, as 
outlined in the Lowdermilk plan from which Hays worked. Two additional stages were 
suggested to be implemented in the future, although not stated, they most likely 
included the diversion of the Litani River water into geographical Palestine in order to 
be used for Israeli projects. 
As a continuation of the Lowdermilk-Hays Plan, the new government of Israel, 
soon after the War of 1948, began to prepare practical plans for the utilization and 
control of the area’s water resources. A Seven Year Plan was approved publicly in 
1953, centred on the diversion of the Jordan River water south toward the Negev 
Desert and establishing a unified and comprehensive water network that would cover 
all parts of Israel. 
In September 1953, the construction of the National Water Carrier began and 
thus plans to divert the Jordan River water, south to the Negev, were activated. 
Diversion originated at the Banat Yacoub Bridge in the demilitarized zone between 
Israel and Syria. After Syrian objection to the excavation process, and United States’ 
economic sanctions against Israel, a temporary freeze on the work at Banat Yacoub 
Bridge was announced in October 1953. 
During the 1948 war, the Rutenberg electricity generating plant was destroyed 
by the Jewish army in an attempt to avoid exclusive Arab control over the use of the 
Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers. The war forced a great number of Palestinian refugees 
to flee and settle in the eastern part of the Jordan Valley. The Jordanian Government 
and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) agreed to develop 
irrigation schemes in the area to assist Palestinian refugees to cultivate the land and 
resettle. For this purpose, the Jordanian Government commissioned a British 
consultant, Sir Murdoch MacDonald, to conduct a study on their behalf. 
d- The McDonald Plan 
The McDonald Plan was finalized in 1951. It is considered a complement to 
the Ionides Plan. The plan called for Jordan Basin water to be exclusively used for 
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irrigation of both banks of the Jordan River by storing surplus water from the 
Yarmouk River in Lake Tiberias and constructing canals down both sides of the 
Valley. Arabs were uneasy with the suggestion of the storage of water in Lake 
Tiberias, as they were in previous plans. 
e- The Bunger Plan 
The Arabs favoured the plan put forward by the American engineer M. E. 
Bunger a suitable location for the construction of a water storage dam along the 
Yarmouk River at the Moqarin area, where three valleys join together. The 
impounded water would be diverted to another dam at Addassiyah into gravity flow 
canals along the East Ghore area in the Jordan Valley. The plan included two 
hydroelectric generating plants at the site of the two dams to supply water and 
electricity to both Jordan and Syria. 
The Bunger Plan addressed several of Jordan and Syria’s needs, and 
intended to resolve, to some extent, the Palestinian refugees’ problem by increasing 
the productivity of available agriculture lands in the East Jordan Valley and parts of 
Syria. As soon as work began in July 1953, Israel vocalized its concern about 
increasing Arab control over the area’s water resources. Israel objected on the 
grounds that the original Rutenberg Concession gave it exclusive rights to the 
Yarmouk River. As a result, pressure was exerted on the United States Government 
and UNRWA to cease support for the project. To the surprise of the Jordanian 
Government, work was halted soon thereafter and the project was terminated. 
f- The Johnston Plan 
In October 1953, the United States prepared the Johnston Plan as yet another 
attempt to solve the area’s water crisis. The rising tension caused by the Israeli 
initiation of the National Water Carrier project, encouraged the United States to 
mediate between the two parties. The plan sought to satisfy the minimum 
requirements of riparian Arab states, as well as Israel. Eric Johnston implemented a 
water plan prepared by Charles Main, under the supervision of the Tennessee Valley 
Authority. Essentially, the Johnston Plan was a combination of the Lowdermilk-Hays 
and the MacDonald-Bunger Plans.  
6.3.1 Johnston Negotiations, 1951-55; Yarmouk Mediations, 1980’s 
The Jordan River flows between five particularly contentious riparians, two of 
which rely on the river as the primary water supply. By the early 1950’s, several 
states announced unilateral plans for the Jordan watershed. Arab states began to 
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discuss organized exploitation of two northern sources of the Jordan; the Hasbani 
and the Banias. (Stevens 1965)  
The Israelis made public their “All Israel Plan” which included the draining of 
Huleh Lake and swamps, diversion of the northern Jordan River and construction of 
a carrier to the coastal plain and Negev Desert, the first out-of-basin transfer for the 
watershed in the region. (Naff and Matson 1984)  
Jordan announced a plan to irrigate the East Ghor of the Jordan Valley by 
tapping the Yarmouk. At Jordan’s announcement, Israel closed the gates of an 
existing dam south of the Sea of Galilee and began draining the Huleh swamps, 
which infringed on the demilitarized zone with Syria. This action led to a series of 
border skirmishes between Israel and Syria, which escalated over the summer of 
1951 and prompted Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Sharrett to declare clearly that 
“Our soldiers in the north are defending the Jordan water sources so that water may 
be brought to the farmers of the Negev”. (Stevens. 1965) 
In March 1953, Jordan and the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees (UNRWA) signed an agreement to begin implementing the “Bunger Plan”, 
which called for a dam at Maqarin on the Yarmouk River with a storage capacity of 
480 Mm3, and a diversion dam at Addassiyah which would direct gravity flow along 
the East Ghor of the Jordan Valley.  
The water would both open land for irrigation and provide power for Syria and 
Jordan and offer resettlement for 100,000 Palestinian refugees. In June 1953, 
Jordan and Syria agreed to share the Yarmouk but Israel protested that its riparian 
rights commonly recognized as being due to entities that border a waterway, were 
not being recognized. (Naff and Matson. 1984) 
In July 1953, Israel began construction on the intake of its National Water 
Carrier at the Bridge of Jacob’s Daughters (Gesher B’not Ya’akov), north of the Sea 
of Galilee and in the demilitarized zone. Syria deployed its armed forces along the 
border and artillery units opened fire on the construction and engineering sites. Syria 
also protested to the U.N. and, though a 1954 resolution for the resumption of work 
by Israel carried a majority, the USSR vetoed the resolution. The Israelis then moved 
the intake to its current site at Eshed Kinrot on the north-western shore of the Sea of 
Galilee. 
This was a doubly costly move for Israel. First, as mentioned earlier, water 
salinity is much higher in the lake than in the upper Jordan. The initial water pumped 
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in 1964 was actually unsuitable for some agriculture. Since that time, Israel has 
diverted saline springs away from the lake and filtered carrier water through artificial 
recharge to ease this problem (Stevens. 1965). Second, the water from B’not 
Ya’akov would have flowed to the Negev by gravity alone. Instead, 450 Mm3/yr is 
currently pumped a height of 250 m before it starts its 240 km journey southward. 
Against this tense background, President Dwight Eisenhower sent his special 
envoy Eric Johnston to the Middle-east in October 1953 to try to mediate a 
comprehensive settlement of the Jordan River system allocations, and design a plan 
for its regional development. Johnston’s initial proposals were based on a study 
carried out by Charles Main and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) at the request 
of UNRWA to develop the area’s water resources and to provide for refugee 
resettlement. 
The TVA addressed the problem with a regional approach, pointedly ignoring 
political boundaries in their study. In the words of the introduction, “the report 
describes the elements of an efficient arrangement of water supply within the 
watershed of the Jordan River System. It does not consider political factors or 
attempt to set this system into the national boundaries now prevailing”. (ibid. 1965) 
6.3.2 Johnston negotiations 1953 - 1955  
The large number of plans proposed between 1953 and 1955 represented 
bargaining stages in the negotiations over the sharing of the Jordan River. The main 
bargaining was based on:  
- The water quotas for the riparian; 
- The use of Lake Tiberias as a storage facility; 
- The use of Jordan waters for out-of-basin areas; 
- The use of the Litani River as part of the system; 
- The nature of international supervision and guarantees. 
The basic plan for Johnston’s mission was an UNRWA-sponsored desk study 
prepared by Charles T. Main, under the supervision of the US Tennessee Valley 
Authority (as mentioned before), with the backing of the American State Department. 
The plan featured: 
- A dam on the Hasbani to provide power and irrigate the Galilee area;  
- Dams on the Dan and Banias Rivers to irrigate Galilee; 
- Drainage of the Huleh swamps; 
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- A dam at Maqarin with 175 Mm3 storage capacities to be used for power 
generation;  
- A dam at Addassiyah to divert water to Lake Tiberias and into the east Ghor 
area; 
- A small dam at the outlet of Lake Tiberias to increase the lake’s storage 
capacity; 
- Gravity-flow canals down the east and west sides of the Jordan valley to 
irrigate the area between the Yarmouk and the Dead Sea; 
- Control works and canals to utilize perennial flows from the valleys. 
The major features of the Main Plan included small dams on the Hasbani, 
Dan, and Banias, a medium size (175 Mm3 for storage) dam at Maqarin, additional 
storage at the Sea of Galilee, and gravity flow canals down both sides of the Jordan 
Valley. Preliminary allocations gave Israel 394 Mm3/yr, Jordan 774 Mm3/yr, and Syria 
45 Mm3/yr. (Table 6.3.a) In addition, the Main Plan: 
- Described only in-basin use of the Jordan River water, although it conceded 
that “it is recognized that each of these countries may have different ideas 
about the specific areas within their boundaries to which these waters might 
be directed”; 
- Excluded the Litani River. 
a- Israelis Cotton Plan: 
Israel responded to the “Main Plan” with the “Cotton Plan”, which it allocated 
Israel 1290 Mm3/yr, including 400 Mm3/yr from the Litani River, Jordan 575 Mm3/yr, 
Syria 30 Mm3/yr and Lebanon 450 Mm3/yr. In contrast to the Main Plan, the Cotton 
Plan: 
- Called for out-of-basin transfers to the coastal plain and the Negev; 
- Included the Litani River; 
- Recommended the Sea of Galilee as the main storage facility, thereby 
diluting its salinity. 
b- The Arab Plan 
In 1954, representatives from Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt established 
the Arab League Technical Committee under Egyptian leadership and formulated the 
“Arab Plan”. Its principal difference from the Johnston Plan was in the water 
allocated to each state. Israel was to receive 182 Mm3/yr, Jordan 698 Mm3/yr, Syria 
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132 Mm3/yr, and Lebanon 35 Mm3/yr in addition to keeping all of the Litani River. 
The Arab Plan: 
- Reaffirmed in-basin use; 
- Excluded the Litani River; 
- Rejected storage in the Galilee, which lies wholly in Israel. 
Johnston worked until the end of 1955 to reconcile these proposals in a 
Unified Plan amenable to all of the states involved. His dealings were bolstered by a 
U.S. offer to fund two-thirds of the development costs. His plan addressed the 
objections of both sides, and accomplished no small degree of compromise, 
although his neglect of groundwater issues would later prove an important oversight. 
Though they had not met face to face for these negotiations, all states agreed on the 
need for a regional approach. Israel gave up on integration of the Litani and the 
Arabs agreed to allow out-of-basin transfer.  
 
Table 6.3.a: Johnston Negotiations. 1953-1955 water allocations to riparian of 
Jordan River system 
  Allocation (Mm3/yr) 
Plan/Source a Lebanon Syria Jordan Israel Total 
Main Plan Nil 45 774 394 1213 
Arab Plan 35 132 698 182 1047 
Cotton Plan 450.7 30 575 1290 2345.7 
Unified (Johnston) Plan 
Hasbani 35    35 
Banias  20  20  
Jordan (main 
stream)  22 100 375
b 497b 
Yarmouk  90 377 25 492 
Side wadis   243 243  
Total Unified Plan 35 132 720 400b 1287b 
Source: Naff and Matson (1984)  
(a) The Cotton Plan included the Litani as part of the Jordan River system. Different plans allocated different 
amounts in accordance with differing estimates of the resources of the system. One major variable in the 
reporting of the planned allocations is the amount of groundwater included in the estimates.  
(b) According to the compromise “Gardiner Formula”, the share to Israel from the main stream of the Jordan was 
defined as the "residue" after the other co-riparians had received their shares. This would vary from year to year, 
but was expected to average 375 Mm3. 
 
The Arabs objected, but finally agreed, to storage at both the Maqarin Dam 
and the Sea of Galilee, so long as neither side would have physical control over the 
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share available to the other. Israel objected, but finally agreed, to international 
supervision of withdrawals and construction. Allocations under the Unified Plan, later 
known as the Johnston Plan, included 400 Mm3/yr to Israel, 720 Mm3/yr to Jordan, 
132 Mm3/yr to Syria and 35 Mm3/yr to Lebanon. 
 
6.4 The Yarmouk River Negotiations 
The Yarmouk River originates on the south-eastern slopes of Mount Hermon 
in a complex of valleys developed in Quaternary volcanic rocks. The main trunk of 
the Yarmouk River part forms the present boundary between Syria and Jordan for 40 
km before it becomes the border between Jordan and Israel. Where it enters the 
Jordan River 10 km below Lake Tiberias, the Yarmouk contributes about 400 
Mm3/yr. 
There is no flow contribution from the part of the valley (wadi) where Israel is 
a riparian. From the 7,242 km² of the Yarmouk basin, 1,424 km² lie within Jordan and 
5,252 km² within Syria. The flow of the Yarmouk is derived from winter precipitation 
that averages 364 mm per year over the basin (Naff and Matson 1984). The stream 
flow is supplemented by spring discharges from highly permeable zones in the lavas; 
some further spring discharges may be channeled to the surface on valley floors via 
solution pathways in the underlying lime stones. 
The mean annual flow discharge is 400 Mm3/yr, which is 65% of the total 
discharge of 607 Mm3/yr from the Jordan’s East Bank. The flow is largely influenced 
by the rainfall pattern in the Mediterranean climate, indicating a maximum monthly 
discharge of 101 Mm3 in February and a minimum of 19 Mm3 in September. 
In 1952, Miles Bunger, an American attached to the Technical Cooperation 
Agency in Amman, first suggested the construction of a dam at Maqarin to help even 
the flow of the Yarmouk River and to tap its hydroelectric potential. The following 
year, Jordan and UNRWA signed an agreement to implement the Bunger plan the 
following year, including a dam at Maqarin with a storage capacity of 480 Mm3 and a 
diversion dam at Addassiyah, Syria and Jordan agreed that Syria would receive 2/3 
of the hydropower generated, in exchange for Jordan’s receiving 7/8 of the natural 
flow of the river. Dams along the Yarmouk were also included in the Johnston 
negotiations; the Main Plan included a small dam, 47 meters high with a storage 
capacity of only 47 Mm3, because initial planning called for the Sea of Galilee to be 
the central storage facility. As Arab resistance to Israeli control over Galilee storage 
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became clear in the course of the negotiations, a larger dam, 126 meters high with a 
storage capacity of 300 Mm3 was included. 
While the idea faded with the Johnston negotiations, the idea of a dam on the 
Yarmouk was raised again in 1957, in a Soviet-Syrian Aid Agreement, and at the 
First Arab Summit in Cairo in 1964, as part of the All-Arab Diversion Project (see 
appendix 4, annex 1 and annex 2). Construction of the diversion dam at Mukheiba 
was actually begun, but was abandoned when the borders shifted after the 1967 
war. One side of the projected dam in the Golan Heights shifted from Syrian to Israeli 
territory. 
The Maqarin Dam was resurrected as an idea in Jordan’s Seven Year Plan in 
1975, and Jordanian water officials approached their Israeli counterparts about the 
low dam at Mukheiba in 1977. While the Israelis proved amenable at a ministerial-
level meeting in Zurich, a more-even flow of the river would benefit all of the riparian; 
the Israeli government shifted that year to one less interested in the project. 
This stalemate might have continued except for strong US involvement in 
1980, when President Carter pledged a $9 million loan towards the Maqarin project, 
and Congress approved an additional $150 million, provided that all of the riparian 
agree. Philip Habib was sent to the region to help mediate an agreement. While 
Habib was able to gain consensus on the concept of the dam, on separating the 
question of the Yarmouk from that of West Bank allocations, and on the difficult 
question of summer flow allocations, 25 Mm3 would flow to Israel during the summer 
months, negotiations were suspended for winter flow allocations, and final ratification 
was never reached. 
Syria and Jordan reaffirmed mutual commitment to a dam at Maqarin in 1987, 
whereby Jordan would receive 75% of the water stored in the proposed dam, and 
Syria would receive all of the hydropower generated. The agreement called for 
funding from the World Bank, who insisted that all riparian agree to a project before it 
can be funded. Israel refused until its concerns about the winter flow of the river were 
addressed.  
Against this backdrop, Jordan in 1989 approached the US Department of 
State for help in resolving the dispute. Ambassador Richard Armitage was 
dispatched to the region in September 1989 to resume indirect mediation between 
Jordan and Israel where Philip Habib had left off a decade earlier. The points raised 
during the following year were as follows:  
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- Both sides agreed that 25 Mm3/yr would be made available to Israel during 
the summer months, but disagreed as to whether any additional water would 
be specifically earmarked for Israel during the winter months; 
- The overall viability of a dam was also open to question, the Israelis still 
thought that the Sea of Galilee ought to be used as a regional reservoir, and 
both sides questioned what effects ongoing development by Syria at the 
headwaters of the Yarmouk would have on the dam’s viability. Since the State 
Dept. had no mandate to approach Syria, their input was missing from the 
mediation; 
- Israel eventually wanted a formal agreement with Jordan, a step, which 
would have been politically difficult for the Jordanians at the time. 
By fall of 1990, the agreement seemed to be taking shape, by which Israel 
agreed to the concept of the dam, and discussions on a formal document and winter 
flow allocations could continue during construction, estimated for more than five 
years. Two issues held up agreement:  
- First, the lack of Syrian input left questions of the future of the river 
unresolved, a point noted by both sides during the mediations;  
- Second, the outbreak of the Gulf War in 1991 overwhelmed other regional 
issues, finally pre-empting talks on the Yarmouk.  
The issue has not been brought up again until recently in the context of the 
Arab-Israeli peace negotiations. 
  In the absence of an agreement, both Syria and Israel are currently able to 
exceed their allocations from the Johnston accords, the former because of a series 
of small storage dams and the latter because of its downstream riparian position. 
Syria began building a series of small impoundment dams upstream from both 
Jordan and Israel in the mid-1980’s, while Israel has been taking advantage of the 
lack of a storage facility to increase its withdrawals from the river.  
Syria currently has 27 dams in place on the upper Yarmouk, with a combined 
storage capacity of approximately 250 Mm3 (its Johnston allocations are 90 Mm3/yr 
from the Yarmouk), and Israel currently uses 70-100 Mm3/yr (its Johnston allocations 
are 25-40 Mm3/yr). This leaves Jordan approximately 150 Mm3/yr for the East Ghor 
Canal (as compared to its Johnston allocations of 377 Mm3/yr). 
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6.5 “Picnic Table” negotiations 1991 – 1994  
Israel and Jordan have had probably the warmest relations of any two states 
legally at war. Communication between the two continued since their independence, 
ameliorating conflict and facilitating conflict resolution on a variety of subjects, 
including water. The so called “Picnic Table Talks” on allocations of the Yarmouk 
have taken place since the 1950’s, and negotiations formulating principles for water-
sharing projects and allocations have occurred in conjunction with, and parallel to, 
both the bilateral and multilateral peace negotiations. 
In the 1980’s, a discreet agreement was reached between Jordan and Israel, 
to make arrangements on the Yarmouk River for sharing its water. These 
arrangements were made with the blessing of both sides’ leaders, but they did not 
constitute a formal agreement. Experts from the two sides, accompanied by officers 
of their respective armies and in the presence of officer of the United Nations Truce 
Supervision Organisation, met at the diversion point (Adassiya/Point121), for what is 
sometimes called the “Picnic table Meetings”, and were designed to respond to 
requests by either side to adjust the flow to either country, especially in the dry 
months. The meeting on the Yarmouk River served to create working relations and 
mutual respect between the water experts of the two sides, and to form some of the 
basis for the formal negotiations in the 1990’s. 
Following the Madrid Conference Accord in October 1991, negotiations on 
water took place in a series of rounds, in Washington D.C., and later in the region, 
most of the time was in closed sessions, except for informal discussions that took 
place during coffee/tea breaks at which Americans and/or Russians were present. 
As both party’s attitude was to deal with each other directly, the presence of the 
Americans and the Russians, as “hosts” or as “facilitators”, was to overcome rough 
spots in the process and to offer some advices, but always maintaining a balanced 
non-interfering position. 
An agreed common “Agenda” was signed on September 14, 1993 (appendix 
3, annex 1); this was the day following the signing of the Declaration of Principles 
(DOP) between Israel, represented by Yitzhak Rabin, and the Palestinian Authority 
represented by Yasser Arafat in the presence of the American President Clinton, at 
the White House. It is worth mentioning that the common “Agenda” was ready many 
months before this date, but awaited an agreement between Israel and the 
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Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) to open the road for the concrete 
negotiations between Jordan and Israel.     
In February and again in June 1994, there were extended and very intensive 
meetings of the delegations of both countries in Washington, mainly based on the 
common “Agenda” signed in September 1993. In July 1994 the meeting moved to 
the region, the first being held in a large tent in the Araba/Arava Valley and the 
following ones in various venues in both countries. 
The Water Agreement was finalized in the morning of October 17, 1994 at the 
Hashimiya Palace in Amman in the presence of King Hussein and other dignitaries 
from both countries, and the ceremonial signing of the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty 
took place in the Araba/Arava Valley, north of the cities of Aqaba and Eliat, on 
October 26 1994. 
 
6.6 Dealing with Water Rights 
The term “Water Rights” was raised (especially during the negotiations 
between Israel and the Palestinians, with the Jordanians the agreement was 
“pragmatic”) during the negotiations leading up to the treaty. The Israelis, arguing 
that the entire region was running out of water, insisted on discussing only water 
“allocations”; that is, the future needs of each riparian. The Jordanians, in contrast, 
refused to discuss the future until past grievances had been addressed. They would 
not negotiate “allocations” until the historic question of water “rights” had been 
resolved. There is little room for bargaining between the past and the future, 
between “rights” and “allocations”. Negotiations reached an impasse until one of the 
mediators suggested the term “rightful allocations” to describe simultaneously 
historic claims and future goals for cooperative projects. This new term is now 
imbibed in the water-related causes of the Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace. 
The most important relations, regarding the domain of water, were with the 
borders and with environmental issues. Two locations were discussed: 
- A small agriculture area east of the Jordan River at its confluence with the 
Yarmouk River, called the Baqura, was under Israeli control and cultivated by 
Israeli farmers, and was claimed by Jordan; 
- And in the southern Araba/Arava Valley, Jordan claimed sovereignty over a 
stretch where it stated that Israel had moved the boarder eastward (Israel had 
drilled fourteen wells in this area, and used their water to irrigate crops). 
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In the Baqura area Israel was interested in maintaining the use of the land by 
its farmers. In the Araba/Arava Valley Israel wished to continue to use the water from 
these wells, and to be allowed to extract further quantities from groundwater. The 
agreement returned these two areas to Jordanian sovereignty, but allowed Israel the 
cultivation of the Baqura area for a period of twenty-five years, with a possibility of 
requesting an extension, while in the south the border was moved westward and the 
agreement enabled Israel to continue using the wells that are now in Jordan and 
“may increase the abstraction rates from wells and systems in Jordan by up to 10 
Mm3/yr”. In the north, Israel agreed to give Jordan an annual quantity of 10 Mm3/yr 
from the desalination of saline springs. Until this was done, Israel would provide 
Jordan with this 10 Mm3/yr from the Jordan River.  
Jordan got back the lands it claimed while Israel maintained the right to use 
the land (in the north) or the water (in the south). 
The water agreement specifies that both sides shall prohibit the disposal of 
municipal and industrial wastewater into the courses of the Yarmouk River or the 
Jordan River before they are treated to standards allowing their unrestricted 
agriculture use (appendices 3, annex 2).  
 
6.7 Creative Outcomes 
As previously mentioned, there was little room for any unilateral development 
without impacting on other riparian states. The issue was an equitable allocation of 
the annual flow of the Jordan watershed between its riparian states; Israel, Jordan, 
Lebanon, and Syria. Egypt also was included, given its pre-eminence in the Arab 
world. Since water was (and still) deeply related to other contentious issues of land, 
refugees, and political sovereignty, the negotiations took on vital importance to 
relations between these new neighbours. 
The technical committees from both sides accepted the Unified Plan, and the 
Israeli Cabinet approved it without vote in July 1955. President Nasser of Egypt, at 
first, became an active advocate because Johnston’s proposals seemed to deal with 
the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian problem simultaneously. Among other 
proposals, Johnston recommended the diversion of Nile water to the western Sinai 
Desert to resettle two million Palestinian refugees. 
The plan called for water allocations to be determined in proportion to the 
amount of irrigable land each state had within the basin, and then allowed each 
160 
 
country to do what it wished with its water, including out-of-basin transfers. The 
development plan was created without regard to political borders, guaranteeing a 
degree of objectivity and engineering efficiency. The plan incorporated issues of 
hydrologic variability. For example, Israel was to receive the “residue” after Arab 
withdrawals, sometimes more, sometimes less from the average flow. 
Jordan/Yarmouk, shared aquifers (Israel, Jordan 10/26/1994): Treaty of peace 
between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan: Allocations of 
Yarmouk and Jordan Rivers based on Johnston accord; agreed in conjunction with 
joint development projects. Water from shared aquifers allocated on basis of prior 
use. “Rightful allocations” divide waters on the basis of historic rights plus future 
projects. Creative management: land and water historically used by Israel leased 
from Jordan; in the absence of storage facility, Yarmouk water “loaned” to Israel in 
summer, returned to Jordan from Jordan River during winter. 
The idea for a Red/Dead Sea Canal has been revived once again. At the 
Johannesburg Summit on Sustainable Development, Israeli and Jordanian ministers 
announced plans for a canal to save the Dead Sea. Called a “Peace Conduit”, the 
proposed pipeline is expected to pump some 1.8 billion cubic meters of water per 
year from the Red Sea near Eilat and Aqaba to the Dead Sea, a distance of 190 km. 
The potential advantages, according to the Ministry for Regional Cooperation, are to 
raise the water level of the Dead Sea while promoting regional cooperation, water 
supply to Jordan through desalination, and tourism development.  
It is widely agreed that the Dead Sea is one of Israel’s most important 
resources, a foremost industrial base and a top-priority tourist site, both nationally 
and internationally. 
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Part IV Possibility for Co-operation 
 
7 General Conflict Management; Different 
Perspectives 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The issue of water resources availability and the potential for further 
development of advanced systems to provide adequate supply is not merely an 
academic or technological question, it also has political implications. 
Regional politics can worsen the task of understanding and managing 
complex natural systems, and disparities between riparian states, such as level of 
economic development, infrastructural capacity, political orientation or cultural 
values, can complicate the development of joint management structures. 
For conflict resolving, one needs to know the factors influencing the conflict 
dynamic. These influencing factors may not always be the same as the root causes 
of the conflict. A conflict over access to resources, for example, may develop into a 
conflict along ethnic lines. Over time the ethnic factor may become more important 
than the original cause of the conflict. Ethnicity would be termed an influencing 
factor. Influencing factors can affect the outcome of a conflict without influencing the 
initiation of the conflict. (This will be further discussed in sub-section 8.5) 
General conflict management can be divided into military (e.g. peace 
enforcement, peace-keeping) and non-military conflict management, which in its turn 
can be divided into two broad areas: those dealing with legal and institutional 
frameworks and structural causes, and those involving co-operative negotiations and 
interactive conflict management. (Fisher, 2001) 
After a brief explanation on what is considered as conflict prevention and the 
best way/s of managing disagreements, the following highlights personal comments, 
opinions and discussions based on meetings and general discussions with key 
figures during visits to Lebanon between 2006 and 2008, especially after the armed 
conflict that took place on July 2006 between Israel and Lebanon. Sub-section 7.3 
focuses mainly on two points of view, which are considered the most significant 
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indicators toward finding common understanding or common ground between parties 
in conflict. 
 
7.2 Conflict prevention and better understanding of disagreements 
The conflict prevention and co-operation process starts with the potential for 
conflict or co-operation. This potential is determined by the hydrological, institutional, 
socio-political, and economic context. 
Co-operation usually takes the form of an agreement, this agreement can be 
implicit or explicit, written or unwritten, and legally binding or not. Examples include 
formal treaties, private law contracts, customary law, shared understandings, and 
even a shared culture and cultural practices. 
Most agreements need to be implemented and this process may change the 
context, and thereby create a new potential for conflict or co-operation, and start a 
new cycle. The process can also take a different course. Sometimes the potential for 
conflict and cooperation does not result in an agreement, but in an escalating 
conflict. Furthermore, sometimes an agreement is reached but not implemented. 
This can necessitate the negotiation of a new agreement, but it can also result in an 
escalating conflict. Finally, agreements can also be reached if there is an actual 
conflict and not just a potential, as many peace treaties have shown. Conflicts can 
de-escalate as well as escalate. 
To understand the conflict resolution and prevention and co-operation, one 
first needs to understand the major management issues, the players involved, and 
the freshwater resource. This requires a basic understanding of different kind of 
contexts in relation to different aspects that may be important in specific cases. 
- Hydrological context: Precipitation, evaporation, discharge, recharge, 
abstractions, water pollution, actual water quality, and the water quality 
needed for different uses and ecosystems, morphological aspects such as 
erosion and sedimentation, hydropower potential, and so on; 
- Socioeconomic context: Uses and users of the freshwater resource, in-
stream uses, economic circumstances of the different users, social position, 
degree of organization and power, regional and other disparities, need and 
potential for economic development, the different national cultures, and the 
like; 
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- Institutional context: National and international water managers and 
commissions, decision-making rules, existing operational rules, water use and 
provision rules; 
- Political context: National, sub-national, and international political dynamics, 
international relations and mutual trust or mistrust, power, and similar factors. 
These contexts are not stable. Conflicts and cooperation can lead to changes in the 
hydrology, to new infrastructure, more or less water abstraction and water pollution, 
more or less poverty, worse or better international relations, and so on. 
Consequently, the context should not be analysed only at the beginning of the 
process; its evolution should be monitored. Information on the context is often scarce 
and difficult to obtain and the reliability of the information is often low or unknown 
(ibid. 2001). Many abstractions and emissions are not registered, water quality is 
often not monitored or the results are kept confidential, groundwater data are often 
lacking, and so on. Besides, the data can often be interpreted in different ways. 
Accordingly, the objective facts of the case are often very controversial. Uncovering 
such controversies is part of understanding the context. Furthermore, the context 
can include issues that have nothing to do with freshwater management if these 
issues involve the same or partially the same parties. 
The analysis of the context should make it possible to identify the main issues 
and players and the potential for conflict and cooperation. It should be possible to 
characterize the main issues as collective problems, positive externalities, or 
negative externality problems. As mentioned previously, the cooperation potential is 
highest in the case of collective problems and conflict potential is highest in the case 
of negative externality problems. Yet one should also pay attention to subjective 
perceptions and to relational aspects, including the degree of trust or mistrust and 
the balance of power. 
Growing pressure due to increasing demand for water can be a source of 
conflict, as mentioned previously. When water is scarce, competition for limited 
supplies can lead nations to see water as a matter of national or regional security. 
History provides ample evidence of competition and disputes over shared fresh 
water resources. Existing international water law may be unable to handle the strains 
of ongoing and future problems. But some mechanisms for reducing the risks of such 
conflicts do in fact exist. 
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Some of the most vociferous enemies around the world have negotiated water 
agreements or are in the process of doing so, and the institutions they have created 
frequently prove to be resilient over time and during periods of otherwise strained 
relations. Secret talks have been held between Israel and Jordan since the 
unsuccessful Johnston negotiations of 1953/55, even as these riparian states were 
in a legal state of war. (For more details see section 6.3)  
 
7.3 Common Destiny and Living Together 
By a personal initiative of the Pope, on June 12, 1991, his Holiness John Paul 
II announced in the presence of the four Catholic Patriarchs of Lebanon (the 
Maronite, the Melkite or Greek Catholic, the Armenian Catholic and the Syrian 
Catholic) the call to convene a Synod of Bishops for Lebanon. 
The Synod's work led to the Apostolic Exhortation (incitement) and the 
drafting of 46 proposals and other documents for discussion, and it consists of six 
chapters. The Synod culminated in the Pope's visit to Lebanon on May 10 and 11, 
1997, where the Apostolic Exhortation was signed and presented to the Lebanese 
people and their ecclesiastical and civil authorities. 
The Apostolic Exhortation defines Lebanon: 
Lebanon is a vital element for Catholic existence in the Middle East because 
"the destiny of the Catholics is profoundly bound to Lebanon's destiny and its 
particular mission". 
Lebanon's human capacity is composed of several communities, which are "at 
the same time its fortune and its uniqueness".  
The cultural value of Lebanon lies in being "the cradle (birth place) of an 
ancient culture and one of the Mediterranean's beacons." Furthermore, "no one 
could ignore the name of Byblos, which reminds us of the origins of the alphabet".  
In his address to the Patriarchs and Bishops of the Catholic Church on May 1, 1984, 
the Pope affirmed that Lebanon has a "valuable cultural worth" and that Lebanon is 
"more than a country: Lebanon is a message and an example for the East as well as 
for the West." His Holiness considers that "Lebanon's historical message" is a 
"message of freedom," of democracy, and that it is "a land of dialogue and 
conviviality among diverse religions and cultures".  
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His Holiness, during the opening of the Synod, said: "Lebanon, this small 
country, is larger than its size in what it represents in terms of values. Lebanon is 
grand in its history, comprehensiveness, esteem and message". 
The Pope called in his Exhortation for a true dialogue which respects the 
sensibility of individuals and various communities. He further noted that the Muslim-
Christian dialogue aims in the first place at promoting living together between 
Christians and Muslims in a spirit of openness and collaboration, which is essential 
for each person in order to prosper and determine choices dictated by conscience. 
The Pope linked the essential conditions for a true dialogue to the acceptance of the 
concept of pluralism. With this, the Pontiff acknowledges that affirming pluralism is 
the door to all solutions and without which solutions remain unattainable. 
The Catholic Church sees the Islamic-Christian living together as divine will in 
the sense of being neighborly, cohabiting, interacting with people. Many Lebanese 
endure living together as a fact and as their inevitable destiny, they believe they 
cannot escape it, if they truly want to live on this land and bequeath it to their 
children and their descendants. They are aware, however, that their interest lies in 
more effectively and harmoniously assuming the responsibilities of living together. It 
is only in this way that the insistent request of the Pope to transform 'living together' 
or 'co-existence' into 'conviviality' can become a reality. 
The Exhortation is aware that real 'conviviality' requires the existence of 
suitable circumstances, conditions, systems, regulations, and institutions, without 
which it cannot exist. Once these requirements materialize, 'conviviality' can take 
shape. 
In the Exhortation, His Holiness lists the five most important conditions for 
'conviviality' to be realized: fidelity to cultural pluralism, rejection of secularization, 
true dialogue, common destiny and a just social and political system. 
7.3.1 National Decision Makers and Key Figures Points of View 
During the July 2006 conflict between Israel and Lebanon (Hezbollah), and 
when asked by a Wall Street Journal’s correspondent to the Middle East, General 
Michel Aoun responded:  
“No matter how much longer this fight goes on, the truth is that political 
negotiations will be the endgame. The solution that will present itself a week, a 
month or a year from now will be, in essence, the same solution as the one 
available today, and which, tragically, was available before a single shot was 
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fired or a single child was killed. Given this reality, a more concerted effort is 
required sooner rather than later to stop the death and destruction on both sides of 
the border. 
For some, analysis as to this conflict's sources and resolutions begins and 
ends with the right to self-defence; for others, Israel's claimed self-defensive actions 
are perceived as barbaric and offensive acts aimed at destroying a country and 
liquidating a people. Likewise, some view Hezbollah's capture of two Israeli soldiers 
as fair military game to pressure Israel to repatriate Lebanese prisoners; yet others 
perceive it as a terrorist act aimed at undermining Israel's sovereignty and security. 
These divergences and the world's failure to adopt different paradigms by 
which Middle East problems can be fairly analysed and solved have produced, and 
will continue to produce, a vicious cycle of continuing conflict. If the approach 
remains the same in the current conflict, I anticipate that the result will be the 
same. This, therefore, is a mandate to change the basis upon which problems are 
judged and measured from the present dead-end cycle to one which is based on 
universal, unarguable principles and which has at least a chance to produce a lasting 
positive result.” 
“My own personal belief is that all human life is equal and priceless -- I look 
upon Israeli life as the same as Lebanese life. This belief stems not from my Catholic 
religion, but rather, from basic human values which have their historic home in 
Lebanon. It is no coincidence that a leading figure in the drafting and adoption of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights was Charles Malek, a Lebanese citizen. 
I ask, will other Arab countries and leaders have the courage to acknowledge 
that Israeli life is equal to Arab life? Will Israel have the courage as well to 
acknowledge that Lebanese life is equal to Israeli life, and that all life is priceless? I 
believe that most Israeli and Arab citizens would answer in the affirmative. Can we 
get their governments and their leaders to do the same? 
Acknowledgement of equality between the value of the Lebanese and 
the Israeli people can be a starting point and a catalyst. The universal, 
unarguable concept of the equality of peoples and of human life should be the basis 
upon which we measure and judge events, and should provide the common human 
prism through which the current conflict and old seemingly protracted conflicts, are 
viewed and resolved. This is the only way to peace, prosperity and security, which is, 
after all, what all human beings desire, regardless of their origin. 
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The ideological, political and religious differences between the party that I 
lead, the Free Patriotic Movement, and Hezbollah, could have been addressed either 
through confrontation, or through internal dialogue. Recognizing the value of human 
life, the obvious choice was the second option. We sat down with Hezbollah to 
discuss our differences. 
After many months of extensive negotiations, we came up with an 
understanding that included 10 key items (see appendix 5, annex 2), which laid 
down a roadmap to resolve 10 of the most contentious points of disagreement. For 
example, Hezbollah agreed for the first time that Lebanese who collaborated with 
Israel during Israel's occupation of south Lebanon should return peacefully to 
Lebanon without fear of retribution. We also agreed to work together to achieve a 
civil society to replace the present confessional system which distributes power on 
the basis of religious affiliation. Additionally, Hezbollah, which is accused of being 
staunchly pro-Syrian, agreed for the first time that the border between Lebanon and 
Syria should be finally delineated, and that diplomatic relations between the two 
countries should be established.” 
Furthermore, he added: “This is the essence of the comprehensive solution 
we seek. Because it embodies a shift from a policy based on military force to one 
founded upon human values and reconciling the rights of parties, it would stand the 
test of time. If rights are respected, and if parties are treated with the deference that 
they implicitly deserve as human beings, and then the long-term result will be not 
only physical disarmament but also a disarmament of minds on both sides.” 
In an interview with the New York Times on January 21, 2007, Mr Hassan M. 
Fattah wrote: Last year, General Aoun approached Hezbollah’s leader, Sheik 
Hassan Nasrallah, and said he still intended to strip Hezbollah of its weapons, but 
only after the group’s main complaints with Israel and with the government were 
answered. 
“It’s not like I love Hezbollah,” General Aoun said in an interview. “I am not 
trying to defend Hezbollah as much as I am trying to find a solution with them, 
because a clash with them would ruin us.” 
That honesty, Hezbollah officials say, engendered trust in General Aoun. “It 
created a sense of trust between Shiites and Christians,” said Ghaleb Abu Zeinab, a 
member of Hezbollah’s politburo. “We don’t want to establish an Islamic republic, we 
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want diplomatic and normal relations with Syria, and we want a consensual 
democracy and so does the Free Patriotic Movement.” 
Some analysts credit the alliance with helping stabilize conditions in Lebanon 
after the war, as well as helping to change Hezbollah’s focus from regional issues to 
local ones. 
“It helped show Hezbollah’s real position and its understanding of Lebanon,” 
Mr. Abu Zeinab said. “It helped the party appear as a more Lebanese party than it 
used to before.” 
General Michel Aoun continues:  
“Great nations are those that can couple their political discourse with real 
application. With this in mind, we affirm that change and reform will only find its way 
to implementation according to the following principles and beliefs:  
- We believe in democracy as a system of governance and a way-of-life, and 
we consider it to be the sole system that preserves the dignity of man, empowers the 
individual and frees his abilities, and allows him to be the master of his destiny.  
- We declare that we adhere to human rights as stipulated in international 
charters, and to public freedoms which constitute the foundation of democracy, and 
ascertain that men and women are equal in terms of rights and duties, and that the 
woman is a partner in building society and in decision-making.  
- We wish to achieve a more comprehensively humane and fair society; a 
society in which the concept of citizenship is given its true dimension; a society that 
stands in solidarity with its weak and marginalized groups; a society that does not 
sacrifice its youth for its elderly.  
- We pledge to preserve national unity, based on true partnership and 
balance, as a guarantee to the survival of Lebanon as a nation and a mission.  
- We emphasize modern Arabism that is open to and interacting with all 
cultures and to which Lebanon have contributed greatly.  
- We consider that Lebanon, a land of dialogue and interaction, has a 
prominent role in spreading the culture of peace in its environs and in the world. 
Other Key figures points of view 
In a meeting during one of my visits to Lebanon on September 2008, Dr 
Issam Khalife, one of the well known figures who has many publications in regards to 
water, mentioned that no peace between Israel and Lebanon unless there is peace 
between Israel and its neighbours. This peace should be based on the recognition of 
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the right to exist of all the concerned parties. This cannot be done by dominating 
their natural resources, especially freshwater resources. 
In another meeting with Dr Fadi G. Comair, at the Research and Development 
centre at Notre Dame University (NDU), on October 2008, another well known 
figures and activist with many publications concerning the water sector in Lebanon, 
he said that any peace process between Lebanon and Israel should start by the 
implementation of all the UN resolutions regarding the conflict in the Middle East, 
especially the UN Resolutions 1701 in regard to the recent conflict between Lebanon 
and Israel in 2006. Workshops are a must and all the groups and parties should 
participate in order to reach a common understanding to all the conflictive issues. 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
The Middle East is a region hassled not only by lack of water but also by 
political tensions. While action and co-operation among the states is necessary in 
fields other than water and the environment, water stands to become a vehicle which 
can enhance peaceful relations between the parties and may even relieve tensions 
in other political dimensions. Since water is vital for the survival of the entire regional 
population, parties may find it necessary to co-operate and costly to defect. 
The socio-economic and political way of dealing with scarcity is, in many 
cases, the explanatory factor between scarcity and conflict/co-operation. An 
examination of the socio-economic/political conditions alone would fall short of 
assessing and understanding the situation. The culture/religious issues as well as 
the physical reality should be taken into consideration in choosing the area to be 
studied: for example a natural river basin, such as the Jordan River Basin, and not 
the political borders of one country. 
Unstable international relations complicate the development of co-operation 
and can cause conflict. In some cases it is necessary to improve the relations before 
the water management issues can be solved, but water management issues can 
also trigger the development of good relations. 
The purpose of showing these points of views is to say that there are ways in 
finding common grounds in order to achieve peace 
If the hearts are transformed, so will the structures be. 
If we begin to train our consciences in the direction of peace, reconciliation 
and concord, we can move ahead to the new future. 
170 
 
If we believe in our obligation to forgive and cleanse our memory, we then 
begin with a new spirit. 
If extremism retreats and rights are granted and guaranteed to each person, 
then anxiety and suspicion will disappear, a new path of tranquility will be opened. 
If we are prepared with humble hearts to accept the guidance of the Spirit, we 
can walk in the path that the Lord has laid out for us. (Najem, A. 2007) 
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8 Managing Water Resources towards Co-
operation 
 
8.1 Introduction 
In part two, this thesis looked at water availability in Lebanon and Israel 
(chapters three and four). It then explored the gaps that exist when international law 
is used to resolve regional water disputes in chapter five, as well as discussing the 
use of available resources as efficient as possible. In the case studies, the thesis 
continues by examining the incompetency in the existing international water law 
especially when handling some mechanisms for reducing the risks of conflicts.  
After highlighting the Hydro-political position and the status of the Jordan 
River Basin, in chapter 6, this thesis examined a couple of case studies, in which it 
was demonstrated that despite an existing conflict between two parties, there is a 
high possibility for reaching an understanding. Also this thesis, in chapter 7, 
introduced a few points of view from well known figures and organizations that have 
or can contribute in one way or the other toward long term settlement, which can 
open the door latter to a final resolution to the conflict.  
This chapter highlights the key themes in freshwater availability and discusses 
the related issues concerning the conflict prevention and management of 
disagreements. In a later section (8.5) the focus is on the lessons learned from the 
case studies in chapter six, and the possibilities that could encourage cooperation, 
especially through an attempt to emphasize multilateral talks and common 
denominators. This final section of this chapter is presented as a stepping stone to 
another level of in-depth discussions between the relevant countries. It tries to set up 
a model or a Road Map, which can be used as another step-forward towards using 
water resource negotiations as a means for promoting peace and encouraging 
solution to the conflict.      
 
8.2 Freshwater Availability 
In summarising chapter four we can see why it is that Lebanon is considered 
“un Château d’Eau” compared to its neighbours. Lebanon has a wealth of water 
172 
 
resources in its numerous rivers, and underground aquifers, and gets plentiful rainfall 
in the winter. The country is made up of two principal hydrological regions:  
- The Mediterranean (or coastal) watershed, with an area of 5,500 km2, which 
gives rise to 12 perennial rivers from the western slopes of the mountain 
ranges, flowing from east to west and emptying into the sea; and  
- The interior watershed, with an area of 4,700 km2, which is the source of the 
Litani, Assi (Orontes), and Hasbani rivers. (Appendix 2, Annex 1, Map 2)  
The country may be divided further into some 40 drainage basins of 
permanent or intermittent streams, whose flows depend on the topography of the 
watershed and the size of the mountain reservoirs that their sources feed. 
About 90% of all precipitation is received between November and April. 
January is the wettest month, and snow is frequently present in areas higher than 
1,500 m above sea level. Precipitation varies spatially, as well as temporally. 
Precipitation in the highlands averages 1,500 mm/year, and the mountain peaks 
along the western ranges receive about 2,000 mm. Annual average precipitation in 
the northern Bekaa region, near Hirmil, is 250 mm; in Ba’albeck, 550 mm; and in 
Karoun and Marjoun, 700 mm. Yearly precipitation along the coast is 830 mm in the 
north, 800 mm around Beirut, and 700 mm in and around Sur (Tyre) in the south. 
Lebanon is in a relatively good hydrological position. It is estimated that the 
total yearly precipitation results in an average yearly flow of 8,600 million cubic meter 
(Mm3), giving rise to 40 major streams and rivers (including 17 perennial rivers) and 
more than 2,000 springs. Multiple studies confirm that the fundamental problem is 
that more than half of the rainwater flows unexploited into the sea, accompanied by 
poor water management (for more details see section 4.2).  
On the other hand, Israel is an arid country, with the desert occupying more 
than 50% of its land area. Similar conditions exist in other countries in the region. 
Israel has a surface area of about 20,770 km2 and a population of about 6.3 million. 
Annual rainfall ranges from nearly 1,000 mm in the north to 30 mm in the south, and 
nearly all of it falls within the four-month period from November through February, 
with quantities fluctuating from year to year.  
Annual water availability in Israel is estimated at approximately 2,000 Mm3 per 
year, of which about 1,600 Mm3 is potable water and the rest is brackish and other 
marginal water sources. Both water resource development and consumption have 
grown rapidly since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. The depletion of 
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the country’s main water sources is worsened by the deteriorating quality of water 
resources due to demographic, industrial and agricultural pressures and to 
overexploitation of the country’s water reservoirs beyond the natural replenishment 
rate. 
Israel’s water demand and consumption are increasing, exceeding the 
capacity of the natural sources, which are being depleted. Water quality in the 
sources is deteriorating, due to over-exploitation and intensive human activity. In 
1997, the quantity stored in reservoirs was 1,000 Mm3 compared to the average 
supply of 1,800 Mm3 within the “green line” boundaries (1967 borders) and 2,100 
Mm3 between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean (for more details see sub-
section 3.2).  
It is important to take into account that the aquifers in the Palestinian 
territories, and particularly the mountain aquifer, are the fourth major source of 
water-related disputes in the Middle East. The Palestinians claim the right to use this 
water by virtue of their sovereignty over the territories. Israelis claim that by pumping 
water that would naturally emerge in Israel and that has historically been extracted 
there (even before the creation of the state of Israel in 1948); they are simply taking 
what is theirs. The issue in this matter has two faces. One is the slow destruction of 
the coastal aquifer owing to salt water intrusion caused by over-pumping. Second, 
the areas in the mountain aquifer from which water can most efficiently be pumped 
are near to the Green Line separating the Israelis from the Palestinians. 
Today, all feasible resources are exploited, including springs, groundwater 
reservoirs, aquifers and the Jordan River system. At the same time, as a result of 
accelerated population, industrial and agricultural growth, the coastal aquifer has 
been increasingly threatened by contamination from chemical and microbial 
pollutants, salinity, nitrates, heavy metals, fuels and toxic organic compounds. 
 
8.3 International Laws and Regulatory Mechanisms    
In chapter five we discussed the various international efforts to protect and 
sustain fresh water which have focused primarily on management practices and 
policies, rather than prevention of violence and conflict that impact water supply. 
Little attention has been given to the international legal regimes that are designed to 
protect fresh water, or the effectiveness of those regimes. 
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There are no internationally accepted criteria for allocating shared water 
resources, or their benefits. Indeed, it is difficult to see how to develop guidelines for 
allocating a vital resource which is mobile, which fluctuates in time and in space, and 
which ignores political boundaries. 
International law has not been clear on the shared watercourses, rivers or 
cross border aquifers. The methods, by which an individual, a group, a legal entity or 
a nation can store, transfer and regulate the flow of water, are hard to comprehend. 
Governments, organizations and individuals negotiate agreements using a 
mixture of customary use, local and tradition laws, and the established right of use 
over a period of time. Such mixture is often contradictory and in itself a cause of 
conflict.   
International conflicts are difficult to resolve because no third party has the 
authority to enforce an agreement among national states, let alone impose one. 
Such international agreements as exist have to be self-enforcing. Efficient outcomes 
may emerge, but are not guaranteed. International law may emphasize the doctrine 
of equitable utilization of water resources, but there is no clear definition of what this 
implies. 
In recent years, as concern over the equitable utilization and sustainable 
development of scarce water stocks has deepened, efforts to improve the 
management of shared water resources have expanded. The Declaration of the 
Earth Summit in Rio in 1992, and the accompanying Agenda 21 Action Plan, for 
example, called upon the international community to recognize the multi-sector 
nature of water resources and to manage the resource within and across national 
boundaries (for more details see sub-section 5.2).  
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational 
Uses of International Watercourses, adopted in 1997 by the UN General Assembly 
following twenty-seven years of discussion and negotiations, is one post-Rio 
accomplishment that specifically focuses on trans-boundary water resources. It 
codifies many of the principles deemed essential by the international community for 
the management of shared water resources, such as equitable and reasonable 
utilization of waters with specific attention to vital human needs, protection of the 
aquatic environment and the promotion of cooperative management mechanisms.  
The document also incorporates provisions concerning data and information 
exchange and mechanisms for conflict resolution. If ratified, the UN Convention 
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would provide a legally binding framework, at least upon its signatories, for 
managing international watercourses. Even without ratification, its guidelines are 
being increasingly invoked in international forums. The UN’s approval of the 
Convention, however, does not entirely resolve many legal questions concerning the 
management of internationally shared water:  
- The Convention would technically only be binding on those nations that sign 
and ratify it. Five years after its adoption by the UN General Assembly, the 
Convention has been signed only by sixteen countries and ratified by nine, 
well below the requisite thirty-five instruments of ratification needed to bring 
the Convention into force, and it therefore has no legal status; 
- International law only guides conduct between sovereign nations, and 
cannot address the grievances of political or ethnic units within nations;  
- While the Convention offers general guidance to co-riparian states, the 
vague and occasionally contradictory language can result in varied, and 
indeed conflicting, interpretations of the principles contained therein. 
A fourth legal issue left unresolved by the Convention is that there is no official 
enforcement mechanism to back up the Convention’s guidance. 
Given the current state of developments, it seems there is not enough in the 
body of international law that can be used effectively to resolve regional water 
disputes. Countries mismanage their water resources, largely on agriculture, with 
disregard for their actions’ implications for the quantity and quality of water that will 
be available tomorrow and almost no consideration for the impacts on their 
neighbours. On the other hand, when water availability becomes worse, countries 
are ready to do battle over their sovereign rights, heritage, and national security.  
It remains clear, however, that well developed domestic water management 
can prevent, or at least significantly delay such crises; regional water management 
may postpone such crises indefinitely; and if all else fail, countries with access to the 
sea can evaluate the costs of desalination to obtain an upper limit on the cost of 
additional water supplies. 
 
8.4 Lessons learned from the case studies in Section 6 and the possibilities 
towards co-operation 
When formal regulatory mechanisms are absent or ineffective, communities 
will seek other means of translating their preferences into reality. This will be 
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considered as an informal regulation, which need not be limited to cases where 
formal regulation is absent. Saying that, informal regulation will be likely wherever 
formal regulation leaves a gap between actual and locally-preferred cooperation. 
The use of the Jordan River creates a complex relationships, claims, and 
dependencies. Its four tributaries, and thus its origins, are in several nations. The 
Yarmouk River originates in Syria, the Banias in Israeli-occupied Syria, the Hasbani 
in Lebanon, and the Dan in Israel. The Jordan River itself can be claimed, at least in 
part, by Israel, Syria, Jordan, and the Palestinians. The intersection of so many 
interests and tensions amid outright political hostility among the actors creates a 
potential flashpoint for conflict.  
Accordingly, attempts and future strategies to deal with tensions between 
parties should take into consideration the following: “lessons learned” section from 
the previous chapter, after examining the lessons learned overall, the following sub-
sections explore the possibilities of cooperation over water based first on Religion, 
Culture and values, second on the rights to needs’ phenomena, and third on 
economical issues. 
8.4.1 Lessons learned  
a) In highly conflicting settings, separating resource issues from political 
interests may not be a productive strategy: 
Eric Johnston took the approach that the processes of reaching a rational 
watershed management plan: 
 - May, itself, act as a confidence-building catalyst for increased cooperation 
in the political realm; 
- May help alleviate the burning political issues of refugees and land rights. By 
approaching peace through water, however, several overriding interests 
remained unmet in the process. The plan finally remained unratified mainly for 
political reasons. 
Issues of national sovereignty which were unmet during the process included:  
The Arab states saw a final agreement with Israel as recognition of Israel, a step 
they were not willing to take at the time. Some Arabs may have felt that the plan was 
devised by Israel for its own benefit and was put over by the US. 
  The plan allowed the countries to use their allotted water for whatever 
purpose they saw fit. The Arabs worried that if Israel used their water to irrigate the 
Negev (outside the Jordan Valley), that the increased amount of agriculture would 
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allow more food production, which would allow for increased immigration, which 
might encourage greater territorial desires on the part of Israel. 
b) Issues of national sovereignty can manifest itself through the need for each 
state to control its own water source and/or storage facilities: 
The Johnston Plan suggested that some winter flood waters be stored in the 
Sea of Galilee, which is entirely in Israeli territory. The Arab side was reluctant to 
relinquish too much control of the main storage facility. Likewise, Israel had the same 
kinds of control reservations.  
c) Ignoring a riparian party, even one without political standing, can hamper 
agreement: 
There was some concern over whether the Plan was designed to “liquidate 
the Palestinian refugee problem rather than to give the refugees their right of return”. 
In fact, Palestinians were not addressed as a separate political entity. 
Along with political entities, many interests affected by river management 
were not included in the process. These included Non-Government Organizations 
(NGOs), public interest groups, and environmental groups. Perhaps as a 
consequence, the entire river was allocated, leaving no water at all for in-stream 
uses. 
d) Including key non-riparian parties can be useful to reaching agreement; 
excluding them can be harmful: 
Egypt was included in the negotiations because of its pre-eminence in the 
Arab world and despite its non-riparian status. Some attribute the accomplishments 
made during the course in part to President Nasser’s support. 
In contrast, pressure after the negotiations from other Arab states not directly 
involved in the water conflict may have had an impact on its eventual demise. Iraq 
and Saudi Arabia strongly urged Lebanon, Syria and Jordan not to accept the Plan. 
Perhaps partially as a result, Lebanon said they would not enter any agreement that 
split the waters of the Hasbani River or any other river. 
  e) All of the water resources in the basin ought to be included in the planning 
process. Ignoring the relationship between quality and quantity, and between surface 
and groundwater, ignores hydrologic reality. Groundwater was not explicitly dealt 
with in the Plan, and is currently the most pressing issue between Israel and the 
Palestinians. Likewise, tensions have flared over the years between Israel and 
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Jordan over Israel’s diverting saline springs into the lower Jordan, increasing the 
salinity of water on which Jordanian farmers rely. 
f) Even in the absence of an explicit arrangement, some degree of implicit 
cooperation may be possible, perhaps leading to fairly high stability. While the lack of 
ratified agreement left a legacy of unilateral and generally sub-optimum water 
development in the basin, the implicit arrangement, which resulted, particularly 
between Israel and Jordan, decreased tensions and added certain stability between 
these most riparians. The “Picnic Table” talks have allowed a venue for some level of 
technical understanding, and an outlet for minor disputes, for more than forty years. 
Overall, allocations were based on irrigable land within the basin; then each 
could do what it wishes with water. Each tributary had one state without designated 
flow, to accommodate fluctuating supply. Accord was never ratified for political 
reasons. 
Despite the forward momentum, the Arab League Council decided not to 
accept the plan in 1955 (Appendices 3, Annex 3) because of the political implications 
of accepting, the momentum died out. Although the agreement was never ratified, 
both sides have generally adhered to the technical details and allocations even while 
proceeding with unilateral development. The agreement was encouraged by the 
United States, which promised funding for future water development projects only as 
long as the Johnston Plans allocations were adhered to. 
8.4.2 Conflict or Cooperation 
The likelihood of conflict will be at its minimum and the difficulties surrounding 
a water management issue more manageable while there are viable options. This is 
especially true for water projects in regions where pumping today from underground 
aquifers, both replenish and especially non-replenish ones will have a major impact 
on tomorrow’s water availability. These options can be explored in three areas. 
1) Religions, Culture and Values 
For any negotiation, towards cooperative agreement or discussions between 
relevant parties, the following points of view suggest there are many common values 
that exist: 
- When asked: When a dark moonless night ends? A Rabbi answered: 
“When looking at the coming person’s face we see either one of our brothers 
or one of our sisters.” 
- Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) once said: 
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“One should live in the world not like a permanent resident but like a traveller, 
and should never forget that he will die!” 
- When asked: Who he had learned his virtues from? Jesus responded:  
“I did not learn them from anyone. I looked at others, observed the things I did 
not like and I avoided doing the same, copying and imitating the things I 
liked.” 
Most scientists and even development professionals avoid examining religion 
or values in the context of their work to avoid discord and to keep discussions 
“objective.” However, where science, development, and values intersect, the issue 
cannot be avoided. 
Many value systems have their origins in religion. Recognizing the role of 
religion can therefore enrich our understanding of how individual and collective 
choices are made, independently of our own belief in, or attitude towards religion in 
general, or towards a particular religion. Examining values is not easy; it can be 
particularly sensitive especially in the Middle East, where the prevailing religion is 
Islam, but which also has many adherents of other faiths, such as Christianity and 
Judaism.  
The values need not always be infinite in importance. Sometimes the 
compensation variation will be infinite because the parties do not like the idea of 
paying cash for certain values, or do not like the idea of trading those values through 
a more complicated form of barter. In some cases the value itself is incompatible 
with the idea of trade, i.e. a bought respect is no respect at all, and the gains from 
trade model will fail in cases of this kind. 
Conflicts between groups are often not solved but suppressed and may result 
in an armed struggle, at least when the cultures concerned are also uncertainty 
averse. Uncertainty averse means that members of these cultures feel threatened by 
uncertain or unfamiliar situations (as in the case of Israel and the Arab countries). 
Several strategies must be taken into consideration to overcome conflicting 
interests, the most common and effective one is to develop and maintain good 
relations and to compromise on the basis of reciprocity on points that are important 
between countries. In the long run such a strategy should benefits all parties 
concerned.  
Most concepts of culture generally can be misused. Culture may be used to 
label people or be used as an excuse for failing negotiations. If the concept is not 
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specified, it can be misused to explain everything that cannot be explained 
otherwise.  
The cultural values of humans affect the way the natural environment and 
resources are comprehended, used, and managed. Water management principles 
that listen to the local cultural-religious context and understanding are likely to be 
more effective than abroad ones. 
Complications can occur when the parties come from different cultures. 
Culture influences the perceptions of the parties and the values to which they are 
bound to, so different cultures can mean different values. Misunderstandings can 
occur easily when the same actions and words may have different meanings. 
Problems may also occur if one party sees the other party, whether correctly or not, 
as culturally arrogant and dominant.  
Relations can improve if one of the parties shows an interest in the culture of 
the other and common cultural elements are discovered. Whenever there are large 
cultural differences, it may be useful to have experienced diplomats undertake the 
negotiations rather than high government officials with little international experience. 
One could also use a mediator as a kind of “cultural interpreter”. 
As an example: In 1997 discussions among the riparians of the Euphrates 
basin, the Syrians objected strongly the proposals for water pricing. This led to a 
temporary impasse until it was explained by an outside observer that some Islamic 
legal interpretation forbids charging money for water itself. The term was modified to 
“tariff”, to represent costs only for storage, treatment, and delivery, and discussions 
were able to proceed (sub-section 5.2). 
Parties to war and conflict are unlikely to have a realistic assessment of one’s 
prospects and abilities. For instance, people tend to have especially stubborn and 
irrational opinions in the areas of religion and politics. Large number of them thinks 
they are the world’s best judges of truth in this area, but few have comparable 
opinions about their relative expertise in building bridges.  
The general tendency is to think that what benefits one’s interest also benefits 
the world at large. However two parties may find it hard to agree, if they do not share 
the same positive vision of how the world works. On top of those problems, the 
minority that does not want peace at all takes actions to exacerbate adverse 
behavioural and psychological reactions (i.e. terrorism as an attempt to manipulate 
such behavioural weaknesses). 
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There are other reasons why users of a communally managed or owned 
resource will fail to come to an agreement on managing the resource even though it 
is in the interest of all users to cooperate and reduce their rates of use of the 
resource. One reason is that if this improved situation is attained, every user will 
earn even higher returns by free-riding. Thus cooperative agreements, even if they 
are reached, will not persist. The only way out of the common property dilemma is 
intervention by a third party. Because national sovereignty must be respected, the 
only way out of this dilemma is agreement. Yet, there are strong incentives for 
governments not to cooperate, or to defect from an agreement. 
2) Rights to Needs  
Many of the negotiations begin with parties basing their initial positions in 
terms of rights, the sense that a riparian is entitled to a certain allocation based on 
hydrography or chronology of use. Up-stream riparians often invoke some variation 
of the Harmon Doctrine, claiming that water rights originate where the water falls, as 
did France in the Lac Lanoux case and the Palestinians over the West Bank aquifer. 
Down-stream riparians often claim absolute river integrity, claiming rights to an 
undisturbed system or historic rights based on their history of use. (Chapter 5, sub-
section 5.2.3) 
The paradigms used for negotiations have not always been rights-based, 
however, neither on relative hydrography nor chronology of use, but rather needs-
based. Needs are defined by irrigable land, population, or the requirements of a 
specific project. This then leads to distinguishing between rights in terms of a sense 
of entitlement, and legal rights. Once negotiations lead to allocations, regardless of 
how they are determined, each riparian has legal rights to that water; even if the 
allocations were determined by needs. 
Along the Jordan River, the only water agreement for that basin ever 
negotiated, the Johnston Accord (sub-section 6.3) emphasized the needs rather than 
the inherent rights of each of the riparians. Johnston’s approach, based on a report 
prepared under the direction of the Tennessee Valley Authority, was to estimate, 
without regard to political boundaries, the water needs for all irrigable land within the 
Jordan Valley basin which could be irrigated by gravity flow. National allocations 
were then based on these in-basin agricultural needs, with the understanding that 
each country could then use the water as it wished including diverting it out-of-basin.  
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This was not only an acceptable formula to the parties at the time, but it 
allowed for a break-through in negotiations when a land survey of Jordan concluded 
that its future water needs were lower than previously thought. Years later, Israel and 
the Palestinians came back to the needs in the Interim Agreement of 1995, where 
Israel first recognized Palestinian water rights in the West Bank. 
The law of international water resources offers two extreme rules that are 
related to property rights. The doctrine of unlimited territorial sovereignty or the 
doctrine of absolute sovereignty stipulates that a country has exclusive rights to the 
use of water within its territory. This means that a country may pollute its river as 
much as it wants. This principle, referred to as the Harmon Doctrine for the US 
attorney-general who suggested this stance in 1895 regarding a dispute with Mexico 
over the Rio Grande, argues that a state has absolute rights to water flowing through 
its territory. (Section 5.2) 
This doctrine was immediately rejected by Harmon’s successor and later 
officially repudiated by the US: it was never implemented in any water treaty; it was 
not used as a source for judgment in any international water legal ruling; and  it was 
rejected by the international tribunal over the Lac Lanoux case in 1957 (Appendix 1, 
Annex 4). 
In contrast, the doctrine of unlimited territorial integrity or the doctrine of 
limited territorial sovereignty states that the quantity and quality of water available to 
a country cannot be altered by another country. This rule implies that the upstream 
country cannot pollute the shared river. This principle has reached acceptance in the 
international setting as rarely as absolute sovereignty. (Chapter 5, section 5.2) 
In an arid watershed, the down-stream riparian often has older water 
infrastructure, which is in its interest to defend. The principle that rights are acquired 
through older use is referred to as historic rights (or prior appropriations in the US), 
that is, first in time, first in right.  
The doctrine of unlimited territorial integrity reflects rights to reasonably use 
the waters of an international waterway, yet with the acknowledgment that one 
should not cause harm to any other riparian state. This is a concern, which is raised 
regularly in negotiations, recently between Egypt and Ethiopia, and for a series of 
proposed canals from Turkey or Lebanon into the Jordan basin. It is primarily this 
concern, which causes Israel to emphasize desalination over possibly less-
expensive water import schemes. 
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  Needs-based allocations have been advocated in recent disputes, especially 
in and around the Jordan River watershed where riparian disputes exist not only 
along the river itself, but also over several shared groundwater aquifers. Gleick 
(1993) defines basic human needs, regardless of climate, as 50 litres per capita per 
day for personal use alone (18.25 m3/yr.) and, in earlier work Gleick suggests 75 
M3/yr, as appropriate minimum levels per capita for the Middle East.  
Shuval (1992) also argues for a minimum baseline allocation between Israel, 
West Bank Palestinians, and Jordan, based on a per capita allotment of 100 M3/yr 
for domestic and industrial use plus 25 M3/yr for agriculture. He adds 65% of urban 
uses for recycled wastewater, and advocates a series of water import schemes and 
desalination plants to provide the difference between regional supply and future 
demand.  
Wolf (1995) likewise advocates a needs-based approach, but considers new 
sources such as recycled wastewater as separate issues. He plans for total urban 
needs of 100 M3/yr per person, and extrapolates to the point in the future where all of 
the basin’s 2,500 Mm3/yr. has to be allocated first to these needs, in other words 
when the regional population reaches 25 million, expected in the early part of this 
century. 
Negotiations move from rights-based to needs-based criteria for allocation 
because:  
a) In part, this reflects the typical psychology of negotiations. Rothman (1995), 
among others, points out those negotiations ideally move along three stages:  
- The adversarial stage, where each side defines its positions, or rights;  
- The reflexive stage, where the needs of each side bringing them to their 
positions is addressed; 
 - And finally, the integrative stage, where negotiators brainstorm together to 
address each side’s underlying interests.   
The negotiations here seem to follow this pattern from rights to needs and, 
occasionally, to interests. Where each negotiator may initially see himself, or herself 
as Egyptian or Israeli or Indian, where the rights of one’s own country are 
paramount, over time one must empathize to some degree to notice that even one’s 
enemy, be he or she Sudanese, Palestinian, or Pakistani, requires the same amount 
of water for the same use with the same methods as oneself. 
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b) Rights are not quantifiable and needs are. We have seen in Section 2 the 
vague guidance that the 1997 Convention provide for allocations, a series of 
occasionally conflicting parameters, which are to be considered as a whole. If two 
nations insist on their respective rights of upstream versus down, for example, there 
is no spectrum along which to bargain, no common frame of reference. One can 
much more readily determine a needs-based criterion (irrigable land or population, 
for example) and quantify each nation’s needs. Even with differing interpretations, 
once both sides feel comfortable that their minimum quantitative needs are being 
met, talks eventually turn to straightforward bargaining over numbers along a 
common spectrum. 
3) Economic measures encouraging cooperation 
Before water problems become serious, they are more likely to be seen as 
economic rather than political; thus, the earlier potential water disputes are 
addressed, the more likely it is that they will be resolved efficiently and peacefully. 
The use of optimizing models and the exchange of water permits can greatly assist 
in such resolution. 
Disputes over water among different users are most commonly considered to 
be zero-sum games (one party’s gain is another’s loss). Such a view of water 
allocation can lead only to conflict. But by considering water as an economic good, 
countries and regions can manage water optimally and differences can be resolved 
before they lead to conflict.  
As is true of any economic good, water is scarce; but, unfortunately, 
competitive markets cannot be relied upon to allocate water efficiently. Water 
markets are usually not competitive, because there are few sources of water and few 
sellers, and the social and private costs of obtaining and distributing water and the 
social and private benefits from using it do not coincide. 
The allocation of water resources according to its economic value is 
considered as one of the most important principles involved into water conflict 
resolution. Here we distinguish between the allocations of water to its highest value 
use “Efficiency” and the distribution of gains from allocation “Equity” (for more details 
see section 5.2).  
Allocations always reflect political considerations, together with economic 
realities. Allocation of water based on economic considerations tends to promote 
efficiency in both the production and consumption of water, as well as increasing the 
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efficacy of major new water project investments, but other modes of allocation do 
not. In Israel for example, economic considerations long played a secondary role, 
thereby exacerbating the scarcity problem. 
Are efficient allocations equitable? Economists disagree about how to define 
equity and how to quantify it. As a result, no agreement on whether one efficient 
allocation is preferred to another is attainable. One inefficient allocation of resources 
may be more equitable than another efficient allocation.  
Negotiated outcomes need not maximize net benefits for all countries. 
Inefficiencies can be traced to the desire to nationalize resources rather than to gain 
from cooperative development. Both efficiency and equity should be considered in 
agreements for managing international water resources (for more details see section 
5.2).  
The basic economic problem that underlies all economic issues is the 
combined existence of scarce resources and unlimited wants. Given that, the first 
question is how to use scarce resources and organize production so as to satisfy to 
the greatest extent possible, society’s unlimited wants? In other words, the available 
resources must be used as efficiently as possible, meaning that the maximum output 
must be obtained from the resources in hand (for more details see section 5.2).  
The Coase Theorem suggests that war should be unlikely, rather than fighting 
the two sides could achieve some mutually advantageous bargain. They could live at 
peace with a higher standard of living, or in case of conflict one side, the weaker, 
should surrender rather than fight (for more details see section 5.2). 
The following discussion of the optimization model is based on, and borrows 
heavily from Fisher M. Franklin (2002), and, as regards to water in the wider Middle 
East context, we refer to Hussein Askari and Catherine Brown (2001) and Askari 
Hussein (2001) alone, allocating water so as to maximize the net benefits to all 
consumers, subject to constraints. When such maximization of benefits involves one 
or more constraints, a system of “shadow values” is involved in the solution.  
The “shadow value” of water at a particular location shows the increase in 
system-wide benefits that would occur if an additional cubic meter of water were 
available at that location. The “shadow value” associated with a particular constraint 
shows the extent to which the net benefits from water usage would increase if that 
constraint were relaxed. For example, where a pipeline’s capacity is limited, the 
associated shadow value shows how much benefits would increase if capacity were 
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slightly increased; this is the amount that those benefiting would be willing to pay for 
such an increase in capacity.  
The shadow value of water in a given location does not generally equal the 
direct cost of providing it there. In other words, let us consider a limited water source 
whose pumping costs are zero. If demand for water from that source is sufficiently 
high, the shadow value of that water will not be zero; benefits to water users would 
be increased if more water were available from that source.  
When demand at the source exceeds capacity, it is not costless to provide a 
particular user with an additional unit of water. That water can be provided only by 
depriving some other user of the benefits of the water, that loss of benefits 
represents an opportunity cost. In other words, an entity that owns its water 
resources and uses them itself incurs an opportunity cost equal to the amount of 
money it could otherwise have earned through selling the water. 
Accordingly, scarce resources have positive values and positive prices even if 
their direct cost of production is zero. Such a positive value, the shadow value of the 
water in site (where it is found), is called a scarcity rent. The general results are as 
follows:  
- The shadow value of water used in any location equals the direct marginal 
cost of production plus the scarcity rent; 
- Water will be produced at a given location only if the shadow value of water 
at that location exceeds the marginal cost of production; 
- If water can be transported from one location to another, then the shadow 
value of water at the second location can never exceed the shadow value at 
the first location by more than the cost of transportation; 
- An activity should be increased if it is profitable at the margin using shadow 
values; an activity that loses money at the margin using these values should 
be decreased.  
The WAS model can be applied to districts within a country or to two or more 
countries that have interdependent water supplies, water demands, water costs, and 
related water infrastructures. The geographical region under management is divided 
into a number of districts. Within each district, demand curves for water are defined 
for household use, industrial use, and agricultural use. The annual renewable 
amount of water from each source is taken into account, as is the pumping cost. 
Allowance is made for recycling of wastewater and inter-district conveyance.  
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Environmental issues are handled in several ways:  
- First, water extraction is restricted to annual renewable amounts;  
- Second, an effluent charge can be imposed on households and industry;  
- And, third, the use of recycled water in agriculture (as opposed to other, 
competing uses) can be restricted.  
The model permits experimentation with different assumptions about the 
infrastructure that will be in place in the future, such as the creation of seawater 
desalination plants in any district that has a seacoast.  
The analyst specifies the national and regional policies toward water that are 
desired. The model does not make water policy. The analyst imposes his or her 
values or policies on the model, which then respects them absolutely. The WAS 
model provides the analyst with the means to examine how his or her policies can be 
efficiently implemented and what the consequences would be.  
The WAS model allocates the available water so as to maximize net benefits, 
providing the analyst with optimal water allocations and shadow values. Among other 
things, the model is a powerful tool for analyzing the costs and benefits of various 
infrastructure projects.  
Separate models of this kind have now been built for Israel, Jordan, and the 
Palestinians National Authority (PNA) to help them study aspects of a variety of 
projects, including the following:  
- A cost-benefit analysis of the infrastructure that would be required to bring 
additional water to Israel from the Litani River in Lebanon (assuming full 
peace and Lebanese agreement to sell water to Israel);  
- A cost-benefit analysis of reducing leakage in the water system of Amman;  
- The relationships among desalination at Gaza, a pipeline between Gaza and 
the West Bank, and the amount of water owned by the Palestinians.  
Beyond such uses for more efficient water management, however, WAS 
models could be used to assist in water negotiations and to foster cooperation 
by creating win-win situations.  
These uses can be briefly described as follows:  
- Because the use of a WAS model reveals the value of water in different 
locations, it enables water disputes to be expressed in monetary terms, which 
should facilitate their resolution. This is particularly so because the availability 
of seawater desalination puts a ceiling on the value of water to any country 
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that has a seacoast. For Israel, Jordan, and the PNA, that ceiling is not very 
high, and the results obtained with the model show that the value of disputed 
water is very low indeed, so that the disputes involved are not nearly as 
economically important as they appear.  
- Each negotiating party can use its WAS model to evaluate the 
consequences to itself of different proposed water agreements and to 
estimate the consequences for others.  
- Perhaps most important, the use of a regional WAS model shows that 
cooperation in managing shared water sources can be very beneficial. That 
cooperation can involve the trading of water permits, short-term permits to use 
another party’s water at specified locations. Such trading would take place at 
the shadow values given by the WAS model’s output and would lead to joint 
gains wherever the parties valued water differently. Further gains are possible 
from the construction of joint infrastructure. While property rights ultimately 
have to be established, the WAS-type approach clearly shows that such 
disputes are merely matters of money and should be seen as such. As a 
result, a WAS-type solution can be used without waiting for a resolution of 
disputed property rights, because payments can be placed in a written 
agreement fund while countries continue to negotiate. For Israel and the PNA, 
the gains from cooperation appear far greater than the value of ownership of 
disputed water resources.  
The following example is among the gains that would arise: The WAS model 
strongly suggests that it would be efficient to have a water treatment plant in Gaza 
with treated effluent sold to Israel for agriculture use. Both parties would gain, and it 
would be a serious act of cooperation between them. Thus it means that Israel has 
an economic interest in assisting with the construction of a Gaza treatment plant.  
Figure 8.a shows an example of the main menu that the user sees when 
using WAS. Given the choice made by the user, the model allocates the available 
water so as to maximise total net benefits from water. These are measured as the 
total amount that consumers are willing to pay for the water supplied minus the cost 
of providing it. 
WAS generates a shadow value for water in each district. The shadow value 
of water in a district shows the amount by which net benefits would increase if there 
were an additional cubic meter of water available there. It is the true value of 
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additional water in that district. Similarly, the shadow value of water at the source is 
the scarcity rent of water in that source. 
 
Figure 8.a Water Allocation System: WAS Main Menu 
 
Source: Fisher 2002, pp. 188 
 
WAS provides a powerful tool for the analysis of the costs and benefits of 
various infrastructure projects. For example, if one runs the model without assuming 
the existence of seawater desalination facilities, then the shadow values in coastal 
districts provide a cost target that seawater desalination must meet to be 
economically viable. Alternatively, by running the model with and without a 
desalination plant, one can find the increase in annual benefits that the plant in 
question would bring. Taking the present discounted value of such increases gives 
the net benefits that should be compared with the capital cost of plant construction. 
(Fisher, 2002) 
A water treaty that merely defines the parties’ water ownership can become 
out of date as situations change. Water quantity allocations that appear adequate at 
one time may not be so at other times. By contrast, an agreement to trade in water 
permits, as described, provides a flexible way of adjusting water-use allocations, with 
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all parties benefiting from the adjustment. This can prevent water from becoming a 
source of new or reawakening tension.  
For a region to fully achieve these benefits, it is appropriate to include all 
countries whose water conditions are interdependent and to construct a multiyear 
model, because withdrawals from aquifers today have important implications for 
water supply in the future. 
It is important to say that economic benefits have not been explicitly used in 
allocating water, although economic principles have helped guide definitions of 
beneficial uses. Economic considerations alone may not provide an acceptable 
solution to water allocation problems, especially to solve water allocation disputes 
between nations.  
Although economic criteria have never been explicitly used to determine water 
allocations in an international treaty and, while in some cases States have 
compensated co-riparian for water, no international water market has ever been 
established. 
Furthermore, treating water as a purely economic item means that its various 
functions are considered to have values that can be measured in monetary terms. 
However, the values linked to water are often complementary and cannot be 
replaced by money. Water for life must be recognized as the highest priority in order 
to guarantee the sustainability of ecosystems, so access for all to a minimum 
quantity of good quality water is recognized as a human right. 
Water for general interest purposes should be ranked as the second level of 
priority, in connection with citizen’s social rights and in the general interest of society 
as a whole. Water for development, which is an economic function relating to 
production activities should be placed at the third level of priority. This function 
consumes the largest part of all water resources, and is largely responsible for the 
problems of scarcity and pollution.   
 
8.5 Conclusion  
An in-depth analysis of what have been previously observed shows that the 
concepts of water as a basic need and water as a human right appears that they 
have often been used without a clear understanding of their differences and possible 
policy and financial implications. 
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The situation changed somewhat when the UN Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights issued General Comment No. 15 in January 2003. This 
Comment reinterpreted Articles 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). It stated that: 
‘Water is a limited natural resource and a public good fundamental for life and 
health. The human right to water is indispensable for leading a life in human 
dignity...’ 
‘...The right to water contains both freedoms and entitlements. The freedoms 
include the right to maintain access to existing water supplies necessary for the right 
to water, and the right to be free from interference, such as right to be free from 
arbitrary disconnections or contamination of water supplies. By contrast, the 
entitlements include the right to a system of water supply and management that 
provides equality of opportunity for people to enjoy the right to water'. (Abu-Zeid, 
O’Neil. 2008) 
Effective water management is required in order to meet the needs of present 
and future generations and protect the environment. Large numbers of factors are 
involved in this context, such as hydrology, the political situation, the cultures of the 
countries concerned, and especially the types of management issues. 
The co-operative approach addresses the interests of the involved parties 
directly, as well as the dynamics of conflict and co-operation affecting the 
relationship between them. Military intervention is often needed in highly escalated 
conflicts where mutual destruction can only be avoided by outside intervention. The 
conflict between Israel and the Palestinians could be taken as an example as well as 
the last conflict between Israel and Lebanon (July 2006). As this high form of 
escalation is rare for international conflicts, the military form of problem solving will 
not be discussed in this research. 
8.5.1 General conflict management and its characteristics 
When dealing with the question of conflict management, there must be a shift 
away from the focus on causes of conflict to a focus on the linkages of factors 
influencing the conflict in the present moment. This shift also entails focusing on the 
future solution rather than on the past problem. 
The conflict potential of international river basin varies considerably, it is 
characterised by the following elements: 
- The importance of the water supply for the riparian state; 
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- The power of the riparian state, mainly military; 
- The position of the riparian state (upstream/downstream).  
Despite the conflict potential of international rivers, there have been no major 
armed conflicts over water at the level of the nation state (Wolf, 1995). It is important 
to signal that the relationship between water stress and armed conflict is complex, 
and that water is often only one factor among others. 
The leading question is not who is right or who is wrong (a legal question), 
and neither who is more powerful (a military or economic question), but whether 
there are ways of transforming the conflictive relationships to a cooperative 
relationship, and finding “win-win” solutions to satisfy the interests of all parties 
involved. Accordingly, the debate within this field is how much to focus on resolutions 
and problem-solving and how much on process, perceptions and relations. 
8.5.2 Most Significant Principles  
Some of the main principles of conflict management are summarized as 
follow: 
• All human relationships are characterized by the respective power of 
the parties, the rules governing their interaction, and negotiations 
between them. When power asymmetry between conflict parties is 
great, rules are non-existent or unjust, and the powerful side doesn’t 
compromise. The lower the unbalanced power between parties the 
greater the will to co-operate, the better the chances that negotiations 
lead to success; 
• The recognition of the right to exist for the opponent, plus the 
acknowledgment of one another and the validity of the other parties’ 
interests. Conflict cannot be resolved in the long run without satisfying 
basic human needs. Shedding light on the underlying interests can 
open a way forward to finding mutually compatible management 
options. 
• The brain storming phenomena, conflicting parties should participate 
directly in jointly shaping a solution as they know the situation best and 
they easily stick to agreements they are active in formulating. This can 
be achievable only when people interact with each other in a co-
operative way. In this context, unofficial experts who meet in informal 
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settings are often more flexible about developing and brainstorming 
management options, as they do not need to defend official policies. 
• Intervention by a third party is needed at some stage, especially when 
conflict escalates above a certain level. In this regard, the third party 
acts as a repository of trust and facilitates co-operative interaction 
between the parties. This intervention by a third party depends on the 
level of escalation starting with the prevention and moderation, 
continuing with facilitation and mediation, and ending with peace 
enforcement and peace-keeping in highly escalated conflicts. 
• The interpretation of scientific data is uncertain; accordingly, it is 
difficult to create a joint problem definition. Fact-finding and technical 
analysis should not be separated from the main negotiation efforts. The 
perceptions and the relationship between the parties cannot be 
ignored, as the best technical solutions can only be implemented if 
people accept and support them.   
• The design of a conflict management process requires taking the 
context of the conflict into account. Mediation between conflict parties 
that represent groups involves steps to ensure that groups mandate 
actors from their group to represent them during the mediation, and 
that these people are reintegrated into their groups after the mediation. 
Four steps are involved:  
1- Design the conflict management architecture (who are the 
actors, in what forums do they meet, what is the timeframe?). 
This preparation is called “pre-mediation”;  
2- Resume the many involved actors and issues until one 
arrives at a manageable number, this can happen for 
example with forums open to everyone;  
3- Manage the actual negotiation or mediation process;  
4- Support the transfer of the settlement in the mediation back 
to their greater socio-political context. 
One of the greatest challenges of conflict management does not only concern 
the economic regulation or mathematical allocation of scarce resources, but the form 
of communication between the concerned parties. The focus of human relationships 
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can also be used by one conflict party aiming at winning the opponent over. In this 
context, three requirements are needed: 
1- The good will of one party towards the opponent. Non-violence is not 
effective if it is used to cover fear and powerlessness; 
2- Respects and understanding to concerned society’s laws and culture, in 
well defined circumstances, in order to judge which rules are unjust, and 
which rules are to be taken into account; 
3- Minimal acceptance of party’s right to existence. 
8.5.3 Multilateral talks and the identification of Common Denominators 
Dealing with population size and conservation measures, promoting 
awareness and adopting water-saving technologies and pricing techniques, 
especially in agriculture, are essential to reduce demand. The private sector, non-
governmental organizations, international and national agencies can play a major 
role both as investors and as managers of utilities. It is the common responsibility of 
all actors of society: businesses, governments, scholars, researchers and 
individuals, to contribute to the elaboration of numerous solutions. In addition, 
learning from their efforts and efforts in other regions interested parties must 
promote a new water and environmental ethic, educate the masses and facilitate 
discussion.  
Perceptions concerning water relations in Lebanon and Israel should be 
assessed using explorative expert interviews, a conflict-sensitive research method. 
Interviews must be carried out in Lebanon and Israel. Dialogue workshops have to 
be organized with the aim of a joint publication on the subject by academics from the 
respective countries.  
The workshops emphasize the role of communication in understanding 
different perceptions, and can clarify issues at stake and support the development of 
a research network. Pre-conditions for communication to work are that there is a 
potential benefit for each actor. Communication facilitates and enhances 
cooperation, which is a prerequisite of sustainable development, in an atmosphere of 
trust and confidence. 
The dialogue workshops publications have to have authors from different 
sides working together to develop an all-inclusive view of the issues and lessons 
learned. As Conflicts are characterized by biased information coverage, science can 
contribute to conflict management by minimizing bias and providing “objective” 
195 
 
information to stakeholders and third parties. It is also necessary that the participated 
speakers have to share their views in terms of their multidisciplinary research, 
without any political or diplomatic representation. The geographic scope should be 
based on a wide definition of the nations bordering on the eastern Mediterranean 
Sea from Turkey in the north to Egypt in the south.  
The role of these Workshops is to provide a “neutral” analytical background 
on the following ten points: 
1- Assessing freshwater balances that represent the first step in exploring 
prospects for regional cooperation in the sharing and management of fresh water. 
The following should be taken into account: Justice and respect for international law, 
and the necessity of making some concessions that take into account the reality on 
the ground. 
2- By focusing on needs rather than on rights the number of options that can 
satisfy the different interests increase and compatible solutions can be developed 
more easily. 
3- The acknowledgment of water as a human right, which “entitles everyone 
to sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and affordable water for 
personal and domestic uses”  (CESCR, 2002). (This definition has been provided by 
the General Comment No. 15, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
This Covenant is one of the major human rights treaties that have been adopted and 
are being monitored within the framework of the United Nations human rights 
system. It has been in force since 1976 and currently 153 States have ratified the 
treaty and are therefore legally bound by it. This means they are obliged to 
implement the provisions of the treaty at the national level). Here we should 
distinguish between the “Right to Water” and “Water Rights”, the first can be 
considered as an integral part of other human rights, such as the right to life and the 
rights to health. The latter generally refers to accessing or using water for specific 
purposes. 
4- Recognizing the different functions and values of water:  
- Water for life, which must be recognized as the highest priority in order to 
guarantee the sustainability of the ecosystems;  
- Water for general purposes, which should be ranked at the second level of 
priority, and;  
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- Water for development, which is an economic function, and must occupy the 
third level of priority. 
5- In order to set up a priority among users’ rights and management standards 
for each level mentioned in point 4, it is important to recognize different categories of 
values in question and the ethical criteria of fairness and sustainability. In other 
words, to recognize an ethic that enables to distinguish between the values of water 
and the various functions, in order to prioritize fundamental human rights over private 
and market interests, without neglecting economic efficiency with regard to the 
purely economic functions of water. 
6- The values of preservation of the environment and aquatic systems, and 
the fundamental values of life are linked; accordingly the values related to water are 
often complementary and cannot be measured in monetary terms, and should not be 
administrated according to market rules. 
7- Efficiency and effectiveness should be the core of any discussion. The 
former for economic reasons and the latter for the direction of values linked to the 
respect of human rights. Accordingly, no government or authority has a valid excuse 
for not securing the necessary investments to construct and modernize basic 
networks and systems to guarantee access to drinking water for all. Even in the 
poorest country the argument of lack of financial means is unacceptable while 
military spending proceeds. 
8- The potential for dealing with a variety of regional conflicts over water can 
be significantly enhanced with the good application of management and pricing 
regimes. Many argue that one of the roots of many socio-economic/political 
problems is a lack of cooperatively managed resources. A shift of focus from the 
environment as a cause of conflict to the environment as an issue in cooperative 
conflict management should be taken into consideration. 
9- The physical reality should be taken into account: For example, a natural 
river basin not the political borders.  
10- The role of multilateral talks in identifying common denominators in the 
concerned parties’ water resources management systems and the ability to 
cooperate on the basis of these denominators. [The Declaration of Principles for 
Cooperation on Water-Related Matters and New and Additional Water Resources, 
February 13, 1996] (Appendix 5, Annex 1)  
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There is no doubt that no single set of actors holds the key to effectively 
addressing the challenge of equitable and sustainable management of precious 
water resources. It is also important to realize that it is not enough just to seek to 
increase the availability and usability of water. It is essential to reduce the demand 
for water by managing population size, enacting conservation measures, promoting 
awareness and adopting water-saving technologies and pricing techniques, 
especially in agriculture. Governments, both national and local, hold the key 
responsibility. 
However, the private sector, non-governmental organizations, international 
agencies and national agencies can play a major role both as investors and as 
managers of utilities. In fact, it is the common responsibility of all actors of society: 
businesses, governments, scholars, researchers and individuals, to contribute to the 
elaboration of numerous solutions. In addition to learning from their efforts and 
efforts in other regions, interested parties must promote a new water and 
environmental ethic, educate the masses and facilitate discussion. 
The ‘promised land’ will not fall from heaven, it will be built with the arms and 
hearts of those who seek and build peace. Either the heavenly Jerusalem of the 
Apocalypse exists on earth, or it does not exist. This is the Jerusalem of which 
Psalmist prays:  
(6-9) Pray for Jerusalem's peace!  
      Prosperity to all you Jerusalem-lovers!  
   Friendly insiders, get along!  
      Hostile outsiders, keep your distance!  
   For the sake of my family and friends,  
      I say it again: live in peace!  
   For the sake of the house of our God, GOD,  
      I'll do my very best for you. (Psalm 122: 6-9). 
Furthermore: 
(2) Then I, John, saw the holy city, New Jerusalem, coming down out of 
heaven from God, prepared as a bride adorned for her husband. (3) And I heard a 
loud voice from heaven saying, “Behold, the tabernacle of God is with men, and He 
will dwell with them, and they shall be His people. God Himself will be with them and 
be their God. (4) And God will wipe away every tear from their eyes; there shall be 
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no more death, nor sorrow, nor crying. There shall be no more pain, for the former 
things have passed away. (Revelation 21:2-4) 
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Glossary 
 
Abrahamic religion: It is a term of Islamic origin, commonly used to designate 
the three prevalent monotheistic religions – Judaism, Christianity, and Islam – which 
claim Abraham (Hebrew: Avraham םָהָרְבאַ ; Arabic: Ibrahim ميھاربا) as a part of their 
sacred history. 
Action Research: It is a type of applied research designed to find an effective 
way of bringing about a conscious change in a partly controlled environment (Collis 
J. and Hussey R., 2003). 
Case study: It is an extensive examination of a single instance of a 
phenomenon of interest and is an example of a phenomenological methodology. 
Conflict management: A generic term that refers to all interventions in a 
conflict with the aims of solving problems, transforming relations, and changing 
structures.  
Conflict transformation: Conflict transformation acknowledges that conflict is a 
part of life; the aim is to transform destructive forms of dealing with conflict to 
constructive ones. It focuses on understanding perceptions and improving 
relationships by empowering actors and supporting recognition of each other. 
Co-operation: It is understood as distinct from harmony and definitely as 
distinct from discord / conflict. 
Dialogue workshop: In Dialogue Workshops, non-official representatives of 
the conflict parties meet in an informal setting facilitated by a third party with the aim 
of non-polemical conflict analysis, transformation of antagonistic relationships, joint 
action, or problem-solving. 
Epistemology: It is concerned with the study of knowledge and what we 
accept as being valid knowledge. The epistemology can be classified as objectivist; 
the researchers accepting this view hold that if they go about their research in the 
correct way it is possible to discover objective truth (Crotty, 1998). 
Ethnography: It is an approach in which the researcher uses socially acquired 
and shared knowledge to understand the observed patterns of human activity. 
Evapotranspiration: It is a term used to describe the sum of evaporation and 
plant transpiration from the earth's land surface to atmosphere. Evaporation 
accounts for the movement of water to the air from sources such as the soil, canopy 
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interception, and water-bodies. Transpiration accounts for the movement of water 
within a plant and the subsequent loss of water as vapor through stomata in its 
leaves. Evapotranspiration is an important part of the water cycle. An element (such 
as a tree) that contributes to evapotranspiration can be called an evapotranspirator 
(wikipedia.org 2008). 
Grounded theory: It is an approach for looking systematically at qualitative 
data aiming at the generation of theory. Sometimes, grounded theory is seen as a 
qualitative method, but grounded theory reaches further: it combines a specific style 
of research (or a paradigm) with pragmatic theory of action and with some 
methodological guidelines (wikipedia.org, 2008). 
Hydraulic imperative: A theory that describes the quest for water resources as 
the motivator for military conquests, and was developed in the academic literature 
and the popular press since Israel’s invasion of Lebanon 1982 (see section 1.2). 
Mediation: Mediation is a way of transforming and/or resolving conflicts with 
the support of an even-handed third party that is accepted by all the involved conflict 
parties. The mediator structures and guides the process, facilitates communication 
between the conflicting parties and seeks to empower the parties in 
resolving/transforming their conflict. The mediator does not provide any solutions. 
Need: A condition or situation in which something is required. In this context 
‘needs’ refer to basic needs, e.g. the need for independence (security, economic 
well-being, control over one’s life) and relatedness (a sense of belonging, 
recognition, relationship). According to the human needs theory, conflicts can only 
be resolved in the long term if basic needs are satisfied. 
Parties: People or groups of people involved in a conflict. A “third party” is 
someone who is not initially involved in the conflict, but who gets involved to try to 
help the disputants work out a solution (or at least improve the situation by 
communicating better or increasing mutual understanding). Examples of third parties 
are mediators, arbitrators, conciliators, and facilitators. 
Proposal-disagreement:  Eric Johnston’s efforts to settle the water issue in the 
mid-50s failed mostly because as long as the Arabs accepted a plan, Israel would 
reject it because it wasn’t granted access to the Litani waters. And the other way 
round, the Arabs couldn’t say yes to a proposal and decide for example on the Litani 
due to political reasons (see section 1.2). 
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Quantitative vs. Qualitative: “in quantitative research facts act to constrain our 
beliefs; while in interpretive research beliefs determine what should count as facts” 
(Smith, 1983, p. 10) 
Research methodology: Methodology refers to the overall approach to the 
research process, from the theoretical underpinning to the collection and analysis of 
the data. 
Research methods: They are described as the techniques or procedures used 
to gather and analyse data related to some research question (Crotty, 1998). 
River Basin: Or a drainage basin which is an extent of land where water from 
rain or snow melt drains downhill into a body of water, such as a river, lake, 
reservoir, estuary, wetland, sea or ocean. The drainage basin includes both the 
streams and rivers that convey the water as well as the land surfaces from which 
water drains into those channels, and is separated from adjacent basins by a 
drainage divide. The drainage basin acts like a funnel, collecting all the water within 
the area covered by the basin and channeling it into a waterway. Each drainage 
basin is separated topographically from adjacent basins by a geographical barrier 
such as a ridge, hill or mountain, which is known as a water divide. Other terms that 
are used to describe a drainage basin are catchment, catchment area, catchment 
basin, drainage area, river basin, water basin and watershed (wikipedia.org, 2008). 
Virtual Water: Water that is imported in the form of food. It is easier to import 
water in the form of food, e.g. cereals, than it is to transport water. “Virtual water” can 
be approximated by the following rule of thumb: one kg of bread requires about 
1,000 litres of water for its production, one kg of meat is approximately equivalent to 
4,000 litres (Allan 1998). 
Watercourse: This term encompasses a system of surface waters and 
groundwater with a physical relationship to each other 
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Appendix 1 
 
Annex 1: the Relevant Articles for the Section 5.2  
(Vinogradov, S., Wouters, P. and Jones P. 2004) 
 
Article 5: Equitable and reasonable utilization and participation  
- Watercourse States shall in their respective territories utilize an international 
watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. In particular, an international 
watercourse shall be used and developed by watercourse States with a view to 
attaining optimal and sustainable utilization thereof and benefits there from, taking 
into account the interests of the watercourse States concerned, consistent with 
adequate protection of the watercourse.  
- Watercourse States shall participate in the use, development and protection 
of an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. Such 
participation includes both the right to utilize the watercourse and the duty to 
cooperate in the protection and development thereof, as provided in the present 
Convention.  
 
Article 6: Factors relevant to equitable and reasonable utilization 
- The weight to be given to each factor is to be determined by its importance 
in comparison with that of other relevant factors. In determining what is a reasonable 
and equitable use, all relevant factors are to be considered together and a 
conclusion reached on the basis of the whole. 
 
Article 7: Obligation not to cause significant harm  
- Watercourse States shall, in utilizing an international watercourse in their 
territories, take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm to 
other watercourse States.  
- Where significant harm nevertheless is caused to another watercourse 
State, the States whose use causes such harm shall, in the absence of agreement to 
such use, take all appropriate measures, having due regard for the provisions of 
articles 5 and 6, in consultation with the affected State, to eliminate or mitigate such 
harm and, where appropriate, to discuss the question of compensation.  
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Article 10: Relationship between different kinds of uses  
- In the absence of agreement or custom to the contrary, no use of an 
international watercourse enjoys inherent priority over other uses.  
- In the event of a conflict between uses of an international watercourse, it 
shall be resolved with reference to the principles and factors set out in articles 5 to 7, 
with special regard being given to the requirements of vital human needs. 
 
Article 33: Settlement of disputes 
- In the event of a dispute between two or more Parties concerning the 
interpretation or application of the present Convention, the Parties concerned shall, 
in the absence of an applicable agreement between them, seek a settlement of the 
dispute by peaceful means in accordance with the following provisions. 
- If the parties concerned cannot reach agreement by negotiation requested 
by one of them, they may jointly seek the good offices of, or request mediation or 
conciliation by, a third party, or make use, as appropriate, of any joint watercourse 
institutions that may have been established by them or agree to submit the dispute to 
arbitration or to the International Court of Justice. 
- … If after six months from the time of the request for negotiations … the 
Parties concerned have not been able to settle their dispute through negotiation or 
any other means … the dispute shall be submitted, at the request of any of the 
parties to the dispute, to impartial fact-finding. … 
- A Fact-finding Commission shall be established, composed of one member 
nominated by each party concerned and in addition a member not having the 
nationality of any of the parties concerned chosen by the nominated members who 
shall serve as Chairman. 
- The Commission shall adopt its report by majority vote, unless it is a single-
member Commission, and shall submit that report to the parties concerned, setting 
forth its findings and the reasons therefore and such recommendation deems 
appropriate for an equitable solution of the dispute, which the Parties concerned 
shall consider in good faith. 
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Annex 2: International Regulation regarding the Use of International 
Watercourses for Purposes other than Navigation  
http://www.cawater-info.net/bk/water_law/pdf/madrid_1911_e.pdf 
 
Declaration of Madrid, 20 April 1911  
 
Statement of Reasons  
Riparian States with a common stream are in a position of permanent physical 
dependence on each other which precludes the idea of the complete authonomy of 
each State in the section of the natural watercourse under its sovereignty.  
International law has dealt with the right of navigation with respect to 
international rivers but the use of water for the purposes of industry, agriculture, etc. 
was not foreseen by international law.  
It therefore seems expedient to remedy this lack by noting the rules of law 
resulting from the interdependence which undoubtedly exists between riparian 
States with a common stream and between States whose territories are crossed by a 
common stream.  
With the exception of the right of navigation, as already established or to be 
established by international law:  
The Institute of International Law is of the opinion that the following 
regulations should be observed from the point of view of (any) use of international 
streams.  
 
I. When a stream forms the frontier of two States, neither of these States may, 
without the consent of the other, and without special and valid legal title, make or 
allow individuals, corporations, etc. to make alterations therein detrimental to the 
bank of the other State. On the other hand, neither State may, on its own territory, 
utilize or allow the utilization of the water in such a way as to seriously interfere with 
its utilization by the other State or by individuals, corporations, etc. thereof.  
The foregoing provisions are likewise applicable to a lake lying between the 
territories of more than two States.  
 
II. When a stream traverses successively the territories of two or more States:  
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1. The point where this stream crosses the frontiers of two States, whether 
naturally, or since time immemorial, may not be changed by establishments of one of 
the States without the consent of the other;  
2. All alterations injurious to the water, the emptying therein of injurious matter 
(from factories, etc.) is forbidden;  
3. No establishment (especially factories utilizing hydraulic power) may take 
so much water that the constitution, otherwise called the utilizable or essential 
character of the stream shall, when it reaches the territory downstream, be seriously 
modified;  
4. The right of navigation by virtue of a title recognized in international law 
may not be violated in any way whatsoever;  
5. A State situated downstream may not erect or allow to be erected within its 
territory constructions or establishments which would subject the other State to the 
danger of inundation;  
6. The foregoing rules are applicable likewise to cases where streams flow 
from a lake situated in one State, through the territory of another State, or the 
territories of other States;  
7. It is recommended that the interested States appoint permanent joint 
commissions, which shall render decisions, or at least shall give their opinion, when, 
from the building of new establishments or the making of alterations in existing 
establishments, serious consequences might result in that part of the street situated 
in the territory of the other States. 
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Annex 3: Israeli-Syrian Water Diversion Dispute: United Nations Security 
Council Resolution, October 27, 1953 (1) 
 
The Security Council,  
 
Having taken note of the report of the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision 
Organization dated 23 October 1953 (S/3122), (2) 
 
Desirous of facilitating the consideration of the question, without however prejudicing 
the rights, claims or position of the parties concerned,  
 
Deems it desirable to that end that the works started in the Demilitarized Zone on 2 
September 1953 should be suspended during the urgent examination of the question 
by the Security Council,  
 
Notes with satisfaction the statement made by the Israel representative at the 631st 
meeting regarding the undertaking given by his Government to suspend the works in 
question during that examination, (3) 
 
Requests the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization to inform it 
regarding the fulfillment of that undertaking (4) 
 
(1) U.N. doc. S/3128, Oct. 27, 1953. The resolution was adopted following a 
complaint by Syria concerning Israeli activity on a hydroelectric project involving the 
diversion of the Jordan River at Banat Yaacov in the Syrian-Israeli demilitarized 
zone.  
 
(2) The report stated, among other things, that the Chief of Staff of the Truce 
Supervision Organization had informed Israel on Sept. 23, that the work in the 
demilitarized zone should cease "so long as an agreement is not arranged."   
 
(3) U.N. Security Council, Official Records, 631st Meeting, Oct. 27, 1953, p. 5.  
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(4) The Security Council continued to consider this question. In December 1953 the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and France sponsored a resolution which among 
other things, supported the Chief of Staff in his decision with regard to stopping the 
diversion project, called upon him to maintain the demilitarized character of the zone, 
and authorized him to explore conciliation possibilities. The Soviet Union opposed 
the resolution on the ground that bilateral consent and not the decision of the Chief 
of Staff was the basis for permitting any undertaking in the demilitarized zone, and 
vetoed the resolution on Jan. 22, 1954. It was its 57th veto. For statements by the 
U.S. Representatives in the Security Council on Dec. 16 and 21, 1953, and Jan. 21, 
1954, in connection with the draft resolution, see Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 
11, 1954, pp. 58 59, and Feb. 22, 1954, pp. 297-298. For background discussion see 
United States Participation in the United Nations: Report by the President to the 
Congress for the Year 1953 (Department of State publication 5459; 1954), pp. 77-78; 
ibid., 1954 (Department of State publication 5769; 1955), pp. 73-74; and Report of 
the Security Council to the General Assembly Covering the Period from 16 July 1953 
to 16 July 1954 (A/2712), pp. 15-29.  
 
Source: American Foreign Policy 1950-1955, Basic Documents Volumes I and II, Department of State 
Publication 6446, General Foreign Policy Series 117, Washington, DC : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957. 
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Annex 4: Lac Lanoux Case  
(Affair du Lac Lanoux, Espagne versus France, 1957) 
(UNEP – ELI/PAC, 1998) 
 
The Lac Lanoux arbitration case involving France and Spain shows how the 
process of prior consultation and negotiation has been interpreted by an international 
arbitral tribunal, not only as a treaty stipulation, (specifically the Bayonne Treaty of 
1866 between France and Spain), but more generally as a principle of customary 
law. 
 
Background 
The Lac Lanoux negotiations began in 1917. The case was put to arbitration 
in 1956. 
Lake Lanoux is located on the French side of the Pyrenees mountain chain. It 
is fed by many streams rising in 
France and running only in the French territory. However, its waters also run 
into the headwaters of the river Carol which, some 25 kilometres from the lake, do 
cross the Spanish frontier at Puigcerda, having previously fed the Canal of 
Puigcerda, which is the private property of that town. After some 6 kilometres in 
Spanish territory, the Carol joins the Segre, which ultimately flows into the Ebro. The 
frontier between France and Spain was fixed by the Treaty of Bayonne, 1866 and an 
additional Act thereto, whereby regulations were made for the joint use of the water 
resources. 
Spain alleged that certain plans proposed by France would adversely affect 
Spanish rights and interests contrary to the Treaty, and could only be undertaken 
with prior consent of both Parties. 
 
Award 
In the light of the agreement between the two countries (treaty of Bayonne, 
1866, and Additional Act), the tribunal found that the conflicting interests aroused by 
the industrial use of international rivers must be reconciled by mutual concessions 
embodied in the agreements which needed to be interpreted. In the present case, 
the Tribunal was of the opinion that “the French scheme complied with the 
obligations of Article 11....In carrying out without prior agreement between the two 
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Governments, works for the utilization of the waters of Lake Lanoux...and brought to 
the notice of the representatives of Spain...., the French Government was not 
committing a breach of the provisions of the Treaty of Bayonne...or of the Additional 
Act”. 
The Tribunal said that, because the question before it related uniquely to a 
treaty of 1866, the tribunal would apply the treaty if it was clear. But if interpretation 
was necessary, the tribunal would turn to international law, allowing it in this case to 
take account of the “spirit” of the Pyrennées treaties and “des règles du droit 
international commun”, and also consider certain rules of customary international law 
in order to proceed to the interpretation of the Treaty and the Act. 
 
Commentary 
The tribunal discussed the applicable law because the Parties (France and 
Spain) disagreed on this issue of international rights and obligations of States 
sharing common natural resources such as water. Consultations and negotiation in 
good faith are necessary not only as a mere formality, but as an attempt to conclude 
an agreement for the prevention of conflicts. 
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Annex 5: Efficiency in Production and the Production Possibilities Frontier 
 
Two major problems prevent society from achieving economic efficiency: 
 
Unemployment of available resources:  
In order to have economic efficiency all available resources must be 
employed, whenever there are available resources standing idle, there are fewer 
inputs into economy’s productive process. As a result, there is a lower output of 
goods to satisfy society’s wants. 
 
Underemployment or resource misallocation: 
If certain available resources are used to do jobs for which other available 
resources are better suited there is underemployment, or misallocation of resources. 
In other words, reallocation of resources to productive activities for which they are 
better suited will result in a larger output of some or all goods and no reduction in the 
output of any. 
When there is no unemployment or underemployment of available resources, 
an economy is able to produce the maximum number of goods possible. When this 
occurs the economy is said to be on its Production Possibilities Frontier (PPF). This 
PPF is a curve connecting the maximum possible output combinations of goods for a 
fully employed economy. 
The economy is producing its maximum possible output of goods when an 
economy’s available resources are fully employed. The maximum possible output 
level is limited too. Therefore, producing more of one kind means, producing less of 
another. Let us illustrate this concept by focusing on the issue of cleaning up 
environmental pollution. Suppose that the output in an economy may be divided into 
two categories:  
- X an antipollution device. 
- Y bundle contains one of each and every good produced in the economy 
except X. 
If we want a cleaner environment, we need to use X in many production 
processes that cause pollution. How do we measure the cost to society of providing 
these devices?  
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Product A B C D E 
X 0 50 80 100 110 
Y 80 60 40 20 0 
Table a. Possible combinations of X and Y produced (hypothetically) in a full-employment economy. 
These numbers represent Production Possibilities (output/year in thousands)  
 
Given the existing supply of resources and level of technology, society must 
make a choice. Table a shows different possible combination an economy have that 
may be produced when using all of its resources. Moving from point A to E, 
resources must be shifted out of the production of Y and into the production of X.  
Whenever scarcity forces an economy to make a choice, a cost must be paid, 
called opportunity cost. This cost is measured in terms of foregone alternatives. 
 
     X     
        
 
             E 
   110 •  
   100   •  D    
     90 
     80    • C 
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     60 
     50    • B  
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     30 
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     10     A 
       0                     •  
         20        40       60       80       100   Y 
 
Figure a: Production Possibilities Frontier (PPF) 
Each point on the downwards-sloping curve (Fig. a) represents some 
maximum-output combination for an economy whose available resources are fully 
employed. No combination to the right or above the curve is possible given the 
available resources. On the other hand, any point to the left represents a 
combination produced when the economy is operating inefficiently. Moving along the 
curve (moving from point A to E), represents a shift in resources out of the 
production of Y and into the production of X, this phenomena is called sometimes the 
law of increasing cost. 
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The law of increasing cost is: When moving along the PPF, the cost per 
additional unit obtained, measured in terms of the unit sacrificed, rises due to the 
difference in productivity of resources when used in different production process. 
The shape of PPF is determined by what is called the Marginal Rate of 
Transformation (MRT), which is the magnitude of the slope of the frontier at each 
point. The MRT measures how much Y must be given up to produce one additional 
unit of X.  
Whenever there are changes in the existing supply of resources (land, labour 
and capital) or/and level of technology, the position of PPF will change. Therefore an 
economy’s present choice of a point on its PPF influences the future location of that 
frontier. 
An economy can fall short of its PPF if resources are misallocated or if the 
best-known production techniques are not used. Another kind of economic 
inefficiency also occurs whenever available resources are allowed to stand idle. This 
will also keep an economy from operating on its PPF.    
Given an economy’s available resources and technology, knowledge of what 
is possible is necessary in order to answer a number of important questions or 
problems that an economy, in socialist, communist or capitalist countries, must 
solve. These questions are: 
- What and how much to produce? 
- How should production be organised? 
- For whom should goods be produced? 
The answer to the question of what to produce determines the nature and 
location of the PPF. The answer to the question of how much to produce determines 
the point chosen on the PPF.  
How to organise production determines whether the chosen point will be 
reached. Ideally, society should allocate available resources to productive activities 
and use known productive techniques in such a way that no reallocation of resources 
or change of technique could yield more of any good without yielding less of another. 
This is true of any combination of goods represented by any point on the PPF. For 
whom to produce is largely determined by ideological orientation as to the proper mix 
of free markets, government regulations and central planning.  
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Annex 6: Marginal Damages Function and Marginal Abatement Costs 
Function 
 
a. By damages we mean all the negative impacts that user of the environment 
experience as a result of the degradation of the environment. In the river pollution 
example, damages were to who could no longer use the river or who suffered a 
higher chance of picking up water-borne diseases, and to all city dwellers that had to 
pay more to treat the water before they could put into the public water mains. In 
general, the greater the pollution, the greater the damages it produces.  
To describe the relationship between pollution and damage, we will use the 
idea of a damage function. A damage function shows the relationship between the 
quantity of a residual and the damage that residual cause. 
Marginal Damages Function shows the change in damages resulting from a 
unit change in emissions or ambient concentration. To note that, graphically, the 
areas under marginal damage functions correspond to total damages. The height 
and shape of a damage function depends on the pollutant and circumstances 
involved. 
b. Abatement Costs are the costs of reducing the quantity of residuals being 
emitted into the environment, or of lowering ambient concentrations. On the 
assumption that one of the two countries has free access to the river, the cheapest 
way to get rid of the wastes is simply to pump them into the river, but normally there 
are technological and managerial mean to reduce these emissions. The costs of 
engaging in these activities are called Abatement Costs, as they are the costs of 
abating, or reducing, the quantity of residuals dumped into the river. 
This can be represented graphically by using the concept of the Marginal 
Abatement Costs Function, which shows the added costs of achieving a one-unit 
decrease in emission level, or alternatively the costs saved by a unit increase of 
emissions. The larger the reduction in emissions, the greater the marginal costs of 
producing further reductions and vice-versa. This determines the curve’s slope. 
c. The efficient level of emissions is defined as the level at which the marginal 
damages are equal to marginal abatement costs. In another words it is the level at 
which two types of costs (higher emissions expose society, or some part of it, to 
greater costs resulting from environmental damages. And lower emissions involve 
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society in greater costs in the form of resources devoted to abatement activities) 
exactly offset one another. 
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Annex 7: Externalities and Economic Efficiency; Efficiency in Exchange, 
and Efficient Allocations 
 
In an efficient allocation of goods, no one can be made better off without 
making someone else worse off. To understand more we must show why mutually 
beneficial trades result in an efficient allocation of goods.  
In general, voluntary trade between two people is mutually beneficial. How trade 
makes people better off? Two important assumptions: 
a. Both people have complete information about each other’s preferences. 
b. Exchanging goods involve no costs, i.e. transactions costs are zero. 
 
Suppose Maria (M), and Maroun (Mn) have between them two goods X and 
Y. Each consumer has different choices or different combinations of X and Y about 
which he or she feels indifferent as to whether has one of them or any combination. 
The consumer can list as many combinations as he or she wants until there is a 
continuum of points forming a curve. This curve is called Indifference Curve (IC), at 
which the consumer gets equal satisfaction at any point along it.  
What is the best combination of these two goods the consumer can have? To 
answer this question, we note, for each and every consumer exist an unlimited 
number of  (IC), a curve that lies to the right and above the existing one represents a 
higher level of satisfaction for the consumer, IC2 represents a higher level of 
satisfaction then IC1 for Maroun, and for Maria U3 then U2 (Figure 5.1). For both of 
them to decide which IC gives the level of satisfaction, they have to take into 
consideration their incomes and the prices of both goods X and Y.  
In our model exist only two goods, both consumers must decide how much to 
spend on each good. This decision depends on their level of income, which can be 
called Budget Constraint (BC), BC can be illustrated (PP’ Figure 3.1.a) as a straight 
line representing all possible combinations of goods that a consumer can obtain at a 
given prices by spending a given size budget [the slope of this line is equal to the 
price of good X (PX) divided by the price of Y (PY)]. Point G (Figure 5.1) represents 
the point of tangency of Maria and Maroun’s ICs with their BC line, and at which the 
optimum purchase combination is determined, and also the highest possible level of 
satisfaction is realised (at this point MRS (M) = MRS (Mn) = PX / PY).   
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If Maria values X more than Y, and Maroun values Y more than X then there 
is room for mutually advantageous trade. These values are measured by Marginal 
Rate of Substitution (MRS), which is the rate at which the consumer is willing to 
substitute one good for another so as to leave his or her level of satisfaction 
unchanged.  
Whenever two consumers’ MRSs are different, there is room for mutually 
beneficial trade because the allocation of resources is inefficient. In other words, an 
allocation of goods is efficient only if the goods are distributed so that the MRS 
between any two pairs of good is the same for all consumers. This important result 
also holds when there are many goods and consumers.    
If trade is beneficial, which of those trades will allocate goods efficiently 
among customers, and how much better off will the consumers then be?  
The answer to this question will be by using a diagram called an Edgeworth Box1. 
Each point in the diagram simultaneously describes the market baskets of both 
consumers, under the assumption that there are fixed supplies of both goods. Which 
point is considered an efficient allocation? The answer depends on whether the MRS 
of each consumer is equal to the other’s MRS.  
As previously mentioned, an allocation of goods is efficient only if the goods 
are distributed so that the MRS of both consumers is the same at a particular point.  
Figure 5.1, shows the only place that MRSs for both consumers are identical, is 
when the indifference curves are tangent, E, F, G and H represent some possible 
efficient allocations of goods X and Y. When joining all these points we obtain the 
contract curve (MRS (M) = MRS (Mn) at every single point along this curve). The 
contract curve shows all allocations from which no mutually beneficial trade can be 
made.  
These allocations are sometimes called Pareto efficient allocations, after an 
Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923), who developed the concept of 
efficiency in exchange: An allocation is Pareto efficiency if goods cannot be 
reallocated to make someone better off without making someone else worse off. In 
other words, suppose we are in a competitive market, the bargaining outcomes 
depend on circumstances of each consumer. In this market there are many buyers 
                                                           
1Named after political economist F.Y. Edgeworth, who suggested its use in his 1881 book: “Mathematical 
Psychics: An Essay on the Application of Mathematics to the Moral Sciences”, New York, August M. Kelley, 
1953. 
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and sellers, if people do not like the terms of an exchange, they can look for another 
seller who offers better terms. As a result, each buyer and seller takes the price of 
the goods as fixed and decides how much to buy and to sell at that price. At point G 
(Figure 5.1) the allocation in a competitive equilibrium is efficient, first because the 
ICs are tangent, all MRS between consumers are equal. Second, each IC is tangent 
to BC or the price line (MRS (M) = MRS (Mn) = PX / PY). 
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Figure 5.1 the Contract Curve 
Are efficient allocations equitable? Economists and others disagree both 
about how to define equity and how to quantify it. As a result, no agreement on 
whether one efficient allocation is preferred to another is possible. One inefficient 
allocation of resources may be more equitable than another efficient allocation. 
A competitive equilibrium leads to a Pareto efficient outcome. But that 
particular outcome may not be equitable. In fact, a competitive equilibrium could 
occur at any point on the contract curve, depending on the initial allocation. Because 
of that, society must rely to some extent on government to redistribute income or 
goods among households to achieve equity goals. These goals can be reached 
through the tax system, providing public services …etc 
Unfortunately, all programs that redistribute income in our society are costly. 
Taxes may encourage individuals to work less or cause firms to devote resources to 
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avoid taxes rather than producing output. For an economy to be efficient, it must not 
only produce goods at minimum cost, it must also produce goods in combinations 
that match people’s willingness to pay for them.   
The efficient combination of outputs is produced when the Marginal Rate of 
Transformation (MRT) between the two goods (which measures the cost of 
producing one good relative to the other) is equal to the consumer’s MRS (which 
measures the marginal benefit of consuming one good relatively to another). In a 
competitive output market, people consume to the point where their MRS is equal to 
the price ratio. Producers choose outputs, so that the MRT is equal to the price ratio 
also. Because the MRS equals the MRT the competitive output market is efficient. 
Any other price ratio will lead to an excess demand for one good and excess supply 
of the other. At point C (Figure 5.2) MRS = MRT = PX / PY. 
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Figure 5.2 Output efficiency 
It is important to say that one of the main reasons (actually there are four: 
monopoly power, incomplete information, public goods and externalities) of market’s 
failure is externalities, which is considered as the effects of production and 
consumption activities not directly reflected in the market. 
Externalities 
An externality occurs when an agent’s well being is directly affected by the 
actions of another agent, in other words it is a situation where one agent’s actions, 
producing or consuming, imposes costs, or provides benefits, to other agents without 
paying compensation, or respectively receives a reward. 
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Externalities can be negative, when the action of one party imposes costs on 
another party, or positive, when the action of one party benefits another party. For 
example, a negative externality occurs when an upstream country (A) dumps its 
waste in a River that downstream country (B) is benefiting from, more waste will 
definitely leads to more negative outcomes.  
The negative externality arises because country (A) has no incentive to 
account for the external costs that it imposes, due to its actions, when making its 
decision. A positive externality may occur when country (A) decides not to dump its 
waste in the River, hence positive outcomes (benefits) for country (B). With such 
external effects competitive equilibria need not be Pareto efficient and some 
government intervention may be necessary to achieve efficiency. 
Various regulatory rules and pricing schemes have been developed to ensure 
that goods produced by increasing returns technologies and/or goods giving rise to 
externalities are efficiently provided.  
Example, the polluter should pay the costs of their pollution. If consumption of 
a good at price p in quantity x imposes external pollution cost C(x) on other 
consumers then governments should intervene to increase the price charged to p + 
C’(x) by levying a tax t per unit of consumption equal to C’(x) with tax t the external 
cost of consuming the good (previously unpaid for the pollution damage) is 
internalised and the externality disappears.  
Government regulation can deal with the inefficiencies that arise from 
externalities. But this regulation is not the only way, in some circumstances 
inefficiencies can be eliminated through private bargaining among the affected 
parties, or by legal system in which parties can sue to recover the damages they 
suffer.            
The concept that underlies the whole externalities’ discussions is the concept 
of property rights. Property rights are the legal rules that describe what people may 
do with their property. They may build a house, sell the land, they are also protected 
from interference with their use of rights. 
Property Rights 
Private property rights are the dominant institutional arrangement in most 
developed economies of the west, developing countries also are moving in that 
direction. Private property in land is also a familiar arrangement. If someone owns a 
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piece of land, he or she has an incentive that the land is managed in ways that 
maximise its value.   
Using the previous example, country (A) disposes its wastes in the River. If 
(A) has a property right, it has no incentive to include or to pay any cost associated 
with the damages done. If country (B) has a property right to clean water, it could 
demand that country (A) pays the costs associated with the damages. These costs 
will be internalised, and efficient allocation of resources could be achieved. 
More explanation needed. Figure 5.3 shows that the marginal damages 
function, which is represented by the curve MD, and the marginal abatement costs 
function, which is represented by the curve MAC. The point of intersection of both 
curves represents the efficient level of emissions e∗ (see appendix 1, annex 4 for 
more explanations). 
Some assumptions are needed: 
  - The marginal damage function refers to all the damages suffered by country 
(A); 
- The marginal abatement cost curve applies to the country emitting effluent 
into the River (B); 
- Country (B) may use the River any way it wishes. 
 
 
         $ 
   
          r   
         
                MAC             MD 
 
 
     
         
 
 
 
 
      
           0 
                 e
∗
    e
1 
      Emissions (tons/year) 
 
Figure 5.3 Liability and Property Rights 
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Suppose that emissions initially are at e1, country (B) is devoting no resources 
at all to emissions abatement. At this point marginal damages are $r and marginal 
abatement costs are nil. The obvious action for country (A) to do is to offer country 
(B) some amount of money to reduce its effluent stream; for the first ton any amount 
agreed on between 0 and $r would make both parties better off. In fact, they would 
continue to bargain as long as marginal damages exceeded marginal abatement 
costs. This bargaining process would result in a reduction in effluent to e∗, the point 
at which marginal damages and marginal abatement costs are equal. 
On the other hand, if country (A) has the same right of use given previously to 
country (B), in this case the emission level would be zero or very close to it (point 
e1). So country (B) would have to buy permission from country (A) to dump its 
wastes. Any price for this, lower than marginal abatement costs but higher than 
marginal damages would make both parties better off. Similar process of bargaining 
with payments now going in the opposite direction, the emission level would be 
adjusted from the low level where it started toward the efficient level e∗. 
If property rights over the environmental asset are clearly defined, and 
bargaining among “owners” and “prospective users” is allowed, the efficient level of 
effluent will result irrespective of who was initially given the property right.   
By defining private property rights, the conditions under which decentralized 
bargaining can produce efficient levels of environmental quality, can be established. 
Because some will say that the parties doing bargaining may know more about the 
relative values involve (abatement costs and damages), and the true efficiency point 
may be reached at the end. Also, no need to have some “bureaucratic organization” 
making decisions, based mostly on political considerations, instead of the true 
economic values involved.  
In order for a property rights approach to be effective, three main conditions 
should be met: 
- Property rights must be well defined, enforceable, and transferable; 
- There must be a reasonably efficient and competitive system for interested 
parties to come together and negotiate about how these environmental property 
rights will be used; 
- There must be a complete set of markets so that private owners may 
capture all social values associated with the use of an environmental asset. 
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Finally it is important to mention that the efficient use of the River depends on 
negotiations and agreement between the two countries. In this sample we assume 
that, transactions costs, which are negotiations costs together with the costs of 
policing the agreement, are expected to be fairly modest. As transactions costs are 
low, both countries should be able to negotiate on the efficient level of emissions. 
The question that arises is:  
- When transactions costs are high, can this seriously reduce the potential of 
the private property approach to identify the efficient level of emissions? 
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Annex 8: Water in the Bible  
European Christian Environmental Network, (2007) 
http://www.africanwater.org/religion.htm  
 
Old Testament 
Because the Bible was written in a part of the world where water is scarce it is 
not surprising that water features significantly in the lives of the people.  The 
scarceness of water was very serious and drought was often as a result of the wrath 
of God.  The prophets Elijah, Jeremiah and Haggai all predict drought as 
punishment from God (1 Kings 17:1, Jeremiah 14: 1-6 and Haggai 1: 10-11 
respectively).  Conversely rainfall is a sign of God’s favour and goodness. 
Water was often associated with danger and death, as in the story of the 
Great Flood, the drowning of the Egyptians in the Red Sea and the fear of the sea 
and deep waters expressed by the Psalmists as in Psalm 32:6- 
For this shall every one that is godly pray unto thee in a time when thou 
mayest be found: surely in the floods of great waters they shall not come nigh unto 
him. 
Polluted and undrinkable water was also very serious.  One of the plagues 
of Egypt was turning the waters of the Nile River to blood (Exodus 7:14-24).  When 
the Israelites left the Red Sea and came to Marah they found the water there bitter 
and complained to Moses.  God allowed Moses to perform the miracle of making the 
water sweet and restored the Israelites faith in Him (Exodus 15:22-27).  
In warfare it was common practice to cut off a city’s water supply as 
Jehosaphat did with the wells of Moab (2 Kings 3:19-25).   
Water was also important for cleansing.  Priests were washed at their 
consecration (Exodus 29:4) special ablutions were demanded for priests on the Day 
of Atonement (Leviticus 16:4, 24, 26) and of all men for the removal of ceremonial 
pollution (Leviticus 11:40, 15:15, Deuteronomy 23:11 etc). 
Water is also symbolic of God’s blessing and spiritual refreshment and is 
used many times in the Bible.  The following are just a few examples: 
Isaiah 35:6-7 
...for in the wilderness shall waters break out, and streams in the desert. 
And the parched ground shall become a pool, and the thirsty land springs of water... 
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Isaiah 41:17-18 
When the poor and needy seek water, and there is none, and their tongue 
faileth for thirst, I the LORD will hear them, I the God of Israel will not forsake them. 
I will open rivers in high places, and fountains in the midst of the valleys: I will make 
the wilderness a pool of water, and the dry land springs of water. 
The longing for water indicates spiritual need as in Psalm 42:1- 
As the hart panteth after the water brooks, so panteth my soul after thee, O God. 
In Ezekial’s vision of God’s house the waters that poured from under the 
threshold represent the unrestricted flow of God’s blessings upon his people 
(Ezekiel 47:1-12). 
Jeremiah describes God as “ the fountain of living waters” (Jeremiah 2:13, 
17:13). 
New Testament 
In the New Testament water is connected with the gift of eternal life.  Some 
examples are  
John 4:14  
But whosoever drinketh of the water that I shall give him shall never thirst; but 
the water that I shall give him shall be in him a well of water springing up into 
everlasting life. 
Revelation 21:6 
...I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end. I will give unto him that 
is athirst of the fountain of the water of life freely. 
 
The story of Jesus and the Samaritan woman  
John 4: 1-42 
(King James Version, the Holy Bible. Christ’s words are in Italics) 
1When therefore the LORD knew how the Pharisees had heard that Jesus 
made and baptized more disciples than John, 2(though Jesus himself baptized not, 
but his disciples,) 3he left Judaea, and departed again into Galilee.  
4And he must (needs) go through Samaria.  5Then cometh he to a city of 
Samaria, which is called Sychar, near to the parcel of ground that Jacob gave to his 
son Joseph.  6Now Jacob’s well was there. Jesus therefore, being wearied with his 
journey, sat thus on the well: and it was about the sixth hour. 
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7There cometh a woman of Samaria to draw water: Jesus saith unto her, 
“Give me to drink” 8(for his disciples were gone away unto the city to buy meat.) 
 
9Then saith the woman of Samaria unto him, “How is it that thou, being a Jew, 
askest drink of me, which am a woman of Samaria?” (For the Jews have no dealings 
with the Samaritans.) 
10Jesus answered and said unto her, “If thou knewest the gift of God, and who 
it is that saith to thee, Give me to drink; thou wouldest have asked of him, and he 
would have given thee living water.” 
11The woman saith unto him, “Sir, thou hast nothing to draw with, and the well 
is deep: from whence then hast thou that living water?  12Art thou greater than our 
father Jacob, which gave us the well, and drank thereof himself, and his children, 
and his cattle?” 
13Jesus answered and said unto her, “Whosoever drinketh of this water shall 
thirst again: 14but whosoever drinketh of the water that I shall give him shall never 
thirst; but the water that I shall give him shall be in him a well of water springing up 
into everlasting life.” 
15The woman saith unto him, “Sir, give me this water, that I thirst not, neither 
come hither to draw.” 
16Jesus saith unto her, “Go, call thy husband, and come hither.” 
17The woman answered and said, “I have no husband.” Jesus said unto her, 
“Thou hast well said, I have no husband: 18for thou hast had five husbands; and he 
whom thou now hast is not thy husband: in that saidst thou truly.” 
19The woman saith unto him, “Sir, I perceive that thou art a prophet.  20Our 
fathers worshipped in this mountain; and ye say, that in Jerusalem is the place 
where men ought to worship.” 
21Jesus saith unto her, “Woman, believe me, the hour cometh, when ye shall 
neither in this mountain, nor yet at Jerusalem, worship the Father.  22Ye worship ye 
know not what: we know what we worship: for salvation is of the Jews.  23But the 
hour cometh, and now is, when the true worshippers shall worship the Father in spirit 
and in truth: for the Father seeketh such to worship him.  24God is a Spirit: and they 
that worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth.” 
25The woman saith unto him, “I know that Messiah cometh, which is called 
Christ: when he is come, he will tell us all things.”  
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26Jesus saith unto her, “I that speak unto thee am he.”  
27And upon this came his disciples, and marvelled that he talked with the 
woman: yet no man said, “What seekest thou?” or, “Why talkest thou with her?” 
28The woman then left her waterpot, and went her way into the city, and saith 
to the men, 29“Come, see a man, which told me all things that ever I did: is not this 
the Christ?”  30Then they went out of the city, and came unto him. 
31In the mean while his disciples prayed him, saying, “Master, eat.” 
32But he said unto them, “I have meat to eat that ye know not of.” 
33Therefore said the disciples one to another, “Hath any man brought him 
ought to eat?” 
34Jesus saith unto them, “My meat is to do the will of him that sent me, and to 
finish his work.  35Say not ye, There are yet four months, and then cometh harvest? 
behold, I say unto you, Lift up your eyes, and look on the fields; for they are white 
already to harvest.  36And he that reapeth receiveth wages, and gathereth fruit unto 
life eternal: that both he that soweth and he that reapeth may rejoice together.  37And 
herein is that saying true, One soweth, and another reapeth.  38I sent you to reap that 
whereon ye bestowed no labour: other men laboured, and ye are entered into their 
labours.” 
39And many of the Samaritans of that city believed on him for the saying of the 
woman, which testified, “He told me all that ever I did.”  40So when the Samaritans 
were come unto him, they besought him that he would tarry with them: and he abode 
there two days.  41And many more believed because of his own word;  
42And said unto the woman, “Now we believe, not because of thy saying: for 
we have heard him ourselves, and know that this is indeed the Christ, the Saviour of 
the world.”) 
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Annex 9: EU Rapid Reaction Mechanism – End of programme report 
Lebanon/Israel Wazzani springs dispute 
European Commission Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit, January 
2004. www.unispal.un.org/.../6d44261ed50b1a0e85256e51006a826e?OpenDocument  
 
Summary 
This report is submitted to the Council pursuant to article 9 of Council 
Regulation (EC) 381/2001 of 26 February 2001 establishing the Rapid Reaction 
Mechanism. 
The Commission sent an expert team under the Rapid Reaction Mechanism 
(RRM) to Lebanon and Israel in October 2002 as part of a concerted international 
response to rising tensions between Israel and Lebanon over the construction of a 
pumping station at the Wazzani springs. The team was sent in response to an 
appeal by the Lebanon and the UN for assistance in resolving the dispute. It was 
tasked with providing an objective assessment of the technical data upon which a 
mediated settlement of the dispute could be built. 
The Wazzani springs rise in Lebanon close to the Blue Line. Their waters feed 
the Hasbani river - a tributary of the Jordan, one of Israel’s main water sources. 
Israel objected to the construction of the pumping station without prior consultation, 
while Hezbollah threatened retaliation to any Israeli attack on the plant. 
The study team (to which the French authorities seconded an expert at the 
request of the Commission) delivered its report in July 2003 (as reported to Member 
States at the time). It provides a technical overview of the water resources of the 
whole Hasbani basin. The study also identifies the parameters affecting future 
development of the water resources in the basin. In the absence of an agreed 
framework for mediation of the dispute the report has not yet been released, though 
Israel, Lebanon, the US and the UN have been briefed on its key findings. The report 
has been delivered to the EU Special Representative on the Middle East Peace 
Process who is expected to raise the issue on his forthcoming tour to the region in 
January 2004. 
 
Background 
The water resources of the Hasbani basin became a source of mounting 
tension between Lebanon and Israel in August 2002 when Lebanon announced the 
254 
 
construction of a new pumping station at the Wazzani springs. The springs feed the 
Hasbani river, which rises in the south of Lebanon and crosses the frontier (‘Blue 
Line’) to feed the Jordan and subsequently the Sea of Galilee, which is used as 
Israel’s main reservoir. 
The pumping station was completed in October 2002. Its purpose was to 
provide drinking water and irrigation to some sixty villages on the Lebanese side of 
the Blue line. An existing pumping station supplied a small population on the Israeli 
side of the line. October 2002 also marked the high point of tension between Israel 
and Lebanon, with a real risk of armed conflict over the station. The Israelis 
complained about the lack of prior consultation whereas the Lebanese contended 
that the project was consistent with the 1955 Johnston Plan on the water resources 
of the region 2. 
The EU and US both sent envoys to the region in late 2002 in response to the 
rising tensions. The UN also indicated that it was prepared to offer its good offices to 
the parties and co-ordinated international offers of assistance. On 13 October, the 
Lebanese Prime Minister invited the EC to provide technical assistance to establish 
objective baseline information on the water resources of the disputed area. The EC 
Rapid Reaction Mechanism assessment team arrived in the region two days later, 
and prepared a preliminary appraisal of the situation as a first contribution within the 
framework UN co-ordinated response. 
 
Objectives of the programme 
The overall objective of the project was to contribute to the reduction of 
tension between Israel and Lebanon over the sharing of the water resources of the 
Wazzani springs and the Hasbani river. 
The project’s specific objective was to provide objective information on 
volumes of water being extracted from the springs and the Hasbani river and to offer 
a technical overview of the parameters affecting the usage of the water resources of 
the Hasbani basin. 
 
Outputs 
The study team provided the following outputs: 
 A hydrological impact assessment of the Wazzani pumping station; 
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 An assessment of water needs for the area served by the Wazzani pumping 
station and a preliminary assessment of the technical options for meeting 
these needs. 
 Identification of the parameters affecting the use of water resources in the 
wider Hasbani basin, including their possible impact on downstream water 
users. 
 
Management of the programmes and follow-up 
The study was designed in close consultation with the office of the EU Special 
Representative and the UN Special Representative for South Lebanon, Stefan de 
Mistura. The secondment of a hydrologist from the French Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs proved valuable in ensuring a coherent EU approach to the technical issues 
underlining the dispute. 
The study was been conducted in close collaboration with the Lebanese 
authorities and in consultation with Israel (which, however, declined to provide any 
data). The exercise has been co-ordinated with the UN at high level in New York. 
 
Monitoring, Reporting and Evaluation 
The programme was monitored by the EC Delegations in Beirut and Tel Aviv. 
Regular briefings have been given to the EU Special Representative (EUSR) and his 
staff, the Political and Security Committee, the Council working group on the Middle 
East Peace Process and the Water Task Force (most recently at its meeting of 16 
December 2003). The Commission has ensured regular communication with the US 
State Department and the UN both at field and headquarters level. 
 
Financial Summary 
 
Programme Ref  RRM 2002-03 Policy Advice and Mediation Facility 
Financing Decision C(2002)1245 
Start Date of project 16/10/2002 
End Date of project 16/04/2003 
Project amount €86,500 
OECD DAC Code 14010 
Water resources policy and administrative management 
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Assessment of Impact 
The final report of the RRM team was accepted in June 2003 and a summary 
of its findings communicated to Member States. Regrettably the mediation process 
to which the study was intended to contribute has not yet materialised, with the 
Israelis insisting that the US act as guarantors of its interests in such a process, 
whereas Lebanon is seeking a UN framework. The UN is ready to provide its good 
offices to the parties to the dispute but is not prepared to mediate between 
intermediaries. 
It was agreed in discussions with the EUSR and the Council that an early 
public release of the Wazzani study in the absence of a political process for the 
resolution of the dispute would undermine its value. However, the Commission has 
provided oral briefings on the main findings of the study to the Lebanese Prime 
Minister, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the UN and the US State Department. 
The dispute remains unresolved. Nevertheless, it is clear that the concerted 
international response to the crisis on the Israel–Lebanon border sparked by the 
Wazzani pumping station was effective in reducing tension in the area and avoiding 
a military engagement. The Wazzani study contributed an important practical 
element to the international response, and was effective in strengthening the role of 
the EU in the dispute in a number of distinct ways: 
 It provided concrete demonstration of the effective engagement of the 
international community in the dispute; 
 It contributed to ensuring continued international scrutiny of the issue 
throughout the six months of the study period; 
 It ensured the EU Prime Ministerial level access on the issue in Lebanon; 
 It provided a non-political channel of contact with the Israeli side, which 
eventually led to an official Israeli demarche and non-paper on 2 February 
2003;  
 It provided an opportunity for reinforced co-operation with the United States, 
resulting in regular briefing sessions with State Department officials. 
The issue remains on the agenda, though good Winter rains are expected to take 
the edge off the dispute for the time being (as was the case in Winter 2002/3). It is 
expected to be raised by EUSR Otte during his January visit to the region. The 
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Commission has indicated that it will seek the advice of the EUSR and Member 
States before releasing the full study. 
 
European Commission 
Brussels, January 2004 
 
Contact:  Alexander McLachlan 
Telephone +32 2 2994485 
Alexander.McLachlan@cec.eu.int 
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Annex 10:  The Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development 
Dublín, Ireland, January 31, 1992 
www.un-documents.net/h2o-dub.htm,  www.sawse.org/Helpus.html 
http://www.wiserearth.org/resource/view/50a7c9f5d1b56d7fd82d1fbc06ba4e6b    
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 Agricultural production and rural water supply 
 Protecting aquatic ecosystems 
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 The enabling environment 
 The knowledge base 
 Capacity building 
 
Follow-Up 
 
Introduction 
Scarcity and misuse of fresh water pose a serious and growing threat to 
sustainable development and protection of the environment. Human health and 
welfare, food security, industrial development and the ecosystems on which they 
depend, are all at risk, unless water and land resources are managed more 
effectively in the present decade and beyond than they have been in the past. 
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Five hundred participants, including government-designated experts from a 
hundred countries and representatives of eighty international, intergovernmental and 
non-governmental organizations attended the International Conference on Water 
and the Environment (ICWE) in Dublin, Ireland, on January 26-31, 1992. The experts 
saw the emerging global water resources picture as critical. At its closing session, 
the Conference adopted this Dublin Statement and the Conference Report. The 
problems highlighted are not speculative in nature; nor are they likely to affect our 
planet only in the distant future. They are here and they affect humanity now. The 
future survival of many millions of people demands immediate and effective action. 
The Conference participants call for fundamental new approaches to the 
assessment, development, and management of freshwater resources, which can 
only be brought about through political commitment and involvement from the 
highest levels of government to the smallest communities. Commitment will need to 
be backed by substantial and immediate investments, public awareness campaigns, 
legislative and institutional changes, technology development, and capacity building 
programmes. Underlying all these must be a greater recognition of the 
interdependence of all peoples, and of their place in the natural world.  
In commending this Dublin Statement to the world leaders assembled at the 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de 
Janeiro in June 1992, the Conference participants urge all governments to study 
carefully the specific activities and means of implementation recommended in the 
Conference Report, and to translate those recommendations into urgent action 
programmes for water and sustainable development. 
 
Guiding Principles 
Concerted action is needed to reverse the present trends of overconsumption, 
pollution, and rising threats from drought and floods. The Conference Report sets out 
recommendations for action at local, national, and international levels, based on four 
guiding principles. 
 
Principle No. 1 - Fresh water is a finite and vulnerable resource, essential to 
sustain life, development and the environment 
Since water sustains life, effective management of water resources demands 
a holistic approach, linking social and economic development with protection of 
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natural ecosystems. Effective management links land and water uses across the 
whole of a catchment area or groundwater aquifer. 
 
Principle No. 2 - Water development and management should be based on a 
participatory approach, involving users, planners and policy-makers at all 
levels 
The participatory approach involves raising awareness of the importance of 
water among policymakers and the general public. It means that decisions are taken 
at the lowest appropriate level, with full public consultation and involvement of users 
in the planning and implementation of water projects. 
 
Principle No. 3 - Women play a central part in the provision, management and 
safeguarding of water 
This pivotal role of women as providers and users of water and guardians of 
the living environment has seldom been reflected in institutional arrangements for 
the development and management of water resources. Acceptance and 
implementation of this principle requires positive policies to address women’s 
specific needs and to equip and empower women to participate at all levels in water 
resources programmes, including decision-making and implementation, in ways 
defined by them. 
 
Principle No. 4 - Water has an economic value in all its competing uses and 
should be recognized as an economic good 
Within this principle, it is vital to recognize first the basic right of all human 
beings to have access to clean water and sanitation at an affordable price. Past 
failure to recognize the economic value of water has led to wasteful and 
environmentally damaging uses of the resource.  
Managing water as an economic good is an important way of achieving 
efficient and equitable use, and of encouraging conservation and protection of water 
resources. 
 
The Action Agenda 
Based on these four guiding principles, the Conference participants 
developed recommendations which enable countries to tackle their water resources 
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problems on a wide range of fronts. The major benefits to come from implementation 
of the Dublin recommendations will be: 
 
Alleviation of poverty and disease 
At the start of the 1990s, more than a quarter of the world’s population still 
lack the basic human needs of enough food to eat, a clean water supply and 
hygienic means of sanitation. The Conference recommends that priority be given in 
water resources development and management to the accelerated provision of food, 
water and sanitation to these unserved millions. 
 
Protection against natural disasters 
Lack of preparedness, often aggravated by lack of data, means that droughts 
and floods take a huge toll in deaths, misery and economic loss. Economic losses 
from natural disasters, including floods and droughts, increased three-fold between 
the 1960s and the 1980s.  
Development is being set back for years in some developing countries, 
because investments have not been made in basic data collection and disaster 
preparedness. Projected climate change and rising sea levels will intensify the risk 
for some, while also threatening the apparent security of existing water resources. 
Damages and loss of life from floods and droughts can be drastically reduced by the 
disaster preparedness actions recommended in the Dublin Conference Report. 
 
Water conservation and reuse 
Current patterns of water use involve excessive waste. There is great scope 
for water savings in agriculture, in industry and in domestic water supplies. 
Irrigated agriculture accounts for about 80% of water withdrawals in the world. In 
many irrigation schemes, up to 60% of this water is lost on its way from the source to 
the plant. More efficient irrigation practices will lead to substantial freshwater 
savings. 
Recycling could reduce the consumption of many industrial consumers by 
50% or more, with the additional benefit of reduced pollution. Application of the 
"polluter pays" principle and realistic water pricing will encourage conservation and 
reuse. On average, 36% of the water produced by urban water utilities in developing 
countries is "unaccounted for". Better management could reduce these costly losses. 
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Combined savings in agriculture, industry, and domestic water supplies could 
significantly defer investment in costly new water-resource development and have 
enormous impact on the sustainability of future supplies. More savings will come 
from multiple use of water. Compliance with effective discharge standards, based on 
new water protection objectives, will enable successive downstream consumers to 
reuse water which presently is too contaminated after the first use. 
 
Sustainable urban development 
The sustainability of urban growth is threatened by curtailment of the copious 
supplies of cheap water, as a result of the depletion and degradation caused by past 
profligacy. After a generation or more of excessive water use and reckless discharge 
of municipal and industrial wastes, the situation in the majority of the worldþs major 
cities is appalling and getting worse. As water scarcity and pollution force 
development of ever more distant sources, marginal costs of meeting fresh demands 
are growing rapidly. Future guaranteed supplies must be based on appropriate water 
charges and discharge controls. Residual contamination of land and water can no 
longer be seen as a reasonable trade-off for the jobs and prosperity brought by 
industrial growth. 
 
Agricultural production and rural water supply 
Achieving food security is a high priority in many countries, and agriculture 
must not only provide food for rising populations, but also save water for other uses. 
The challenge is to develop and apply water-saving technology and management 
methods, and through capacity building, enables communities to introduce 
institutions and incentives for the rural population to adopt new approaches, for both 
rainfed and irrigated agriculture. The rural population must also have better access 
to a potable water supply and to sanitation services. It is an immense task, but not 
an impossible one, provided appropriate policies and programmes are adopted at all 
levels--local, national and international. 
 
Protecting aquatic ecosystems 
Water is a vital part of the environment and a home for many forms of life on 
which the well-being of humans ultimately depends. Disruption of flows has reduced 
the productivity of many such ecosystems, devastated fisheries, agriculture and 
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grazing, and marginalized the rural communities which rely on these. Various kinds 
of pollution, including transboundary pollution, exacerbate these problems, degrade 
water supplies, require more expensive water treatment, destroy aquatic fauna, and 
deny recreation opportunities. Integrated management of river basins provides the 
opportunity to safeguard aquatic ecosystems, and make their benefits available to 
society on a sustainable basis. 
 
Resolving water conflicts 
The most appropriate geographical entity for the planning and management of 
water resources is the river basin, including surface and groundwater. Ideally, the 
effective integrated planning and development of transboundary river or lake basins 
has similar institutional requirements to a basin entirely within one country. The 
essential function of existing international basin organizations is one of reconciling 
and harmonizing the interests of riparian countries, monitoring water quantity and 
quality, development of concerted action programmes, exchange of information, and 
enforcing agreements. 
In the coming decades, management of international watersheds will greatly 
increase in importance. A high priority should therefore be given to the preparation 
and implementation of integrated management plans, endorsed by all affected 
governments and backed by international agreements. 
 
The enabling environment 
Implementation of action programmes for water and sustainable development 
will require a substantial investment, not only in the capital projects concerned, but, 
crucially, in building the capacity of people and institutions to plan and implement 
those projects. 
 
The knowledge base 
Measurements of components of the water cycle, in quantity and quality, and 
of other characteristics of the environment affecting water are an essential basis for 
undertaking effective water management. Research and analysis techniques, 
applied on an interdisciplinary basis, permit the understanding of these data and 
their application to many uses.  
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With the threat of global warming due to increasing greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere, the need for measurements and data exchange 
on the hydrological cycle on a global scale is evident. The data are required to 
understand both the world’s climate system and the potential impacts on water 
resources of climate change and sea level rise. All countries must participate and, 
where necessary, be assisted to take part in the global monitoring, the study of the 
effects and the development of appropriate response strategies. 
 
Capacity building 
All actions identified in the Dublin Conference Report require well-trained and 
qualified personnel. Countries should identify, as part of national development plans, 
training needs for water resources assessment and management, and take steps 
internally and, if necessary with technical co-operation agencies, to provide the 
required training, and working conditions which help to retain the trained personnel. 
Governments must also assess their capacity to equip their water and other 
specialists to implement the full range of activities for integrated water-resources 
management. This requires provision of an enabling environment in terms of 
institutional and legal arrangements, including those for effective water-demand 
management. 
Awareness rising is a vital part of a participatory approach to water resources 
management. Information, education and communication support programmes must 
be an integral part of the development process. 
 
Follow-Up 
Experience has shown that progress towards implementing the actions and 
achieving the goals of water programmes requires follow-up mechanisms for periodic 
assessments at national and international levels. In the framework of the follow-up 
procedures developed by UNCED for Agenda 21, all Governments should initiate 
periodic assessments of progress. At the international level, United Nations 
institutions concerned with water should be strengthened to undertake the 
assessment and follow-up process. In addition, to involve private institutions, 
regional and non-governmental organizations along with all interested governments 
in the assessment and follow-up, the Conference proposes, for consideration by 
UNCED, a world water forum or council to which all such groups could adhere. 
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It is proposed that the first full assessment on implementation of the recommended 
programme should be undertaken by the year 2000. 
UNCED is urged to consider the financial requirements for water-related 
programmes, in accordance with the above principles, in the funding for 
implementation of Agenda 21. Such considerations must include realistic targets for 
the timeframe for implementation of the programmes, the internal and external 
resources needed, and the means of mobilizing these. 
The International Conference on Water and the Environment began with a 
Water Ceremony in which children from all parts of the world made a moving plea to 
the assembled experts to play their part in preserving precious water resources for 
future generations. 
In transmitting this Dublin Statement to a world audience, the Conference 
participants urge all those involved in the development and management of our 
water resources to allow the message of those children to direct their future actions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
266 
 
Appendix 2 
 
Annex 1: Maps 
 
Map 1: The State of Israel 
 
Source: Wikipedia. December 31, 2006. 
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Map 2: Lebanon’s Major River Basins 
 
Source: ECODIT 2001, Lebanon State of the Environment Report, P: 114. 
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Map 3: The Jordan River Basin 
 
Source: Adapted from the Johnston Plan (Passia.org 2007) 
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Map 4: Israel Freshwater Resources 
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Annex 2: Zionist Organization Statement on Palestine 
Paris Peace Conference (February 3, 1919) 
 
PROPOSALS PRESENTED TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE 
 
The Zionist Organization respectfully submits the following draft resolutions 
for the consideration of the Peace Conference:  
1. The High Contracting Parties recognize the historic title of the Jewish 
people to Palestine and the right of Jews to reconstitute in Palestine their National 
Home.  
2. The boundaries of Palestine shall be as declared in the Schedule annexed 
hereto.  
3. The sovereign possession of Palestine shall be vested in the League of 
Nations and the Government entrusted to Great Britain as Mandatory of the League.  
4. (Provision to be inserted relating to the application in Palestine of such of 
the general conditions attached to mandates as are suitable to the case.)  
5. The mandate shall be subject also to the following special conditions:  
1. Palestine shall be placed under such political, administrative and economic 
conditions as will secure the establishment there of the Jewish National 
Home, and ultimately render possible the creation of an autonomous 
Commonwealth, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which 
may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities 
in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other 
country.  
To this end the Mandatory Power shall inter alia:  
1. Promote Jewish settlement and close settlement on the land, the 
established rights of the present non-Jewish population being equitably safeguarded.  
2. Accept the co-operation in such measures of a Council representative of 
the Jews in Palestine and of the world that may be established for the development 
of the Jewish National Home in Palestine and entrust the organization of Jewish 
education to such Council.  
3. On being satisfied that the constitution of such Council precludes the 
making of private profit, offer to the Council in priority any concession for public 
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works or for the development of natural sources which may be found desirable to 
grant:  
1. The Mandatory Power shall encourage the widest measure of self-
government for localities practicable in the conditions of the country.  
2. There shall be forever the fullest freedom of religious worship for all creeds 
in Palestine. There shall be no discrimination among the inhabitants with 
regard to citizenship and civil rights, on the grounds of religion, or of race.  
3. (Provision to be inserted relating to the control of the Holy Places.)  
 
THE BOUNDARIES OF PALESTINE 
SCHEDULE  
The boundaries of Palestine shall follow the general lines set out below:  
Starting on the North at a point on the Mediterranean Sea in the vicinity south of 
Sidon and following the watersheds of the foothills of the Lebanon as far as Jisr El-
Karaon thence to El-Bire, following the dividing line between the two basins of the 
Wadi El-Korn and the Wadi Et-Teim, thence in a southerly direction following the 
dividing line between the Eastern and Western slopes of the Hermon, to the vicinity 
west of Beit Jenn, then eastward following the northern watersheds of the Nahr 
Mughaniye close to and west of the Hedjaz Railway.  
In the east a line close to and west of the Hedjaz Railway terminating in the 
Gulf of Akaba;  
In the south a frontier to be agreed upon with the Egyptian Government;  
In the west the Mediterranean Sea.  
The details of the delimitations, or any necessary adjustments of detail, shall 
be settled by a Special Commission on which there shall be Jewish representation.  
 
STATEMENT 
THE HISTORICAL TITLE 
The claims of the Jews with regard to Palestine rest upon the following main 
considerations:  
1. The land is the historic home of the Jews; there they achieved their 
greatest development; from the centre, through their agency, there emanated 
spiritual and moral influences of supreme value to mankind. By violence they were 
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driven from Palestine, and through the ages they have never ceased to cherish the 
longing and the hope of a return.  
2. In some parts of the world, and particularly in Eastern Europe, the 
conditions of life of millions of Jews are deplorable. Forming often a congested 
population, denied the opportunities which would make a healthy development 
possible, the need of fresh outlets is urgent, both for their own sake and the interests 
of the population of other races, among whom they dwell. Palestine would offer one 
such outlet. To the Jewish masses it is the country above all others in which they 
would most wish to cast their lot. By the methods of economic development to which 
we shall refer later, Palestine can be made now, as it was in ancient times, the home 
of a prosperous population many times as numerous as that which now inhabits it.  
3. Palestine is not large enough to contain more than a proportion of the Jews 
of the world. The greater part of the fourteen millions or more scattered throughout 
all countries must remain in their present localities, and it will doubtless be one of the 
cares of the Peace Conference to ensnare for them, wherever they have been 
oppressed, as for all peoples, equal rights and humane conditions. A Jewish 
National Home in Palestine will, however, be of high value to them also. It influence 
will permeate the Jewries of the world, it will inspire these millions, hitherto often 
despairing, with a new hope; it will hold out before their eyes a higher standard; it will 
help to make them even more useful citizens in the lands in which they dwell.  
4. Such a Palestine would be of value also to the world at large, whose real 
wealth consists in the healthy diversities of its civilizations.  
5. Lastly, the land itself needs redemption. Much of it is left desolate. It 
present condition is a standing reproach. Two things are necessary for that 
redemption -- a stable and enlightened Government, and an addition to the present 
population which shall be energetic, intelligent, devoted to the country, and backed 
by the large financial resources that are indispensable for development. Such a 
population the Jews alone can supply.  
Inspired by these ideas, Jewish activities, particularly during the last thirty 
years, have been directed to Palestine within the measure that the Turkish 
administrative system allowed. Some millions of pounds sterling have been spent in 
the country, particularly in the foundation of agricultural settlements. These 
settlements have been, for the most part, highly successful.  
273 
 
With enterprise and skill the Jews have adopted modern scientific methods 
and have shown themselves to be capable agriculturalists. Hebrew has been revived 
as a living language; it is the medium of instruction in the schools and the tongue is 
in daily use among the rising generation. The foundations of a Jewish University 
have been laid at Jerusalem and considerable funds have been contributed for the 
creation of its building and for its endowment. Since the British occupation the Zionist 
Organization has expended in Palestine approximately =A3 50,000 a month upon 
relief, education and sanitation. To promote the future development of the country, 
great sums will be needed for drainage, irrigation, roads, railways, harbors and 
public works of all kinds, as well as for land settlement and house building. Assuming 
a political settlement under which the establishment of a Jewish National Home in 
Palestine is assured, the Jews of the world will make every effort to provide the vast 
sums of money that will be needed.  
Hundreds of thousands of Jews pray for the opportunity speedily to begin life 
anew in Palestine. Messengers have gone out from many places, and groups of 
young Jewish men proceeding on foot have already reached Trieste and Rome on 
their weary pilgrimage to Zion.  
The historic title of the Jews to Palestine was recognized by the British 
Government in its Declaration of November 2nd, 1917, addressed by the British 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to Lord Rothschild, and reading as follows:  
"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a 
National Home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate 
the achievement of this objective, it being clear that nothing shall be done which may 
prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in 
Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."  
The French Government gave its support to the British Declaration to M. Sokolow as 
follows:  
Ministre des Affaires Etrangres de la 
Republique Francaise 
Le 14 Fevrier, 1918 
Monsieur, 
"Comme il avait convenu au cours de notre entretien le samedi 9 de ce mois, 
le Gouvernement de la Republique, en vue de preciser son attitude  
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vis-a-vis de aspirations sionistes, tendant por les juifs en Palestine un foyer national, 
a publi un communique dans la Presse.  
"En vous communiquant ce texte, je saisis avee empressement l occasionde 
vous feliciter du gereux devouement avec lequel vous poursuivez la realisation des 
voeux de vos coreligionnaires et de voux remercier du zele que vous apportez el leur 
faire connaitre les sentiments de sympathie que leurs efforts eveillent dans les pays 
de le Entente et notamment en France.  
"Veuillez agreer, Monsieur, les assurances de ma consideration tres 
distinguee.  
(Sgd.) S. Pichon 
Monsieur Sokolow, 
tel Meurice 
Paris. 
[Enclosure]  
Paris, Le 9 de Fevrier, 1918.  
"Monsieur Sokolow representant des organisations Sionistes, a et reu ce 
matin, au Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, par M. Stephen Pichon, qui a heureaux 
de lui conformer que l entente est complete entre les gouvernements francaise et 
britannique en ce qui concerne la question dun etablissement juif en Palestine.  
The Italian Government has declared its approval on the same lines. The President 
of the United States has expressed his sympathy with the Zionist aspirations in the 
spirit of Mr. Balfour's declaration. The Governments of Japan, Greece, Serbia, 
China, and Siam have added their approval to the declaration.  
Great Britain as Mandatory of the League of Nations  
We ask that Great Britain shall act as Mandatory of the League of Nations for 
Palestine. The selection of Great Britain as Mandatory is urged on the ground that 
this is the wish of the Jews of the world, and the League of Nations in selecting a 
Mandatory will follow as far as possible the popular wish of the people concerned.  
The Preference on the part of the Jews for a British Trusteeship is unquestionably 
the result of the peculiar relationship of England to the Jewish Palestinian problem. 
The return of the Jews to Zion has not only been a remarkable feature in English 
literature, but in the domain of statecraft it has played its part, beginning with the 
readmission of the Jews under Cromwell. It manifested itself particularly in the 
ninetenth century in the instructions given to British Consular representatives in the 
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Orient after the Damascus [Blood Libel] incident; in the various Jewish Palestinian 
projects suggested by English non-Jews prior to 1881; in the letters of endorsement 
and support given by members of the Royal Family and Officers of the Government 
to Lawrence Oliphant; and, finally, in the three consecutive acts which definitely 
associated Great Britain with Zionism in the minds of the Jews, viz: the El-Arish offer 
in 1901; the East African offer in1903, and, lastly, the British Declaration in favour of 
a Jewish National Home in Palestine in 1917. Moreover, the Jews who have gained 
political experience in many lands under a great variety of governmental systems, 
whole-heartedly appreciate the advanced and liberal policies adopted by Great 
Britain in her modern colonial administration.  
It may be stated without doubt that all of these things account for the attitude 
taken by the Jews with reference to the Trusteeship, as evidenced by the following:  
On December 16th, 1918, the American Jewish Congress composed of delegates 
representing 3,000,000 American Jews adopted the following resolution:  
"The American Jewish Congress instruct their delegation to Europe to co-
operate with representatives of other Jewish Organizations and specifically with the 
World Zionist Organization, to the end that the Peace Conference may recognize the 
aspirations and historic claims of the Jewish people with regard to Palestine, and 
declare that, in accordance with the British Government's Declaration of November 
2nd, 1917, endorsed by the Allied Governments and the President of the United 
States, there shall be established such political administrative and economic 
conditions in Palestine, as will assure under the trusteeship of Great Britain, acting 
on behalf of such League of Nations as may be formed, the development of 
Palestine into a Jewish Commonwealth; it being clearly understood that nothing shall 
be done which shall prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish 
communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in other 
countries."  
Similar action was taken in Jaffa in the month of December, 1918, by a 
conference of representatives of the Jewish population in Palestine, and on January 
4th, 1919, by Jewish Congresses representing about two million Jews of the 
reconstituted States of Austria-Hungary and of Poland.  
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BOUNDARIES  
The boundaries above outlined are what we consider essential for the 
necessary economic foundation of the country. Palestine must have its natural 
outlets to the seas and the control of its rivers and their headwaters. The boundaries 
are sketched with the general economic needs and historic traditions of the country 
in mind, factors which necessarily must also be considered by the Special 
Commission in fixing the definite boundary lines. This Commission will bear in mind 
that it is highly desirable, in the interests of economical administration, that the 
geographical area of Palestine should be as large as possible, so that it may 
eventually contain a large and thriving population which could more easily bear the 
burdens of modern civilized government than a small country with a necessary 
limitation of inhabitants.  
The economic life of Palestine, like that of every other semi-arid country, 
depends on the available water supply. It is, therefore, of vital importance not only to 
secure all water resources already feeding the country, but also to be able to 
conserve and control them at their sources.  
The Hermon is Palestine's real "Father of Waters," and cannot be severed 
from it without striking at the very root of its economic life. The Hermon not only need 
re-afforestation but also other work before it can again adequately serve as the water 
reservoir of the country. It must, therefore, be wholly under the control of those who 
will most willingly as well as most adequately restore it to its maximum utility. Some 
international arrangement must be made whereby the riparian rights of the people 
dwelling south of the Litani River may be fully protected. Properly cared for, these 
headwaters can be made to serve in the development of the Lebanon as well as of 
Palestine.  
The fertile plains east of the Jordan, since the earliest Biblical times, have 
been linked economically and politically with the land west of the Jordan. The 
country which is now very sparsely populated, in Roman times supported a great 
population. It could now serve admirably for colonization on a large scale. A just 
regard for the economic needs of Palestine and Arabia demands that free access to 
the Hedjaz Railway throughout its length be accorded both Governments.  
An intensive development of the agriculture and other opportunities of Trans-
Jordania make it imperative that Palestine shall have access to the Red Sea and an 
opportunity of developing good harbours on the Gulf of Akaba. Akaba, it will be 
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recalled, was the terminous of an important trade route of Palestine from the days of 
Solomon onwards. The ports developed in the Gulf of Akaba should be free ports 
through which the commerce of the Hinterland may pass on the same principle 
which guides us in suggesting that free access be given to the Hedjaz Railway.  
 
PROPOSALS TO THE MANDATORY POWER  
In connection with the Government to be set up by the Mandatory of the 
League of Nations until such time as the people of Palestine shall be prepared to 
undertake the establishment of representative and responsible Government, 
proposals will be made in due course to the Mandatory Power to the following effect:  
1. In any instrument establishing the constitution of Palestine the Declarations 
of the Peace Conference shall be recited as forming an integral part of that 
constitution.  
2. The Jewish people shall be entitled to fair representation in the executive 
and legislative bodies in the selection of public and civil servants. In giving such 
representation the Mandatory Power shall consult the Jewish Council hereinafter 
mentioned.  
Neither law nor custom shall preclude the appointment of a citizen of 
Palestine as chief of the Executive.  
1. That in encouraging the self-government of localities the Mandatory Power 
shall secure the maintenance by local communities of proper standards of 
administration in matters of education, communal or regional activities. In granting or 
enlarging local autonomy regard shall be had to readiness and ability of the 
community to attain such standards. Local autonomous communities shall be 
empowered and encouraged to combine and co-operate for common purposes.  
2. Education without distinction of race shall be assisted from public funds.  
3. Hebrew shall be one of the official languages of Palestine and shall be 
employed in all documents, decrees, and announcements and on all stamps, coins 
and notes issued by the Government.  
4. The Jewish Sabbath and Holy Days shall be recognized as legal days of 
rest.  
5. All inhabitants continuing to reside in Palestine who on the day of , 19 , 
have their domicile in Palestine, except those who elect in writing within six months 
from such date to retain their foreign citizenship, shall become citizens of Palestine, 
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and they and all persons in Palestine or naturalized under the laws of Palestine after 
the day of , 19 , shall be citizens thereof and entitled to the protection of the 
Mandatory Power on behalf of the Government of Palestine.  
Land Commission  
Recognizing that the general progress of Palestine must begin with the reform 
of the conditions governing land tenure and settlement, the Mandatory Power shall 
appoint a Commission (upon which the Jewish Council shall have representation) 
with power:  
1. To make a survey of the land and to schedule all lands that may be made 
available for close settlement, intensive cultivation, and public use.  
2. To propose measures for determining and registering titles of ownership of 
land.  
3. To propose measures for supervising transactions in land with a view of 
preventing land speculation.  
4. To propose measures for the close settlement, intensive cultivation, and 
public use of land, where necessary by compulsory purchase at a fair pre-war price 
and further, by making available all waste lands unoccupied and inadequately 
cultivated lands or lands without legal owners and state lands.  
5. To propose measures for the taxation and the tenure of land and in general 
any progressive measures in harmony with the policy of making the land available 
for close settlement and intensive cultivation.  
6. To propose measures whereby the Jewish Council may take over all lands 
available for close settlement and intensive cultivation.  
7. In all such measures the established rights of the present population shall 
be equitably safeguarded.  
THE JEWISH COUNCIL FOR PALESTINE  
1. A Jewish Council for Palestine shall be elected by a Jewish Congress 
representative of the Jews of Palestine and of the world, which shall be convoked in 
Jerusalem on or before January 1st, 1920, or as soon thereafter as possible by the 
Provisional Jewish Council hereinafter mentioned.  
The Jewish Congress shall determine its function as well as constitution and 
functions of the Jewish Council in conformity with the purpose and spirit of the 
Declarations of the Peace Conference and of the powers conferred by the 
Mandatory Power upon the Jewish Council.  
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2. The Jewish Council shall be recognized as a legal entity and shall have 
power:  
1. To co-operate and consult with and to assist the Government of Palestine 
in any and all matters affecting the Jewish people in Palestine and in all such 
cases to be and to act as the representative of the Jewish people.  
2. To participate in the development and administration of immigration, close 
land settlement, credit facilities, public work, services and enterprises, and 
every other form of activity conducive to the development the country. The 
organization of Jewish education to be entrusted to such Council.  
3. To acquire and hold real estate.  
4. To acquire and exercise concessions for public works and the development 
of natural resources.  
5. With the consent of the Jewish inhabitants concerned or their accredited 
representatives, to assess such inhabitants for the purpose of stimulating and 
maintaining education, communal, charitable and other public institutions 
(including the Jewish Council), and other activities primarily concerned with 
the welfare of the Jewish people in Palestine.  
6. With the approval of the Mandatory Power and upon such terms and 
conditions as the Mandatory Power may prescribe, to administer the 
immigration laws of Palestine in so far as they affect the Jewish immigration.  
7. With the approval of the Mandatory Power, to issue bonds, debentures, or 
other obligations, the proceeds of any or all of which to be expended by the 
Jewish Council for the benefit of the Jewish people or for the development of 
Palestine.  
8. The Jewish Council shall hold all of its property and income in trust for the 
benefit of the Jewish people.  
3. A Provisional Jewish Council of representatives of the Zionist Organization, 
of the Jewish population in Palestine, and of such other approved Jewish 
organizations as are willing to co-operate in the development of a Jewish Palestine 
shall be formed forthwith by the Zionist Organization. Such Provisional Jewish 
Council shall exercise all of the powers and perform all of the duties of the Jewish 
Council until such time as the Jewish Council shall be formally constituted by the 
Jewish Congress.  
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4. Finally, when in the opinion of the Mandatory Power, the inhabitants of 
Palestine shall be able to undertake the establishment of a representative and 
responsible government, such steps shall be taken as will permit the establishment 
of such government through the exercise of a democratic franchise without regard to 
race or faith; and the inhabitants of Palestine under such government shall continue 
to enjoy equal civil and political rights as citizens irrespective of race or faith.  
THE ZIONIST ORGANIZATION  
The foregoing proposals with reference to Palestine are submitted to the 
Peace Conference by the Zionist Organization. The Organization in the present form 
dates from the year 1897, when the first Zionist Congress was held at Basle, 
Switzerland, under the leadership of Theodore Herzl. This Organization absorbed at 
that time all Zionist Organizations which had been in existence previously. The 
Zionist Movement is supported by Jews in every country where there are Jewish 
mass settlements, i.e., in Eastern Europe, the United States of America, in Western 
Europe, in all the British Colonies, in the Argentine, in Siberia, in Shanghai, in 
Morocco, and in Tunis. Zionist federations actively engaged in furthering the 
principles for which the movement stands are to be found in all these countries.  
The supreme body which controls the activities of the organizations in the different 
countries consist of delegates elected by the various local Shekel payers (poll tax) by 
a democratic franchise, and this body meets biennially.  
Through the several financial agencies which the Zionist Congress has 
created to enable it to carry forward its work in Palestine, the Organization and 
associated bodies have raised and have expended in Palestine since its inception; 
millions of pounds. Notwithstanding the fact that since 1913 no meetings of the 
Congress have been held, the Organization has greatly increased its enrolled 
membership, and has the support of hundreds of thousands of Jews who sympathize 
with aims of the movement, and contribute to its funds. Since the war, the centres of 
political activity have been transferred to London and the United States of America.  
In the allied countries the conduct of the political activities of the Organization has 
been entrusted to Dr. Chaim Weizmann and M. Nahum Sokolow, members of the 
Executive. In the United States of America the Provisional Executive Committee for 
General Zionist Affairs, created at the outbreak of the war, has been replaced by the 
Zionist Organization of America, the Honorary President of which is Louis D. 
Brandeis, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. Zionists are 
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to be found at the head of all the greater Jewish national institutions which depend 
upon mass opinion for moral and financial support; and in addition, take a prominent 
part in all the Jewish National Councils established in the new states in Eastern 
Europe.  
CONCLUSION  
In every part of the world on the Day of Atonement the Jews pray that "all 
nations may be united by a common bond, so that the will of God may reign supreme 
throughout the world." In the fulfillment of this prayer, the Jews hope that they will be 
able to take an honorable place in the new community of nations. It is their purpose 
to establish in Palestine a government dedicated to social and national justice; a 
government that shall be guided, like the community of old, by that justice and 
equality which is expressed in the great precept of our Lawgiver: "There shall be but 
one law for you and the stranger in the land."  
All of which is respectfully submitted.  
Rothschild (Lord Walter Rothschild)  
On behalf of the Zionist Organization,  
Nahum Sokolow, 
Chaim Weizmann. 
On behalf of Zionist Organization of America,  
Julian W. Mack. 
Stephen S. Wise 
Harry Friedenwald. 
Jacob De Haas. 
Mary Fels. 
Louis Robison. 
Bernard Flexner. 
 
On behalf of the Russian Zionist Organization  
Israel Rosoff. 
On behalf of the Jewish Population of Palestine in accordance with Mandate 
received,  
Nahum Sokolow 
Chaim Weizmann 
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Even before the establishment of the Israeli state, water played a key role in 
the Zionist colonization of Palestine. As early as 1919, Chaim Weizmann, 
campaigning for the “minimum requirements essential to the realization of the Jewish 
National Home” in Palestine, wrote to the British Prime Minister Lloyd George (then):  
 
Fig.1.a: Israel Proposed Boundaries.    
 
 
Sources: - Jewish proposal for Jewish Homeland, 1919. From the Proposals Presented by the Zionist 
     Organisation to the Paris Peace Conference (1919) 
   - Boundary: Mark Tessler, “A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, Indiana University     
     Press, Bloomington (1994) 
www.eretzyisroel.org/~samuel/parispeace.html (2007) 
 
The boundaries, of the Jewish Home, cannot be drawn exclusively on historic 
- biblical lines ... Our claims to the north are imperatively demanded by the 
requirements of modern economic life . . . The whole economic future of Palestine is 
dependent on its water supply for irrigation and for electric power, and the water 
supply must mainly be derived from the slopes of mount Hermon, from the 
headwaters of the Jordan and from the Litany River in Lebanon ... We consider it 
Proposed Zionist Boundary 
Before 1967 Boundaries  
Amman, Jordan’s Capital 
Damascus, Syria’s Capital  
Lebanon South 
The Golan Heights 
 
West Bank and Gaza Strip 
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essential that the National Frontier of Palestine should include the Valley of the 
Litany, for a distance of about 25 miles above the bend, and the Western and 
Southern slopes of Mount Hermon. 
As figure 1.a shows, the borders Weizmann was proposing covered not only 
all of present-day Israel and the occupied territories of the Gaza Strip, the West 
Bank, and the Golan Heights, but also significant portions of Lebanon, Syria and 
Jordan. 
 
Fig 1.b: United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine on 29 November 1947. 
 
Source: www.eretzyisroel.org/~samuel/parispeace.html (2007) 
 
b) On 29 November 1947 the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine or 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181, a plan to resolve the Arab-
Israeli conflict in the British Mandate of Palestine, was approved by the United 
Nations General Assembly. Increased anti-Semitism in Europe, which had been on 
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the rise since the late 19th century, led to a greater Jewish influx following the war. 
The plan would have partitioned the territory of Palestine into Jewish and Arab 
states, with the Greater Jerusalem area, encompassing Bethlehem, coming under 
international control.  
The British proposed a Palestine divided between a Jewish and an Arab 
State, but in time changed their position and sought to limit Jewish immigration from 
Europe to a minimum. This was seen by the Zionists and their sympathisers as 
betrayal of the terms of the mandate, especially in light of the increasing persecution 
in Europe. It was met with a popular uprising and guerilla war from Jewish militant 
groups, often viewed as one of several factors that forced the British to hand the 
problem of Palestine over to the United Nations. The failure of the British 
government and the United Nations to implement this plan, prior agreement between 
the Jewish Agency and King Abdullah to divide Palestine between them, and 
rejection of the plan by the Arabs resulted in the War for Independence, also known 
as the 1948 Arab-Israeli War.  
According to recent studies by Israeli historians, Zionist acceptance of the 
United Nations Partition Plan was merely a tactical decision aimed at preventing the 
establishment of a Palestinian state, leaving open the possibility of further Zionist 
expansion onto land designated by the United Nations for the new Palestinian state. 
Thus, when the much expanded State of Israel was declared in 1948, following the 
1947-1948 war, no reference was made to the United Nations Partition Plan or to 
any internationally recognized borders. As David Ben-Gurion explained, “I do not see 
partition as the final solution of the Palestine question ... after the formation of a large 
army in the wake of the establishment of the state, we will abolish the partition and 
expand to the whole of Palestine.” 
The new Israeli state immediately began work on its water projects. In 1953, 
construction of the National Water Carrier began according to the basic outline 
developed under the Lowdermilk-Hayes project. This involved significant diversion of 
the Jordan River, which Syria protested to the United Nations because it violated the 
cease fire agreement. The United States considered Israel’s moves to be 
provocative and threatened to cut off aid to Israel, which then stood at $50 million 
annually. Israel backed down and instead the Israeli National Water Carrier was 
supplied with water from Lake Tiberias. 
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Annex 3: Israel Water Rights (November 30, 1953) 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/water.html 
 
In a review in the Knesset of Israel's foreign relations, Foreign Minister Moshe 
Sharett devoted the final part of his speech to the dispute concerning Israel's water 
rights. The relevant parts follow: 
“One matter is still pending, namely, the subject of the Security Council 
deliberations in recent weeks: the future of our work in diverting the Jordan to 
generate electricity which is also linked to future irrigation plans. I will not enter into 
details, partly because they have been made public and also because the matter is 
still under discussion and no decision has yet been taken. In this campaign, too, we 
have invested much effort. We insist on our right to continue and finish the work we 
have begun. We disrupted it temporarily in order to allow the Security Council a short 
spell to clarify the issue in a calm atmosphere, just as previously we were prepared 
to facilitate the clarification of certain points for the UNTSO Chief of Staff by a short 
halt in the work. We are certainly interested in renewing the work in full agreement 
with the UN. The only limitations which we shall be ready to contemplate as justified, 
in so far as renewing the work is concerned, relate to securing individual rights 
against any damage. The yard-stick for the sincerity and efficiency of such a 
guarantee is approval of its sufficiency by an authorized UN institution. We shall not 
agree to accept the approval of any other body on this matter. 
As for the question of regional water planning which has meanwhile arisen, 
we were the first to have declared our readiness to sit with our three neighbours with 
whom we have, or may have, common water interests Jordan, Syria and Lebanon to 
elucidate and determine a regional settlement of water resources on the basis of 
their just apportionment, and if they so desire, to arrive also at a joint planning of 
water utilization for irrigation and the supply of energy for the good of all factors 
concerned. As long as no such settlement is established again, because of the 
refusal of the neighbouring countries to convene with Israel we shall deem ourselves 
free and justified to treat the waters of the rivers flowing in our country as our own. It 
is inconceivable that a ban or delay be imposed on our development work pending 
the neighbouring countries' consent to cooperate. Such a condition is tantamount to 
putting the lid on every Israeli development project dependent on utilization of water 
resources in the north. On the contrary, we are convinced that the uninterrupted 
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continuation of Israeli development projects is, possibly, the most efficient means for 
bringing about regional cooperation. 
Finally, we are prepared to examine in good faith any regional water plan 
which may be submitted by any international body. It was in this spirit that we 
promised to approach, and indeed did so approach the study of a plan proposed 
some time ago in general outline by the Government of the United States. Our 
method in the study of such plans will be dual: first, a very careful examination of the 
assessments and the scientific and technical data upon which the plan is founded, in 
the light of our vast accumulation of knowledge and experience and on the basis of 
opinion of experts of international repute whom we trust, secondly, a firm insistence 
on the full quantity of water and available energy necessary for Israel's economic 
development and its very Survival. The plan submitted to us is conspicuously faulty 
from both these aspects, as well as from others. Discussion of the plan is not yet 
concluded. 
All those wishing to win our cooperation in this sphere must realize one thing. 
For Israel, water is no luxury, not even merely a highly desirable and useful addition 
to our system of natural resources. Water for us is life itself. It is food for the people 
and not food alone. Without large scale irrigation projects we shall not achieve high 
productivity, balancing the economy or economic independence. For without 
irrigation we shall not at all produce a worthy agriculture under our special 
circumstances, and without agriculture particularly highly developed and progressive 
agriculture shall not be a people rooted in the land, secure in its existence, stable in 
its character, in control of all the possibilities of material and spiritual creation 
inherent in it and which this country can open before it.”  
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Annex 4: Historical Reading 
Source: Wikipedia, 2008. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/  
 
a) The Sea of Galilee is Israel’s largest freshwater lake. It is approximately 53 
km (33 miles) in circumference, about 21 km (13 miles) long, and 13 km (8 miles) 
wide; it has a total area of 166 km², and a maximum depth of approximately 43 m. At 
209 m below sea level, it is the lowest freshwater lake on Earth and the second-
lowest lake in the world after the Dead Sea, a saltwater lake. It is not a sea by any 
normal definition; it is called a sea by tradition. The lake is also known on modern 
maps as Lake Galilee or Lake Tiberias. The name Galilee refers to the region of 
Galilee in which it is located. In modern Hebrew it is known by its biblical name, Yam 
Kinneret (תרנכ םי), “Sea of Kinnereth” (Numbers 34:11; Joshua 13:27). The name 
may originate from the Hebrew word kinnor (“harp” or “lyre”) - which the lake’s shape 
resembles. It has also been called the Lake of Gennesaret or the Sea of 
Gennesaret (Luke 5:1) after the name of a small fruitful plain which lies on its 
western side. The Arabic name for the lake is Buhairet Tabariyya (ايربط ةريحب) 
meaning Lake Tiberias. Other names for the Sea of Galilee are Ginnosar, Lake of 
Gennesar, Sea of Chinneroth, Sea of Tiberias (Roman) and Waters of 
Gennesaret. 
The Kinneret is fed by underground springs, but its main source is the Jordan 
River, which flows through it from north to south. The lake is situated deep in the 
Jordan Great Rift Valley, the valley caused by the separation of the African and 
Arabian Plates. Consequently the area is subject to earthquakes and, in the past, 
volcanic activity. This is evidenced by the abundant basalt and other igneous rock 
that define the geology of the Sea of Galilee region. 
Due to its low-lying position in the rift valley, surrounded by hills, the sea is 
prone to sudden violent storms; hence the New Testament story about Jesus 
calming the storm. Indeed, the main feature of the lake seems to be its ever-
changing character. It is still noted, as in New Testament times, for its rich fish 
stocks, and in today's restaurants, “St. Peter’s Fish” (tilapia) is very popular. 
The Sea of Galilee lies on the ancient Via Maris which linked Egypt with the 
northern empires. The Greeks, Hasmoneans, and Romans founded flourishing 
towns and settlements here: Gadara, Hippos, Tiberias and others. The first-century 
historian Flavius Josephus was so impressed by the area that he wrote, “One may 
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call this place the ambition of Nature.” Josephus also reported a thriving fishing 
industry at this time, with 230 boats regularly working in the lake. 
Much of the ministry of Jesus occurred on the shores of Lake Galilee. In those 
days, there was a continuous ribbon development of settlements and villages around 
the lake and plenty of trade and ferrying by boat. The Synoptic gospels of Mark 
(1:14-20), Matthew (4:18-22), and Luke (5:1-11) describes how Jesus recruited four 
of his apostles from the shores of Lake Galilee: the fishermen Simon and his brother 
Andrew and the brothers John and James. One of Jesus’ famous teaching episodes, 
the Sermon on the Mount, was given on a hill overlooking the lake. Many of his 
miracles were also recorded to occur here: his walking on water, calming a storm, 
feeding five thousand people (in Tabgha), and many others. 
In 135, the second Jewish revolt against the Romans, called Bar Kokhba’s 
revolt, was put down. The Romans responded by banning all Jews from Jerusalem. 
The center of Jewish culture and learning shifted to the region of the Kinneret, 
particularly the city of Tiberias. It was in this region that the so-called “Jerusalem 
Talmud” was probably compiled. 
In the time of the Byzantine Empire, the lake’s significance in Jesus’ life made 
it a major destination for Christian pilgrims. This led to the growth of a full-fledged 
tourist industry, complete with package tours and plenty of comfortable inns. 
The lake’s importance declined when the Byzantines lost control of it. The 
area came under the control of the Umayyad Caliphate and subsequent Islamic 
empires. Except for Tiberias, the major towns and cities were gradually abandoned. 
In 1187, Saladin defeated the armies of the Crusades at the Battle of Hattin, largely 
because he was able to cut the Crusaders off from the valuable fresh water of the 
Sea of Galilee. 
In 1909 Jewish pioneers built their first cooperative farming village (kibbutz), 
Kvutzat Kinneret which trained Jewish immigrants in farming and agriculture. Later, 
Kinneret pioneers established Kibbutz Degania. Kinneret was the cradle of the 
Kibbutz culture of early Zionism and was the birthplace of Naomi Shemer and the 
burial site of Rachel - two of the most prominent Israeli poets. 
In 1923 an agreement between the United Kingdom and France established 
the border between the British Mandate of Palestine and the French Mandate of 
Syria. The British handed over the southern Golan Heights to the French in return for 
the northern Jordan Valley. The border was re-drawn so that both sides of the 
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Jordan river and the whole of the Sea of Galilee, including a 10-metre wide strip 
along the northeastern shore, were made a part of Palestine. The 1947 UN Partition 
Plan put this territory area inside the Jewish state. 
During the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Israel occupied the lake’s southwestern 
shore. This map illustrates the border lines and the Demilitarized Zones at the time 
the 1949 Armistice Agreements were signed. In 1967, the State of Israel took control 
of the entire Sea of Galilee as well as the Golan during the Six Day War. Syria still 
claims the northeastern shore of the sea, arguing it is a part of the Golan Heights, 
which has been occupied by Israel since 1967. 
Israel’s National Water Carrier, built in 1964, transports water from the lake to 
the population centers of Israel, and is the source of most of the country's drinking 
water. Israel also supplies water from the lake to the West Bank and to Jordan 
(under the terms of the Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace). Increasing water demand 
and some dry winters have resulted in stress on the lake and a decreasing water 
line, at times to dangerously low levels. 
Today, tourism is again the Kinneret's most important economic activity. The 
entire Sea of Galilee is a popular holiday resort area. The many historical and 
spiritual sites around the lake, especially its main town Tiberias, are visited by 
millions of local and foreign tourists annually. Other economic activities include 
fishing in the lake and agriculture, particularly bananas, in the fertile belt of land 
surrounding it. 
A key attraction is the site where the Kinneret's water flows into the Jordan 
River. Thousands of pilgrims from all over the world come to be (re-)baptized there 
every year. 
b) The Hulah Valley or Hula Valley (in Hebrew: הלוחה קמע, `Emeq ha-Hūlāh) 
is an agricultural region in northern Israel with abundant fresh water. It is an 
important bottleneck site for birds migrating along the Syrian-African Rift Valley 
between Africa, Europe, and Asia. 
Lake Hulah or Lake Hula (the Biblical Lake Merom) and its surrounding 
swamps were drained in the 1950s as an attempt to alter the environment to suit 
agricultural needs. Though initially perceived as a great national achievement for 
Israel, with time it became evident that the benefits from transforming the 
"wasteland" of Lake Hula and its swamps were limited. In the past few years, 
following nearly 50 years of an unsuccessful struggle to utilize the drained valley's 
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resources, the Israeli government has finally recognized that successful 
development can endure only if a balanced compromise between nature and 
development is reached. Thus, a small section of the former lake and swamp region 
was recently reflooded in an attempt to prevent further soil deterioration and to revive 
the nearly extinct ecosystem. 
Lake Hula was referred to by many different names: In the 14th century BCE, 
the Egyptians called the lake - Samchuna. The Tanakh records it as Merom. In the 
1st century CE, the Jewish historian Flavius Josephus termed it Semechonitis. In 
Aramaic the lake was called Hulata or Ulata. In the Talmud it is called Yam Sumchi - 
i.e. Sea of Sumchi. Currently the lake is called Buheirat el Huleh in Arabic and Agam 
ha-Hula in Hebrew. 
The "Waters of Merom" has sometimes been used erroneously in scientific 
literature, although that term refers specifically to springs on the western side of the 
valley. 
Prior to its drainage in the 1950s, Lake Hula was 5.3 kilometres long and 4.4 
kilometres wide, extending over 12-14 square kilometres. It was about one and a half 
metres deep in summer and three metres deep in winter. 
The lake attracted human settlement from early prehistoric times. Paleolithic 
archaeological remains were found near the Bnot Yaakov ("Daughters of Jacob") 
bridge at the southern end of the valley. The first permanent settlements, Enan 
(Mallaha), dating from 9,000-10,000 years ago was discovered in the valley. 
The Hula Valley was a main junction on the important trade route connecting 
the large commercial centre of Damascus with the eastern Mediterranean coast and 
Egypt. During the Bronze Age, the cities of Hazor and Layish were built at key 
locations on this route approximately 4,000 years ago. 
At the end of the 13th century BCE, the Israelite tribe of Dan destroyed the 
city of Layish and built in its place a new city which they named Dan, and for about 
400 years, the Israelites ruled over the Hula Valley until it was captured by the 
Assyrian armies of Tiglath-Pileser III and its inhabitants were driven away. The Bible 
records the lake "Merom" as the site of a victory of Joshua over the Canaanites. 
(Josh. 11:5-7). 
Throughout the Hellenistic, Roman, Byzantine and early Arab periods (fourth 
century BCE to eighth centuries CE) rural settlement in the Hula Valley was 
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uninterrupted. During the Seleucid Empire, a town Seleucia Samulias was founded 
on the lake. 
Traditional crops were rice (as early as the Hellenistic period), cotton and 
sugar cane (Brought by the Arabs following their conquest in 636), sorghum and 
maize. Water buffalo were introduced in the eighth century supplying milk and 
serving as beasts of burden. 
The first modern Jewish settlement in the Hula Valley, Yesod Hamaala on the 
western shore of the lake, was established in 1883 during the first aliyah. In total, by 
1948 there were 12 Jewish and 23 Arab settlements in the Hula Valley. Following the 
establishment of Israel and the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the Arab inhabitants fled the 
valley to neighbouring Arab countries. 
Numerous kibbutzim, including Kfar Blum, are in the Hula Valley. 
c) The Jezreel Valley; Hebrew: קמע לאערזי, Emek Yizrael, also known as the 
Plain of Esdraelon (Esdraelon is the Koine Greek rendering of Jezreel), and as the 
Zirin Valley (Arabic: نيعرز لھس, Sahel Zir’in), and as the Meadow of Amr’s son (Marj 
Ibn Amer,  رماع نب جرم ), is a large plain and inland valley in the south of the Lower 
Galilee of Israel, on the northern border of the West Bank. The valley was once the 
channel by which the Dead Sea (to the southeast of the valley) connected to the 
Mediterranean Sea; around two million years ago, the land between the 
Mediterranean Sea and the Great Rift Valley rose to such a degree that this 
connection was severed, and periodic floods from the Mediterranean Sea were 
interrupted, resulting in the Dead Sea no longer having an outlet, and becoming 
heavily saline. 
It takes its ancient name from the city of Jezreel (known in Arabic as Zir’in; 
نيعرز) located on a low hill on the southern edge and overlooking the valley, though 
some scholars think that the name of the city originated from the name of the clan 
that founded it, as in their view the Merneptah stele mentions the existence of this 
clan, not the similarly spelt Israel; Jezreel means God sows or El sows. The phrase 
“valley of Jezreel” was sometimes used to refer to the central part of the valley, 
around the city of Jezreel, while the southwestern portion was known as the valley of 
Megiddo, after the ancient city of Megiddo, which was located there. 
In addition to Jezreel and Megiddo, the valley is the location of a number of 
other important settlements both ancient and modern. The largest modern settlement 
in the Jezreel Valley is the city of Afula (Hebrew: הלופע, Arabic: ةلوفع), also known as 
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the “Capital of the Valley”; Afula may once have been the Biblical city of Ophrah, 
which the Book of Judges identifies as the home of Gideon. The valley formed an 
easier route through the Levant than crossing the mountains on either side, and so 
saw a large amount of traffic, and was the site of many historic battles; the earliest 
battle for which there is known to be a surviving detailed account - the Battle of 
Megiddo - was fought in the valley. Due to the surrounding terrain, Egyptian chariots 
were only able to travel from Egypt as far as the Jezreel valley and the valley north 
of Lake Huleh. 
According to the Bible, the valley was the scene of a victory by the Israelites, 
lead by Gideon, against the Midianites, the Amalekites, and the children of the east, 
but was later the location at which the Israelites, lead by king Saul, were defeated by 
the Philistines; according to textual scholars, the account of a Philistine victory at 
Jezreel derives from the monarchial source, in contrast to the republican source, 
which places the Philistine victory against the Israelites at Gilboa. In Christian 
Eschatology, the part of the valley on which the Battle of Megiddo was fought is 
believed to be destined to be the site of a final battle, between good and evil, known 
as Armageddon (a word derived from Megiddo). 
Between 1912 and 1925 the Lebanese Sursock family of Beirut (then under 
the French Mandate of Syria) sold their 80,000 acres of land in the Vale of Esdraelon 
to the American Zion Commonwealth; the Sursocks had originally purchased the 
land, in 1872, from the Ottoman gouvernment for about ₤20,000, but American Zion 
Commonwealth paid them nearly three quarters of a million pounds, and so the 
Sursocks allegedly “went happily back to Beirut”. 
However, the people actually living on the land - 8,000 Palestinian fellahin 
(landless farmers), in 22 Arab villages - suddenly lost the land they had worked on 
for the absentee landowners, and although the new owners of the land were 
compelled to pay compensation in addition to the purchase of the land itself, for the 
most part they considered themselves evicted following these sales. In some cases, 
the farmers refused to leave their land, as in Afula (El-Ful), but the new Zionist 
owners decided that it would be forbidden for fellahins to remain as tenants on land 
intended for Jewish labour, and they also followed the socialist ideaology of the 
Yishuv, believing that it would be wrong for a (Jewish) landlord to exploit a landless 
(Arab) peasantry. 
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As eviction orders increased over the following years, British police had to be 
used to expel the villagers from their homes. The dispossessed fellahin had to make 
their way to the coast to search for new work; most ended up in shanty towns on the 
edges of Jaffa and Haifa. In the 1920s the American Zion Commonwealth founded 
the modern day city of Afula; the first moshav, Nahalal, was settled in this valley on 
September 11, 1921. 
d) Mount Carmel (Hebrew: Karem El, Arabic: Kurmul/Jabal Mar Elyas) is a 
coastal mountain range in northern Israel and the West Bank, stretching from the 
Mediterranean Sea towards the southeast. Its name literally means plantation of high 
quality trees, roughly equivalent to the garden, in reference to the richly fertile 
character of the hillside. The range was traditionally known as the vineyards of God, 
and archaeologists have discovered ancient wine and oil presses at various 
locations within the range. 
The phrase Mount Carmel has been used in three distinct ways: 
• To refer to the 24 mile long mountain range, stretching as far in the 
southeast as Jenin; 
• To refer to the northwestern 12 miles of the mountain range; 
• To refer to the headland at the northwestern end of the range.  
The range is about 4-5 miles wide, sloping gradually towards the southwest, 
but forming a steep ridge on the northeastern face, 1,742 feet high; the Jezreel 
Valley lies to the immediate northeast. The range forms a natural barrier in the 
landscape, just as the Jezreel Valley forms a natural passageway, and consequently 
the mountain range and the valley had much impact on migration and invasions 
through the Levant. The mountain formation is an admixture of limestone and flint, 
containing many caves, and covered in several volcanic rocks. 
The sloped side of the mountain is covered with luxuriant vegetation, including 
oaks, pines, olives, and laurels. Several towns are located on the range, including 
Yokneam on the eastern ridge, Zikhron Ya’aqov on the southern slope, the Druze 
town of Carmel City (formed in 2003 from the towns of Daliyat al-Karmel and Isfiya) 
on the more central part of the ridge, and the towns of Nesher, Tirat Hakarmel, and 
the city of Haifa, on the far northwestern promontory and its base. 
From 1930 to 1932, Dorothy Garrod excavated four caves, and a number of 
rock shelters, in the Carmel mountain range at el-Wad, el-Tabun, and Es Skhul. 
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Garrod discovered Neanderthal and early modern human remains, including the 
skeleton of a Neanderthal female, named Tabun I, which is regarded as one of the 
most important human fossils ever found. The excavation at el-Tabun produced the 
longest stratigraphic record in the region, spanning 600,000 or more years of human 
activity, from the Lower Paleolithic to the present day, representing roughly a million 
years of human evolution. There are also several well-preserved burials of 
Neanderthals and Homo Sapiens Sapiens) and passage from nomadic hunter-
gatherer groups to complex, sedentary agricultural societies is extensively 
documented at the site. Taken together, these emphasize the paramount 
significance of the Mount Carmel caves for the study of human cultural and biological 
evolution within the framework of palaeo-ecological changes. 
Due to the lush vegetation on the sloped hillside, and many caves on the 
steeper side, Carmel became the haunt of criminals; Carmel was seen as a place 
offering an escape from Yahweh, as implied by the Book of Amos. According to the 
Book of Kings, Elisha travelled to Carmel straight after he had arranged for 42 
children to be killed, merely because they had mocked his baldness; this does not 
necessarily imply that Elisha had sought asylum there from any potential backlash, 
although the description in the Book of Amos, of the location being a refuge, is dated 
by textual scholars to be earlier than the accounts of Elisha in the Book of Kings, and 
according to Strabo it had continued to be a place of refuge until at least the first 
century. 
According to Epiphanius, and Josephus, Mount Carmel had been the 
stronghold of the Essenes that came from a place in Galilee named Nazareth; 
though this Essene group are sometimes consequently referred to as Nazareans, 
they are not to be confused with the “Nazarene” sect, which followed the teachings 
of Jesus, but associated with the Pharisees. Members of the modern American 
groups claiming to be Essenes, but viewed by scholars as having no ties to the 
historical group, treat Mount Carmel as having great religious significance on 
account of the protection it afforded to the historic Essene group. 
During World War I, Mount Carmel played a significant strategic role. The 
(20th century) Battle of Megiddo took place at the head of a pass through the Carmel 
Ridge, which overlooks the Valley of Jezreel from the south. General Allenby led the 
British in the battle, which was the turning point in the war against the Ottoman 
Empire. The Jezreel Valley had played host to many battles before, including the 
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very historically significant Battle of Megiddo between the Egyptians and Canaanites, 
but it was only in the 20th century battle that the Carmel Ridge itself having a 
significance in the battle, due to the developments in munitions. 
In ancient Canaanite culture, high places were frequently considered to be 
sacred, and Mount Carmel appears to have been no exception; Thutmose III lists a 
holy headland among his Palestinian territories, and if this equates to Carmel, as 
Egyptologists such as Maspero believe, then it would indicate that the mountain 
headland was considered sacred from at least the 15th century BC. According to the 
Books of Kings, there was an altar to Yahweh on the mountain, which had fallen into 
ruin by the time of Ahab, but was rebuilt by Elijah. Iamblichus describes Pythagoras 
visiting the mountain on account of its reputation for sacredness, stating that it was 
the most holy of all mountains, and access was forbidden to many, while Tacitus 
states that there was an oracle situated there, which Vespasian visited for a 
consultation; Tacitus states that there was an altar there, but without any image upon 
it, and without a temple around it. 
In mainstream Jewish, Christian, and Islamic thought, it is Elijah that is 
indelibly associated with the mountain, and he is regarded as having sometimes 
resided in a grotto on the mountain. In the Books of Kings, Elijah is described as 
challenging 450 prophets of a particular Baal to a contest at the altar on Mount 
Carmel to determine whose deity was genuinely in control of the Kingdom of Israel; 
since the narrative is set during the rule of Ahab and his association with the 
Phoenicians, biblical scholars suspect that the Baal in question was probably 
Melqart. 
According to the biblical account, the challenge was to pursuade a deity light 
a sacrifice by fire, and after the others had failed to acheive this, Elijah poured water 
on his sacrifice, prostrated himself in prayer, and the fire fell from the sky, and 
consumed the sacrifice; shortly afterwards, in the account, clouds gather, the sky 
turns black, and it rains heavily. Scholars think that the account represents a more 
legendary description of a storm, during which the altar on Mount Carmel was struck 
by lightning; rather than a prayer for fire, scholars think that the account of Elijah’s 
actions at the altar actually describes a rain-making ritual. 
Though there is no biblical reason to assume that the account of Elijah’s 
victory refers to any particular part of Mount Carmel, Islamic tradition places it at a 
point known as El-Maharrakah, meaning the burning. In 1958, archaeologists 
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discovered something on the mountain range that resembled an altar, which they 
assumed must have been Elijahs altar. 
A Catholic religious order was founded on Mount Carmel in the 12th century, 
named the Carmelites, in reference to the mountain range; the founder was a certain 
Berthold (who died at an unknown point after 1185), who was either a pilgrim or 
crusader. The order was founded at the site that it claimed had once been the 
location of Elijah’s cave, 1700 feet above sea level at the northwestern end of the 
mountain range; this, perhaps not co-incidentally, is also the highest natural point of 
the entire mountain range. Though there is no documentary evidence to support it, 
Carmelite tradition suggests that a community of Jewish hermits had lived at the site 
from the time of Elijah until the Carmelites were founded there; prefixed to the 
Carmelite Constitution of 1281 was the claim that from the time when Elijah and 
Elisha had dwelt devoutly on Mount Carmel, priests and prophets, Jewish and 
Christian, had lived praiseworthy lives in holy penitence adjacent to the site of the 
fountain of Elisha, in an uninterrupted succession. 
A Carmelite monastry was founded at the site shortly after the order itself was 
created, and was dedicated to Mary, in the guise of a sea star (stella maris in Latin) - 
a common medieval presentation of Mary; although Louis IX (of France) is 
commonly referred to as the founder, he was not, and had merely visited it in 1252. 
The Carmelite order grew to be one of the major Catholic religious orders worldwide, 
although the monastry at Carmel had a less successful history. During the Crusades 
the monastry frequently changed hands, frequently finding itself to have become a 
mosque; under Islamic control, the location came to be known as El-Maharrakah, 
meaning place of burning, in reference to the account of Elijah’s challenge to the 
priests of Hadad. In 1799 the building was finally converted into a hospital, by 
Napoleon, but in 1821 the surviving structure as destroyed by the pasha of 
Damascus. A new monastry was later constructed directly over a nearby cave, after 
funds were collected by the Carmelite order for restoration of the monastry; the cave, 
which now forms the crypt of the monastic church, is termed Elijah's grotto by the 
monks. 
One of the oldest scapulars is associated with Mount Carmel, and the 
Carmelites. According to Carmelite legend, the Scapular of Our Lady of Mount 
Carmel was first given to Simon Stock, an English Carmelite, by Mary, the mother of 
Jesus; the legend itself, however, is first recorded in a document from 1642, nearly 
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400 years after the death of Simon Stock. The Carmelites sometimes refer to Mary 
as Our Lady of Mount Carmel, in honour of the legend, and celebrate a feast day 
dedicated to her in this guise, on the 16 July. 
In 1863, the followers of Bábism were exiled from Persia, and in 1868 were 
transferred to Acre; the corpse of Siyyid `Alí Muḥammad, the founder of Bábism, was 
transferred from Tehran to the vicinity of Mount Carmel in 1899, and in 1909 the 
remains were laid to rest within a mausoleum, which had been constructed on the 
side of Mount Carmel for this purpose. The site thus came to have great importance 
in Bábism, and its offshoot Bahá'í, and a more elaborate shrine, known as the Shrine 
of the Báb, was built over the mausoleum in the 1950s, with a series of decorative 
terraces being constructed around it. Mírzá Ḥusayn-`Alí, the founder of the Bahá'í 
faith, writing in the Tablet of Carmel, designated the area around the shrine as the 
location for the administrative headquarters of the religion; the Bahá'í administrative 
buildings were constructed adjacent to the decorative terraces, and are referred to 
as the Arc, on account of their physical arrangement. 
e) Beit Shean Valley; (Hebrew: תיֵבּ ןאְָשׁ, Bet Šəʼan; unofficially also spelled 
Beth Shean; official Israeli Arabic: ناش تيب Bayt Šān; Arabic: ناسيب Beesān, also 
spelled Beisan or Bisan) is a city in the North District of Israel. 
The modern Israeli city of Beit She’an was founded in 1949, a short time after 
the establishment of the State of Israel. Beit She’an lies about 120 meters below sea 
level in the Jordan River Valley, about 60 km south of Tiberias on Highway 90. 
Beit She’ans location has often been strategically significant, as it sits at the 
junction of the Jordan River Valley and the Jezreel Valley, essentially controlling 
access from the interior to the coast, as well as from Jerusalem to the Galilee. Its 
name is believed to derive from the early Canaanite “house of the God Shan” or 
“house of tranquillity.” 
In 1934, Lawrence of Arabia noted that “Bisan is now a purely Arab village,” 
where “very fine views of the river can be had from the housetops.” He further noted 
that, “Many nomad and Bedouin encampments, distinguished by their black tents, 
were scattered about the riverine plain, their flocks and herds grazing round them.” 
Beisan was home to a mainly Mizrahi Jewish community of 95 until 1936, 
when the 1936–1939 Arab revolt saw Beisan serve as a center of Arab attacks on 
Jews in Palestine. 
298 
 
In 1938, after learning of the murder of his close friend and Jewish leader 
Haim Sturmann, Orde Wingate led his men on a rampage in the Arab section of Beit 
She’an, the rebels’ suspected base. Wingate’s forces damaged property and 
wounded several people, some may have been killed. 
According to population surveys conducted in British Mandate Palestine, 
Beisan consisted of 5,080 Muslim Arabs out of a population of 5,540 (92% of the 
population), with the remainder being listed as Christians. In 1945, the surrounding 
“Beisan district” consisted of 16,660 Muslims (67%), 7,590 Jews (30%), and 680 
Christians (3%), and Arabs owned 44% of land, Jews owned 34%, and 22% 
constituted public lands. The 1947 UN Partition Plan allocated Beisan and most of its 
district to the proposed Jewish state. 
The first attacks by Jewish militias during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War against 
Beisan in February and March 1948, part of Operation Gideon, centered on the 
Bedouin populations of the wider Beisan district, which Walid Khalidi argues was part 
of a wider Plan Dalet. Joseph Weitz, a leading Zionist figure, wrote in his diary on 
May 4th 1948 that, “The Beit Shean Valley is the gate for our state in the Galilee... 
[I]ts clearing are the need of the hour.” 
Beisan fell to the Jewish militias three days before the end of British Mandate 
Palestine. After Israel’s Declaration of Independence in May 1948, 6,000 Arabs were 
expelled from Beisan, and their property and communal buildings were confiscated 
and held by the state of Israel. Many were loaded onto trucks and taken to the 
Jordanian and Syrian borders where they were forced to cross. Most Palestinian 
Christians were relocated to Nazareth, including Naim Ateek and his family, who he 
says left after his father was told by the local Israeli military commander that they 
would be killed unless they left straightaway. Demolition of homes in Beisan began in 
June 1948, but was halted to allow Jewish immigrants, largely Ashkenazi, many of 
them Holocaust survivors, to settle in what remained of the Palestinian homes. 
A family of four was held hostage and then killed in 1974 by terrorists from the 
Palestine Liberation Organization’s Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine, who took over their apartment building. 
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Appendix 3 
 
Annex 1 the Israel-Jordan Negotiations 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20Process/Isra
el-Jordan%20Negotiations  
 
The bilateral talks between Israel and Jordan, initiated at the Madrid 
Conference, continued for almost two years in Washington until the signing of the 
Israeli-Jordanian Common Agenda on September 14, 1993. The Common Agenda 
constituted the blueprint for the peace treaty, comprising the following components: 
security, water, refugees and displaced persons, borders and territorial matters.  
The first public meeting between King Hussein and Prime Minister Rabin took 
place in Washington, on July 25, 1994. Out of this meeting emerged The 
Washington Declaration, signed by Prime Minister Rabin and King Hussein, with 
President Clinton serving as a witness.  
The major achievements of the Washington Declaration were a series of 
agreements and concrete steps symbolizing the new era:  
- The state of belligerency between Jordan and Israel was terminated.  
- Both states agreed to seek a just, lasting and comprehensive peace based 
on UN Resolutions 242 and 338. 
-Israel will respect the special role of the Hashemite Kingdom over Muslim 
holy shrines in Jerusalem. 
Concrete steps included the establishment of direct telephone links, joint 
electricity grids, new border crossings, free access to third country tourists, and 
cooperation between the police forces in combating crime, with special emphasis on 
drug smuggling. It was also decided to continue negotiations on bilateral economic 
cooperation and abolishing economic boycotts, as well as on the opening of an 
international air corridor between the two countries.  
The first meeting in the region of the Israeli and Jordanian bilateral 
delegations took place on July 18-19, 1994 at Ein Avrona, located in the boundary 
area north of Aqaba and Eilat. The parties agreed to hold talks on a continuous 
basis, alternately on the Israeli and Jordanian sides of the border. These talks 
culminated in the signing of a Treaty of Peace between Israel and Jordan on October 
26, 1994. 
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With the ratification of the peace treaty full diplomatic relations were 
established between Israel and Jordan on November 27, 1994. Since that time, 
relations between Israel and Jordan have been steadily progressing. The Jordanian 
parliament's action in August 1995 to rescind its adherence to the Arab boycott on 
Israel, as well as the regional economic conference in Amman in November 1995, 
served as significant positive indicators for the future.  
The open border crossings between the two countries have facilitated the 
normalization of relations. Joint business ventures are being consistently initiated 
and the free movement of businessmen, by both land and air, has created an 
atmosphere of cooperation and open communication. Tourism between the two 
countries has been on the rise.  
The basis for the implementation of the peace treaty with Jordan was set with 
the 15 bilateral agreements which have since been signed and ratified. These 
agreements cover the following areas: Environmental Protection, Commerce and 
Trade, Transportation, Air Transport, Water, Agriculture, Combatting Crime and Illicit 
Drugs, Communications and Mail, Science and Culture, Education, Health, Borders, 
The Eilat-Aqaba Region, Tourism and Energy. These treaties are to serve as the 
foundation of the peaceful, normal relationship between Israel and the Hashemite 
Kingdom.  
These are some of the recent highlights of activity:  
- Commerce and Trade: Since trade began between Jordan and Israel in July 
1996, the figures indicate a steady growth in Jordanian-Israeli commerce. In 1996 
Israel exported some 9 million dollars’ worth of goods to Jordan, while importing 
products valued at 5 million dollars. In 1997 the value of exports rose to about 20 
million dollars, and imports from Jordan amounted to 12.5 million. Estimates for the 
period January-September 1998 alone show exports and imports at more than 29 
million dollars. 
- Economic Cooperation: An important part of the economic cooperation 
between Jordan and Israel is taking place in the Hassan Industrial Park in Irbid - the 
first area to be granted the status of duty-free export to the USA (QIZ). Cooperation 
in this region is mainly in the areas of textiles and the manufacture of jewelry and 
electronic equipment. Thousands of Jordanians are employed in these industries, as 
well as in other industrial areas throughout the country. The success of the joint 
industrial park in Irbid has given rise to a decision reached by the Ministers of 
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Industry and Trade of the two countries with regard to the expansion of this move to 
additional industrial parks in the border area between Jordan and Israel subject to 
approval by the United States. 
- International Cooperation and Agriculture: In October 1995 an agreement on 
cooperation in these areas was signed between Jordan and Israel. Under the terms 
of this agreement, the Israel Foreign Ministry’s Centre for International Cooperation 
(MASHAV) works together with several government ministries in Jordan and with a 
number of non-governmental organizations for the promotion of economic and social 
development for the benefit of both peoples. The two countries have established a 
joint enterprise for the marketing of agricultural produce, with a view to developing 
new markets for the agricultural produce being grown in the eastern Jordan River 
Valley with the help of Israeli technologies. 
- Air Transport: A “pilot project” has been activated involving the use of Aqaba 
Airport for flights from Europe bringing tourists to Eilat. With the completion of the 
new terminal on the Israeli side, all international flights currently landing at Ovda and 
Eilat Airports will be transferred to the Aqaba-Eilat Peace Airport. Moreover, the 
number of flights between Amman and Ben-Gurion Airport has been stepped up this 
year to 14, and a new line has been put in, linking Amman with Haifa twice a week. 
- Tourism: In 1996, and again in 1997, some 125,000 Israeli tourists visited 
Jordan. The number of Jordanian tourists visiting Israel came to about 50,000 
annually (not counting family visits). There has been an increase in the level of 
cooperation between the tourist agenci.s of the two countries in the matter of 
marketing package tours for Israel and Jordan. There is agreement, too, between the 
two countries concerning cooperation with the approach of the year 2000 and the 
expected stream of tourists to the Holy Land from all over the world. 
- Water: Under the terms of the peace treaty, Israel today provides Jordan 
with nearly 75 million cubic meters of water per year. Work is to begin soon on the 
erection of a dam deigned to divert water from the Yarmouk River: another aspect of 
the cooperation between Jordan and Israel in this domain. 
A Trilateral Israel-Jordan-US Economic Committee was established at the 
October 1993 White House meeting between President Clinton, Crown Prince 
Hassan and Foreign Minister Peres to discuss economic cooperation and 
development. This forum first convened in Washington D.C. on November 30, 1993, 
and then periodically in the region. Sub-groups were established to discuss specific 
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issues, such as: trade, finance and banking; Jordan Valley cooperative projects; and 
civil aviation. The outcomes of these talks have been incorporated in the Peace 
Treaty between Israel and Jordan.  
The convening of the fifth meeting of the Trilateral Economic Committee at the 
Dead Sea Spa Hotel in Jordan on July 20-21, 1994 was the occasion for the first 
public meeting of Israeli and Jordanian leaders in the region -- Jordanian Prime 
Minister Majali and Israeli Foreign Minister Peres. 
 
ARTICLE 6: WATER  
With the view to achieving a comprehensive and lasting settlement of all the 
water problems between them:  
The Parties agree mutually to recognize the rightful allocations of both of them 
in Jordan River and Yarmouk River waters and Araba/Arava ground water in 
accordance with the agreed acceptable principles, which shall be fully respected and 
complied with.  
The Parties, recognizing the necessity to find a practical, just and agreed 
solution to their water problems and with the view that the subject of water can form 
the basis for the advancement of co- operation between them, jointly undertake to 
ensure that the management and development of their water resources do not, in 
any way, harm the water resources of the other Party.  
The Parties recognize that their water resources are not sufficient to meet 
their needs. More water should be supplied for their use through various methods, 
including projects of regional and international co-operation.  
In light of paragraph 3 of this Article, with the understanding that co-operation 
in water-related subjects would be to the benefit of both Parties, and will help 
alleviate their water shortages, and that water issues along their entire boundary 
must be dealt with in their totality, including the possibility of trans-boundary water 
transfers, the Parties agree to search for ways to alleviate water shortage and to co- 
operate in the following fields:  
• Development of existing and new water resources, increasing the water 
availability including co- operation on a regional basis as appropriate and 
minimising wastage of water resources through the chain of their uses.  
• Prevention of contamination of water resources. 
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• Mutual assistance in the alleviation of water shortages. 
• Transfer of information and joint research and development in water-related 
subjects, and review of the potentials for enhancement of water resources 
development and use. 
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Annex 2: Arab Higher Committee for Palestine Rejects Johnston Plan 
(August 18, 1955) 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/ahcrej.html  
 
While the negotiations conducted by Ambassador Eric Johnston with 
representatives of Israel and an Arab League Technical Committee were in 
progress, and an agreement was in sight, the Arab Higher Committee for Palestine, 
headed by the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem, urged the Arab States to reject the scheme 
and any project connected with Israel. On 18 August 1955, the Higher Committee 
sent the following letter to Heads of Arab Governments, Foreign Ministers, the 
Secretariat General of the Arab League, leaders of political parties and parliamentary 
blocs:  
1. The Arab Higher Committee for Palestine presents to you this letter 
concerning Mr. Eric Johnston's Scheme. It is enclosing herewith a map and a 
detailed account of this scheme which aims at the exploitation of the waters of the 
Arab countries, in the region of the Jordan River Valley, for the benefit of the Zionist 
cause and of that of the State of Israel. (The Committee) trusts and hopes that this 
important question will be the object of your care and attention. 
Mr. Johnston is still continuing his efforts to carry out his Scheme, known as 
"The Unified Development of Water Resources in the Jordan Valley Region", and 
which has been associated with his name because of the talks which he had, in this 
connection, with the Arab States and with the Jewish authorities in Occupied 
Palestine. 
There are many indications showing very clearly that Mr. Johnston's Scheme 
is but another step and a wide step made by the imperialists and the Zionists to carry 
out their programmes and to attain their ends, under the attractive guise of 
"economic interests" which, they claim, the Arabs in general, and the refugees in 
particular, will gain from the Scheme. 
2. It has been established by conclusive evidence that this scheme has been 
put forth only to serve Zionist interests, and to provide economic means and factors 
for sustaining Zionist existence in Palestine, and (securing) its continuity, progress, 
welfare and territorial expansion in the heart of the Arab homeland. 
There is no question but that the most important of these means and factors is 
"water", which is needed by the Zionists to consolidate their existence and to irrigate 
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the extensive lands which they have usurped from Palestine but which they cannot 
cultivate and exploit except by ensuring (the existence of) water especially in the 
Negev and the southern parts of Palestine. 
3. The Zionists had previously put forth a number of schemes to exploit the 
water resources of the Jordan River Valley foremost among which are the well-
known project of Mr. Lowdermilk. They have been trying to control these water 
resources ever since the British Mandate was imposed on Palestine after the First 
World War. 
The scheme of Unified Development, the subject of the present study, has 
been meant to fulfil for the Zionists all the water schemes which they put forth many 
years ago and for the fulfilment of which they have waited for the opportune time. 
4. The Zionists admit that their possession of water resources is a 
fundamental factor in the life of their State and their continued existence. They 
consider themselves (to be engaged) in a fierce battle with the Arabs, which is the 
"battle of water". 
One of the most conspicuous indications of the importance attached by the 
Zionists to the water problem is what their Prime Minister Ben-Gurion stated in the 
course of a speech made by him on 14 May 1955 in Tel Aviv, in commemoration of 
the establishment of their State. He said: "The Jews are today fighting the Arabs in 
the 'battle for water'. On the outcome of this battle depends the future of the Jewish 
existence of Palestine. If we were not to win this battle, it would be as if we had done 
nothing in Palestine, and we should (then) admit (our) failure." 
5. There is no question but that the Johnston Scheme will be the strongest 
weapon in the hands of the Zionists if they succeed in carrying it out, (and this), 
despite the objections which they are raising (now) against some aspects of the 
scheme, and (notwithstanding) the disinterestedness which they are feigning 
concerning (the scheme) because it (supposedly) does not fulfil their wishes. 
There is no doubt that these Zionist allegations are meant only to mislead and 
deceive the Arabs, in order to make them accept it. 
6. The scheme mentioned will realize for the Zionists their ambitions of seizing 
the (water) resources and exploiting them to irrigate the southern areas and the 
Negev. For it will make the waters of the tributaries of al-Hasbani, Banias, Tall al-
Qadi and al-Yarmuk (and all these lie outside Palestine and outside its occupied 
part), as well as the Jordan River itself, within the reach of the Zionists and subject to 
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their exploitation for their own interests. This is confirmed by (the fact that) there is 
(now) a study about the Unified Development Scheme (Johnston's Scheme), 
showing that the tragedy, to which the tragedy of Andalusia, or indeed any other 
tragedy which has befallen the Arab nation, cannot (by any means) be comparable. 
It is undeniable that the Jewish State, which was established by imperialism 
and Zionism on the wreckage of the Arabs in Palestine, is dominated by economic 
crises, by (special) political circumstances, and by party differences which it can 
hardly stand. (This is) in addition to its being subject to the pressure of the Arab 
economic blockade. It is as if the advocates of the Johnston Scheme are asking the 
Arab nation to harness its water resources and wealth to the service of such an 
aggressive Jewish State and to lend it their support, thereby saving it from its plight 
and willingly handing over to it their effective weapon which it will use to destroy 
them in the near future. 
For this reason, the Arab Higher Committee considers that the interest of the 
Arab nation, in general, and that of the Palestine problem and the refugees, in 
particular, necessitate the outright rejection of the scheme of "The Unified 
Development of Water Resources in the Jordan River Valley", as well as the 
rejection of any co-operation concerning it. 
The Arab (Higher) Committee is certain that the esteemed Arab States, 
having made accurate studies of this scheme, share in its opinion regarding the 
great extent of its danger and the great harm it will bring to Palestine and the 
neighbouring Arab countries, and consequently, to the whole Arab nation. There is 
no doubt that the Arabs will lose nothing by rejecting that scheme, for, (by doing so), 
they will keep their water power for themselves, at a time when the Israelis alone will 
suffer loss. 
If the Western Powers, and America in particular, really intend to help the 
underdeveloped countries, and to develop (for the Arabs) the water resources in the 
Arab countries, they should be able to help through schemes specially designed for 
the Arabs and having no connection with the Zionists. 
It is also possible for the Arab countries to undertake purely Arab schemes, 
beneficial to their countries and peoples, without having to rely for these upon 
American dollars, with which the foreigners are beckoning in order to attract and 
entice the Arabs and thus drive them to give their consent to a scheme such as that 
of Johnston's which in reality aims at the consolidation of the Zionist State, its 
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development and the enlargement of its territory in the very midst of the Arab 
homeland. 
The Arab Higher Command has attached to this letter a map and a detailed 
memorandum written after a thorough study in the light of the political and 
imperialistic aims of Zionism on the dangerous Zionist ambitions over the Arab 
waters of Syria, Lebanon and Palestine, as well as on "The Unified Development of 
Water Resources" Scheme. And it urges the Arab States concerned which have any 
connection with this imperialistic Zionist Scheme to reject it definitively. 
 
(Greetings and Respects) 
President of the Arab Higher Committee for Palestine 
(Signed) Muhammed Amin al-Husayni 
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Appendix 4 
 
Annex 1: Arab Summit Decides to Divert Jordan River 
(January 13-17, 1964) 
 http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/watsum.html  
 
The first Arab summit conference, held in Cairo in January 1964 decided, 
among other things, on the diversion of the headwaters of the River Jordan. The plan 
itself was only hinted at in the final communiqué issued at the conclusion of the 
conference, but more details were revealed by the Secretary-General of the Arab 
League. The final communiqué of the summit reads as follows:  
The Council of the Kings and Heads of State of the Arab League, in its first 
session held at the Arab League Headquarters in Cairo, from 13 to 17 January 1964, 
upon the suggestion of President Gamal Abdul Nasser, President of the United Arab 
Republic; 
- Having considered the threat and repeated use of force by Israel since it 
evicted the Palestine Arab population, and created in their territory a colonialist State 
which practises discrimination against the Arab minority, adopts a policy of 
aggression of which the fait accompli is the basic feature, flouts continuously the 
resolutions of the United Nations which affirm the right of the Palestine Arab people 
to repatriation, and insultingly ignores the many condemnations of it adopted by the 
United Nations authorities; 
- Having discussed Israel's new and aggressive plan to divert the course of 
the River Jordan, thereby greviously endangering the riparian rights of the Arabs with 
the object of realizing Zionist designs for expansion through immigration and Israel's 
plan to establish further centres of aggression against the security and progress of 
Arab countries, thus endangering world peace; 
- In pursuance of the legitimate right of self-defence; 
- Fully persuaded of the sacred right of the Palestine Arab people to self 
determination and liberation from the Zionist colonization of their country, believing 
that Arab solidarity is the means to off-set imperialist designs, and convinced of the 
need for the realization of equitable common Arab interests to raise the living 
standard of the people and to implement programmes for reconstruction and 
rehabilitation; 
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- Has therefore adopted the practical resolutions essential to ward off the 
imminent Zionist menace, whether in the defensive or the technical domains in the 
field of organizing the Palestinian people to enable them to play their part in the 
liberation of their country and attain self-determination. 
The Council's meeting has brought the Kings and Heads of State to 
unanimous agreement to put an end to differences, clear the Arab atmosphere of all 
discord, suspend all campaigns by information media, consolidate relations among 
the Arab States, ensure collective co-operation and reconstruction and frustrate 
aggressive expansionist designs menacing all Arab States. 
The Council was also of the view that the convening of more of these 
meetings at the highest level is a matter necessitated by supreme Arab interests, 
and decided that the Kings and Heads of State should meet at least once a year and 
that the coming meeting be held during August, 1964, at Alexandria. 
The Arab Kings and Heads of State declare that the Arab nation calls upon 
those nations and peoples of the world which cherish the right to self-determination 
to extend to it the staunchest support in repelling the new Israeli aggression. 
These leaders affirm that, in adopting this just and defensive stand, they will regulate 
their political and economic relations with other countries in accordance with the 
policy of these countries toward the legitimate Arab struggle against Zionist designs 
in the Arab world. 
The Arab Kings and Heads of State also hope that all those Afro-Asian 
countries which placed their faith in the Bandung principles and committed 
themselves to the Addis Ababa Charter and which sacrificed a great deal in fighting 
imperialism, fought racial discrimination and have been and are still being subjected 
to the Zionist and imperialist dangers and designs particularly in Africa would extend 
their true support and assistance to the Arabs in their just struggle. 
These leaders also hope for the support of all free nations which believe in 
peace based on justice. 
The Arab Kings and Heads of State further affirm the belief in the justice of 
the Arab struggle and in the need for supporting this struggle against imperialism in 
occupied South Yemen and in Oman, as well as their belief in the justice of the 
national struggle in Angola and South Africa and in every part of the world, that the 
cause of liberty and justice is integral and indivisible. 
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The leaders confirm their faith in solving world problems through peaceful 
means in accordance with the United Nations Charter and affirm their belief in the 
principle of peaceful co-existence among nations and in the policy of non-alignment. 
Inspired by this conviction, the Arab countries welcome the partial nuclear test-ban 
treaty of Moscow and have hastened to sign it. They support the concerted efforts 
made towards achieving total and complete disarmament in ways that can safeguard 
world peace. 
Inspired by their attachment to the principles of peace based on equity and 
justice, and their determination to participate in the economic development of the 
world through the elimination of economic and social under-development, the Arab 
countries played a major role in the Conference of Economic Development held in 
Cairo in the spring of 1963. They pledge themselves to participate with the same 
spirit and determination in the World Conference of Development and Trade which 
will be held this year. 
The Kings and Heads of State welcome the African Unity Charter in which 
they see a new hope for peace, freedom, and equality in Africa and the world. 
Moreover, they affirm their determination to consolidate Afro-Asian co-
operation, which began in earnest with the Bandung Conference of 1955. 
The Arab Kings and Heads of State declare their devotion to their duty towards their 
Arab nation, towards the dignity of the human family, and in the service of peace and 
prosperity in the world.  
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Annex 2: Israeli Response to Arab League Plan to Divert Jordan 
(January 21, 1964) 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/isresp.html  
 
Israel's reaction to the first Arab summit came in a speech to the Knesset by 
Prime Minister Levi Eshkol. He declared that Israel would draw water from Lake 
Kinnereth within the limits established in the Unified Plan. Referring to the Arab 
threat to divert the headwaters of the Jordan, he added that “Israel will oppose 
unilateral and illegal measures by the Arab States and will act to protect its vital 
interests.” The text of his statement follows:  
Last week thirteen Arab Heads of State and representatives met in Cairo at 
the invitation of the Egyptian President in order to discuss ways of sabotaging the 
State of Israel's water plan. At the end of the conference a statement was issued 
containing attacks and threats against Israel, and reporting the adoption of decisions 
in both the military and the technical spheres. 
Whatever was obscure in the statement was spelled out later by the 
Secretary-General of the Arab League, who announced the establishment of military, 
administrative and financial machinery for the execution of what he called "The Arab 
Plan for the Jordan Waters" which means the diversion of the headwaters of the 
Jordan to prevent their waters flowing into Israeli territory, with the further purpose of 
increasing the salinity of the water that will remain. 
The deliberation of the conference were held in camera, but before the first 
session was closed to the public, the President of Egypt managed to reveal the gist 
of several decisions adopted in 1960 and 1961 by the Council of the Arab League, 
the League's Defence Council, and the Supreme Council of the Arab General Staffs. 
These decisions dealt with military and engineering measures designed to prevent 
the execution of Israel's water plan. The President of Egypt expressly stated that the 
measures planned in 1960/61 were to have been based on united military operations 
by the Arab States against Israel. 
From the Egyptian President's statement it is clear beyond a shadow of a 
doubt that if these military and engineering plans to the detriment of Israel's rights 
and security were not carried out, it was only because the practical conditions 
required were lacking. 
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A few days have passed since the conference of the Arab Heads of State 
broke up, and it is important that the world should be aware of the deplorable 
significance of the decisions it adopted and the statements it issued. All the States 
that took part ill the conference are members of the United Nations Organization. 
Under the Charter of the United Nations, it is their duty to refrain not only from the 
use of force but from any threat of force against any other country. Compliance with 
these principles of the United Nations Charter is humanity's only hope of emerging 
from the nightmare of war and building a better world founded on justice, law and 
peace. In recent times the world has become more sensitive to the vital need for a 
relaxation of world and regional tensions and the avoidance of the danger of armed 
violence. The aspiration for peace in our time comes from the hearts of all mankind. 
It is common to all nations and all continents. And it is just in these days that the 
Heads of the Arab States openly and expressly proclaim that they planned acts of 
aggression against another State entitled to equal rights in the family of nations, and 
announce their intention to revive these plans and carry them into effect. 
Is it not clear that those who make such proclamations regard the Charter of 
the United Nations as no more than a worthless scrap of paper? Has it not been 
demonstrated afresh that the signatures of Egypt and the other Arab countries on the 
Charter of the United Nations are of no value whatsoever? 
We find ourselves confronted with a doctrine of international relations to which 
there is no parallel in our generation. It is contrary to all law and morality. It makes a 
mockery of the repeated declarations by the Egyptian President and his colleagues 
of their devotion to peace and world disarmament. It runs contrary to the mainstream 
of international thought in our days which has as its central objective the relaxation of 
tension and the strengthening of peace. 
While it is not yet clear what the practical results of the Cairo conference will 
be, it has already brought out into the clear light of day aggressive and destructive 
aims that should shock the conscience of every lover of peace. Thirteen Heads of 
State were moved to assemble and deliberate together. How deplorable it is that the 
purpose of their meeting was not the social and economic advancement of their tens 
of millions of people. How horrifying that the only aim that could bring them together 
under one roof was their lust for aggression against a neighbouring State. 
The Cairo conference has laid bare a general posture of hostility to Israel; but 
tile main subject with which it dealt was our country's national water scheme. Here 
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the conference arrived at a dual conclusion: it painted a distorted picture of our legal 
and constructive enterprise; and it proclaimed a plan of sabotage, which is based 
entirely on negation and envy, violation of law and deliberate aggression. 
Arab propaganda tries to describe Israel's water project as a unilateral and 
illegal scheme, which violates the rights of the Arab countries. There is not a grain of 
truth in this picture. This campaign of distortion deliberately passes over the history 
of tile scheme, its legal basis, and the true facts. 
Eleven years ago the Arab States and Israel agreed to the mediation of the 
President of the United States, who sent the late Ambassador Eric Johnston to this 
part of the world as his special envoy to work out an agreed regional plan for the 
utilization of the waters of the Jordan, the Yarmuk and their tributaries. At the 
opening of the negotiations, the Arab countries on the one hand and Israel on the 
other submitted separate plans for the allocation of the Jordan and Yarmuk waters. 
For almost three years Ambassador Johnston conducted parallel and co-ordinated 
negotiations with the Arab Governments and with Israel. 
After prolonged and exhaustive discussions, in which Arab, Israeli and 
international engineers took part, Mr. Johnston produced a Unified Regional Plan 
which was based upon accepted rules and principles of international law and 
procedure. This plan assured Syria and Lebanon of all the quantities of water 
demanded by them in the Arab plan, without any cuts whatsoever. The Unified Plan 
allocated to the Kingdom of Jordan all the water required by it for the irrigation of its 
irrigable areas. 
This allocation was based on a detailed, objective survey. In other words, the 
needs of Jordan, Syria and Lebanon were fully satisfied by the Unified Plan. And 
indeed, as Ambassador Johnston testified in an article published in the New York 
Times on 10 August 1958, the Arab countries and Israel agreed to the Unified Plan 
from every point of view connected with its technical and other merits. In October 
1955, however, the Arab League decided against ratification of the Plan, not for any 
reasons pertaining to the quantities of water allocated, but on the deliberate principle 
of opposing any cooperation even indirect with Israel. 
But the three years of negotiation were not in vain. An agreed allocation of 
water had been determined, which was founded on criteria accepted the world over, 
and against which the parties concerned had made no objection. And now, in 1964 - 
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eleven years after the beginning of the negotiations over the Unified Plan, Israel will 
begin to draw its share of water from Lake Kinnereth in accordance with this Plan. 
We have undertaken to remain within the framework of the quantities 
specified in the Unified Plan and we shall honour this undertaking. According to the 
principles of international law governing water questions, the refusal of one party to 
reach agreement with a second party does not give the party that refuses the right to 
prevent its neighbour drawing its reasonable share from a river flowing through the 
territories of a number of States. The accepted law pertaining to the allocation of 
water does not recognize the right of veto or the right to compel the second party to 
allow its water to run to waste. 
Israel will not be the first country to draw water from the Jordan-Yarmuk 
system. For the past two years the Kingdom of Jordan has been drawing 
considerable quantities of water from this system in the framework of its Yarmuk 
Plan. This Plan enjoys the support of international development agencies, which aim 
at advancing the complete utilization of water resources in every country, in pursuit 
of the goal of comprehensive regional development. Syria and Lebanon are also 
drawing all their requirements from the headwaters of the Jordan. 
This, then, is the situation: The Arab countries are utilizing the Jordan-Yarmuk 
system to meet all their needs, while they seek to prevent Israel drawing its share 
from this network. They believe, apparently, that what is permissible to them should 
be forbidden to Israel. Their aim is to injure Israel even at the cost of injury to 
themselves. They wish to convince the world that, in the name of hostility to Israel, 
they are entitled to prevent the flow of the Jordan headwaters in their natural 
channels in Israel's territory. I note with satisfaction that the world in general has not 
been convinced by this theory of hostility and hatred. It is becoming clearer and 
clearer to the world that the arguments of the Arab countries have nothing to do with 
water, but are meant to deny Israel's right to exist. 
In closing, I wish to clarify the position of the Government of Israel. 
Israel will draw water from Lake Kinnereth within the limits of the quantities 
laid down in the Unified Plan. 
Israel will oppose unilateral and illegal measures by the Arab States and will 
act to protect its vital rights. 
We believe that world public opinion will not be misled by malicious 
misstatements and will reject the campaign of incitements and threats against a 
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legitimate and constructive development project. This area needs the benefits that 
will flow from its waters, and not incitement to bloodshed; it needs economic 
development, not barren strife; cooperation, not envious hostility; the utilization - not 
the waste - of its water resources; the advancement of peace and not the fomenting 
of war. 
The more firmly world public opinion rejects hostility and aggression, and 
encourages useful and constructive development, the more it will help the Arab 
Governments to abandon a policy of reckless adventurism, and will help our area to 
advance along the road of progress, constructive endeavour and peace. 
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Appendix 5 
Annex 1: NOTE PREPARED BY THE PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR 
JUSTICE AND PEACE 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/justpeace/documents/rc_pc_justpeace_d
oc_20030322_kyoto-water_en.html  
 
A CONTRIBUTION OF THE DELEGATION OF THE HOLY SEE ON THE 
OCCASION OF THE THIRD WORLD WATER FORUM (Kyoto, 16th-23rd March 2003)  
 
PRESENTATION BY H.E. MSGR. RENATO R. MARTINO 
On this World Water Day, I have the pleasure of presenting WATER, AN 
ESSENTIAL ELEMENT FOR LIFE: a Note prepared by the Pontifical Council for 
Justice and Peace as a contribution of the Holy See to the Third World Water Forum, 
now taking place in Kyoto, Japan. Even the title of the Note reflects the concern of 
the Holy See, as well as its ethical and religious understanding of the many complex 
water-related problems. Water is a good that must serve for the development of the 
whole person and of every person. 
After the first section, in which some of the fundamental moral principles 
related to the question of water are laid out, the Note deals with the key problems 
which governments and the international community have to face today at the social, 
economic, political and environmental level. In the final section, after having 
acknowledged the importance water holds within religious traditions, the Note 
considers in some detail the right to water because of the growing importance that 
the efforts towards its full recognition is assuming in the public debate. 
After the Third World Water Forum, and in the light of its conclusions, the 
Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace will deal with the topic of water in a more 
developed and detailed document. The topic is closely related to the message of the 
Social Doctrine of the Church concerning human promotion and is also an extremely 
urgent problem in today’s world. 
 
Vatican City, 22 March 2003 
  Archbishop Renato R. Martino 
President of the Pontifical Council for Justice and 
Peace 
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NOTE: WATER, AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT FOR LIFE  
Introduction 
Water is an essential element for life. Many people must confront daily the 
situation of an inadequate supply of safe water and the very serious resulting 
consequences. The intention of this paper is to present some of the human, social, 
economic, ethical and religious factors surrounding the issue of water. 
The Holy See offers these reflections on some of the key issues in the agenda 
of the 3rd World Water Forum (Kyoto, 16th-23rd March 2003), in order to contribute its 
voice to the call for action to correct the dramatic situation concerning water. The 
human being is the centre of the concern expressed in this paper and the focus of its 
considerations. 
The management of water and sanitation must address the needs of all, and 
particularly of persons living in poverty. Inadequate access to safe drinking water 
affects the well being of over one billion persons and more than twice that number 
have no adequate sanitation. This all too often is the cause of disease, unnecessary 
suffering, conflicts, poverty and even death. This situation is characterized by 
countless unacceptable injustices. 
 
I. A FAR-REACHING QUESTION 
Water plays a central and critical role in all aspects of life – in the national 
environment, in our economies, in food security, in production, in politics. Water has 
indeed a special significance for the great religions. 
The inadequacy in the supply and access to water has only recently taken 
centre stage in global reflection as a serious and threatening phenomenon. 
Communities and individuals can exist even for substantial periods without many 
essential goods. The human being, however, can survive only a few days without 
clean, safe drinking water. 
Many people living in poverty, particularly in the developing countries, daily 
face enormous hardship because water supplies are neither sufficient nor safe. 
Women bear a disproportionate hardship. For water users living in poverty this is 
rapidly becoming an issue crucial for life and, in the broad sense of the concept, a 
right to life issue. 
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Water is a major factor in each of the three pillars of sustainable development 
– economic, social and environmental. In this framework, it is understood that water 
must meet the needs of the present population and those of future generations of all 
societies. This is not solely in the economic realm but in the sphere of integral 
human development. Water policy, to be sustainable, must promote the good of 
every person and of the whole person. 
Water has a central place in the practices and beliefs of many religions of the 
world. This significance manifests itself differently in various religions and beliefs. Yet 
two particular qualities of water underlie its central place in religions: water is a 
primary building block of life, a creative force; water cleanses by washing away 
impurities, purifying objects for ritual use as well as making a person clean, 
externally and spiritually, ready to come into the presence of the focus of worship. 
 
 II. THE WATER ISSUE: SOME ETHICAL CONSIDERATIOINS 
The principle water difficulty today is not one of absolute scarcity, but rather of 
distribution and resources. Access and deprivation underlie most water decisions. 
Hence linkages between water policy and ethics increasingly emerge throughout the 
world. 
Respect for life and the dignity of the human person must be the ultimate 
guiding norm for all development policy, including environmental policy. While never 
overlooking the need to protect our eco-systems, it is the critical or basic needs of 
humanity that must be operative in an appropriate prioritisation of water access. 
Powerful international interests, public and private, must adapt their agendas to 
serve human needs rather than dominate them. 
The human person must be the central point of convergence of all issues 
pertaining to development, the environment and water. The centrality of the human 
person must thus be foremost in any consideration of the issues of water. The first 
priority of every country and the international community for sustainable water policy 
should be to provide access to safe water to those who are deprived of such access 
at present. 
The earth and all that it contains are for the use of every human being and all 
peoples. This principle of the universal destination of the goods of creation confirms 
that people and countries, including future generations, have the right to fundamental 
access to those goods which are necessary for their development. Water is such a 
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common good of humankind. This is the basis for cooperation toward a water policy 
that gives priority to persons living in poverty and those living in areas endowed with 
fewer resources. The few, with the means to control, cannot destroy or exhaust this 
resource, which is destined for the use of all. 
People must become the "active subjects" of safe water policies. It is their 
creativity and capacity for innovation that makes people the driving force toward 
finding new solutions. It is the human being who has the ability to perceive the needs 
of others and satisfy them. Water management should be based on a participatory 
approach, involving users, planners and policy makers at all levels. Both men and 
women should be involved and have equal voice in managing water resources and 
sharing of the benefits that come from sustainable water use. 
In a globalized world the water concerns of the poor become the concerns of 
all in a prospective of solidarity. This solidarity is a firm and persevering 
determination to commit oneself to the common good, to the good of all and of each 
individual. It presupposes the effort for a more just social order and requires a 
preferential attention to the situation of the poor. The same duty of solidarity that 
rests on individuals exists also for nations: advanced nations have a very heavy 
obligation to help the developing people. 
The principle of subsidiarity acknowledges that decisions and management 
responsibilities pertaining to water should take place at the lowest appropriate level. 
While the water issue is global in scope, it is at the local level where decisive action 
can best be taken. The engagement of communities at the grassroots level is key to 
the success of water programs. 
 
 III. WATER: A SOCIAL GOOD 
While vital to humanity, water has a strong social content. It is highly charged 
with symbolism and is one of the essentials of life. Among the important social 
characters of water is its role in human nourishment, health and sanitation as well as 
peace and conflict avoidance. 
Water for Food and Rural Development 
Agriculture represents a key sector in the economies of developing countries 
and cannot be sustained without sufficient water. In most of these countries 
agricultural activities are a major source of livelihood and an essential dimension of 
local social cohesion and culture. This activity is carried on by small farmers in rural 
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areas, very often with huge constraints. However, it must be remembered that, in the 
end, the dominant use of water around the world will continue to be water for food 
security. 
People living in rural areas, many times in poverty, can be driven by necessity 
to exploit beyond sustainable limits the little land they have at their disposal. Special 
training aimed at teaching them how to harmonise the cultivation of land with respect 
for water and other environmental needs should be encouraged. Where possible, 
cooperative efforts of water management and use should be encouraged. 
Participation suffers when large portions of a population lack skills and 
knowledge to engage in the issue before them. It should not be overlooked, 
however, that often those lacking formal education possess traditional forms of 
knowledge that can be vital and decisive in addressing and solving the question of 
water. The special knowledge of indigenous people should be esteemed. 
In the context of rural development, a shift is needed, however, in the 
emphasis from the traditional irrigation to other means that focus on the needs of the 
poor and their food insecurity. The challenges are to develop water-saving 
technologies and to structure incentives to encourage development. 
Lands that have been damaged by waterlogging and salinization must be 
reclaimed through drainage programs. New irrigation development needs to be 
carried out with proper environmental impact assessment. Policies must be 
encouraged that develop sustainable irrigation and harness the wider potential of 
rainfed farming, incorporating water management for gardens and foods from 
common property resources. 
Safe Drinking Water, Health and Sanitation 
Three crucial concerns are present in the relationship between water and 
health: managing quantity constraints faced by water-poor countries and their impact 
on human activities; the maintenance of water quality in the face of growing demand; 
and the direct link between health and water as pertains to diseases. 
Management of water quantity can be carried out by revising the allocation of 
water to different users. Better maintenance and repair of existing water systems can 
often significantly increase the water supply. Water conservation methods such as 
rainwater harvesting, fog condensation and underground dams should be studied for 
use where appropriate along with stabilization ponds for wastewater and treatment 
technology for the use of wastewater for irrigation. 
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Water shortages can be substantially overcome through further development 
and use of treated urban wastewater for use in agriculture. This has considerable 
potential and if carefully managed carries only very limited risks and associated 
difficulties. 
The problem of maintaining and improving water quality is especially acute in 
the more urbanized areas, predominantly in developing countries. This is most often 
hampered by a failure to enforce pollution controls at the main point source and the 
inadequacy of sanitation systems and of garbage collection and disposal. 
Most of the diseases that contaminate water come from animal or human 
waste and are communicable. These diseases have health effects that are heavily 
concentrated in the developing world, and within that context particularly among poor 
urban populations. Wastewater is often the medium through which these can affect 
humans. 
Whether it relates to quantity, quality or disease, the trend away from 
centralized government agencies and towards empowering local governments and 
local communities to manage water supplies must be emphasised. This necessitates 
building community capacities, especially in the area of personnel, and the allocation 
of resources to the local level. 
Peace and/or Conflict 
Growing pressure due to increasing demand for water can be a source of 
conflict. When water is scarce, competition for limited supplies has lead nations to 
see water as a matter of national or regional security. History provides ample 
evidence of competition and disputes over shared fresh water resources. 
Identifying potential trouble areas does little good if there are no effective and 
recognized mechanisms for mitigating tensions. Existing international water law may 
be unable to handle the strains of ongoing and future problems. But some 
mechanisms for reducing the risks of such conflicts do in fact exist. These need 
renewed international support and should be applied more effectively and at an 
earlier stage of potential conflicts. 
At the international level, conflicts tend to focus on shared river basins and 
transboundary waters, especially when combined with circumstances of low water 
availability. Tensions arise with increasing frequency over projects to dam or divert 
water by countries in a powerful position upstream from their neighbouring countries. 
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 IV. WATER: AN ECONOMIC GOOD 
Water has always been acknowledged for its role in production and thus in the 
economy. However, in recent years increased emphasis has been given to the 
economic value of water. 
The Economics of Water 
The economics of water is one of the most important aspects of water 
resource management that needs to be balanced with cultural and social concerns. 
The concept of treating water as an economic good is valid but the practice of doing 
so can be challenging. 
The use of water for industry and energy are of great importance in terms of 
the amounts of water used, the cost of investments to provide the water and the 
economic significance of the resultant production. Every water policy must address 
the underlying economic issues. 
The aim of treating water as an economic good should be to accord water its 
proper economic value and enable the water economy of the country to be 
integrated with the broader national economy. Policies relating to the economics of 
water should ensure optimum efficiency and the most beneficial use while meeting 
the required objects of social development and environmental sustainability. There 
are increasing instances, however, of the commercialisation of water and water 
services. 
The most delicate and sensitive point in the consideration of water as an 
economic good is to ensure that a balance is maintained between ensuring that 
water for basic human needs is available to the poor and that, where it is used for 
production or other beneficial use, it is properly and appropriately valued. 
Water and Energy 
Hydroelectric power is an important source of clean energy. It provides 
approximately twenty percent of total electricity production worldwide and brings 
notable economic and environmental benefits. For poor mountainous regions it offers 
one of the few avenues for economic growth via electricity exports. However, too 
often in the past such projects have been accompanied by devastating 
environmental costs. 
Policy discussion in this area has been dominated by big dams to the neglect 
of issues such as small-scale hydropower and water use for cooling in thermal power 
plants. While most of this water re-enters the water system, the significant change in 
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temperature and in some cases quality, has serious environmental and resource 
implications. Dams still remain today one the most contentious development issues 
for the water sector. 
Private Sector Engagement and Privatisation 
Water by its very nature cannot be treated as a mere commodity among other 
commodities. Catholic social thought has always stressed that the defence and 
preservation of certain common goods, such as the natural and human 
environments, cannot be safeguarded simply by market forces, since they touch on 
fundamental human needs which escape market logic (cf. Centesimus Annus, 40). 
Water has traditionally been a State responsibility in most countries and 
viewed as a public good. Governments worldwide, for diverse political and social 
considerations, may indeed often provide large subsidies to insulate water users 
from the true cost of water provision. Being at the service of its citizens, the State is 
the steward of the people’s resources which it must administer with a view to the 
common good. 
At the same time, in the interest of achieving more efficient sustainable water 
services, private sector involvement in water management is growing. It has however 
proved to be extremely difficult to establish the right balance of public-private 
partnerships and serious errors have been committed. At times individual enterprises 
attained almost monopoly powers over public goods. A prerequisite for effective 
privatisation is that it be set within a clear legislative framework which allows 
government to ensure that private interventions do in actual fact protect the public 
interest. 
The debate today is not whether the private sector will be involved but how 
and to what extent it will be present as the actual provider of water services. In any 
formation of private sector involvement with the state, there must exist a general 
parity among the parties allowing for informed decisions and sound agreements. A 
core concern in private sector involvement in the water sector is to ensure that 
efforts to achieve a water service that is efficient and reliable do not cause undue 
negative effects for the poor and low-income families. 
 
 V. WATER: AN ENVIRONMENTAL GOOD 
The debate surrounding water has historically been largely confined to socio-
economic issues. Today, in the context of sustainable management of water 
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resources, the environmental aspect is coming to the forefront along with water’s role 
in supporting ecosystem functioning and species. 
This approach to water resources has focussed on sustainable use and on 
ensuring water utilization that is environmentally sound. A specific proposal to 
protect aquatic ecosystems and fresh water living resources has been put forward 
over the years reflecting the extreme threats that exist for many wetlands, rivers and 
lake ecosystems, deltas and other areas. 
Systematic changes to policy approaches are now needed, moving away from 
a traditional supply-side technical focus to one in which environmental issues are 
seen as integral to water policies and practices. Policy goals and priorities have in 
some cases to be re-ordered with frequent use of Environmental Impact 
Assessments as determinants of decisions on water investments. There is, however, 
a lack of adequate human resources in this sector. This calls for planning and 
investments in human resource development. 
Environmentally Sound Sanitation 
Conventional forms of centralised sanitation are coming under increasing 
criticism due to huge operating and maintenance costs but more importantly their 
high water consumption and the groundwater pollution that can result. Further these 
types of wastewater and sewage disposal systems usually deprive agriculture, and 
consequently food production, of valuable nutrients. 
An alternative approach towards ecologically and environmentally sound 
sanitation is offered by a concept referred to as "ecological sanitation". This takes 
the principle of environmental sanitation further in that their focus is keeping the 
environment clean and safe and preventing pollution. It includes wastewater 
treatment and disposal and disease prevention activities. It is an approach premised 
on recycling principles with a key objective of promoting a new philosophy of dealing 
with what has been regarded as waste. 
Disaster Mitigation and Risk Management 
A people centred pro-poor policy on water management must address the 
question of water related hazards such as floods, droughts, desertification, tropical 
storms, erosion and various kinds of pollution. Many so called natural disasters are 
in fact man made in their roots, due to inadequate attention to the environment and 
the consequences of human actions or indeed inaction. Once again, it is the poor 
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who suffer most when they are exposed to such dangers. But everyone’s security is 
at risk. 
More can be done in the areas of monitoring and forecasting of extreme 
events especially through more efficient early warning system and technical 
cooperation between poor and more developed countries in devising planning 
strategies and setting up appropriate infrastructures. Climate variability and change 
are now recognized as being an essential dimension of such evaluation. 
Efforts of humanitarian assistance in response to disasters relating to water 
must identify the faults which gave rise to such occurrences and ensure that they do 
not recur. Post disaster reconstruction is not a question of reconstructing the past, 
but of building for a safer and more ecologically sustainable future. 
 
 VI. OTHER ISSUES IMPACTING WATER SUPPLY 
The water that exists today would be enough to meet human needs if it were 
equitably distributed throughout the world. Since it is not, there arise situations of 
scarcity; some due to natural causes and others due to a range of human activities. 
Population 
World population has continued to grow throughout history. While the human 
demand for fresh water has risen steadily, since 1940 the global water withdrawals 
have risen even faster than the rate of population growth. It is correct to deduce that 
more people need more water. However, to attribute to population growth a 
disproportional role misrepresents the true picture. The principal cause in increased 
demand is not in itself the mere growth of population but the disproportionate and 
unsustainable use of water for production and consumption by populations in 
developed countries. 
The ever growing concentration of a very high percentage of the world’s 
population in large urban areas, especially in mega-cities, is going to propose new 
challenges for water and sanitation management, which will seriously impact the 
short-term and long-term local demand for water. 
Politics 
Water is a political issue. There is little today that cannot be achieved 
technically. What is needed is political effectiveness, political will and effective 
governance. 
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The political arena is where decisions of water utilisation will take place. The 
solution to water problems requires the interaction of many spheres and sectors. 
This interaction must take account of the objectives of safe drinking water, sanitation 
and food security for all. Politics must ensure proper interaction, through setting 
correct priorities and the equitable allocation of resources, as well as through 
fostering interaction between institutions and the engagement and support of local 
communities, who are the most directly affected. Political will and effective follow 
through is required for successful action in the water sector. The long-term viability of 
a country’s water supply infrastructure depends on leadership and vision of political 
leaders, at national and local levels and their capacity to get things done. 
New legislation and institutional changes will be needed in many countries to 
form the framework within which the politics of water supply can be realised. A larger 
portion of the national budget may need to be directed to the water sector. Political 
leaders are crucial in generating genuine political support and vision in order to 
provide the motivation for such changes. 
Often the institutional structure of the water sector at government level and 
the water portfolio is moved about between different ministries and many times is the 
result of political uncertainty and a lack of political responsibility. 
The international political arena must be given its proper role in seeking and 
formulating global strategies to address water issues. The issue of water cuts across 
so many areas relating to sustainable development and poses considerable 
challenges to politics at the international level. Action-orientated responses to the 
challenges is what the people of the world await. 
A Right to Water 
A major achievement of recent history has been the ability to elaborate, within 
the framework of the United Nations, a network of international instruments formally 
identifying and proclaiming a broad spectrum of universally recognized human rights. 
Although access to water is a precondition to many of these rights, "clean drinking 
water" is explicitly mentioned only in the Convention on the Rights of the Child.11 It is 
however to be found in some regional human rights documents and national 
Constitutions. 
Sufficient and safe drinking water is a precondition for the realization of other 
human rights. It is argued that water was so fundamental a resource that, just as a 
right to air was not identified, water was not explicitly mentioned at the time the 
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fundamental human rights documents were drawn up but was understood as a given 
which the drafters implicitly included. Furthermore, several of the explicit rights 
protected by conventions and agreements, such as rights to food, clothing, housing 
and medical care and necessary social services, cannot be attained or guaranteed 
without also guaranteeing access to clean water. 
There is a growing movement to formally adopt a human right to water. The 
dignity of the human person mandates its acknowledgement, along with the sound 
and logical argumentation found in the concept of implicit inclusion. Water is an 
essential commodity for life. Without water life is threatened, with the result being 
death. The right to water is thus an inalienable right. 
The challenge remains as to how such a right to water would be realized and 
enforced at the local, national and international levels. Just as, for example, the 
acknowledgement of the right to food has not eliminated hunger, the promotion of 
the right to water is a first step and needs careful implementation thought to arrive to 
the desired goal of access to safe drinking water for all. A right to adequate and safe 
drinking water should be interpreted in a manner fully consistent with human dignity 
and not in a narrow way, by mere reference to volumetric quantities and 
technologies or by viewing water primarily as an economic good. 
Poverty 
Poverty is the most important factor related to the sustainable provision of 
basic water and sanitation services. The unavailability of basic services is a primary 
measure of poverty and poverty is the primary obstacle in the effective provision of 
basis services. Water scarcity has more dramatic effects for the poor than for the 
wealthy. The cost of even minimal basic water services is so high that the poor may 
never be able to afford them. 
Sustainable water policies will not be attained in areas which are 
impoverished in many other aspects. Poor services are a symptom of something 
fundamental. Authorities are unable to provide the institutional framework and the 
infrastructures to regulate the sector. Development at the institutional level is needed 
whereby the priority of water is clearly identified. The authority and responsibility to 
enable services to operate efficiently must be provided. This will require structures 
for environmental and economic regulation. 
The water services in many developing countries are however still plainly 
inadequate in providing safe water supplies. This situation is so dramatic that it will 
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not be overcome without increased development assistance and focused private 
investment from abroad. Funds released through debt relief could well be utilized in 
improving water services. Country partnerships can provide a method of institutional 
building and reform whereby a long-term link can be formed between the water 
sector of a developed country and that of a developing country. International poverty 
reduction strategies should focus explicitly on the water needs of the poorest 
populations. 
National and local financial support for the water sector must also increase. 
Where subsidies are necessary, and they will be necessary, they should carefully 
target poor and families living in poverty rather than being applied generally. 
Following consultation at the community level, policies on water and related public 
health and environmental sectors need to be revised and where lacking established. 
After such policy change there is need to create or revise the body of laws impacting 
water that will effectively obtain and allocate the necessary supply of it. 
Poverty is about people and their ability to realize their God-given potential. 
The poor show extraordinary creativity in seeking means of survival in the absence 
of adequate services. This creativity is a resource which should not be overlooked in 
working together to build up sustainable communities and avoid the creation of 
dependence. 
 
Conclusion 
Water is an essential element for life. Right throughout human history water 
has been looked on as something intertwined with humankind. Human beings live 
alongside water and are nourished by water. It is a source of beauty, wonder and 
relaxation and refreshment. Our very contact with nature has a deep restorative 
power. It is no accident that people chose places associated with water for the 
holidays, in order to renew and regenerate themselves. Water has an aesthetic 
value. 
In the Judeo-Christian Holy Book, God is presented as the source of living 
water beside which the just man can find life. Because the Bible was written in a part 
of the world where water is scarce, it is not surprising that water features significantly 
in the lives of the people. Due to the scarceness of water in the lands of the 
Scripture, rainfall and an abundance of water was seen as a sign of God’s favour 
and goodness. 
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Water is a primary building block of life. Without water there is no life, yet 
water, despite its creative role, can destroy. The Bible opens precisely with the 
image of the divine spirit hovering over the water at the creation of the universe. In 
the accounts of creation contained in the first two chapters of the Bible, it is from the 
midst of the waters that dry land is made to appear, while living reptiles and rich life 
forms are made to swarm the waters. It is also water that moistens the earth for 
other forms of life to appear. 
The separation of the elements permits them to interact in a positive sense, 
recognizing the intrinsic value of each. Disorder and confusion among the elements 
provokes a return to the primeval chaos. Humankind is thus called to live in harmony 
with creation and to respect its integrity. 
Conservation of water is good because it provides for future generations that 
fundamental good which nourishes and allows us to protect such a source of power 
beauty and many other nice things. 
None of the issues presented here is done in isolation. Only in a true holistic 
approach can the human being confront the challenges set forward in addressing the 
issue of water. The Holy See’s contribution is presented with the conviction of the 
central role of the human being in caring for the environment and its constitutive 
elements. Only when humankind respects the integrity of creation, in conformity to 
God’s providential plan, will we reach a true appreciation of the significance of water 
in creation and for humankind. 
Vatican City,  14 March 2003 
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Annex 2: Declaration on Principles for Cooperation on Water-Related 
Matters and New and Additional Water Resources (February 13, 
1996) Multilateral Peace Process in the Middle East, Multilateral 
Working Group on Water Resources, Oslo, February 13, 1996 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20Process/Dec
laration%20on%20Principles%20for%20Cooperation%20on%20Water  
 
As part of the Program adopted by the Multilateral Working Group on Water 
Resources (MWGWR) of the Middle East Peace Process, the Government of 
Norway has sponsored certain activities of the agenda. Within this context 
comparative studies on Water Legislation, Institution, Institutions and Pricing of the 
Core Parties were commissioned and executed.  
As an outcome of these studies the Parties, facilitated by the Government of 
Norway and the Office of Gavelholder, have identified common denominators in their 
water resources management systems and proclaimed this Declaration on Principles 
for Cooperation among the Core Parties on Water-related Matters and New and 
Additional Water Resources. Although the Core Parties in the Middle East Peace 
Process are considered to be Jordan, Syria, Israel, Lebanon and the PLO for the 
benefit of the Palestinian Authority, for the purposes of this Declaration, the term the 
Core Parties are those who are signatories to this Declaration. The Core Parties 
agree that this Declaration and the cooperation there under will not affect or alter in 
any form or manner any of the bilateral or other agreements or undertakings among 
them, nor does it prohibit or constrain any bilateral arrangements, understandings or 
agreements aimed at enhancing cooperation in water-related matters. The Core 
Parties view this Declaration as an expression of:  
- The role of the multilateral talks in promoting cooperation and confidence-
building in the field of water resources and in the importance of cooperation 
for the promotion of matters of mutual interest.  
- A joint resolve to cooperate among them in the development of New and 
Additional Water Resources.  
- The importance of water resources management on the basis of locally 
compatible legal, economic and institutional frameworks and principles.  
- The recognition that cooperative efforts among them will facilitate the 
development of New and Additional Water Resources for their joint benefit.  
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- The ability to cooperate on the basis of the common denominators identified 
within their respective water management systems.  
The Core Parties proclaim as objectives of their cooperation:  
- Identifying the needs for New and Additional Water Resources;  
- Identifying potential New and Additional Water Resources and the 
development thereof;  
- Combining their cooperative efforts in the development of New and 
Additional Water Resources; and  
- Enhancing their water supply, and increasing the efficiency of its use.  
The Declaration consists of three parts, namely: Common Denominators, 
Principles of Cooperation on New and Additional Water Resources, and 
Cooperation on Other Water-Related Matters.  
Common Denominators  
The Core Parties identified and agreed to the following common denominators 
in their water legislation as a basis for cooperation among themselves:  
1. Water Resources in Legislation  
Their respective water legislations apply to all types of water resources 
including wastewater and desalinated water.  
2. Ownership and Administration of Water Resources  
All water resources of each party are publicly owned and/or centrally 
controlled. They are used for the benefit of their respective societies. The Core 
Parties promote public participation in water resources management. Well drilling, 
water production and supply are allowed only by permit or license.  
A Central Water Authority/ Government Agency exist in each of the Core Parties, 
and exercises effective control over water resources.  
3. Allocation  
Domestic uses occupy the first priority in the allocation of water resources.  
4. Drought Measures  
The Core Parties will take appropriate measures in periods of drought and 
water scarcity.  
5. Water Quality and Protection  
Water quality standards for various water uses have been adopted by each of 
the Core Parties; water preservation is an overriding concern, and enforcement 
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powers exist in the hands of competent authorities to prevent water pollution, and to 
mitigate any negative environmental impacts on them at the expense of the polluters.  
6. Data and Record Keeping  
Obligations exist, pursuant to the legislation of each Core Party, to measure, 
monitor and keep proper record of all water production, supplies and consumption.  
7. Compliance and Enforcement  
Proper sanctions against non-compliance are explicit in the respective 
legislation of each of the Core Parties. Enforcement of the water legislation is the 
norm.  
8. Water Charges  
Water is not supplied free of charge in any of the Core Parties. Tariff 
structures, taking into account different extents of cost recovery, apply to domestic, 
industrial and agricultural sectors. These tariffs are periodically reviewed and 
adjusted. 
 
Principles of Cooperation on New and Additional Water Resources 
1. Definitions  
For the purpose of this Declaration:   
- New and Additional Water Resources are only those potential water 
resources which are not Existing Water Resources, and which are not part of new 
and additional water resources developed pursuant to bilateral agreements.  
-  Existing Water Resources are the individual resources of each of the 
respective parties' renewable, non-renewable and waste water resources.  
- Cooperating Parties are those of the Core Parties, signatories to this 
Declaration, which actively participate in the development of any specific Project 
relating to new and additional water resources.  
- A New and Additional Water Resources Project, hereinafter the Project, 
means a project among Cooperating Parties to develop New and Additional Water 
Resources by specific agreement.  
2. General Principles  
- The development of New and Additional Water Resources will not adversely 
affect the development or utilization of Existing Water Resources.  
- All arrangements with respect to New and Additional Water Resources will 
be limited in time and subject to periodic mutual review.   
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3. Mechanisms of Cooperation  
- Cooperation among the Core Parties will be carried out by their respective 
water institutions through joint bodies on a ministerial and managerial level to be 
established, as appropriate, for each respective Party.  
- Each Project requires the consensus of all the Cooperating Parties for 
implementation.  
4. Ownership and Utilization  
- New and Additional Water Resources, developed in joint effort by the Core 
Parties for the benefit of some or all of them, will be considered as part of their own 
water resources only to the extent of the share allocated to them.  
- Details concerning the utilization and ownership will be the subject of 
separate agreements for each Project.  
- Each Core Party can apply its legislation, within its respective jurisdiction, on 
the share allocated to it by each Project.  
5. Technical, Economic and Financial Issues   
- Projects will be technically, economically, and financially sustainable.  
- The Cooperating Parties will carry their respective share of the project 
financing including the costs of operation, maintenance, and amortization of the 
Project. Due regard will be given to less developed Cooperating Parties and joint 
efforts will be made to assist in the obtaining of financing on favourable terms, 
provided that no such efforts affect any of the bilateral donor/recipients 
arrangements or protocols.  
- The Cooperating Parties agree to participate jointly in the raising of the funds 
needed for the Project implementation, and to secure the funds needed for the 
operation and maintenance of the new water system.  
- The cost to each of the Cooperating Parties of water derived from New and 
Additional Resources will be based upon the cost of production, operation, 
maintenance and amortization.  
- Water derived from the New and Additional Resources will not be subject to 
levies on account of conveyance, storage, treatment, or protection in excess of 
levies which the owner of the project would normally incur.  
- Cooperating Parties may, by mutual consent, trade the use of their 
respective shares of the waters from New and Additional Resources, provided that 
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such trading does not cause harm to the shares allocated to any other Cooperating 
Parties.  
6. Environmental Management  
- All Projects will be based on environmentally sound principles.  
- The Cooperating Parties give preference to those Projects which utilize 
advanced technological water usage methods.  
- Each Cooperating Party is responsible for the protection of the Project 
against environmental pollution originating within its jurisdiction.  
7. Water Protection  
- Each Cooperating Party is responsible for the prevention of harm to those 
parts of the Projects under its jurisdiction.  
- Such responsibility includes inter alia the preservation of water quality and 
the prevention of unauthorized withdrawals.  
8. Operation and Maintenance  
The Cooperating Parties will set the standards for the operation and 
maintenance of the Projects.  
9. Areas of Cooperation  
It is understood that the following potential areas of cooperation in the 
development of New and Additional Water Resources for the Cooperating Parties 
will be further studied in order to determine their feasibility:  
- Acquisition and import of water including the possibility of carrying such 
waters through existing or new supply systems (wheeling);  
- Development of desalination plants;  
- Rainfall enhancement; and  
- Any other relevant area of cooperation.  
 
Cooperation on Other Water-Related Matters  
Cooperation on other water-related matters, although originating among the 
Core Parties, will be open to regional and extra-regional parties of the Multilateral 
Working Group on Water Resources.  
1. Cooperation on Specific Sectors  
The Parties express their desire to cooperate among themselves and with 
other interested Parties on the following Other Water-related Matters:   
- Weather forecasting, climatology, weather modification, and meteorology;  
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- Environmental conservation;  
- Sustainable water-related natural resources management and desertification 
control;  
- Enhancement of public awareness and participation; and  
- Human resources development   
2. Proposed Areas of Cooperation  
The Core Parties will in due time explores possible cooperation among 
themselves and with other interested parties in the following areas:  
- Collection, filing, processing, transmission and exchange of water data and 
related information.  
- Preparation of plans for flood-protection and utilization; with emphasis on 
development of Early Warning Systems;  
- Development of norms, standards and specifications for water devices, 
equipment and infrastructure;  
- Transfer and adoption of advanced technology throughout the chains of 
water storage, conveyance and application, including automation and controls of 
water systems; particularly related to reduction of crop water requirements;  
- Water-energy interactions, with emphasis on desalinization;  
- Establishment of a Regional Centre; and  
- Identification of ways to achieve optimal use of water in the agricultural 
sector.  
3. Mechanism of Cooperation   
- The Cooperating Parties will decide on the mechanism of their cooperation 
on other water-related matters set out in this section.  
- All decisions with respect to cooperation on Other Water-related Matters will 
be adopted by consensus.  
4. Specific Cooperation  
- The Core Parties agree to hold Regional Seminars on various water-related 
matters;  
- The Core Parties agree to publish the results of their cooperation in a 
Regional Publication.  
5. Extended Cooperation  
The Cooperating Parties may by consensus agree to include additional water-
related matters in their cooperation. 
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Annex 3 Paper of Common Understanding Between Hezbollah and the Free 
Patriotic Movement.  February 6, 2006 
  http://www.tayyar.org/tayyar/articles.php?article_id=10411&type=news     
 
1- Dialogue 
National dialogue is the only avenue to find solutions to Lebanon’s crises on 
stable and firm bases that are a reflection of a unifying consensual will. The following 
conditions must be obtained to ensure its success: 
a- The participation of parties that have a political, popular and national standing 
with a round table as a venue; 
b- Transparency, openness, and placing the interests of the nation above any 
other interest, through the reliance on self-driven will and a free and 
committed Lebanese decision-making; 
c- Include all national issues that require general consensus. 
 
2- Consensual Democracy 
Consensual democracy remains the fundamental basis for governance in 
Lebanon because it is the effective embodiment of the spirit of the Constitution and 
the essence of the pact of shared coexistence. From this standpoint, any approach 
for dealing with national issues according to a majority-minority formula depends on 
historic and social conditions for practicing effective democracy in which the citizen 
becomes a self-standing value. 
 
3- The Electoral Law 
The reform of political life in Lebanon requires the adoption of a modern electoral 
law, where proportional representation may be one of its effective means that 
guarantees accurate and just popular representation and contributes to the 
accomplishment of the following objectives: 
a- Activate and develop the role of political parties in achieving civil society; 
b- Limit the influence of political money and sectarian fanaticisms; 
c- Make available equal opportunities for using the various means of the media; 
d- Ensure the required means to enable the Lebanese expatriates to exercise 
their voting rights. 
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We ask the Government and Parliament to commit to the shortest possible 
deadline to enact the required electoral law.   
 
4- Building the State 
Building a modern state that has the trust of its citizens and is able to meet their 
needs and aspirations, and provide them with the sense of security and safety as to 
their present and future, requires that the state should be erected on strong and solid 
foundations that make it impervious to destabilization and periodic crises whenever it 
is faced by difficult challenges and changing circumstances. This requires the 
following: 
a- Adopt the standards of justice, equality, parity, merit and integrity; 
b- An equitable and impartial judiciary is the essential condition for creating a 
state of rights, laws and institutions based on: 
- The complete independence of the judiciary and the selection of judges with 
recognized competence in order to activate the work of all courts; 
- The respect for actions of the constitutional institutions while keeping them 
away from political polarization, ensure the continuity of their work and 
prevent their blockage (the Judicial Council and the Constitutional Council). 
What happened in the Constitutional Council is an example of such blockage, 
when the legal challenges of parliamentary elections submitted to it have not 
been acted upon; 
c-  Eradicate corruption from its roots, because temporary and partial solutions 
are no longer sufficient. They have in fact become an exercise in bluff that the 
beneficiaries of corruption at all levels carry out to perpetuate their theft of the 
resources of the state and its citizens. This requires:  
- Activating the institutions and boards of financial and administrative control 
and inspection, while ensuring their strict separation from the executive power 
to guarantee that their work is not politicized; 
- Conducting a complete survey of the cases of corruption, in preparation for 
opening judicial investigations that would lead to the prosecution of those 
responsible for corruption, and to the return of embezzled public funds; 
- Legislating the required laws that contribute to combating all aspects of 
corruption and calling upon the Government to sign the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption; 
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- Working toward a comprehensive administrative reform that ensures that the 
right person is assigned to the right position, particularly those whose merit, 
competence and integrity are recognized. This can be accomplished by 
empowering the Civil Service Council to assume its full prerogatives; 
- Setting deadlines for actions on these issues because the factor of times has 
become critical. This matter requires fast and judicious solutions which would 
use the time factor to their advantage instead of the corrupt using it to theirs. 
 
5- The Missing During the War 
To turn the page of the past and achieve a comprehensive national reconciliation, 
all the outstanding files of the war must be closed. The file of the missing in the war 
requires a stance of responsibility to end this anomalous situation and put the 
parents’ minds at ease. The parents cannot be asked to forgive without respecting 
their rights to know the fate of their children. This is why we ask all parties involved in 
the war for their full cooperation to uncover the fate of the missing and the locations 
of the mass graves. 
 
6- The Lebanese in Israel 
Whereas both sides are convinced that the presence of Lebanese citizens in their 
homeland is better than their presence in enemy territory, a resolution of the 
question of the Lebanese residing in Israel requires a speedy action to ensure their 
return to their country while taking into consideration all the political, security and 
livelihood circumstances surrounding the matter. On this basis, we call upon them to 
promptly return to their country in the spirit of the call by Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah 
following the Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon and the speech delivered by 
Michel Aoun at the first session of Parliament. 
 
7- The Security Question  
First, Political Assassinations: 
Any form of political assassination is condemned and rejected because of its 
violation of basic human rights and of the most important foundations of the 
existence of Lebanon represented by difference and diversity, and of the essence of 
democracy and its practice. Therefore, to the extent that we condemn the 
assassination of Former Prime Minster martyr Rafiq Hariri and all assassinations and 
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assassination attempts that preceded and followed it, leading to the assassination of 
MP Gebran Tueni, we emphasize the importance of moving forward with the 
investigation according to the officially approved mechanisms in order to uncover the 
truth. This is an issue that cannot be subjected to any compromise because it is a 
required condition to achieve justice and serve it against the criminals, as well as to 
bring an end to the cycle of murder and bombings. For this reason, it is an obligation 
to keep these issues away from any attempts at political exploitation, which would 
harm their essence, and the essence of justice that must remain above any political 
conflicts or disagreements. 
      Second, Security Reforms: 
 A reform of the Security Services is an inseparable part of the broader reform 
process of state institutions and their rebuilding on sound and solid bases, Given the 
dedicate position that the Security Services occupy in protecting and defending a 
stable security environment in the country against any breaches or threats, the 
process of building those services must be given special attention. Therefore, the 
government is urged to assume its full responsibilities as follows: 
a- Put in place an integrated security plan based on the centralization of security 
decision and on a clear definition of enemy versus friend, the determination of 
security threats, including the issue of terrorism as well as the security 
breaches that must be dealt with; 
b- Dissociate the Security Services from any political consideration, for their full 
loyalty should be to the nation; 
c- Assign the responsibility of the Security Services to personalities with 
recognized competence and integrity; 
d- Security measures must not be in conflict with the basic freedoms guaranteed 
by the Constitution, most of all the freedom of expression and political action, 
which do not threaten security and public stability; 
e- Constitute a Parliamentary Intelligence Committee that would oversee the 
reform and building processes of the Security Services. 
 
8- Lebanese-Syrian Relations 
The establishment of balanced and sound Lebanese-Syrian relations requires a 
review of the past experience while drawing the necessary conclusions and 
lessons in order to avoid the accumulated mistakes, blemishes and breaches. 
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This is in order to pave the way to build these relations on clear bases on parity 
and the full and mutual respect for the sovereignty and independence of both 
states, on the grounds of rejecting the return to any form of foreign tutelage. 
Therefore, it is necessary: 
a- That the Lebanese government take all legal measures and procedures 
pertaining to the assertion of the Lebanese identity of the Shebaa Farms and 
present these to the United Nations, now that the Syrian state has declared 
the Shebaa Farms to be fully Lebanese. 
b-  To demarcate the borders between Lebanon and Syria away from the 
tensions that could block this operation which both Lebanon and Syria have 
had a long-standing need to achieve through a mutual agreement; 
c- To ask the Syrian state to fully cooperate with the Lebanese state to uncover 
the fate of the Lebanese detainees in Syrian prisons without the provocation, 
tension, and negativity that would hinder a positive settlement of this file; 
d- Establish diplomatic relations between the two countries and provide 
appropriate conditions for them, thus transferring them from a relation 
between individuals and groups to a relation between institutions in order to 
secure their permanence and stability. 
 
9- Lebanese-Palestinians Relations 
Addressing the Palestinian file requires a comprehensive approach the asserts, 
on the one hand the respect by the Palestinians of the authority of the Lebanese 
state and their compliance with its laws, and on the other hand the reaffirmation of 
solidarity with their cause and the recovery of their rights, in accordance with the 
following rules: 
a- The social condition of the Palestinians requires a strong attention to improve 
their living conditions and secure a decent standard for  a dignified human life 
on the basis of bilateral cooperation and the human rights charter, in addition 
to facilitating their movement inside and outside Lebanese territory; 
b- The Right of Return of the Palestinians is a fundamental and permanent right, 
and the rejection of the settling of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is an issue 
that has the consensus of the Lebanese people and cannot be concerned 
under any circumstances; 
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c- Define the relationship between the Lebanese state and the Palestinians in a 
single institutional Palestinian framework that would be a legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people in Lebanon in a manner conductive to 
proper coordination and cooperation; 
d- The issue of putting an end to Palestinian weapons outside the camps and 
controlling the security situation inside them should be dealt with as part of a 
serious, responsible and close dialogue between the Lebanese government 
and the Palestinians, leading to the exercise of the state’s authority and laws 
over the entire Lebanese territory. 
 
10- The Protection of Lebanon and the Preservation of its Independence and 
Sovereignty 
Protecting Lebanon and preserving its independence and sovereignty is a 
national public responsibility and duty, guaranteed by international treaties and the 
Human Rights Charter, particularly in confronting any threats or dangers from any 
source. Therefore, carrying arms is not an objective in itself. Rather, it is an 
honourable and sacred means exercised by any group whose land is occupied, 
similar in this way to the methods of political resistance. 
In this context, Hezbollah’s weapons should be addressed as part of a 
comprehensive approach that falls within two bounds: 
- The first bound is the reliance on justifications which meet national consensus, 
and which would constitute a source of strength for Lebanon and the Lebanese 
people for keeping the weapons; 
- And the other bound is the definition of objective conditions that would lead to a 
cessation of the reasons and justifications for keeping those weapons. 
And since Israel occupies the Shebaa Farms, imprisons Lebanese resistance 
members and threatens Lebanon, the Lebanese people should assume their 
responsibilities and share the burden of protecting Lebanon, safeguarding its 
existence and security, and protecting its independence and sovereignty by: 
a- Liberating the Shebaa Farms from Israeli occupation; 
b- Liberating the Lebanese prisoners from Israeli prisons; 
c- Protecting Lebanon from Israeli threats through a national dialogue leading to 
The formulation of a national defence strategy over which the Lebanese agree to 
and subscribe to by assuming its burdens and benefiting from its outcomes. 
